pejury / contempt of court
aisha
(Querist) 26 November 2009
This query is : Resolved
As experts sugested in my previous qerryy "Your Husband and the other woman can be tried for pejury" . My husband gave false affidavit in high court n dist court , but the other lady gave false affidavit to my husband and further he submitted that in dist court.
Now my querry:
1 Both of them can be tried in one complaint
2 what is the jurisdiction for filing as false affidavits were filed at different courts at different places
3 can i file in high court / dist court
4 Is pejury different from contempt of court as i have moved one complaint in high court against my husband for filing false affidavits in highcourt. he has filed two affidavits in high court with different stand , one he says he is not married to me and married to other lady , 2nd he only married to me
Raj Kumar Makkad
(Expert) 26 November 2009
Two different complaint should be filed in the given matter. If you have filed a complaint in this regard with HC then it is sufficient and no other complaint is required to be filed.
rupareliya
(Expert) 25 December 2009
u can file complaint for perjury
case study and judment given bellow
2008 (0) GLHEL-SC 41777
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH)
Hon'ble Judges:Arijit Pasayat and P.Sathasivam JJ.
Mahila Vinod Kumari Versus State Of Madhya Pradesh
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) No. 4950 of 2008 ; 4951 of 2008 ; *J.Date :-
JULY 11, 2008
CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973 Section - 344
INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860 Section - 376(2)(g)
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - S. 344 - Indian Penal Code, 1860 - S. 376(2)(g) trial under - fabrication of evidence - petitioner filed FIR alleging rape by two accused - Trial Court found that petitioner had tendered false evidence and had fabricated evidence against the accused persons with the intention that such evidence shall be used in the proceedings, and therefore, directed cognizance in terms of S. 344 of the Cr.P.C. - admission of guilt - three months' simple imprisonment - held, evil of perjury has assumed alarming propositions in cases depending on oral evidence and in order to deal with the menace effectively it is desirable for the Courts to use the provision more effectively and frequently than it is presently done - Court has rightly taken action and find nothing infirm in the order of Trial Court and High Court to warrant interference - appeal dismissed.
Imp.Para: [ 5 ] [ 6 ] [ 11 ]
Cases Referred to :
Narayanswamy V/s. State Of Muharashtra, 1971 2 SCC 182 : AIR 1971 SC 1789 : 1971 (Supp) SCR 588 : 1971 SCC(Cri) 507 : 1971 CrLJ 1301
Equivalent Citation(s):
2008 (8) SCC 34 : AIR 2008 SC 2965 JUDGEMENT :- ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.
1 Heard learned counsel for the petitioner.
2 Delay condoned.
3 Though, we are not inclined to entertain the special leave petitions, but we find that there is a need for expressing views on action to be taken for maliciously setting law into motion.
4 The petitioner lodged a report against two persons at Pichhore Police Station to the effect that on 28.1.1993 between 6.00 to 7.00 a.m. she was waylaid by them who dragged her and committed rape on her, one after another. She claimed to have narrated the incident to her father and uncle and, thereafter lodged the report at the police station. On the basis of the report, matter was investigated. The accused persons were arrested. Chargesheet was filed. The accused persons faced trial for alleged commission of offence punishable u/s. 376(2)(g) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short 'the IPC'). The accused persons abjured their guilt. During trial, the petitioner stated that she had actually not been raped. As she resiled from the statement made during investigation, she was permitted to be cross-examined by the prosecution. She even denied to have lodged the first information report (Exh.P-1) and to have given any statement to the police (Exh.P-2). In view of the statement of the petitioner, the two accused persons were acquitted by judgment dated 28.11.2001. The Trial Court found that the petitioner had tendered false evidence and had fabricated evidence against the accused persons with the intention that such evidence shall be used in the proceedings, and, therefore, directed cognizance in terms of Sec. 344 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short 'the Code') to be taken against the petitioner. A show-cause notice was issued and the case was registered against the petitioner who filed reply to the effect that being an illiterate lady, she had committed the mistake and may be excused. The Trial Court found that the petitioner admitted her guilt that she had lodged false report of rape against the accused. She was, accordingly, sentenced to undergo three months' simple imprisonment. Aggrieved by the order, the petitioner filed an appeal before the Madhya Pradesh High Court, which, by the impugned order, was dismissed.
