A very good Judgement by Punjab and Haryana High Court in Section 24 application.
The court can not be silent, when an application has been moved u/s 340 CrPC r/w 195 CrPC that someone has lied under affidavit in the court. In the instant case, the husband had moved an application for perjury, which was not decided by the court.
One thing I have seen in multitude of cases, where perjury application has been filed for lying about salary etc by wife, the wife does not press for maintenance amount thereafter.
The crux of the judgement is as follows:
A glance through the impugned order would reveal that the learned
trial Court has given a go by to the provisions of Section 340 Cr.P.C. The
approach adopted by the learned trial Court is unwholesome and is depreciable.
The impugned order is absolutely silent as to whether the application has been
dismissed or allowed, if so for which reasons. In consequence of the preceding
discussion the trial Court is directed to decide the application under
discussion in accordance with law. This appeal stands disposed of accordingly.
CRA No. 197 SB of 2010 (O&M) 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
CRA No. 197 SB of 2010 (O&M)
Date of decision: 25-1-2010
Sunny Bhumbla .........Appellant Vs
Shashi .........Respondent CORAM:- HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARBANS LAL
Present: Shri K.S.Boparai, Advocate, for the appellant. HARBANS LAL, J.
This appeal is directed against the order dated 5.12.2008 Annexure
P-1 passed by the court of learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Saheed Bhagat
Singh Nagar vide which he allowed the petition moved under Section 9 of the
Hindu Marriage Act, for restitution of conjugal rights leaving the parties to
bear their own costs and rejected the application moved under Section 195/340
Cr.P.C.
I have heard the learned counsel for the appellant, besides
perusing the record with due care and circumspection. The learned counsel for
the appellant has submitted with great eloquence that after the respondent
admitted in her cross-examination about her employment, salary and inheritance
of the landed property, she again placed on record another affidavit dated
27.8.2008 solemnly affirming therein that she had inadvertently not mentioned
about the source of income as well as employment in the earlier affidavit dated
14.8.2008. Thereafter the appellant moved an application under Section 195 of
Cr.P.C. for initiating proceedings against the respondent for submitting a
false affidavit CRA No. 197 SB of 2010 (O&M) 2 before the learned trial Court,
in order to get more maintenance from the appellant. The learned trial Court
had assured the appellant that his said application shall be decided alongwith
the main case. While deciding the main petition, in paragraph No. 13 of the
judgment it has been observed that "in support of her claim for interim
maintenance under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, the
respondent/applicant had made certain assertions, which were found to be
totally false and the same had apparently been done by her in a deliberate
manner. Consequently even an application for initiating suitable proceedings
against her on account of her having submitted a false affidavit was also filed
by the petitioner on 3.9.2008. Thereafter, the respondent did not press her
claim for interim maintenance, but the same did not absolve her of the
liability of the aforesaid lapse. This court, however, does not wish to
initiate any such proceedings against the respondent with the hope that sooner
or later, the parties may be in a position to resolve their dispute or else
this young couple may adopt such other means so that they can part their ways
in a peaceful manner and therefore, with a view to avoid undue complication of
the matrimonial dispute, no action on account of submitting of the above false
affidavit etc. is being initiated against the respondent."
It is further argued that the learned trial Court has overlooked
the fact that the respondent has used the false affidavit in the judicial
proceedings. Therefore, all the ingredients of the offences of cheating,
forging and perjury etc. are made out and consequently, the order passed by the
learned trial Court in not initiating the proceedings under Section 195 read
with Section 340 Cr.P.C. is illegal.
CRA No. 197 SB of 2010 (O&M) 3 I have given a deep and thoughtful
consideration to these submissions.
