Perjury before central govt industrial tribunal
Rajendra
(Querist) 04 May 2012
This query is : Resolved
Sometime back on the internet I found one high court judgement where in it was held that if a false affidavit is submitted by witness before CGIT then CGIT MUST initiate action for perjury (it is cumpulsory).
In that case the workman was guilty of perjury and employer (Bank) had approached the HC for getting workman punished.
Now despite my best efforts I am not getting that judgement.
I will be thankful if someone gives that judgement
ajay sethi
(Expert) 04 May 2012
not able to trace judgement
ajay sethi
(Expert) 04 May 2012
Supreme Court of India
Ranjit Singh vs The State Of Punjab on 21 April, 1959
Equivalent citations: 1959 AIR 843, 1959 SCR Supl. (2) 727
Bench: K L.
PETITIONER:
RANJIT SINGH
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
THE STATE OF PUNJAB
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
21/04/1959
BENCH:
KAPUR, J.L.
BENCH:
KAPUR, J.L.
IMAM, SYED JAFFER
CITATION:
1959 AIR 843 1959 SCR Supl. (2) 727
ACT:
Criminal Trial-Perjury-False statement in affidavit-Affi- davit affirmed to the best of knowledge and belief-No obligation to file affidavit-Offence, if made out-Indian Penal Code, 1860 (XLV of 1860), ss. 191 and 193.
HEADNOTE:
A habeas corpus application was made to the High Court alleging that one S had been illegally arrested and kept in unlawful custody without any charge being made against him and without obtaining remand from a Magistrate. By way of a return the appellant, a sub-Inspector of Police, filed a false affidavit controverting the allegations made in the application. He was prosecuted and convicted under s. 193, Indian Penal Code. The appellant challenged his conviction on the grounds that: (i) as he was not bound under the law to file an affidavit, the case did not fall under s. 191 of the Indian Penal Code and he could not be convicted under s. 193 ; and (ii) the affidavit having been affirmed as true to the best of the knowledge and belief of the appellant it could not be said which part was true to his knowledge and which to his belief.
Held that, the appellant was rightly convicted. It was not necessary for the application of s. 191 of the Indian Penal Code that the accused should be bound under the law to make an affidavit. If he chose to me one and bound himself on oath to state the truth he was liable under s. 193 Of the Code if e made a false statement and it was no defence to say that he was not bound to enter the witness-box or make an affidavit. In the present case it was necessary for the appellant to file an affidavit as he was bound to place the facts and circumstances justifying
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the detention which could only be done by an affidavit. Ordinarily, where the detention is under orders of the detaining authority in exercise of his plenary powers or of a Court an affidavit may not be necessary in making the return but where it becomes necessary for the detaining authority to justify its action by disclosing facts it has to file an affidavit.
Held, further, that explanation 2 to S. 191 of the Code brings a false statement affirmed to the belief of the accused also within the mischief of s. 191 and thus makes it punishable under s. 193 of the Code.
Emperor v. Lachmi Narain, I. L. R. 1947 All. 155, dis- approved.
JUDGMENT:
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 19 of 1957.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated March 7, 1956, of the former PEPSU High Court in Criminal Revision No. 45 of 1956, arising out of the judgment and order dated February 22, 1956, of the Additional Sessions Judge, Patiala, in Criminal Appeal No. 175/36 of 1955-56. Pritam Singh Safe&, for the appellant.
N. S. Bindra and T. M. Sen, for the respondent. 1959. April 21. The Judgment of the Court was delivered,by KAPUR, J.-This is an appeal by special leave against the judgment and order of the High Court of PEPSU passed in revision'. The appellant was a sub-Inspector of Police who at the relevant time was the Station House Officer in-charge Shehna police station in the erstwhile PEPSU State. He was convicted under s. 193, Indian Penal Code, by a First Class Magistrate and his appeal to the Sessions Judge, Patiala, was dismissed except as to sentence. He took a revision to the PEPSU High Court but that was also
dismissed.
