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Kumar Doab   14 October 2016 at 16:09

Acquittal on technical grounds is ‘honorable acquittal’

Dear Experts,


I am sharing the following judgments:






>>> The employees often face dilemma if criminal charges that are deemed as a case of ‘Moral Turpitude’ are pressed against them, would they be entitled for job and employment?

The employer’s cite their own internal and service rules to deny employment and/or reinstatement, to employee that is booked on criminal charges and moral turpitude.

More so is the case with ‘Uniformed Services’ that demand persons of high character.

The employers claim that if the witnesses have turned hostile ( Or have Compromised) then it is acquittal on technical grounds and this is not a valid reason to accept the candidate for job and/or employee, in employment.

The employers declare that acquittal on ‘technical grounds’ is not ‘honorable acquittal’.

The employer press that nothing less than ‘Honorable Acquittal’ by court of law is acceptable to take the charged employee back in employment.


>>> Once the allegation against the person could not be established by evidence, say if the witnesses turned hostile, it cannot be said that the acquittal was on some technical grounds.

Acquittal in a criminal case, for want of evidence is an acquittal on merit.
There is no provision for ‘Honorable Acquittal’ in criminal trial as per criminal jurisprudence.
Thus acquittal in such case, on technical grounds is ‘honorable acquittal’.
Therefore a duly selected candidate cannot be denied his right of appointment to a post merely on the ground that his acquittal was on technical grounds and thus on ‘Honorable’.

>>> Acquittal in a criminal case for want of evidence is an acquittal on merit.
The state government in the recent case was of the view that person's acquittal in a murder case was on technical grounds and not "honorable acquittal" because all the witnesses had turned hostile.
Therefore the person was not allowed to join the state police even after his acquittal in a murder case.

While the court has held that, the moment a criminal charge fails in a court of law, the person would be deemed to be acquitted of the blame, and that there are no terms like 'honorable acquittal' and 'technical acquittal' of an accused.
Once a person is acquitted by the court in any criminal charges, including murder, one is fully entitled to join uniformed service, the court has observed.

>>> In July 2008, Haryana police had advertised for 5,456 posts for recruitment of general duty constables. The petitioner was selected after qualifying all the stages of the recruitment.


However, during the selection process, he was booked in a murder case in December 2010 along with other persons at Safidon police station in Jind. He faced the trial and was finally acquitted by the session’s court of Jind in December 2011.


The result of the selection board was declared after the judgment of acquittal. However, the state police in February 2012, denied Pawan to join the force on public interest and citing DGP's instructions. Aggrieved by the police orders, the petitioner had approached HC pleading that he couldn't be deprived of his vested right of appointment to the post merely on the ground that he stood trial in a criminal case.

State counsel would state that even though the name of the petitioner was placed in the list of provisionally selected candidates but such selection was subject to verification of character/antecedents. State counsel would refer to the joint written statement filed on behalf of respondents 2 to 4 and would state that the case of the petitioner was examined in the light of instructions issued by the Director General of Police dated 2.7.2007, and dated 13.11.2007, as well as in the light of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court inDelhi Administration v. Sushil Kumar, Kumar decided on 4.10.1996, and, accordingly, a decision has been taken to decline appointment. Passing of the impugned order is sought to be justified by submitting that the purpose and objective of the issuance of the instructions dated 2.7.2007 and 13.11.2007 by the Director General of Police was to restrict the entry of persons of criminal background involved in heinous crimes and offences of moral turpitude. Appointment to the petitioner has been declined on the basis that he was involved in criminal prosecution wherein offence under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code had been cited.

Reliance has also been placed by the learned State counsel upon the judgment dated 1.8.2013 rendered by a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Pritam Singh v. State of Haryana and others, (Civil Writ Petition No.12693 of 2012) wherein under identical circumstances and by referring to the instructions dated 2.7.2007 and 13.11.2007, the action of the State Government in declining appointment to the petitioner therein i.e. Pritam Singh had been upheld.