A careful perusal of the observations rendered by the learned trial
Court in paragraph No. 13 of the impugned judgment would reveal that there is
not even a shred of reference to the application moved under Section 195 read
with Section 340 Cr.P.C. This apart, no specific reasons have been apportioned
for not initiating the action on the basis of the alleged affidavit. The said
application having been moved under the provisions of the Code of Criminal
Procedure was required to be disposed of separately. It was not desirable on
the part of the learned trial Court to decide the said application in a slip
shod manner by making mere passing reference to the alleged affidavit. In the
application moved under Section 340 of the Cr.P.C. if the Court deems fit,the
inquiry has to be held whereas in the present one, the impugned order is
absolutely silent as to whether or not inquiry was held. There is specific
procedure which is to be followed while disposing of an application moved under
Section 340 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Section 340 of the Criminal
Procedure Code reads as under:-
"340.Procedure in cases mentioned in Sec.195--(1) When, upon an
application made to it in this behalf or otherwise any Court is of the opinion
that it is expedient in the interest of justice that an inquiry should be made
into any offence referred to to in cl (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 195,
which appears to have been committed in or in relation to to a proceeding in
that Court, or as the case may be, in respect of of a document produced or
given in evidence in a proceeding in that Court, CRA No. 197 SB of 2010 (O&M) 4
such Court may, after such preliminary inquiry, if any, as it thinks necessary.
(a) record a finding to that effect.
(b) make a complaint thereof in writing
(c) send it to a Magistrate of the first class having jurisdiction.
(d) take sufficient security for the appearance of the accused before
such Magistrate, or if the alleged offence is non- bailable and the Court
thinks it necessary so to do, send the accused in custody to such Magistrate;
and (e) bind over any person to appear and give evidence before such
Magistrate.
(2) The power conferred on a Court by sub-section (1) in respect of an
offence may, in any case where that Court has neither made a complaint under
sub-section (1) in respect of that offence nor rejected an application for the
making of such complaint, be exercised by the Court to which such former Court
is subordinate within the meaning of sub-section (4) of Sec.195.
(3) A complaint made under this section shall be signed (a)
where the Court making complaint is a High Court, by such officer of the Court
as the Court may appoint.
(b) in any other case, by the presiding officer of the Court,
and
(4) In this section, "Court" has the same meaning as in CRA No.
197 SB of 2010 (O&M) 5 Sec.195."
A glance through the impugned order would reveal that the learned
trial Court has given a go by to the provisions of Section 340 Cr.P.C. The
approach adopted by the learned trial Court is unwholesome and is depreciable.
The impugned order is absolutely silent as to whether the application has been
dismissed or allowed, if so for which reasons. In consequence of the preceding
discussion the trial Court is directed to decide the application under
discussion in accordance with law. This appeal stands disposed of accordingly.
(HARBANS LAL)
JUDGE
January 25, 2010
RSK
NOTE: Whether to be referred to the Reporter or not? Yes/No
Karnataka High Court
Equivalent citations: AIR 1975 Kant 162, ILR 1975 KAR 1000, 1975 (1) KarLJ 506
Bench: M Sadanandaswamy
V. Narayana Bhat vs E. Subbanna Bhat on 2/12/1974
JUDGMENT
1. The appellant is the plaintiff. The suit was for recovery of damages of
Rs. 1,000 for defamation'. The defendent-respondent presented a complaint on
28-11-1964 to the Station House Officer, Puttur Police Station, imputing an
offence under Section 392 of the Indian Penal Code against the plaintiff. The
plaintiff alleged that the defamatory statements contained in the complaint
brought him disrepute and infamy in society. He alleged that Police Officers
came to his house, questioned him about the contents of the complaint and wanted
to search his house. He also alleged that he had to go with the police and
remain in the Police station till the evening and had to visit the Police
station on several occasions on account of this complaint. The defendant
admitted having lodged a complaint against the plaintiff to the police and
asserted that the plaintiff along with other persons mentioned in the complaint
petition committed acts attributed to them in the complaint. He also pleaded
that the statements made in the complaint were made in the interests of law and
order and to seek justice. The trial court held that the complaint filed by the
defendant is not false or frivolous or vexatious to the knowledge of the de-
fondant, that the plaintiff failed to show that he was defamed in any way by the
allegations in the complaint and dismissed the suit without going into the
question of quantum of damages. The lower appellate court held that the
imputations made in the complaint petition are defamatory per se. It further
held that the defendant's plea of justification by proof had not been
substantiated. But it came to the conclusion that the statements contained in
the complaint are protected by absolute privilege and that the question of
malice or want of justification does not arise. Hence, it confirmed the decision
of the trial court.
2. The complaint was enquired into by the Police and found to be false.
Thereafter, the police prosecuted the defendant for filing a false complaint and
he was convicted, but the conviction was set aside in appeal.
