Order 6 rule 17 cpc
Querist :
Anonymous
(Querist) 26 September 2011
This query is : Resolved
plaintiff filed suit for perpetual injunction. along with the said suit exh. 5 was preferred. i'm on behalf of the defendant. the said exh. 5 was rejected by the court. after that matter was kept for issues. then the plaintiff came with amendment application and is seeking amendment in respect of cancellation of agreements and have also seeking amendment of prayer clause.
i'm resisting the application. any case law for that purpose that ??? reply..
ajay sethi
(Expert) 26 September 2011
if issues have been framed court wont allow application for amendment of plaint . in addition if new case is sought to be made out amendment application wont be permitted
Raj Kumar Makkad
(Expert) 26 September 2011
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Civil Appeal No. 1881 of 2008
Decided On: 08.02.2010
Appellants: Santosh
Vs.
Respondent: Jagat Ram and Anr.
Hon'ble Judges: V.S. Sirpurkar and Surinder Singh Nijjar, JJ.
Counsels:
For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: V.C. Mahajan, Sr. Adv. and C.V. Subba Rao, Adv.
For Respondents/Defendant: T.S. Ahuja and Ajit Kumar Pande, Advs.
Civil Procedure Code (CPC) - Section 148A - Order 6, Rule 17; Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) - Section 125
Prior History:
From the Judgment and Order Dated 21.02.2006 of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh
in R.S.A. No. 3837 of 2001
Disposition:
Appeal allowed
JUDGMENT
V.S. Sirpurkar, J.
1. This is an appeal by a helpless widow, who has become a prey of the greed of her own elder brother in law and is deprived of her properties in a fraudulent manner. As per the pleadings, Smt. Santosh (appellant herein), the original plaintiff, lost her husband Chander Pal in the year 1985. She is ssueless.Chander Pal, at the time of his death, owned a land to the extent of 36 kanals 7 marlas out of the total land measuring 80 kanals 1 marla comprised in khewat No. 64 khatoni No. 96 and 97 as per Jamabandi for the year 1975-76 situated at Village Kotia, Tehsil and District Mahendragarh. After losing her husbandin the prime of youth, she had nobody to look forward to. Respondents are the sons of one Daya Ram, who was the real brother of Chander Pal. Appellant was approached by Daya Ram (DW-4), who convinced her to accompany him to Courts of Mahendragarh, so that the mutation of the properties inherited by her from her husband could be made and the properties could be recorded in her name. Believing him, she accompanied him to Mahendragarh, where her thumb impressions were obtained on 3-4 papers. She was also asked to say 'yes' if she was asked any question by the authorities. She believed in good faith that the mutation will be done and the properties would be recorded in her name. All this happened on 26.3.1985. About two and half months, before filing of second suit the respondents (original defendants) and her brother in law Daya Ram (DW-4) started interfering with her possession and insisted that there was a decree passed in their favour in respect of her lands. She, therefore, filed the present suit for declaration to the effect that she was owner in possession of the land in respect of the properties mentioned above and the so-called decree dated 26.3.1985 shown to have been suffered by her in favour of the respondents-defendants is illegal, bad and was a result of fraud and, therefore, not binding upon her at all.
2. The suit was contested by the respondents-defendants. They claimed that the decree in question was legal and there was no question of fraud and that in fact, the said decree was as per the family settlement. They also pleaded that the suit was barred by limitation and as such, the suit was liable to be dismissed. The evidence was led on behalf of the appellant-plaintiff in support of her plea, wherein she examined herself, while on behalf of the respondents-defendants, four witnesses were examined including one Dharam Singh (DW-1), Record Keeper, one Ram Singh (DW-2), Bailiff, one S.K. Joshi (DW-3), Advocate and Daya Ram (DW-4) himself. The Trial Court accepted the evidence of the appellant/plaintiff and disbelieved the witnesses examined on behalf of the respondents-defendants and while decreeing the suit, returned a finding that the decree dated 26.3.1985 was a result of a fraud.
3. An appeal came to be filed by the respondents-defendants against the above order, which was allowed. The Appellate Court came to the conclusion that there was no fraud played and the consent decree dated 26.3.1985 was a good and a valid decree. The Appellate Court also held that the suit filed by the appellant-plaintiff was barred by time.