5 Stand before the High Court was that being an illiterate lady, she does not understand law and the particulars of the offence were not explained to her and, therefore, the appeal should be allowed. This was opposed by the State on the ground that the petitioner had admitted her guilt before the Trial Court and, therefore, the conviction is well founded. The High Court perused the records of the Trial Court and found that in the show-cause reply she had admitted that she had told lies all through. The stand that the particulars of the offence were not explained to her, was found to be equally untenable, because in the show-cause notice issued, relevant details were given. In the first information report, and the statement recorded by the police, she had clearly stated that she was raped by the accused persons. But in Court she denied to have stated so. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the Court imposed 15 days' simple imprisonment which is harsh. But that is not the end of the matter. The petitioner filed an application before the High Court stating that a wrong statement was made before the High Court that she had already suffered custody for 15 days, which weighed with the High Court to reduce the sentence.
6 Learned counsel for the petitioner stated that being a girl of tender age, she was pressurized by her mother and uncle to give a false report. This is at variance with the statement made in court during trial to the effect that she had not reported anything to the police. It is a settled position in law that so far as sexual offences are concerned, sanctity is attached to the statement of a victim. This Court, has, in several cases, held that the evidence of the prosecutrix alone is sufficient for the purpose of conviction if it is found to be reliable, cogent and credible. In the present case, on the basis of the allegations made by the petitioner, two persons were arrested and had to face trial and suffered the ignominy of being involved in a serious offence like rape. Their acquittal, may, to a certain extent, have washed away the stigma, but that is not enough. The purpose of enacting Sec. 344, Cr.P.C. corresponding to Sec. 479A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Old Code') appears to be further arm the Court with a weapon to deal with more flagrant cases and not to take away the weapon already in its possession. The object of the legislature underlying enactment of the provision is that the evil of perjury and fabrication of evidence has to be eradicated and can be better achieved now as it is open to the courts to take recourse to Sec. 340(1) (corresponding to Sec. 476 of the Old Code) in cases in which they are failed to take action u/s. 344 Cr.P.C.
7 This section introduces an additional alternative procedure to punish perjury by the very Court before which it is committed in place of old Sec. 479 A which did not have the desired effect to eradicate the evils of perjury. The salient features of this new provision are:
(1) Special powers have been conferred on two specified Courts, namely Court of Session and Magistrate of the First Class, to take cognizance of an offence of perjury committed by a witness in a proceeding before it instead of filing a complaint before a Magistrate and try and punish the offender by following the procedure of summary trials. For summary trial, see Ch. 21.
(2) This power is to be exercised after having the matter considered by the Court only at the time of delivery of the judgment or final order.
(3) The offender shall be given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause before he is punished.
(4) The maximum sentence that may be imposed is 3 month's imprisonment or a fine up to Rs. 500 or both.
(5) The order of the Court is appealable (vide Sec. 351).
(6) The procedure in this section is an alternative to one under Ss. 340-343. The Court has been given an option to proceed to punish summarily under this section or to resort to ordinary procedure by way of complaint u/s. 340 so that, as for instance, where the Court is of opinion that perjury committed is likely to raise complicated questions or deserves more severe punishment than that permitted under this section or the case is otherwise of such a nature or for some reasons considered to be such that the case should be disposed of under the ordinary procedure which would be more appropriate, the Court may chose to do so [vide sub-sec. (3)].
(7) Further proceedings of any trial initiated under this section shall be stayed and thus, any sentence imposed shall also not be executed until the disposal of an appeal or revision against the judgment or order in the main proceedings in which the witness gave perjured evidence or fabricated false evidence [vide sub-sec. (4)].