3. It is contended by Mr. Ganapathi Bhat, appearing for the plaintiff-
appellant, that the statements contained in the complaint filed by the defendant
to the police are not covered by absolute privilege and that the defendant could
claim only qualified privilege for the same. It is therefore urged by him that
the defendant must prove that he made the statements in good faith and that if
he succeeds in proving the same then the burden shifts on to the plaintiff to
prove malice and that the finding of the lower appellate court is erroneous. The
question for decision in this appeal is whether the defendant could claim
absolute privilege for the statements made in the complaint or only qualified
privilege for the same.
4. In Watson v. McEwan, (1905) AC 480, H.L., the question was whether
absolute privilege protected a witness against the consequences of statements
made to the client and solicitor in preparing the brief for trial. Lord Halsbury
observed as follows at page 487:
"It appears to me that the privilege which surrounds the evidence actually
given in a Court of Justice necessarily involves the same privilege in the case
of making a statement to a solicitor and other persons who are engaged in the
conduct of proceedings in Courts of justice when what is intended to be stated
in a Court of justice is narrated to them that is, to the solicitor or writer to
the Signet. If it were otherwise, I think what one of the learned counsel has
with great cogency pointed out would apply-- that from time to time in these
various efforts which have been made to make actual witnesses responsible in the
shape of an action against them for the evidence they have given, the difficulty
in the way of those who were bringing the action would have been removed at once
by saying, "I do not bring the action against you for what you said in the
witness box, but I bring the action against you for what you told the solicitor
you were about to say in the witness box". If that could be done the object for
which the privilege exists is gone, because then no witness could be called: no
one would know whether what he was going to say was relevant to the question in
debate between the parties. A witness would only have to say, "I shall not tell
you anything; I may have an action brought against me tomorrow if I do;
therefore I shall not give you any information at all." It is very obvious that
the public policy which renders the protection of witnesses necessary for the
administration of justice must as a necessary consequence involve that which is
a step towards and is part of the administration of justice namely, the
preliminary examination of witnesses to find out what they can prove. It may be
that to some extent it seems to impose a hardship, but after all the hardship is
not to be compared with that which would arise if it were impossible to
administer justice, because people would be afraid to give their . testimony."
In AIR 1924 All 535 (Majju v. Lachman Prasad) the Full Bench held that in the
case of a report made to a Police Officer, the question whether it is covered by
absolute privilege is governed by the English common law and since the
statements made in the course of a judicial proceeding are absolutely privileged
in England, they must be held to be absolutely privileged in India following an
earlier decision of the Full Bench of the same court in ILR 40 All 341 = (AIR
1918 All 69). In Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 24, third Edition, at page 49,
it is stated as follows:--
"89. Absolute privilege: No action lies, whether against Judges, counsel,
jury, witnesses, or parties, for words spoken in the ordinary course of any
proceedings before any court or tribunal recognised by law. It is manifest that
the administration of justice would be paralysed if those who were engaged in it
were liable to actions of libel or slander upon the imputation that they had
acted maliciously and not bona fide. Thus, all witnesses or parties speaking
with reference to the matter before the court have privilege for their evidence,
whether oral or in writing, relevant or irrelevant, malicious or not. The
privilege extends not only to words spoken but also to documents properly used
and regularly prepared for use in the proceedings......"
The last sentence in the above quotation is based on the decision in 1905 AC
480. In Salmond on Torts, fifteenth Edition, page 208, it is stated as
follows:--
"Judicial privilege.
The authorities establish beyond all question this : that neither party,
witness, counsel, jury, nor Judge can be put to answer civilly or criminally for
words spoken in office; that no action of libel or slander lies, whether against
Judges, counsel, witnesses, or parties, for words written or spoken in the
course of any proceeding before any court recognised by law, and this though the
words written or spoken maliciously without any justification or excuse, and
from personal ill-will and anger against the person defamed. This absolute
privilege has been conceded on the grounds of public policy to ensure freedom of
speech where it is essential that freedom of speech should exist, and with the
knowledge that courts of justice are presided over by those who from their high
character are not likely to abuse the privilege, and who have the power and
ought to have the will to check any abuse of it by those who appear before them.
The privilege extends to all courts, superior and inferior, civil and military.
The privilege extends not merely to Judges but witnesses, parties, and
advocates. It includes not merely statements made by a witness in court but also
statements made by him to a party, or to the party's solicitor, in the course of
preparation for trial. For it would not be of much use to grant absolute
privilege to what is said in court, if & plaintiff could say: 'I cannot sue you
for what you said in the witness-box, but I am going to sue you for what you
told your solicitor you were going to say in it.'"