4. The appellant-plaintiff field a Second Appeal before the High Court, which was dismissed in limine. This is how the appeal has come before us. 5. Shri V.C. Mahajan, Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, firstly pointed out that the judgment by the High Court in the Second Appeal was a classic example of non-application of mind. He pointed out that the consent decree dated 26.3.1985 was a classic example of fraud. The Learned Senior Counsel, in support of his plea, pointed out that the plaint is dated 26.3.1985; It is filed on 26.3.1985; The Written Statement filed by the appellant is also dated 26.3.1985; The appellant was examined on 26.3.1985 and the decree was also passed on 26.3.1985. The Learned Senior Counsel wondered as to how all this could have happened on one and the same day. He pointed out that there was no question of the appellant being summoned by the Court or she remaining present in pursuance of those summons. The Learned Senior Counsel took us through the plaint in that suit, which was registered as Civil Suit No. 253 of 1985. According to the Learned Senior Counsel, as if all this was not sufficient, later on, an application was filed, purporting to be an application under Section 148A of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) on 30.9.1985. This application was filed with the signatures of the same Advocate S.K. Joshi, who had appeared on behalf of the appellant in the earlier proceedings and had filed a Written Statement of consent. It is then pointed out by the Learned Senior Counsel that a notice was issued by the Court of Sub-Judge, First Class to the appellant and was served through a bailiff and in pursuance of that notice, she came and gave a statement before the Court on 23.11.1985 that she did not intend to file a suit, challenging the consent decree. The Learned Senior Counsel then pointed out that there was no question of any proceedings being instituted on the basis of a so-called caveat under Section 148A of the CPC nor was there any question of the Court issuing any notice on the basis of a caveat. He also pointed out further that all this was nothing but a towering fraud played upon the appellant. He pointed out that it is throughout the case of the appellant that she never appeared before any Court nor did she depose before the Court and that she is an illiterate lady knowing nothing about the intricacies of law and the procedures of the Court. The Learned Senior Counsel further argued that though the suit was rightly decreed by the Trial Court holding that the earlier decree obtained in the year 1985 was a fraud upon the appellant, the Appellate Court has, in a most casual manner, allowed the appeal filed by the respondents/defendants and chose to believe the evidence of the lawyer, which also was a classic example of non-application of mind on the part of the Appellate Court. Learned Senior Counsel further argued that as if all this was not sufficient, the High Court, in a most casual manner, has chosen to dismiss such Second wwAppeal, involving the substantial questions of law, in limine without even considering the same. From this, the Learned Senior Counsel argued that the respondents herein have succeeded in perpetrating their fraud against the appellant.
6. The argument was opposed by Shri T.S. Ahuja, Learned Counsel, appearing on behalf of the respondents on the ground that the case of the respondents was well supported by the fact that the lawyer Shri S.K. Joshi had stepped into the witness box in the subsequent suit and had reiterated that the appellant had consented and instructed him and it was only as per the instructions of the appellant that he had prepared her Written Statement in the first suit. The Learned Counsel also pointed out that Shri Joshi (DW-3) also reiterated about the appellant's statement made in the caveat proceedings. The Learned Counsel further argued that even Shri R.S. Yadav, Advocate, who appeared in the Trial Court for the appellant herein, offered himself as a witness by way of additional evidence and he had stated that the Criminal Petition No. 7-4 dated 28.9.1994 under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.), which was decided on 12.8.2000 was drafted as per the instructions given by the appellant Santosh and that the appellant had put her thumb impression on this petition which was Exhibit AX. From this, the Learned Senior Counsel claimed that even on 28.9.1994, the land was not in possession of the appellant Santosh and, therefore, the story of the appellant that she came to the Court when her possession was being disturbed, is a myth and as such, the second suit was obviously barred by time. The Learned Counsel further reiterated that this was correctly appreciated by the Appellate Court and the High Court and they were correct in dismissing the suit as barred by time. He also pointed out that during the pendency of the appeal before the Appellate Court, the respondent No. 1 had filed an application under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC for amendment, pointing out that after the first decree in Civil Suit No. 253 of 1985, the respondents-defendants had constructed a pucca well and also installed a pumping set and obtained electric connection from the Electricity Board and the appellant Santosh did not object to the same. The Learned Counsel fairly admitted that this application was, however, dismissed by the Additional District Judge.