8 For exercising the powers under the section the Court at the time of delivery of judgment or final order must at the first instance express an opinion to the effect that the witness before it has either intentionally given false evidence or fabricated such evidence. The second condition is that the Court must come to the conclusion that in the interests of justice the witness concerned should be punished summarily by it for the offence which appears to have been committed by the witness. And the third condition is that before commencing the summary trial for punishment the witness must be given reasonable opportunity of showing cause why he should not be so punished. All these conditions are mandatory. [See Narayanswamy V/s. State of Muharashtra, 1971 2 SCC 182].
9 The object of the provision is to deal with the evil perjury in a summary way.
10 The evil of perjury has assumed alarming propositions in cases depending on oral evidence and in order to deal with the menace effectively it is desirable for the courts to use the provision more effectively and frequently than it is presently done.
11 In the case at hand, the court has rightly taken action and we find nothing infirm in the order of the Trial Court and the High Court to warrant interference. The special leave petitions are, accordingly dismissed.
2008 (0) GLHEL-SC 41777
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH)
Hon'ble Judges:Arijit Pasayat and P.Sathasivam JJ.
Mahila Vinod Kumari Versus State Of Madhya Pradesh
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) No. 4950 of 2008 ; 4951 of 2008 ; *J.Date :-
JULY 11, 2008
CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973 Section - 344
INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860 Section - 376(2)(g)
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - S. 344 - Indian Penal Code, 1860 - S. 376(2)(g) trial under - fabrication of evidence - petitioner filed FIR alleging rape by two accused - Trial Court found that petitioner had tendered false evidence and had fabricated evidence against the accused persons with the intention that such evidence shall be used in the proceedings, and therefore, directed cognizance in terms of S. 344 of the Cr.P.C. - admission of guilt - three months' simple imprisonment - held, evil of perjury has assumed alarming propositions in cases depending on oral evidence and in order to deal with the menace effectively it is desirable for the Courts to use the provision more effectively and frequently than it is presently done - Court has rightly taken action and find nothing infirm in the order of Trial Court and High Court to warrant interference - appeal dismissed.
Imp.Para: [ 5 ] [ 6 ] [ 11 ]
Cases Referred to :
Narayanswamy V/s. State Of Muharashtra, 1971 2 SCC 182 : AIR 1971 SC 1789 : 1971 (Supp) SCR 588 : 1971 SCC(Cri) 507 : 1971 CrLJ 1301
Equivalent Citation(s):
2008 (8) SCC 34 : AIR 2008 SC 2965 JUDGEMENT :- ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.
1 Heard learned counsel for the petitioner.
2 Delay condoned.
3 Though, we are not inclined to entertain the special leave petitions, but we find that there is a need for expressing views on action to be taken for maliciously setting law into motion.
4 The petitioner lodged a report against two persons at Pichhore Police Station to the effect that on 28.1.1993 between 6.00 to 7.00 a.m. she was waylaid by them who dragged her and committed rape on her, one after another. She claimed to have narrated the incident to her father and uncle and, thereafter lodged the report at the police station. On the basis of the report, matter was investigated. The accused persons were arrested. Chargesheet was filed. The accused persons faced trial for alleged commission of offence punishable u/s. 376(2)(g) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short 'the IPC'). The accused persons abjured their guilt. During trial, the petitioner stated that she had actually not been raped. As she resiled from the statement made during investigation, she was permitted to be cross-examined by the prosecution. She even denied to have lodged the first information report (Exh.P-1) and to have given any statement to the police (Exh.P-2). In view of the statement of the petitioner, the two accused persons were acquitted by judgment dated 28.11.2001. The Trial Court found that the petitioner had tendered false evidence and had fabricated evidence against the accused persons with the intention that such evidence shall be used in the proceedings, and, therefore, directed cognizance in terms of Sec. 344 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short 'the Code') to be taken against the petitioner. A show-cause notice was issued and the case was registered against the petitioner who filed reply to the effect that being an illiterate lady, she had committed the mistake and may be excused. The Trial Court found that the petitioner admitted her guilt that she had lodged false report of rape against the accused. She was, accordingly, sentenced to undergo three months' simple imprisonment. Aggrieved by the order, the petitioner filed an appeal before the Madhya Pradesh High Court, which, by the impugned order, was dismissed.
