Leading case law on plea bargaining
The status of accused, who pleads not guilty to the charge and claims to be tried is incomparable with the status of the accused, who pleads guilty and invokes remedy of plea-bargaining. In that sense, the two sets of accused cannot be equated or said to be similarly placed. Moreover, the provision, such as Section 265-E, providing for sentence is a concession offered to accused who voluntarily resorts to plea-bargaining, so as to avoid the uncertainty of the trial, the term of sentence, if found guilty and also the litigation costs and time. Until the introduction of Chapter XXI-A in the Code, the law of the land was to discourageplea bargaining, being against public policy. Thus, the argument of discrimination is unavailable to the accused, who, at his own volition, 38 210911
elects the remedy of plea-bargaining. As regards the effect of providing for fixed sentence period in cases of plea-bargaining, even though the principal substantive law does not provide for minimum sentence, we fail to understand as to how this argument can be taken forward by the accused electing remedy ofplea bargaining at his own volition. Notably, the validity of Section 265-E is not put in issue in the present case. Neither the argument of discrimination, nor the effect of the provision resulting in imposing minimum sentence of one-fourth of the punishment provided or extendable can be taken forward by these petitioners.