However Punjab and Haryana High Court at Chandigarh observed that: Once the allegation which was against the petitioner could not be established by evidence, it cannot be said that the acquittal was on some technical ground. Acquittal in a criminal case for want of evidence is an acquittal on merit. There is no provision for "honourable acquittal" in criminal trial as per criminal jurisprudence. As such, the acquittal of the petitioner has to be viewed as an honourable acquittal and the instructions dated 2.7.2007 and 13.11.2007 ,along with the reply cannot operate so as to deny to him his right of appointment to the post as a duly selected candidate.;
And that: The claim of the petitioner seeking appointment to the post of Constable would also be covered in his favour in the light of a very recent judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Joginder Singh v. Union Territory of Chandigarh and others, 2015(1) SCT 87



Punjab and Haryana High Court at Chandigarh: Mr. Justice TEJINDER SINGH DHINDSA,
Directed Haryana police to issue an appointment letter to Pawan within 30 days, the HC in its April 8 orders also clarified that the acquittal of the petitioner had to be viewed as an honorable acquittal and DGP instructions could not operate.

Punjab-Haryana High Court
Pawan Kumar vs State Of Haryana & Ors on 8 April, 2015
CIVIL WRIT PETITION NO.4568 of 2013

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/13559865/


>>> A very recent judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Joginder Singh v. Union Territory of Chandigarh and others, 2015(1) SCT 87…………………..shall leave NO doubt in the mind………………………

The appellant, Joginder Singh, who had also applied in the year 1997, was also called in 2001 and was among the 40 candidates who had applied were declared as successful candidates. The appellant was medically examined and was called for an interview as he was found fit for selection

to the post of Constable. However, after verification of his antecedents and character from his native village, it was found that he was involved in a case with FIR No. 200 dated 14.04.1998, under the provisions of Sections 148/149/323/325/307 IPC a criminal case was registered at Police Station Sadar Bhiwani. After the trial was conducted by the Additional Sessions Judge, Bhiwani, the appellant was acquitted from the charges levelled against him on 04.10.1999.

The appellant filed Original Application before the CAT, Chandigarh, for issuing a direction to the respondent for issuance of an appointment order in view of his selection to the post in the selection process.


4. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Chandigarh after hearing the parties passed an order dated 12.3.2003, allowing the Original Application of the appellant and directed the respondents to appoint the appellant to the post of Constable within a period of 30 days from the date of receipt of the certified copy of the order.



5. Aggrieved by the order of the CAT, the respondent-Union Territory filed C.W.P. No. 5909 CAT of 2003 before the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh questioning the correctness

of the same. The High Court vide its common order dated 24.03.2008 has set aside the order of the CAT and allowed the writ petition.


6. The High Court has opined that the order of the CAT passed in favour of the appellant, suffers from illegality, which cannot be sustained in law

and accordingly set aside the same. Hence, this appeal has been preferred by the appellant urging various legal grounds.

7. It is the contention of Mr. Mukesh K. Giri, learned counsel on behalf of the appellant that the appellant was honourably acquitted from the

charges in the criminal proceedings initiated against him by the State of Punjab and undisputedly, there is no allegation of concealment of the relevant information to be furnished by the appellant in his application to the respondents.



8. It has been further contended by the learned counsel that a perusal of Rule 12.18 of the Punjab Police Rules, 1934, Vol. II (hereinafter referred to as, "the Rules"), shows that the emphasis is on his freedom or otherwise from conviction, meaning thereby, that the acquittal in criminal case will qualify him for appointment to the post of Constable since he was selected and found fit for the post after due selection process was conducted by the respondents.



10. It has been further contended that there is no material on record to justify the conclusion of the Appointing Authority that the antecedents of

the appellant were not up to the mark. Further,there is also no allegation of grave moral turpitude against the appellant for not appointing him as a Constable even though he was selected to

the post.


11. On the other hand, it has been contended by Mr. Sangram S. Saron, learned counsel on behalf of the respondents, that the appellant was not honourably acquitted of the offences arising out of the case registered in FIR No. 200 of 14.04.1998, as the eye witnesses of the occurrence had declined to support the prosecution version and they were declared hostile by the Sessions Judge, therefore, the proceedings against the accused-appellant resulted in an acquittal, which cannot be construed as acquittal of the appellant

on merit.



12. It has been further contended by the learned counsel on behalf of the respondents that the Senior Superintendent of Police, Chandigarh had observed in the order dated 29.07.2003, that since

the post of the Constable is extremely sensitive in nature, considering the fact that the interaction and dealing a Constable with the general public is more than any other member of

the force, therefore, utmost care and caution is required to be exercised by the respondents in making appointments to the post of Constables.