5 Stand before the High Court was that being an illiterate lady, she does not understand law and the particulars of the offence were not explained to her and, therefore, the appeal should be allowed. This was opposed by the State on the ground that the petitioner had admitted her guilt before the Trial Court and, therefore, the conviction is well founded. The High Court perused the records of the Trial Court and found that in the show-cause reply she had admitted that she had told lies all through. The stand that the particulars of the offence were not explained to her, was found to be equally untenable, because in the show-cause notice issued, relevant details were given. In the first information report, and the statement recorded by the police, she had clearly stated that she was raped by the accused persons. But in Court she denied to have stated so. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the Court imposed 15 days' simple imprisonment which is harsh. But that is not the end of the matter. The petitioner filed an application before the High Court stating that a wrong statement was made before the High Court that she had already suffered custody for 15 days, which weighed with the High Court to reduce the sentence.
6 Learned counsel for the petitioner stated that being a girl of tender age, she was pressurized by her mother and uncle to give a false report. This is at variance with the statement made in court during trial to the effect that she had not reported anything to the police. It is a settled position in law that so far as sexual offences are concerned, sanctity is attached to the statement of a victim. This Court, has, in several cases, held that the evidence of the prosecutrix alone is sufficient for the purpose of conviction if it is found to be reliable, cogent and credible. In the present case, on the basis of the allegations made by the petitioner, two persons were arrested and had to face trial and suffered the ignominy of being involved in a serious offence like rape. Their acquittal, may, to a certain extent, have washed away the stigma, but that is not enough. The purpose of enacting Sec. 344, Cr.P.C. corresponding to Sec. 479A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Old Code') appears to be further arm the Court with a weapon to deal with more flagrant cases and not to take away the weapon already in its possession. The object of the legislature underlying enactment of the provision is that the evil of perjury and fabrication of evidence has to be eradicated and can be better achieved now as it is open to the courts to take recourse to Sec. 340(1) (corresponding to Sec. 476 of the Old Code) in cases in which they are failed to take action u/s. 344 Cr.P.C.
7 This section introduces an additional alternative procedure to punish perjury by the very Court before which it is committed in place of old Sec. 479 A which did not have the desired effect to eradicate the evils of perjury. The salient features of this new provision are:
(1) Special powers have been conferred on two specified Courts, namely Court of Session and Magistrate of the First Class, to take cognizance of an offence of perjury committed by a witness in a proceeding before it instead of filing a complaint before a Magistrate and try and punish the offender by following the procedure of summary trials. For summary trial, see Ch. 21.
(2) This power is to be exercised after having the matter considered by the Court only at the time of delivery of the judgment or final order.
(3) The offender shall be given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause before he is punished.
(4) The maximum sentence that may be imposed is 3 month's imprisonment or a fine up to Rs. 500 or both.
(5) The order of the Court is appealable (vide Sec. 351).
(6) The procedure in this section is an alternative to one under Ss. 340-343. The Court has been given an option to proceed to punish summarily under this section or to resort to ordinary procedure by way of complaint u/s. 340 so that, as for instance, where the Court is of opinion that perjury committed is likely to raise complicated questions or deserves more severe punishment than that permitted under this section or the case is otherwise of such a nature or for some reasons considered to be such that the case should be disposed of under the ordinary procedure which would be more appropriate, the Court may chose to do so [vide sub-sec. (3)].
(7) Further proceedings of any trial initiated under this section shall be stayed and thus, any sentence imposed shall also not be executed until the disposal of an appeal or revision against the judgment or order in the main proceedings in which the witness gave perjured evidence or fabricated false evidence [vide sub-sec. (4)].
