@ Jumping folks (Meenal / Jamai and Ambika),
It is not going to be the last word from Apex Court especially from a particular pro women Lordship and it would be interesting to see the fate of same women in society when one amidst the Re. Judgment Lordship’s very soon become the next CJI!
However, these besides the point my point of view is best defied by quoting the very Apex Court in catena of decisions and placing reliance on these and others as in my opinion this Re. Judgment from Apex Court is arbitrary, unfair, unreasonable, unjustified, oppressive, contradictory, conflicting, discriminatory, and unconstitutional provision of law which is bound momentarily to result in absolute absurdity and having no nexus or rational relation with the real objective sought to be achieved. It is just matter of quick time that few of the Rights Activist will approach the Hon’ble Apex Court for Justice challenging the Constitutional validity of the same and for proper, pragmatic and meaningful application of the law.
However, if these tricia (@ Meenal / Jamai and Ambika) commenting so passionately on Re. Apex Court Judgment have an iota of criminal read with societal classification of Statutes as in a in-depth legal knowledge then they should especially know even the word complaint as appeared in the definition of respondent under Section 2(q) of the Act has not been defined anywhere in the Act. Further it is not provided that the definition of complaint can be considered the same as provided under the Cr. P.C but at the same time it is also not prohibited. In view of this, the definition of complaint can appropriately be seen in Cr. PC which goes as under:
2. (d) "complaint" means any allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate, with a view to his taking action under this Code, that some person, whether known or unknown, has committed an offence, but does not include a police report.
Hence, it is clear by this definition that a complaint as provided in Cr. P.C. can only be for an offence. As mentioned hereinabove only two offences have been mentioned bl**dy hell in this Act and those are (1) under S. 31 and (2) under S. 33. To prudent mind who prefer harmonious construction over ‘classification construction” to appease only a particular segment of society it appears that this word complaint appeared in the definition of respondent has been used for initiating proceedings for these two offences and an aggrieved wife or female living in a relationship in the nature of a marriage has been given a right to file a complaint against a relative of the husband or the male partner. This word complaint cannot be considered beyond the scope of the main provision of this Section which has been defined in first part of S. 2(q) that is for any relief under this Act. As provided in S. 31 of the Act, a complaint can be filed against a person who has not complied with a protection order or interim protection order.
Thus, it is clear by the definition of respondent that for obtaining any relief under this Act an application can be filed or a proceeding can be initiated against only adult male person and on such application or under such proceeding, aforementioned protection order can be passed. Obviously those orders will also be passed only against the adult male person. As provided under Section 31 of the Act, non-compliance of a protection order or an interim protection order has been made punishable and as such it can be said that the complaint for this offence can only be filed against such adult male person/respondent who has not complied with the protection order.
The Hon’ble the then CJI A. N. Ray, K. K. Mathew, V. R. Krishna Iyer and S. Murtaza Fazal Ali, JJ. In Re. Dwarka Parsad versus Dwarka Das Saraf (AIR 1975 SC 1758) has rightly propounded that
“if on a fair construction, the principle provision is clear, a
proviso cannot expand or limit it. A proviso must be
limited to the subject matter of the enacting clause. A
proviso must prima facie be read and considered in
relation to the principle matter to which it is a proviso. It is
not a separate or independent enactment.”
Hon’ble Justice S.B. Sinha and Markandey Katju of Supreme Court of India in Re.: S.R. Batra and Anr. VS Smt. Taruna Batra observed with a heavy heart regarding draftsmanship of the DV Act that
“No doubt, the definition of ‘shared household' in Section 2(s) of the Act is not very happily worded, and appears to be the result of clumsy drafting, but we have to give it an interpretation which is sensible and which does not lead to chaos in society”. It is most humbly submitted that same is the case with drafting of section 2(q) of DV Act which is absolutely absurd and seems to deliver altogether a different connotation than intended by the legislature enacting a special statute for protection to women and children under Article 15(3) of the Constitution of India. Hon’ble Justice S.B. Sinha and Markandey Katju of Supreme Court has also propounded that “it is well settled that any interpretation which leads to absurdity should not be accepted”.
Hon'ble Justice Fazal Ali and Sabyasachi Mukharjee in Re.: Pratibha Rani V/s. Suraj Kumar (AIR 1985 S.C. 628 at page 630) in a most pious moments with divine powers conferred by Saraswati, has honestly confessed and cautioned that
“Sometimes the law which is meant to import justice and fair play to the citizens or people of the country is so torn and twisted by a morbid interpretative process that instead of giving heaven to the disappointed and dejected litigants it negatives their well established rights in law.”
Kindly note in legal Forums come for discussions with legal bent of minds not with just kitty party tu – tu mai – mai style (read khaps) as it will not lead you much further. If any of you three have any pure legal points of Law to say then the board is wide open for proper legal debates otherwise enjoy few thumbs up and thumps down and ultimately the same legal point remains unattended to.
All the best jumping folks.............