13. Further, Rules 12.12, 12.14 and 12.18 of the Rules, have laid down the criteria to be followed by the respondents before making appointments to

the post of Constable. The above Rules unequivocally state that clean antecedents and good moral character of a selected candidate is the sine qua non. He/she must fall within the zone

of consideration.




14. On the basis of the aforesaid rival legal contentions urged on behalf of both the parties, the following points would arise for our consideration:


1)Whether the denial of the benefit of
appointment to the appellant by the High
Court is legal and valid in the light of
the fact that the appellant was acquitted
from the criminal case pending against
him.

2)What order?



15. To answer the point no. 1, we must first

consider whether the acquittal of the appellant from the criminal case was an honourable acquittal.




16…………………………………………………. Thus, the learned Judge held that the prosecution had miserably failed to prove the charges leveled against the appellant in the criminal proceedings. Therefore, we are in agreement with the findings and judgment of the learned Additional Sessions Judge and are of the opinion that the acquittal of the accused from the criminal case was an honourable acquittal.



17. Further, an acquittal of the appellant is an "honourable" acquittal in every sense and purpose.

Therefore, the appellant should not be deprived

from being appointed to the post, in the public employment, by declaring him as unsuitable to the post even though he was honourably acquitted in the

criminal case registered against him.



18. Further, undisputedly, there has been no allegation of concealment of the fact that a

criminal case was registered against him by the appellant. Thus, the appellant has honestly disclosed in his verification application submitted to the selection authority that there was a criminal case registered against him and that it ended in an acquittal on account of compromise between the parties involved in the criminal case, he cannot be denied an opportunity to qualify for

any post including the post of a Constable.



22. Thus, we are of the opinion that the alleged past conduct of the appellant in relation to the criminal case will not debar or disqualify him for the post of the Constable for which he was

successfully selected after qualifying the written test, medical test and the interview conducted by the selection authority. Further, as stated by us

earlier, there has been no concealment of any relevant fact from the respondents by the appellant. The respondents were thus not justified in denying the said post to the appellant. The conclusion arrived at by them is not cogent and

lacks proper application of mind.




23. We therefore, hold that the High Court has committed a grave error both on facts and in law and it has failed to follow the legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra and uphold the decision of the CAT. For the foregoing reasons both the appeals succeed and are allowed.



24. Since we have upheld the judgment and order of the CAT, the respondents are directed to comply with the same by issuing appointment letter to the appellants within four weeks from the date of receipt of the copy of this order.




JOGINDER SINGH V/S UNION TERRITORY OF CHANDIGARH, decided on Tuesday, November 11, 2014.
[ In the Supreme Court of India, Civil Appeal No. 2325 of 2009 & Civil Appeal No. 10126 of 2014 (Arising Out of SLP (C) No. 30798 of 2008). ]



http://courtnic.nic.in/supremecourt/temp/ac%20232509p.txt
















Anonymous   14 October 2016 at 14:49

Payment of notice and bond

I had joined a bank as officer in november 2014 and went for maternity leave in december 2015 aftr completion of maternity leave on june 15 2016 i resigned on june 21 2016. I had signed a bond for rs 1 lakh for 2 years and also have notice period of 3 months in offer lettr which i accepted unconditionally. On Oct 7 2016 the bank has finally processed my resignation and is asking for bond money plus notice pay plus training expenses. Training expenses should be paid was not mentioned anywhere in bond or offer letter. Also I was given salary of july and august when i had already resigned.even that amount i am required to pay. Is all these demand by bank correct??.
Also can i sue bank for taking more than 3 months to process resignation??

Anonymous   14 October 2016 at 00:11

Educational course

Sir I m working as a para teacher under sarva shiksha mission. I joined the job on 7/3/2007. that time I was pursuing my graduation. as I was a temporary worker there were no service book or rule that time . that time I was in last year and only exam due . all classes over . so I gave the exam by taking casual leave . now I have a chance to get a permanent job . and for that I need certificate of experience and also graduation certificate. is there any problem . as there were no service rule that time and I was a temporary or contract teacher then

clifford john coelho   13 October 2016 at 22:38

Epf

Sir,i am a contractual employee in AIR INDIA,and recently I noticed my contractor not paying the EPF subscription from 19/4/16 on the EPFO estb pin code search facility.I filed a RTI on 19/9/16 to the epfo.And after that he paid 5 months epf in one go on 4/10/16 to epfo.
In one such epf instalment of 11/2015 I found my name missing whereas I was very much present and I also received full salary.That he is a rouge contractor.Again I filed a rti to the epfo on 5/10/16.The epfo has not yet responded.SIR if epfo dosnt act,can I file a pvt complaint under section 8A.