8 For exercising the powers under the section the Court at the time of delivery of judgment or final order must at the first instance express an opinion to the effect that the witness before it has either intentionally given false evidence or fabricated such evidence. The second condition is that the Court must come to the conclusion that in the interests of justice the witness concerned should be punished summarily by it for the offence which appears to have been committed by the witness. And the third condition is that before commencing the summary trial for punishment the witness must be given reasonable opportunity of showing cause why he should not be so punished. All these conditions are mandatory. [See Narayanswamy V/s. State of Muharashtra, 1971 2 SCC 182].
9 The object of the provision is to deal with the evil perjury in a summary way.
10 The evil of perjury has assumed alarming propositions in cases depending on oral evidence and in order to deal with the menace effectively it is desirable for the courts to use the provision more effectively and frequently than it is presently done.
11 In the case at hand, the court has rightly taken action and we find nothing infirm in the order of the Trial Court and the High Court to warrant interference. The special leave petitions are, accordingly dismissed.
rupareliya
(Expert) 25 December 2009
2001 (0) GLHEL-SC 24074
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Hon'ble Judges:K.T.Thomas, R.P.Sethi and B.N.Agrawal JJ.
Suo Motu Proceedings Against Mr.R.Karuppan, Advocate Versus Union Of India
Writ Petition (Civil) No. 77 of 2001 ; *J.Date :-
MAY 12, 2001
INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860 Section - 191 , 193
Indian Penal Code, 1860 - S. 191, 193 - offence of perjury - petitioner made a statement in petition praying to issue quo warranto against Chief Justice of India contending that Chief Justice of India has attained age of superannuation - in earlier petition petitioner had disputed age of Chief Justice of India in contempt proceedings, still petitioner made a statement that age of Chief Justice of India was not determined by President of India - need to take stem action against persons committing perjury - held, petitioner made statement which he knew to be false - directions given to file complaint against petitioner - steps should be taken to prevent perjury and Court should not take evasive course despite proof of the offence - order accordingly.
Imp.Para: [ 14 ] [ 15 ] [ 16 ]
Equivalent Citation(s):
2001 (5) SCC 289 : AIR 2001 SC 2204 JUDGEMENT :- SETHI, J.
1 Proclaiming to be its President, the respondent Sh. R. Karuppan filed a writ petition in the name of Madras High Court Advocates Association praying for issuance of writ of Quo Warranto against the Hon'ble Chief Justice of India. He also prayed this Court to determine the age of the first respondent in the writ petition as 1.11.1934 and further that the first respondent had attained the age of superannuation on 31.10.1999 and had ceased to hold the office since then. In support of the averments made in the writ petition Shri R. Karuppan (hereinafter referred to as "the respondent") also filed an affidavit.
2 Before the matter was taken up for admission, the Registry of this Court received a petition signed by a number of Advocates claiming to be the members of the said Association and alleging that the Association had not authorised the respondent to file any writ petition in the name of the Association. Ignoring the disputes stated to be existing amongst the members of the Advocates Association, we proceeded to consider the writ petition on the assumption that the petition was either filed on behalf of the Association or by the respondent on his own in his individual capacity as well, particularly when the prayer made was for the issuance of a writ of quo warranto. In the said petition, the respondent had raised the question of the alleged disputed age of the Hon'ble Chief Justice of India.
The writ petition was dismissed in limine observing :
"Now Mr. Karuppan made averments in the present writ petition that 'the petitioner submits that the dispute which has arisen as early as in 1991, undetermined by the President and the operation of Art. 217 is still operative and within the jurisdiction of the President.' He further averred that 'the petitioner submits that the conduct of the President of India, ever since the controversy arose till date only proves that the dispute has never been determined by him or his predecessor'. He further averred that the press note released by the Government of India to the Press Information Bureau on 23.10.2000, reached the notice of the petitioner only after 23.11.2000. In the context of this statement he concealed the fact that copy of the said press note was included in the files of the contempt proceedings initiated against S. K. Sundaram as early as 7.11.2000. Mr. Karuppan admitted before us that he himself appeared in this Court as Advocate for S. K.Sundaram on 20.11.2000."