This appeal has arisen in the following circumstances: One Surjit Singh, s/o Risaldar Waryam Singh, was arrested on September 25, 1953, at Barnala in PEPSU State by the Police Inspector Jaswant Singh. He was kept in the lock-up at Barnala and on the following day his custody was handed over to the appellant and he was taken to Shehna and was kept in custody-it
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is not clear under what section-in the police station lock- up at Shehna. Surjit Singh was there kept in custody from September 26, 1953, till October 10, 1953, when at about 10 p.m., he was surreptitiously removed to Police Station Dialpur and then to Police Post Hamirgarh and from there was taken to Police Station Baga Purana in Ferozepur District, of the then Punjab. An application under s. 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code and under Art. 226 of the Constitution was made for a writ of Habeas Corpus and Mandamus in the High Court of PEPSU. In that petition it was alleged that Surjit Singh was being kept in unlawful custody without any charge being made and without obtaining a remand by a Magistrate. In reply to this, an affidavit dated October 13, 1953, was filed by the appel. lant in which he stated that Surjit Singh had association with notorious dacoits; that he, the appellant, had never taken him into custody at any time; that the said Surjit Singh was absconding and had not been arrested in spite of the best efforts of the police; that at the time of the making of the affidavit he was not in the appellant's custody and that it was incorrect that Inspector Jaswant Singh had ever entrusted Surjit Singh to his (appellant's) custody. He also stated that no petition had been brought to him nor had he received any telegram in connection with the custody of Surjit Singh. This affidavit was affirmed as follows:- " I solemnly affirm that the facts stated from paras Nos. I to 7 are true to the best of my knowledge and belief and nothing which is relevant to this case has been kept back from this Hon'ble Court ".
As both the parties admitted before the High Court that Surjit Singh was not in the custody of the appellant the petition was dismissed. On November 9, 1953, the brother of Surjit Singh made an application under s. 476, Criminal Procedure Code, for the prosecution of Inspector Jaswant Singh and the appellant for perjury under s. 193, Indian Penal Code, in that they had filed false affidavits. This matter was heard by another learned Judge of that Court who ordered the
92
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prosecution of the appellant and directed the Registrar of the High Court to file a complaint which was filed. The complaint was taken cognizance of by the First Class Magistrate at Patiala who convicted the appellant and sentenced him to nine months' imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 300/- and in default to undergo simple imprisonment for two months. The appellant took an appeal to the Sessions Judge, Patiala, who confirmed the order of conviction but reduced the sentence to one of three months' simple imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 50 and in default one month's simple imprisonment, a revision against this order was dismissed in limine by the Chief Justice although he gave reasons for dismissing it. The appellant then obtained special leave from this Court.
On behalf of the appellant the first contention raised was that the appellant was not bound to file an affidavit and therefore he could not be convicted under s. 193, Indian Penal Code, because his case did not fall under s. 191, Indian Penal Code. In support of his contention he relied upon the Rules of the PEPSU High Court framed for the purpose of proceedings under Art. 226 and s. 491(2), Criminal Procedure Code, for the issuing of writs of Habeas Corpus. He also referred to the Rules made by that Court for the issuing of writs of Mandamus, Prohibition, Quo Warranto and Certiorari under Art. 226 and submitted that there was no Rule in the former, i.e., for writ of Habeas Corpus requiring a return to be made on behalf of the res- pondent to be sup-ported by an affidavit whereas in the latter, i.e., issuing of writs of Mandamus etc. an affidavit was necessary and therefore it was submitted that s. 191 was inapplicable. Rule 2 of the Rules of the Court required that when a Judge was of the opinion that prima facie case had been made out for granting the application a rule nisi was to issue calling upon the person or persons against whom the order was sought, to appear before the Court and to show cause why such an order should not be made. As has been pointed out in Greene v. Home Secretary (1) which was a case under Reg. 18-B of the Defence of the
(1) [1942] A.C. 284, 302.