Raman   13 October 2016 at 21:12

Affidavit of valauation in matter

My brother, who appeared in perosn, has filed the SLP against the High court order, in some service matter. The Supreme Court has issued notice and tag with the other SLP pending before the bench. Now the Registry, has issued has send letter advising him to file the “AFFIDAVIT OF VALUATION IN THE MATTER” failing which the default will be reported to the Hon’ble Court
My query is what is meant by affidavit of valuation in the matter as it is not money suit but just service matter
Since its service matter, he has already paid the court fees Rs 1800/- only, Dies it mean to say that he has to file the affidavit stating that he has already paid the court fees? Please clearify

Kumar Doab   13 October 2016 at 15:38

Apex court; currency of a suspension order should not extend beyond three months

Dear Experts,


I am sharing the following judgments.




>>> No employee can be indefinitely suspended; that disciplinary proceedings have to be concluded within a reasonable period.
If it was decided to conduct an Inquiry it had to be concluded “in a time bound manner”.
Even the Tribunal’s have decided that “nothing but a substitution of a judicial determination to that of the authority possessing the power, i.e., the Executive Government as to the justification or rationale to continue with the suspension”.

So far as the question of prejudicial treatment accorded to an employee is concerned, the Apex Court had also observed that: it would be fair to make this assumption of prejudice if there is an unexplained delay in the conclusion of proceedings.( State of A.P. v. N. Radhakishan 1998 (4) SCC 154)


>>> Suspension, specially preceding the formulation of charges, is essentially transitory or temporary in nature, and must perforce be of short duration. If it is for an indeterminate period or if its renewal is not based on sound reasoning contemporaneously available on the record, this would render it punitive in nature. Departmental/disciplinary proceedings invariably commence with delay, are plagued with procrastination prior and post the drawing up of the Memorandum of Charges, and eventually culminate after even longer delay.

Protracted periods of suspension, repeated renewal thereof, have regrettably become the norm and not the exception that they ought to be. The suspended person suffering the ignominy of insinuations, the scorn of society and the derision of his Department, has to endure this excruciation even before he is formally charged with some misdemeanour, indiscretion or offence. His torment is his knowledge that if and when charged, it will inexorably take an inordinate time for the inquisition or inquiry to come to its culmination, that is to determine his innocence or iniquity.

Much too often this has now become an accompaniment to retirement. Indubitably the sophist will nimbly counter that our Constitution does not explicitly guarantee either the right to a speedy trial even to the incarcerated, or assume the presumption of innocence to the accused. But we must remember that both these factors are legal ground norms, are inextricable tenets of common law jurisprudence, antedating even the Magna Carta of 1215, which assures that – “We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either justice or right.” In similar vein the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America guarantees that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial. Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 assures that – “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks”. More recently, the European Convention on Human Rights in Article 6(1) promises that “in the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time….” and in its second sub article that “everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law”.




>>> The Supreme Court of India has time and again delivered landmark judgments that have lead to consequential and direct benefits in service matters.
Once again the Apex Court has come to the rescue of employees and has laid down the legal principle that: Currency of a suspension order should not extend beyond three months
The legal principle laid down by the Apex Court is likely to benefit; employees of PSU’s; public sector undertakings, government banks, in addition to government employees.

>>> Service rules of various Governments give power to the competent authorities to suspend a Government employee.
E.g; CCS (CCA) Rules {The Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965}, govern employees belonging to the Central Civil Services.
Rule 10 of the CCS (CCA) Rules: has a provision; that the suspension order can be issued initially for a period of 90 days, during which period it has to be reviewed by the authority and thereafter it can be extended indefinitely for a period of 180 days at a time subject to further review within such extended period. This means that the suspension can be continued for indefinite periods of time subject to a periodical review.
As:
Rule 10(1) of these Rules gives the power of suspension, in conditions contained therein.
Rule 10(2) of the aforesaid CCS (CCA) Rules deals with “deemed suspension” when a Government servant is detained in custody for a period exceeding 48 hours.
Rule 10(5)(a) : provides for continuation of the suspension until it is modified or revoked by, the authority competent, to do so.