7. The basic questions in this appeal would be as follows:
(i) Whether a fraud was played against the appellant herein for obtaining the decree in Civil Suit No. 253 of 1985?
(ii) Whether the second suit filed by the appellant was within limitation?
8. We have very carefully perused the records of the Courts below since the judgment of the High Court is laconic. Beyond mentioning the facts on the basis of the pleadings, there is nothing in the judgment. It seems to have been passed on the incorrect basis of the absence of substantial question of law. Again the High Court has given a one-line finding that the suit filed by the appellant was beyond the period of limitation, since it was filed in the year 1990, seeking to set aside the decree passed in the year 1985. Ordinarily, we would have remanded this matter back to the High Court. However, considering the time taken so far in finalizing the rights of the parties, we proceed to decide this appeal on merits.
9. The Trial Court, after correctly framing the issues, took the stock of all the four witnesses, namely, Dharam Singh (DW-1), Record Keeper, Ram Singh (DW-2), Bailiff, S.K. Joshi (DW-3), Advocate and Daya Ram, the father of the respondents-defendants. The Court answered the first three issues in favour of the present appellant. Those issues pertain to:
(i) Ownership and joint possession of the suit land of the plaintiff?
(ii) The decree passed on 26.3.1985 in Civil Suit No. 253 of 1985 being nullity.
(iii) Recording the mutation No. 1093 dated 6.11.1985 being illegal and not binding on the rights of the plaintiff?
Taking stock of the evidence, the Trial Court took note of the improved version on the part of Daya Ram (DW-4) that the father of the appellant had demanded Rs. 20,000/- and had then agreed to give share of Chander Pal to the respondents-defendants and that the said amount was paid through one Mam Chand, cousin brother of Daya Ram (DW-4). The Trial Court rightly noted that this was not only an improvement, but said Mam Chand, through whom the amount was given, was never examined. The Trial Court also referred to the admission by Daya Ram (DW-4) that no money was ever given to the appellant for household expenses and that she had no source to maintain herself. From this, the Trial Court correctly deduced that the person who is not having any source to maintain himself/herself, could not part with his/her landed property as well in the manner that the appellant did. The admissions by S.K. Joshi (DW- 3), Advocate to the effect that he and Shri K.L. Yadav, Advocate, who appeared for the appellant in the earlier suit and for the respondents- defendants in the present suit before the Trial Court, used to sit on the same seat and were the partners in the same profession having a common Clerk. The Trial Court also noted the arguments on the side of the respondents to the effect that Daya Ram (DW-4) was looking after the appellant and that the appellant had filed a Written Statement in the first case, the contents of which were well known to her and that she admitted the same as correct, as asserted by S.K. Joshi (DW-3), Advocate, in his evidence. Furthermore, the Trial Court also noted the facts about the Caveat having been filed by the respondents herein, the reply to which was filed by the appellant-plaintiff vide Exhibit DW3/D, wherein she had averred that she had voluntarily suffered the impugned judgment and decree and that she did not challenge the same. The Trial Court rightly found the story of payment of Rs. 20,000/- to be a myth, since it was nowhere stated in the pleadings also. Further, the Trial Court also noted that the appellant, who was an issueless widow and an illiterate lady, was not at all being supported by Daya Ram and Daya Ram being her elder brother in law, was in a position to dominate and take advantage of her ignorance and illiteracy. The Trial Court also inferred correctly from the fact that a Caveat was filed in the year 1985 itself and the appellant was again paraded to make a statement that she did not intend to challenge the decree. As regards the question of limitation, the Trial Court noted that the cause of action arose when respondents started interfering with ownership and possession of the appellant-plaintiff over the suit land about two and half months before filing of the second suit and started asserting about there having a decree in their favour in respect of the suit land.