Here also reliance is placed on 1905 AC 480.
5. In AIR 1926 Mad 521--(Sanjivi Reddy v. Koneri Reddi) the defendant
presented a petition to the Deputy Magistrate praying that the plaintiffs and
some others should be bound over under Section 107 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure. The Magistrate sent the petition to the Police for enquiry and
report. The police reported after enquiry that there was no foundation for the
allegations in the petition. The Magistrate thereafter dismissed the petition.
It was held that the statements made to the police officer with a view to their
being repeated before the Magistrate were absolutely privileged. It was further
held that the petition presented under Section 107, Cr. P. C. was invested under
the common law of England with absolute privilege which attaches not merely to
the actual proceedings of any tribunal exercising judicial functions but to all
preliminary steps which are in accordance with the recognized and reasonable
procedure of such a tribunal. The decision in 1905 AC 480 was followed. In AIR
1941 Mad 26 (Bapa-lal & Co. v. Krishnaswamy Iyer) it was held that a complaint
to a Police Officer being a statement which the complainant is prepared if
called upon to do so, to substantiate upon oath later is absolutely orivileged
following the decision of the Division Bench in AIR 1926 Mad 521 (Sanjivi Reddy
v. Koneri Reddi). In AIR 1941 Mad 538 (Vattappa Kone v. Muthu Karuppan) the
allegations made by the defendants in their statement to the village Magistrate
were held to be absolutely privileged following the decision in AIR 1926 Mad
521. In AIR 1939 Cal 477 (Madhab Chandra v. Nirod Chandra) certain defamatory
statements were made by the defendants against the plaintiff in certain reports
to the police. The decision in 1905 AC 480 was followed. The observation by Lord
Halsbury to the effect that "the overwhelming consideration that a witness must
be protected for' a preliminary statement or he has no protection at all" was
referred to. The contention that witnesses and parties stand on a different
footing was rejected, and it was observed:
"It may be said however that when a party comes to depose on oath there can
be no distinction with regard to his liability to answer questions as between
him and any other witness, and the same must be said with regard to statement
preparatory to giving evidence on oath."
It was further observed that in a sense the statements made to the police
appear to be in this respect on a stronger ground than the statements made to
the solicitor as reported in the English case 1905 AC 480 and it was observed as
follows:--
"For statements made to a solicitor may or may not be followed up by
judicial proceeding, the matter being at the option of the party consulting such
solicitor, in which case the statements would slumber in the office of the
solicitor, as Lord Halsbury said. But the party lodging information before the
police has no option and the police are empowered to So on with the matter and
investigate, leading to other results."
The decision in AIR 1926 Mad 521 (Sanjivi Reddi v. Koneri Reddy was followed.
In (Lachhman v. Pyarchand) the defendants made a report to the Station House
Officer of the police station. In a suit filed by the plaintiff, against whom
defamatory statements had been made in the said report, it was held that the
statements were absolutely privileged. The decisions in AIR 1941 Mad 538 and AIR
1939 Cal 477 were followed, and the decision of Blagden J. in ILR (1943) 1 Cal
250 (Mayr v. Rivaz) was dissented from.
6. Mr. Ganapathi Bhat relied on the decisions in Gangappagouda v. Basayya,
AIR 1943 Bom 167; Maroti 'sada-shiv v. Godubai Narayana Rao, , and Mayr v.