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Realm Act the whole object of proceedings for a writ of Habeas Corpus is to make them expeditious, to keep them as free from technicality as possible and to keep them as simple as possible. " The incalculable value of Habeas Corpus is that it enables the immediate determination of the right to the appellant's freedom " (Lord Wright). When there is no question of fact to be examined or determined no affidavit is needed. As soon as there emerges a fact into which the Court feels it should enquire the necessity for an affidavit arises. Ordinarily an affidavit may not be necessary in making the return if the detention is under orders of the detaining authority in exercise of its plenary discretion as in Liversidge v. Anderson (1) and in Greene's case (2) or a person is detained under the orders of a Court. But where the detention is, as it was in the present case, it becomes necessary for the detaining authority to justify its action by disclosing facts which would show to the satisfaction of the Court that the custody is not impro- per. Where the prisoner says " I do not know why I have been detained, I have done no wrong ", it is for the detaining authority to justify the custody. When issues of fact are raised and the actions of the police officers, as in the present case, are expressly challenged and facts are set out which if unrebutted and unexplained would be sufficient for the writ to issue, an affidavit becomes necessary. It cannot be said therefore that in the present case the appellant was not legally bound to place facts and circumstances before the Court to justify the detention of Surjit Singh and, this could be done by an affidavit. Section 4 of the Oaths Act lays down the authority to administer oaths and affirmations and it prescribes the courts and persons authorised to administer by themselves or by their officers empowered in that behalf oaths and affirmations in discharge of the duties or in exercise of the powers imposed upon them and they are, all courts and persons having by law the authority to receive evidence. Section 5 prescribes the persons by whom oaths or affirmations must be
(1) [1942] A.C. 206.
(2) [1942] A.C. 284, 302.
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made and they include all witnesses, i. e., all persons who' may lawfully be required to give evidence by or before any court. These two sections show that the High Court or its officers were authorised to administer the oath and as the appellant was stating facts as evidence before the High Court he had to make the oath or affirmation and was bound to state the truth. Section 14 of that Act is in the following words:
S. 14. Every person giving evidence on any subject before any Court or person hereby authorised to administer oaths and affirmations shall be bound to state the truth on such subject ".
As the appellant was giving evidence on his own behalf in that he was denying the allegation made in the affidavit of the brother of Surjit Singh he was bound to state the truth on the subject on which he was making the statement. The contention therefore that under s. 191 of the Indian Penal Code the relevant portion of which is:
S. 191. " Whoever being legally bound by an oath or by an express provision of law to state the truth ......... makes any statement which is false and which he either knows or believes to be false or does not believe to be true, is said to give-false evidence " the appellant was not legally bound by oath to state the truth cannot be supported. On the other hand at the stage of the proceedings in the High Court where it was being alleged that Surjit Singh was being detained by the appellant illegally it was necessary for the appellant to make an affidavit in making a return and therefore if the statement is false, as it has been found to be, then he has committed an offence under s. 193. The opening words of s. 191 whoever being legally bound by an oath or by an express provision of law to state the truth............ do not support the submission that a man, who is not bound under the law to make an affidavit, can, if he does make one, deliberately refrain from stating truthfully the facts which are within his knowledge,. The meaning of these words is that whenever in a court of law a person binds himself on oath to state the truth he is bound to state the
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truth and he cannot be heard to say that he should not have gone into the witness-box or should not have made an affidavit and therefore the submission that any false statement which he had made after taking the oath is not covered by the words of s. 191, India Penal Code, is not supportable. Whenever a man makes a statement in court on oath he is bound to state the truth and if he does not, he makes himself liable under the provisions of s. 193. It is no defence to say that he was not bound to enter the witness-box. A defendant or even a plaintiff is not bound to go into the witness-box but if either of them chooses to do so he cannot, after he has taken the oath to make a truthful statement, state anything which is false. Indeed the very sanctity of the oath re-quires that a person put on oath must state the truth. In our opinion this contention is wholly devoid of force and must be repelled. It was then contended that the officer before whom the appellant swore the affidavit, i. e., the Deputy Registrar of the High Court of PEPSU was not authorised to administer oaths. That officer as a witness for the prosecution has stated that he could administer an oath and therefore this contention of the appellant is also without any force and must be repelled.