10. As against this, when we see the judgment of the Appellate Court, there are number of material facts in the evidence, which have been ignored by the Appellate Court. The basic fact which has been ignored by the Appellate Court is that in the earlier Civil Suit No. 253 of 1985, the plaint was filed on that day, Written Statement was also filed on the same day, the evidence of the plaintiffs and the defendant (appellant herein) was also recorded on the same day and the judgment was also made ready along-with a decree on the same day. This, by itself, was sufficient to raise serious doubts in the mind of the Courts. Instead, the Appellate Court went on to believe the evidence of Dharam Singh (DW-1), Record Keeper, who produced the files of the summons. One wonders as to when was the suit filed and when did the Court issue a summons and how is it that on the same day, the Written Statement was also ready, duly drafted by the other side lawyer S.K. Joshi (DW-3). Significantly enough, the Appellate Court has also relied on the evidence of S.K. Joshi (DW-3), who deposed about the appellant having come to him and instructed him to prepare the Written Statement (Exhibit DW3/A). In his evidence, S.K. Joshi (DW-3) has admitted specifically that there was a common clerk between him and the counsel for the plaintiff in the earlier suit and they used to sit on the same Takhat (seat). An impossible inference was drawn by the Appellate Court that the appellant was telling a blatant lie when she asserted that she did not voluntarily suffer a decree. The Appellate Court has also mentioned about the File No. 5 dated 30.9.1985, which would be hardly about six months after the said decree passed on 26.3.1985, which pertain to the Caveat field under Section 148A of the CPC. We put a specific question Shri Ahuja, Learned Counsel, appearing on behalf of the respondents, as to whether in Haryana, on the basis of Caveats, could summons be issued by the Civil Courts, so as to be served on the other side through a Bailiff of the Court. The Learned Counsel was unable to support any such proceeding. As if all that was not sufficient, appellant was again brought to the Court in pursuance of the so-called summons served on her through Bailiff in the proceedings under Section 148A of the CPC and her statement was also got recorded. It is not known as to how a Caveat application was got registered and a summons was sent on the basis of a Caveat application, treating it to be an independent proceedings. Such is not the scope of a Caveat under Section 148A of the CPC. At least Shri Ahuja, Learned Counsel, appearing on behalf of the respondents could not support such a finding and he fairly stated that he was unaware of any such procedure. Nothing has been shown to us in the nature of an order passed by the Court on the basis of the so-called Caveat. We are convinced that this was nothing, but a very poor attempt to get the fate of the appellant sealed by getting her statement recorded. Instead of drawing the correct inferences, the Appellate Court went on to record the impossible findings. The Appellate Court seems to have been more disturbed by the fact that the appellant had challenged the integrity of the counsel for the parties and asked a question as to why should the counsel for the respondent prepare a Written Statement against the wishes of the respondent. The Appellate Court went on to say:
Merely because both the counsel sit on the same bench and have a common clerk and that the suit was decided on the same day when it was present in the Court, it would not, by itself, prove that the judgment and decree were obtained by fraud and misrepresentation. To say that ' we are surprised', would be an understatement. To support this perverse finding, the Appellate Court went on to record the findings regarding the Caveat and the statement of the appellant recorded in those proceedings (?). We are fully convinced that this was nothing, but a towering fraud played upon an illiterate and helpless widow, whose whole inherited property was tried to be grabbed by Daya Ram and/or the respondents herein.
11. Very unfortunately, all this has escaped the notice of the High Court, who passed a very casual judgment without being bothered about these glaring facts. We are of the firm opinion that a whole suit No. 253 of 1985, decree passed thereupon on 26.3.1985 and the subsequent Caveat proceedings were nothing but a systematic fraud. There cannot be a better example of a fraudulent decree. We are anguished to see the attitude of the Court, who passed the decree on the basis of a plaint and a Written Statement, which were filed on the same day. We are also surprised at the observations made by the Appellate Court that such circumstance could not, by itself, prove the fraudulent nature of the decree.
12. A fraud puts an end to everything. It is a settled position in law that such decree is nothing, but a nullity. It has come in the evidence that when the respondents herein started disturbing the possession of the appellant and also started bragging about a decree having been obtained by them, the appellant chose to file a suit. In that view, her suit filed in 1990 would be absolutely within time. The casual observation made by the High Court that her suit would be barred by limitation, is also wholly incorrect.