Rivaz, ILR (1943) 1 Cal 250 in support of his contention that the report to the
police officer filed by the defendant is not covered by absolute privilege, but
that the defendant could only claim a qualified privilege In AIR 1943 Bom 167 a
Mahalkari holding a preliminary enquiry relating to the conduct of a police
patil, on the directions of the Collector in order to report to the Collector,
recorded the statements of the defendants. It was held that the Mahalkari was
not acting in a judicial capacity nor was exercising the attributes of a Court
and that the evidence given before the Mahalkari in such an enquiry is not
absolutely privileged. In it was held that the defamatory statement made before
the police officer in the course of investigation carried on under the Criminal
Procedure Code cannot be regarded as absolutely privileged but that only a
qualified privilege attaches to them. The learned single Judge who decided the
case observed that the Police Officer who recorded the statement cannot be
stated to have been acting in a judicial capacity or exercising the attributes
of a Court and that the statements were not absolutely privileged. The decision
in ILR (1943) 1 Cal 250 was followed and the decisions in AIR 1926 Mad 521 and
AIR 1941 Mad 26 were dissented from since the learned Single Judge felt that he
was bound by the decision of the Division Bench-- AIR 1943 Bom 167. In ILR
(1943) 1 Cal 250, the defendant wrote a letter to the Commissioner of Police
containing passages admittedly defamatory to the plaintiff. The learned Single
Judge Blagden J. considered the decision of a Division Bench of the same court
in AIR 1939 Cal 477 but did not follow the same. The decision in AIR 1941 Mad 26
was also dissented from. It was held that the defendant was not protected by
absolute privilege. The learned Judge considered two illustrations to show why a
complaint to a Police Officer cannot come under the principle in 1905 AC 480 and
should not be considered as absolutely privileged. The first is a case of the
Editor of a newspaper who publishes a statement that AB is a murderer and states
therein that he would be prepared later to substantiate the statement upon oath
in a judicial proceeding which may be taken by AB. In such a case, according to
the learned Judge, if AB takes proceedings against the editor, he can plead
absolute privilege if the aforesaid principle applies. The other illustration
referred to by the learned Judge is that in case a report to the police is made
which culminates in a prosecution and the accused is acquitted, it is open to
the person charged to sue the complaint for malicious prosecution and in order
to succeed in the suit, the plaintiff would have to prove malice; but if the
charge appears to the police to be groundless and no prosecution follows, the
person against whom the allegations are made in the report to the police would
have no civil remedy at all; if those allegations are absolutely privileged; and
it would appear odd that a person who makes baseless allegations in a complaint
to the police is in a safer position than a person whose allegations to the
police may be found to be sufficiently justified to result in a prosecution
though it may prove unsuccessful.
7. The reason why absolute privilege is extended to the statement of a
witness made prior to the commencement of a judicial proceeding is based on
public policy as stated by Lord Halsbury in 1905 AC 480. There is no reason why
the principle stated in the said decision should not be extended to a party and
the absolute privilege confined only to the statement of a witness under such
circumstances. Of the two instances referred to by Blagden J. in ILR (1943) 1
Cal 250 the first refers to the editor of a newspaper as stated above. But it is
doubtful whether the editor of the newspaper in such circumstances can claim
absolute privilege on the basis of the principle laid down in 1905 AC 480. With
regard to the second illustration referred to by Blagden J., if the complaint to
the police results in an unsuccessful prosecution then the person defamed can
only claim damages for malicious prosecution and not for defamation. In case the
complaint to the police does not result in a prosecution, then also the persons
defamed have no remedy in respect of defamatory statements made in such a
complaint to the police. But if a false complaint is made to the police, the
person who makes such a false complaint would be punishable either under Section
182 or Section 211 of the Indian Penal Code. It cannot therefore be said that a
person against whom false charges are made in a complaint to the police, even if
no further action is taken by the police authorities on such complaint, goes
scot-free. I would, therefore, prefer to follow the earlier view of the Division
Bench of the same High Court in AIR 1939 Cal 477 and the other decisions
referred to above which take the view that a complaint to a police officer is
absolutely privileged.
8. It must therefore be held that the statements made by the defendant in his
complaint to the police officer are absolutely privileged'. This appeal is
accordingly dismissed. Parties shall bear their own costs in this appeal.
9. Appeal dismissed.
Satendra Kumar Gupta vs State Of U.P. And Anr. on 22/2/2008
JUDGMENT
A.K. Roopanwal, J.
1. This criminal revision is directed against the order dated 27.9.06 passed
by the Family Court, Gorakhpur in criminal case No. 340/03, Smt. Kanchan Gupta
v. Satendra Kumar Gupta, under Section 125, Cr.P.C. whereby the court allowed
the application and granted maintenance of Rs. 3,500/- p.m. to O.P. No. 2 and
Rs. 3,500/- p.m. for her son from the date of the petition under Section 125,
Cr.P.C.
2. It appears from the record that an application under Section 13, Hindu
Marriage Act was moved by the revisionist against O.P. No. 2 before the Family
Court, Gorakhpur and this was registered as case No. 54/03. The wife Smt.