It was also argued that the affidavit filed by the appellant was affirmed as being true to the best of knowledge and belief and therefore it could not be said as to which part was true to the appellant's knowledge and which to his belief. We have read the affidavit which consists of 7 paragraphs and each paragraph relates to affirmation of a fact which, if true, could only be so to the appellant's knowledge. But even belief would fall under Explanation 2 to s. 191 which is as under:
Explanation 2 to s. 191. " A false statement as to the belief of the person attesting is within the meaning of this section, and a person may be guilty of giving false evidence by stating that he believes a thing which he does not believe, as well as by stating that he knows a thing which he does not know
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The appellant relied upon a judgment of the Allahabad High Court in Emperor v. Lachmi Narain (1). But unless there was something peculiar in the facts of that case it cannot be considered to be good law. It does not even take into consideration Explanation 2 of S. 191.
Lastly it was urged that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was erroneous in that he did not hold an enquiry as required under ss. 200 and 202, Criminal Procedure Code, the former of which is expressly mentioned in sub-section 2 of s. 476, Criminal Procedure Code. That contention is equally untenable because under s. 200, proviso (aa) it is not necessary for a Magistrate when a complaint is made by a court to examine the complainant and neither s. 200 nor s. 202 requires a preliminary enquiry before the Magistrate can assume jurisdiction to issue process against the person complained against.
In our opinion the appellant has been rightly convicted and we would therefore dismiss this appeal.
Appeal dismissed.
ajay sethi
(Expert) 04 May 2012
CRA No. 197 SB of 2010 (O&M) 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
CRA No. 197 SB of 2010 (O&M)
Date of decision: 25-1-2010
Sunny Bhumbla .........Appellant Vs
Shashi .........Respondent CORAM:- HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARBANS LAL
Present: Shri K.S.Boparai, Advocate, for the appellant. HARBANS LAL, J.
This appeal is directed against the order dated 5.12.2008 Annexure
P-1 passed by the court of learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Saheed Bhagat
Singh Nagar vide which he allowed the petition moved under Section 9 of the
Hindu Marriage Act, for restitution of conjugal rights leaving the parties to
bear their own costs and rejected the application moved under Section 195/340
Cr.P.C.
I have heard the learned counsel for the appellant, besides
perusing the record with due care and circumspection. The learned counsel for
the appellant has submitted with great eloquence that after the respondent
admitted in her cross-examination about her employment, salary and inheritance
of the landed property, she again placed on record another affidavit dated
27.8.2008 solemnly affirming therein that she had inadvertently not mentioned
about the source of income as well as employment in the earlier affidavit dated
14.8.2008. Thereafter the appellant moved an application under Section 195 of
Cr.P.C. for initiating proceedings against the respondent for submitting a
false affidavit CRA No. 197 SB of 2010 (O&M) 2 before the learned trial Court,
in order to get more maintenance from the appellant. The learned trial Court
had assured the appellant that his said application shall be decided alongwith
the main case. While deciding the main petition, in paragraph No. 13 of the
judgment it has been observed that "in support of her claim for interim
maintenance under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, the
respondent/applicant had made certain assertions, which were found to be
totally false and the same had apparently been done by her in a deliberate
manner. Consequently even an application for initiating suitable proceedings
against her on account of her having submitted a false affidavit was also filed
by the petitioner on 3.9.2008. Thereafter, the respondent did not press her
claim for interim maintenance, but the same did not absolve her of the
liability of the aforesaid lapse. This court, however, does not wish to
initiate any such proceedings against the respondent with the hope that sooner
or later, the parties may be in a position to resolve their dispute or else
this young couple may adopt such other means so that they can part their ways
in a peaceful manner and therefore, with a view to avoid undue complication of
the matrimonial dispute, no action on account of submitting of the above false
affidavit etc. is being initiated against the respondent."