3 Notice was issued to the respondent requiring him to show cause why prosecution proceedings shall not be initiated against him for offence under Section 193 of the Indian Penal Code.
4 During the pendency of these proceedings 600 and odd persons, claiming to be the members of the Advocates Association submitted in writing that the Association had not passed any Resolution regarding the age of the CJI and that Mr. Karuppan was not authorised to file any case representing the Association. As the notice was issued against the respondent in his individual capacity, we granted him time to file reply to the notice, if he so desired. In reply, the respondent has reiterated the submissions made earlier in the writ petition filed by him. It is submitted that he believed bona fide that the President of India had not determined the age of the Chief Justice of India and even if any determination has been made under Art. 217 of the Constitution, the same is not conclusive for all times. It is contended that the respondent came to know of the Press Information Bureau release, informing that the age of the Chief Justice of India stood determined by the President of India as early as on 16.5.1991 only in December, 2000. The respondent has submitted that he is not guilty of offence of perjury.
5 We have heard the respondent who has appeared in person and examined the whole record.
6 Proved or admitted facts of the case are that one S. K. Sundaram, Advocate sent a telegraphic communication to Dr. Justice A. S. Anand, the Hon'ble Chief Justice of India on 3.11.2000 which read as under :
"I call upon Shriman Dr. A. S. Anand Hon'ble Chief Justice of India to step down from the Constitutional Office of Chief Justice of India forthwith, failing which I will be constrained to move the Criminal Court for offences under Sections 429, 406, 471, Indian Penal Code for falsification of your age, without prejudice to the right to file a writ of quo warranto against you and for a direction to deposit a sum of Rs. 3 crores for usurping to the office of Chief Justice of India even after attaining the age of superannuation."
The said S. K. Sundaram also filed a criminal complaint before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chennai against the CJI. On a note put up by the Registrar General regarding the said telegraphic communication, this Court vide order dated 7.11.2000 found that prima facie the said S. K. Sundaram was guilty of contempt of Court. A notice was issued to him in reply to which he filed his objections. He was represented by the respondent herein. During the pendency of the contempt proceedings this Court was informed that the President of India, in consultation with the Chief Justice of India, decided the question relating to the age of Dr. Justice A. S. Anand as early as on 16.5.1991 holding that the date of birth of Dr. Anand was 1.11.1936. The Court was further informed that for arriving at the conclusion of Dr. Justice Anand's age being 1.11.1936, the President had considered the following documents :
"(1) The certificate of matriculate examination dated 1.9.1951 issued by the University of J & K in respect of Adarsh Sein Anand (the present CJI) which showed explicitly that his date of birth was 1.11.1936. (2) The passport issued to Adarsh Sein Anand (the present CJI) on 3.8.1960, also explicitly showed that his date of birth was 1.11.1936. (3) The report prepared by the then CJI in respect of the age of Dr. Justice A. S. Anand, who was then a Judge of the High Court."
7 The President's Secretariat issued an order way back on 16.5.1991 which read as under :
"The petition from Shri S. K. Sundaram, advocate, Madras, to the President on behalf of his client Shrimati Kasturi Radhakrishnana, Chairperson, Madras Citizenship Progressive Council, Madras and the records have been perused and the matter considered by the President, in consultation with the Chief Justice of India. The President has come the conclusion that the petitions of Shri S. K. Sundaram, Advocate, Madras, in respect of the age of Dr. Justice A. S. Anand of the Madras High Court, be rejected and that no inquiry as stipulated under Art. 217(3) of the Constitution need be undertaken."