Kanchan Gupta also filed an application under Section 125, Cr.P.C. against the
revisionist Satendra Kumar Gupta for her maintenance and for the maintenance of
her son and this case was registered as case No. 340/03.
3. The case of the revisionist was that O.P. No. 2 had neglected him and is
not taking his care and therefore, their marriage be desolved by a decree of
divorce. The Case of O.P. No. 2 was that the husband had neglected her and her
son and therefore, the divorce suit filed by the husband was liable to be
dismissed and she and her son are entitled to maintenance. Both the parties led
oral and documentary evidence in support of their cases. The trial court framed
as many as six issues for decision of the case. After perusal of the evidence
the trial court dismissed the application for divorce which is not the subject
matter of this revision as the only prayer has been made before this Court is
about the maintenance under Section 125, Cr.P.C. filed by the wife. The
application for maintenance was allowed in the manner stated above which gave
rise to this revision.
4. I have heard Mr. Dilip Gupta, learned Counsel for the revisionist, Mr.
K.K. Mishra for O.P. No. 2 and perused the record.
5. Mr. Gupta argued that the trial court has wrongly assessed the income of
the revisionist and has also wrongly fixed the quantum of maintenance,
therefore, findings in this regard are liable to be quashed. In this regard he
argued that the trial court based his findings on the basis of that record which
was subsequently found to be not reliable by the court itself and therefore, the
above findings should be quashed and matter be remanded back to the court for
afresh decision. The above argument was refuted by the other side.
6. A look at the impugned judgment would reveal that the findings regarding
the income and the quantum of maintenance have been recorded by the trial court
on the basis of the record of the income tax assessments for certain years
relied upon by the wife. The husband challenged the truthfulness of these
records by moving an application under Section 340, Cr.P.C. even during the
continuance of the proceedings but the trial court decided the application under
Section 125, Cr.P.C. without deciding the application under Section 340, Cr.P.C.
However, after the decision of the application under Section 125, Cr.P.C. on
27.9.06 the same court decided the application under Section 340, Cr.P.C. vide
order dated 26.2.07. In the last paragraph of this order it was observed by the
court that the judgment in case No. 340/03 has been obtained by the wife on the
basis of forged evidence. The application under Section 340, Cr.P.C. was allowed
by the court and criminal proceedings were instituted against the wife and
others. Learned Counsel for the revisionist says that in view of the decision on
the application under Section 340, Cr.P.C. judgment passed in the proceedings
under Section 125, Cr.P.C. cannot be allowed to stand and therefore, this should
be set aside.
7. Learned Counsel for O.P. No. 2 argued that the procedure adopted by the
trial court for the decision of the application under Section 340, Cr.P.C. is
not a correct procedure and therefore, the argument advanced by the learned
Counsel for the revisionist should not be accepted.
8. In my opinion, it cannot be a valid consideration for deciding the
controversy between the parties as to whether the procedure in initiating the
proceedings under Section 340, Cr.P.C. adopted by the trial court was correct or
wrong. The only consideration for testing the propriety of the judgment under
Section 125, Cr.P.C. is as to whether the decision on the application under
Section 340, Cr.P.C. can be a valid consideration or not for deciding the
application under Section 125, Cr.P.C. and in that regard it can safely be said
that once findings recorded on the application under Section 340, Cr.P.C. have
not been set aside by any competent court of law, hence, these findings are
binding upon the parties and in view of these findings this can very well be
said that the evidence on the basis of which the wife got judgment in the
proceedings under Section 125, Cr.P.C. cannot be said to be a good judgment as
this judgment is based on that evidence which has been held to be forged by that
very court which had decided the proceedings under Section 125, Cr.P.C.
9. In view of the above, I am in agreement with the argument advanced by the
learned Counsel for the revisionist that the judgment and order passed in the
proceedings under Section 125, Cr.P.C. registered as case No. 340/03 are liable
to be quashed and the matter is liable to be remanded back for afresh decision.
10. Accordingly, revision is allowed. Judgment and order dated 27.9.06 is set
aside so far as it relates to the proceedings under Section 125, Cr.P.C.
registered at case No. 340/03. The matter is remanded back to the trial court
for afresh decision on the basis of the evidence on record. The parties may be
allowed to lead fresh evidence, if they so like.
Src : https://indiankanoon.org/doc/157028/