It is further argued that the learned trial Court has overlooked
the fact that the respondent has used the false affidavit in the judicial
proceedings. Therefore, all the ingredients of the offences of cheating,
forging and perjury etc. are made out and consequently, the order passed by the
learned trial Court in not initiating the proceedings under Section 195 read
with Section 340 Cr.P.C. is illegal.
CRA No. 197 SB of 2010 (O&M) 3 I have given a deep and thoughtful
consideration to these submissions.
A careful perusal of the observations rendered by the learned trial
Court in paragraph No. 13 of the impugned judgment would reveal that there is
not even a shred of reference to the application moved under Section 195 read
with Section 340 Cr.P.C. This apart, no specific reasons have been apportioned
for not initiating the action on the basis of the alleged affidavit. The said
application having been moved under the provisions of the Code of Criminal
Procedure was required to be disposed of separately. It was not desirable on
the part of the learned trial Court to decide the said application in a slip
shod manner by making mere passing reference to the alleged affidavit. In the
application moved under Section 340 of the Cr.P.C. if the Court deems fit,the
inquiry has to be held whereas in the present one, the impugned order is
absolutely silent as to whether or not inquiry was held. There is specific
procedure which is to be followed while disposing of an application moved under
Section 340 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Section 340 of the Criminal
Procedure Code reads as under:-
"340.Procedure in cases mentioned in Sec.195--(1) When, upon an
application made to it in this behalf or otherwise any Court is of the opinion
that it is expedient in the interest of justice that an inquiry should be made
into any offence referred to to in cl (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 195,
which appears to have been committed in or in relation to to a proceeding in
that Court, or as the case may be, in respect of of a document produced or
given in evidence in a proceeding in that Court, CRA No. 197 SB of 2010 (O&M) 4
such Court may, after such preliminary inquiry, if any, as it thinks necessary.
(a) record a finding to that effect.
(b) make a complaint thereof in writing
(c) send it to a Magistrate of the first class having jurisdiction.
(d) take sufficient security for the appearance of the accused before
such Magistrate, or if the alleged offence is non- bailable and the Court
thinks it necessary so to do, send the accused in custody to such Magistrate;
and (e) bind over any person to appear and give evidence before such
Magistrate.
(2) The power conferred on a Court by sub-section (1) in respect of an
offence may, in any case where that Court has neither made a complaint under
sub-section (1) in respect of that offence nor rejected an application for the
making of such complaint, be exercised by the Court to which such former Court
is subordinate within the meaning of sub-section (4) of Sec.195.
(3) A complaint made under this section shall be signed (a)
where the Court making complaint is a High Court, by such officer of the Court
as the Court may appoint.
(b) in any other case, by the presiding officer of the Court,
and
(4) In this section, "Court" has the same meaning as in CRA No.
197 SB of 2010 (O&M) 5 Sec.195."
A glance through the impugned order would reveal that the learned
trial Court has given a go by to the provisions of Section 340 Cr.P.C. The
approach adopted by the learned trial Court is unwholesome and is depreciable.
The impugned order is absolutely silent as to whether the application has been
dismissed or allowed, if so for which reasons. In consequence of the preceding
discussion the trial Court is directed to decide the application under
discussion in accordance with law. This appeal stands disposed of accordingly.
(HARBANS LAL)
JUDGE
January 25, 2010
Rajendra
(Querist) 04 May 2012
Thanks a lot Ajay Sethi.
Very useful citations.
But I can wait for some more time if some one can trace a judgement involving CGIT.
R.K Nanda
(Expert) 07 May 2012
I agree with expert Sethi.