13. On the basis of the conclusions that we have reached above, we proceed to set aside the judgment of the High Court, as well as of the Appellate Court and restore the judgment of the Trial Court. The appeal is allowed with the costs estimated at Rs. 25,000/-.
ajay sethi
(Expert) 26 September 2011
Learned lawyer for the petitioner has relied upon the principles laid down in (2005) 4 SCC 480, 2008(3) ICC 399, 2008(3) ICC 612, 2004(4) ICC 821, 2009(2) ICC 1, 2007(1) ICC 337, 2006(3) ICC 222, 2006(3) ICC 375, (2001) 1 SCC 742 and (2008) 14 SCC 364 in support of his contention. He has submitted that just and proper amendment can be introduced at any stage as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy and in appropriate cases where it is arguable that relief sought for by way of amendment would be barred by law of limitation, amendment should still be allowed and the disputed matter will be made the subject matter of an issue. Particularly in the ratio 2007(1) ICC 337 the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that the power to amend the pleadings under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC can be exercised at any stage of the proceeding in the interest of justice and that Court should adopt liberal approach and not a hypertechnical approach where the other side can be compensated with cost.
ajay sethi
(Expert) 26 September 2011
In 2009(2) ICC it has been set at rest by the Hon'ble Apex Court that the power of the Court under Order 6 Rule 17 of the CPC is wider enough and is circumscribed by the following two factors, (i) The application must be bona fide; (ii) the same should have caused injustice to the otherside; AND (iii) it should have affected the right already accrued to the defendants.
Devajyoti Barman
(Expert) 26 September 2011
I think the issues governing the amendment of plaint and giving citations of such decisions would fill up the whole space available here.
After the amendment of CPC the amendment is quite liberally allowed before the hearing starts i.e. evidence commences.
Since framing of issue does not mean hearing of the suit, if the court find that the amendment is necessary for the just decision of the case then it would surely be allowed.
I fail to understand how the decisions cited here are relevant to the question posted by the author.
prabhakar singh
(Expert) 26 September 2011
Expert Devajyoti Barman has already spoken on my behalf too.
Raj Kumar Makkad
(Expert) 27 September 2011
Decisions are meant to tel the circumstances under which such amendment can be allowed. Case law become base for dealing court. How can we experts forget the importance of relevant citation. The space of this site is available for experts for making their replies, one may admit it or deny.
Daksh
(Expert) 27 September 2011
Raj,
For arguing any case the preposition of law is to be developed in the instant case on the basis of facts at hand it is evident that the laws says that the amendment in the pleadings can be allowed at any stage. Any decision of the Court can only be basis of the prevailing law only. Yes space of this site is available for experts for making their comments but will it not be fair for replying for the same if the reply is supported by preposition of law supported with case law in this regard.
On my part I have also tried to compile a few citations for your esteemed reference.
The Hon’ble Supreme court of India in Salem Advocate Bar Assn. v. Union of India [(2005) 6 SCC 344] has held that “It is to be noted that the provisions of Order 6 Rule 17 CPC have been substantially amended by the CPC (Amendment) Act, 2002. Under the proviso no application for amendment shall be allowed after the trial has commenced, unless in spite of due diligence, the matter could not be raised before the commencement of trial.
2. The Hon’ble Supreme court of India in Rajkumar Gurawara (Dead) Thr. L.Rs. vs S.K. Sarwagi And Co. Pvt. Ltd. And Anr. Decided on 14/5/2008 and Judgement can be seen in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/chejudis.asp “ It is settled law that the grant of application for amendment be subject to certain conditions, namely, (i) when the nature of it is changed by permitting amendment; (ii) when the amendment would result introducing new cause of action and intends to prejudice the other party; (iii) when allowing amendment application defeats the law of limitation. The plaintiff not only failed to satisfy the conditions prescribed in proviso to Order VI Rule 17 but even on merits his claim is liable to be rejected.”
3. The Hon’ble Supreme court of India in Chander Kanta Bansal vs Rajinder Singh Anand Decided on: 11/03/2008 and Judgement can be seen in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/chejudis.asp It is observed by court as follows “ It makes it clear that after the commencement of trial, no application for amendment shall be allowed. However, if it is established that in spite of "due diligence" the party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of trial depending on the circumstances, the court is free to order such application. The words "due diligence" has not been defined in the Code. According to Oxford Dictionary (Edition 2006), the word "diligence" means careful and persistent application or effort. "Diligent" means careful and steady in application to one's work and duties, showing care and effort. As per Black's Law Dictionary (Eighth Edition), "diligence" means a continual effort to accomplish something, care; caution; the attention and care required from a person in a given situation. "Due diligence" means the diligence reasonably expected from, and ordinarily exercised by, a person who seeks to satisfy a legal requirement or to discharge an obligation. According to Words and Phrases by Drain-Dyspnea (Permanent Edition 13A) "due diligence", in law, means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible. "Due diligence" means reasonable diligence; it means such diligence as a prudent man would exercise in the conduct of his own affairs. It is clear that unless the party takes prompt steps, mere action cannot be accepted and file a petition after the commencement of trial.”