8 While disposing of the contempt petition this Court held :
"We have absolutely no doubt that when the President of India resolved the question of age of Dr. Justice A. S. Anand in 1991 when he was the Judge of the High Court, that too pursuant to the contemnor himself raking up the question then, he should have, as a dutiful citizen of India, realised that the said decision attained finality so far as the question of the age of Dr. Justice A. S. Anand is concerned. Such decision was based on very weighty and formidable materials available to the President of India then."
9 The Court found that the contemnor was guilty of gross criminal contempt of Court and accordingly convicted him. He was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for six months, the operation of which was suspended for a period of one month which was later extended upon furnishing of an undertaking by the contemnor. All along during the contempt proceedings, the respondent herein was present in the Court and fully knew that the age of Dr. Justice A. S. Anand had been determined by the President of India on 16.5.1991 in exercise of his powers under Art. 217 of the Constitution.
10 Despite the knowledge of the determination of the age of Dr. Justice A. S. Anand by the President of India and the finding of this Court, the respondent herein filed the present writ petition accompanied by his personal affidavit wherein he stated :
"The petitioner submits that after the passing of the above said resolution, it came to its notice that on 23.10.2000 the Government of India had released a press note to the Press Information Bureau. Therein it had been stated that on 16.5.1991 the President had determined the age of the 1st respondent and that Sundaram's attempt to reopen the said issue in 1991 was rejected. Significantly this press report was not published in the details in Tamil Nadu. This renders the statement dubious and no credence could be attached to this communication."
He further submitted :
"The petitioner submits that the dispute which had arisen as early as in 1991, undetermined by the President and the operation of Art. 217 is still operative and within the jurisdiction of the President."
11 The respondent submitted before us that the averments made by him in his writ petition were correct and that he was not guilty of perjury. Alternatively he submitted that he had no knowledge of the passing of the order by the President of India in 1991, prior to 2.12.2000.
12 Courts are entrusted with the powers of dispensation and adjudication of justice of the rival claims of the parties besides determining the criminal liability of the offenders for offences committed against the society. The Courts are further expected to do justice quickly and impartially not being biased by any extraneous considerations. Justice dispensation system would be wrecked if statutory restrictions are not imposed upon the litigants, who attempt to mislead the Court by filing and relying upon the false evidence particularly in cases, the adjudication of which is depended upon the statement of facts. If the results of the proceedings are to be respected, these issues before the Courts must be resolved to the extent possible in accordance with the truth. The purity of proceedings of the Court cannot be permitted to be sullied by a party on frivolous, vexatious or insufficient grounds or relying upon false evidence inspired by extraneous considerations or revengeful desire to harass or spite his opponent. Sanctity of the affidavits has to be preserved and protected discouraging the filing of irresponsible statements, without any regard to accuracy.
13 At common law Courts took action against a person who was shown to have made a statement, material in the proceedings, which he knew to be false or did not believe to be true. The offence committed by him is known as perjury. Dealing with the history of the offence, Stanford H. Kadish in "Encyclopedia of Crime and Justice" (Vol. 3) observed :
"History of the offense
Before witnesses had any formal role in trials, there was no need for a perjury law. In the Middle Ages, when the English common law was developing, trial by battle was used to test a sworn accusation. Similarly, for the sworn denial of a serious charge based on mere suspicion, an ordeal administered by a priest was the predominant mode of trial unit it was abolished in 1215 as superstitious. Finally, at least until the Assize of Clarendon (1166), less serious accusations could be successfully answered by "compurgation", that is, by obtaining a sufficient number of "oath helpers" to support the defendant's credibility.
Trials in the modern sense began to develop only in the thirteenth century. Little is reliably known about the conduct of jury trials prior to the sixteenth century, but in civil cases, it seems that genuine witnesses were permitted to give their accounts, although they could not be compelled to appear. In early criminal cases, the jury seems always to have included some who, aware of the commission of a crime in their community, brought the suspect before a Judge. Those witnesses who did attend these early trials were perceived as part of the jury and retired with them to deliberate, often to make their disclosures in secret. It was the verdict, not the testimony, that was perceived as either true or false; the only remedy for falsehood remotely akin to a perjury prosecution was a seldom-invoked procedure called "the writ of attaint," created in 1202 and not abolished formally until 1825. Though attaint, the jury would be punished for a 'false' verdict and the verdict itself overturned.