Whereas: Rule 10(6) provides: that order of suspension shall be reviewed by the competent authority, before expiry of 90 days from the effective date of suspension, on the recommendation of the Review Committee constituted for the purpose and pass orders either extending or revoking the suspension, and subsequent reviews shall be made before expiry of the extended period of suspension and that extension of suspension shall not be for a period exceeding 180 days at a time.

Likewise: All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969, which govern IAS (Indian Administrative Service), IPS (Indian Police Service) and IFS (Indian Forest Service) officers





>>> In a landmark judgment; the Supreme Court of India has extended, the principle of right to speedy trial in a criminal case, to the service law matters.
The Apex Court has laid down that, the suspension of a Government servant, in case of for a departmental enquiry, cannot be continued beyond 90 days if charge sheet is not given on time.
The Apex Court has directed that even where the charge-sheet is served on time and the suspension is required to be extended by the competent authority, a reasoned order must be passed for the extension of the suspension.


>>> The Apex Court referred to its earlier decisions wherein the right to speedy trial in criminal cases was recognized. It observed that “(t)he legal expectation of expedition and diligence being present at every stage of a criminal trial and a fortiori in departmental inquiries has been emphasized by this Court on numerous occasions.”

The Supreme Court specifically referred to the decision of a Constitution Bench in the case of Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, 1992 (1) SCC 225, wherein it had been held that the right to speedy trial is a fundamental right implicit in Article 21 of the Constitution and in which detailed directions were issued in this regard. The Supreme Court applied the legal principle evolved in the aforesaid Antulay case in service law jurisprudence and held that the impugned decision of the Delhi High Court in the present case setting aside the decision of CAT which had directed that the appellant’s suspension would not be extended beyond 90 days from 19.3.2013, could not be sustained in view of the pronouncement of the Constitution Bench in the aforesaid Antulay case.

The Supreme Court also referred to the provision contained in the Proviso to Section 167(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, which has the effect of circumscribing the power of the Magistrate in criminal cases to authorize detention of an accused person beyond period of 90 days where the investigation relates to an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than 10 years, and beyond a period of 60 days where the investigation relates to any other offence. The Supreme Court extrapolated the quintessence of the Proviso of Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C., 1973, to moderate Suspension Orders in cases of departmental / disciplinary inquiries also.


>>> The apex Court has come down heavily on this type of provisions which allow the competent authorities to extend the period of suspension for indefinite periods after periodical reviews.

The Supreme Court held as under:
“It seems to us that if Parliament considered it necessary that a person be released from incarceration after the expiry of 90 days even though accused of commission of the most heinous crimes, a fortiori suspension should not be continued after the expiry of the similar period especially when a Memorandum of Charges/Chargesheet has not been served on the suspended person. It is true that the proviso to Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. postulates personal freedom, but respect and preservation of human dignity as well as the right to a speedy trial should also be placed on the same pedestal.”

Accordingly, the Supreme Court issued the following important directions in the matter of suspension of an employee:
“We, therefore, direct that the currency of a Suspension Order should not extend beyond three months if within this period the Memorandum of Charges/Chargesheet is not served on the delinquent officer/employee; if the Memorandum of Charges/Chargesheet is served a reasoned order must be passed for the extension of the suspension. As in the case in hand, the Government is free to transfer the concerned person to any Department in any of its offices within or outside the State so as to sever any local or personal contact that he may have and which he may misuse for obstructing the investigation against him. The Government may also prohibit him from contacting any person, or handling records and documents till the stage of his having to prepare his defence. We think this will adequately safeguard the universally recognized principle of human dignity and the right to a speedy trial and shall also preserve the interest of the Government in the prosecution. We recognize that previous Constitution Benches have been reluctant to quash proceedings on the grounds of delay, and to set time limits to their duration. However, the imposition of a limit on the period of suspension has not been discussed in prior case law, and would not be contrary to the interests of justice. Furthermore, the direction of the Central Vigilance Commission that pending a criminal investigation departmental proceedings are to be held in abeyance stands superseded in view of the stand adopted by us.”



IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL No. 1912 OF 2015 (Arising out of SLP © No. 31761 of 2013
AJAY KUMAR CHOUDHARY Vs UNION OF INDIA THROUGH ITS SECRETARY & ANR..
http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=42385





>>> Such has been the impact of the above mentioned judgment of Apex Court that;In a stern notice to all the heads in the Central government ministries and departments, the Department of Personnel has directed that charge sheets be served within the stipulated 90 days period to officers placed under suspension in order to ensure that the suspension does not lapse by default.


Charge-sheet – Dopt Order
AUGUST 25, 2016
DoPT OM on Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 – instructions regarding timely issue of Charge-sheet
Department of Personnel & Training has issued an OM on timely issue of Charge-sheet
F.No.11012/04/2016-Estt.(A)
OFFICE MEMORANDUM
Subject: Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 – instructions regarding timely issue of Charge-sheet – regarding.
The undersigned is directed to refer to DoP&T’s O.M. No.11012/17/2013-Estt.A-III dated 3rd July, 2015 on the above mentioned subject and to say that in a recent case, Ajay Kumar Choudhary vs Union of India Civil Appeal No. 1912 of 2015 dated 16/02/2015, the Apex Court has directed as follows:



“14 We, therefore, direct that the currency of a Suspension Order should not extend beyond three months




http://www.circular.gconnect.in/viewpdf?pdfpath=http://www.circular.gconnect.in/download/conduct-rules/11012_04_2016-Estt.A-23082016.pdf&anchor=Instructions%20regarding%20timely%20issue%20of%20Charge-sheet%20%E2%80%93%20Dopt%20Order



>>> The impact of the above mentioned judgment of Apex Court is immediately visible in judgments delivered by high courts as well, e.g




Madras High Court
M. Karthik vs The Director on 8 August, 2016
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/10014316/




7. On a perusal of the Judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ajay Kumar Choudary's case [cited supra], it is crystal clear that if no charge memo/charge sheet is issued within a period of three months, an employee cannot be continued to be placed under suspension. However, if the charge memo/charge sheet is issued, then, the Department should decide about the extension of suspension.












Devalla Suresh Babu   13 October 2016 at 14:21

Firm Registration

Sir
I want to start a new civil construction sole partnership firm .
Is there any legal procedure for start a firm in ap .
Please give any legal advice regarding the above

Anil   12 October 2016 at 21:15

Suspended for more than 06 monthswithout chargesheet

sir,
I work in a PSB, as an Scale officer joined 4 years back, and I was suspended after 10 months of an explanation call where I was convinced to accept the explanation call charges , where there was no monetary loss happens to the or customer complain at all. now its more than 06 months I have been suspended without chargesheet. please guide me on this.my personal EMAIL ID is anilkumarsah303@gmail.com

rocky   12 October 2016 at 13:10

Regarding getting relieving documents

Hi Team,

I was working with XYZ IT company from last 1.4 years, I resigned in august and company was having pollicy of serving 3 months of notice period. after serving notice period of 1 months due to some personal family problems I requested either to grant leave of 30 days or release me early.

so they allowed me to release early by buying out notice period so I paid the notice period amount by cheque and they encashed it andd gave me my full and final settlement document.
but now after 1 month they are denying to issue my releiving documents as recently I have joined a another IT compny to survive myself as I was not part of previous organization.

I have documnet prrof about check getting encashed and email confirmation from them of accepting the cheque.

now the people from previous organization are harrasing me that I lied to get early release and threatning me of legal notice and bad background verification comments

Please advice me how should I proceed further as I need my releiving documents because If I fail to submit those in current organization I can get terminated from current organization.

CHARANJIV   12 October 2016 at 08:44

Non implementation of 7th pay commission recommendations

Hi, I am Raman Rekhi.
I am working for an organisation registered under the societies registration act 1860 since 1999.
Till date all the pay commissions have been implemented for the employees of the society.
This time the management of the society has not implemented the 7th pay commission's recommendations stating that the board of trustees are setting up a board to decide the pay scales and conditions of service and are planning the delink the employees pay structure form the central government.

Is it legally possible and what recourse do the employees of the society have.