4. The Hon’ble Supreme court of India in N.Pandey & Anr. Vs. Swami Keshavprakeshdasji N. & Ors. [2006 (12) SCC 1]. and Judgement can be seen in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/chejudis.asp In paragraph 57 of the decision, it was observed as follows :”It is submitted that the date of settlement of issues is the date of commencement of trial.”
5. The Hon’ble Supreme court of India in Baldev Singh & Ors. Vs. Manohar Singh & Anr. [2006 (6) SCC 498]. and Judgement can be seen in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/chejudis.asp In paragraph 17 of the decision, it was held and observed as follows : “Before we part with this order, we may also notice that proviso to Order 6 Rule 17 CPC provides that amendment of pleadings shall not be allowed when the trial of the suit has already commenced.
The Hon’ble Supreme court of India in South Konkan Distilleries & Anr. Vs Prabhakar Gajanan Naik & Ors.[Decided on 09-09-2008]. and Judgement can be seen in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/chejudis.asp it was held and observed as follows : “we are of the view that if a suit was filed on the amended claim, it was an admitted position that the said claim was barred by limitation, the question of allowing the amendment of the written statement and the counter claim, in the facts and circumstances of the case, could not arise at all. Accordingly, the courts below were fully justified in rejecting the application for amendment of the written statement and the counter claim.”
IN Rajesh Kumar Aggarwal vs. K.K. Modi [(2006) 4 SCC 385], wherein the approach to be taken by the Courts in considering whether to permit amendment fell for consideration and it was held that the Courts should allow all amendments that may be necessary for determining the real question in controversy between the parties, provided it did not cause injustice or prejudice to the other side. It was observed that the real controversy test is the basic or cardinal test and it is the primary duty of the Court to decide whether such an amendment is necessary to decide the real dispute between the parties. Similar views were also expressed in Andhra Bank vs. ABN Amro Bank N.V. [(2007) 6 SCC 167].
There was no bar to the Appellate Court permitting amendment of
pleadings to enable a party to raise a new plea, as was held by SUPREME Court in
Pandit Ishwardas vs. State of M.P. [(1979) 4 SCC 163]. In fact, SUPREME Court
observed that all that was necessary was that the Appellate Court should
observe the well-known principles subject to which amendments of pleadings are
usually granted. Naturally, one of the circumstances which would be taken into
consideration before an amendment was granted is the delay in making the
application seeking such amendment and, if made at the appellate stage, the
reason why it was not sought in the Trial Court.
SUPREME Court in Harcharan vs. State of Haryana [(1982) 3 SCC
408], where it was observed that amendment of pleadings relating to the main
controversy should not be refused on mere technical grounds
IN REVAJEETU BUILDERS CASE BEFORE SUPREME COURT DECIDED IN OCTOBER 2009 THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPLES WERE QUOTED IN THE MATTER OF AMENDMENT OF PLEADINGS
On critically analyzing both the English and Indian cases, some basic principles emerge which ought to be taken into consideration while allowing or rejecting the application for amendment. (1) Whether the amendment sought is im− perative for proper and effective adjudication of the case? (2) Whether the application for amend− ment is bona fide or mala fide? (3) The amendment should not cause such prejudice to the other side which cannot be compensated adequately in terms of money; (4) Refusing amendment would in fact lead to injustice or lead to multi− ple litigation; (5) Whether the proposed amendment con− stitutionally or fundamentally changes the nature and character of the case? and (6) As a general rule, the court should decline amendments if a fresh suit on the amended claims would be barred by limitation on the date of application.
Best Regards
Daksh
Querist :
Anonymous
(Querist) 27 September 2011
thanks to all of u.!!!