Witnesses first testified under oath in criminal cases on behalf of the Crown in the sixteenth century. No witnesses for the defense were permitted until the mid-seventeenth century, since they would have been witnesses against the Crown, and not until 1702 were defense witnesses permitted to be sworn (1 Anne, St. 2, C. 9, sec. 3 (1701) (England (repealed)). By the late seventeenth century the jury had lost all its testimonial functions, and witnesses thus became the sole means of bringing facts to the Judge's and jury's attention.
Since the early common law had no established mechanism for dealing with false swearing by witnesses, the Court of Star Chamber assumed for itself the power to punish perjury. This authority was confirmed by statute in 1487 (Star Chamber Act, 3 Hen. 5, C. 1 (1487) (England) (repealed)). The first detailed statute against false swearing was enacted in 1562 (5 Eliz. 1, C. 9 (1562) (England) (Repealed)). When the Star Chamber was abolished in 1640, its judicially defined offence of perjury passed into English common law, reaching any cases of false testimony not covered by the terms of the statute.
Edward Coke, whose views strongly influenced early American law, wrote in his Third Institute, published in 1641, that perjury was committed when, after a 'lawful oath' was administered in a judicial proceeding', a person swore 'absolutely and falsely' concerned a point 'material' to the issue in question (164). In this form, the law remained unchanged into the twentieth century."
14 In India, law relating to the offence of perjury is given a statutory definition under Section 191 and Chapter XI of the Indian Penal Code, incorporated to deal with the offences relating to giving false evidence against public justice. The offences incorporated under this Chapter are based upon recognition of the decline of moral values and erosion of sanctity of oath. Unscrupulous litigants are found daily resorting to utter blatant falsehood in the Courts which has, to some extent, resulted in polluting the judicial system. It is a fact, though unfortunate, that a general impression is created that most of the witnesses coming in the Courts despite taking oath make false statements to suit the interests of the parties calling them. Effective and stern action is required to be taken for preventing the evil of perjury, concededly let lose by vested interest and professional litigants. The mere existence of the penal provisions to deal with perjury would be a cruel joke with the society unless the Courts stop to take an evasive recourse despite proof of the commission of the offence under Chapter XI of the Indian Penal Code. If the system is to survive, effective action is the need of the time. The present case is no exception to the general practice being followed by many of the litigants in the country.
15 Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of this case, the record of proceedings in Suo Motu Contempt Petition (Criminal) No. 5 of 2000 and Writ Petition No. 77 of 2001, we are prima facie satisfied that the respondent herein, in his affidavit filed in support of the writ petition (for the purposes of being used in the judicial proceedings, i.e. writ petition), has wrongly made a statement that the age of Dr. Justice A. S. Anand has not been determined by the President of India in terms of Art. 217 of the Constitution. We are satisfied that such a statement supported by an affidavit of the respondent was known to him to be false which he believed to be false and/or at least did not believe to be true. It is not disputed that an affidavit is evidence within the meaning of Section 191 of the Indian Penal Code and a person swearing to a false affidavit is guilty of perjury punishable under Section 193, IPC. The respondent herein, being legally bound by an oath to state the truth in his affidavit accompanying the petition is prima facie held to have made a false statement which constitutes an offence of giving false evidence as defined under Section 191, IPC, punishable under Section 193, IPC.
16 With the object of eradicating the evil of perjury, we empower the Registrar General of this Court to depute an officer of the rank of Deputy Registrar or above of the Court to file a complaint under Section 193 of the Indian Penal Code against the respondent herein, before a Magistrate of competent jurisdiction at Delhi. Such officer is directed to file such complaint and take all steps necessary for prosecuting the complaint. .
