Whether assaulting officer is criminal offense involving moral turpitude

Querist : Anonymous (Querist) 25 October 2011 This query is : Resolved
Sirs,

HAPPY DIWALI.

An amployee assaulted his superior officer. FIR was lodged and the police submitted charge sheet. After trial the Trial Court convicted the erring employee under sec. 341, 323, 506(2) and 504 read with sec. 34 of IPC.

Now the employee challenged the order of the Trial court in Court of Sessions.

Since the errant employee is convicted, whether this assaulting of superior officer comes under the purview of 'criminal offence involving moral turpitude' ?

Thanks.

Follow Query

Report Abuse

Devajyoti Barman (Expert) 25 October 2011
Yes definitely.

Guest (Expert) 25 October 2011
Of course, yes.

prabhakar singh (Expert) 25 October 2011
To me offences like those

1] crimes which involve either an intent to defraud or an intent to steal as an element;

2] crimes which involve an element of intentional or reckless infliction of harm to persons or property;

3] sex crimes, in which "lewd" intent is an element.

Additionally, felonies and some misdemeanors in which malice is an element are commonly held to be crimes of moral turpitude.

Serious offenses, such as murder, voluntary manslaughter, kidnapping, sexual assault, robbery, buglary, larceny, aggravated assault, prostitution, and even shoplifting have been held to involve moral turpitude.

Dineshwar Singh Kaushik (Expert) 25 October 2011
Yes why not.

ajay sethi (Expert) 25 October 2011
it involves moral terpitude .

In its legal sense, everything done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals is moral turpitude. Although a vague term, it implies something immoral in itself, regardless of its being punishable by law. (Reference is made to Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition). „Moral turpitude‟ cannot be applied in its widest term. Whether a certain offence involves „moral turpitude‟ or not will necessarily depend on the circumstances in which the offence is committed. Any criminal conviction per se does not amount to „moral turpitude‟ so, when an employee is convicted on criminal charge, his dismissal cannot be automatic, unless, there is a specific rule in that regard.
19. In the instant case, appellant was convicted for an offence under Section 323 IPC. Charges against the appellant were that on 4th July, 1978 during banking hours, while working as Clerk in Kamla Nagar Branch of the Bank, being dissatisfied with his work, Manager Mr. B.P.Rao, called him and advised him to improve
RSA No.121/2001 Page 13 of 47
his work, lest he would report the matter to the Circle Office. On hearing this, appellant got angry and lost his temper, he shouted at the Manager. It seems that he left the office of the Manager and came back to his cabin and slapped him on his face. Not only this, appellant hit him on his head with a wooden board/iron rod and caused him head injuries. He was charged with an offence under Section 308 IPC. After trial, court convicted him for an offence under Section 323 IPC. Therefore, appellant was convicted for voluntarily causing simple hurt on the person of the Bank Manager, Mr. B.P.Rao.
20. Thus, it is clear that appellant while on duty as a Clerk of the Bank, which is a public institution, not only misbehaved with the Manager but also caused him injuries on his person by slapping him and hitting him on his head, resulting into two bleeding injuries on his head. This indecent behaviour of the appellant in the Bank premises during office hours, whereby he not only shouted at the Manager but also caused him physical injuries on his head, slapped him in presence of the customers and other employees involve moral turpitude. Other employees of the Bank, under the circumstances, would have no respect for such a Manager whose Clerk could misbehave with him and assault him in their presence and in the
RSA No.121/2001 Page 14 of 47
presence of the customers. There was no provocation except that appellant was counselled by the Manager to do his official duties carefully. His indecent behaviour must have been looked down upon by his colleagues and other employees of the Bank in particular and by public who visited the Bank to transact business in general.
21. As discussed above, 'moral' stands for 'right and wrong conduct'. Conduct of the appellant, in this case, was not only wrong but was such which everyone would look down upon. He had no right to go back to the cabin of the Manager after coming out of it and then slapping and assaulting him. His behaviour, therefore, was a case of perversity and has to be called 'moral turpitude.' It is not material that he was convicted for an offence under Section 323 IPC. It is his behaviour as a subordinate towards his senior which constitutes „moral turpitude‟. No subordinate can be allowed to behave in an indecent manner and physically assault his senior in violation of office decorum and discipline. If appellant had any grievance against counselling or alleged reprimand by his Manager, he could have taken recourse to the Rule and procedure permissible as per Banking Regulations. Appellant was on public duty at the relevant time when he caused head injuries on the person of the Manager. His conduct obviously is inherently base, vile and
RSA No.121/2001 Page 15 of 47
depraved and his conviction based on such an act was such that could shock the moral conscience of society in general and his fellowmen in particular. There was no motive for the appellant to commit an offence. There was nothing left to be proved before the enquiring authority. Under the circumstances, Bank was not required to hold an enquiry. 22. Trial Court as well as the Appellate Court were, therefore, right in holding that moral turpitude was involved in the offence committed by the appellant under Section 323 IPC for voluntary causing injuries on the person of the Manager withinthe meaning of Regulation 21 (1) of CBSC. 23.

ajay sethi (Expert) 25 October 2011
In Omprakash Malviya's case (supra), appellant was
RSA No.121/2001 Page 16 of 47
appointed as a Peon in the respondent Bank and was promoted as Daftri. He was arrested in a case under Sections 110 and 112 and convicted under Section 117 of the Bombay Police Act and the Bank, on the basis of his conviction, dismissed him from services. It was held by this Court that conduct of the appellant in office premises where he came in a drunken condition and used abusive and threatening language against his superiors amounted to moral turpitude.