Equality in Land Acquisition Compensation: Expanding the Scope of Section 28-A: Andanayya & Ors. v. Deputy Chief Engineer & Ors.

1.Title

Andanayya and Ors. v. Deputy Chief Engineer and Ors. Civil Appeal Nos. ……… of 2026 (Arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 2587–2593 of 2021) 
Citation: 2026 INSC 293

2.Bench & Quorum

Justice M. M. Sundresh and Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh. 

3.Procedural History of the Case

i.Lands at Mavanoor Village, Hubballi Taluk, were acquired for construction of the Hubballi–Ankola Broad Gauge Line. A preliminary notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was issued on 18.04.2002. The Land Acquisition Officer (LAO) passed an award under Section 11 on 31.03.2003 fixing compensation at Rs. 40,000/- per acre.
ii.Some landowners sought a reference under Section 18 of the Act. The Reference Court enhanced the compensation to Rs. 2,00,000/- per acre vide judgment dated 17.11.2006. The appellants, who did not seek a reference, filed their first application under Section 28-A on 01.02.2007 within the 90-day limitation. This first application was allowed on 02.04.2013 on the basis of the Reference Court award.
iii.Separately, appeals before the High Court of Karnataka by other landowners were allowed on 22.07.2013, further enhancing compensation to Rs. 3,50,000/- per acre. The appellants then filed a second application under Section 28-A on 25.11.2013, seeking re-determination on the basis of this enhanced High Court award. The LAO rejected this second application. The appellants' Writ Petition before the Single Judge was allowed. On Writ Appeal, the Division Bench of the High Court reversed the Single Judge's order, holding that Section 28-A permits re-determination only on the basis of the Reference Court award. The present Civil Appeals arise from that impugned Division Bench judgment.

4.Facts of the Case

The appellants are landowners whose lands were acquired for a public railway project. Unlike some similarly-placed landowners who challenged the Collector's award via the reference mechanism, the appellants did not invoke Section 18. Once a Reference Court enhanced compensation for other landowners (to Rs. 2,00,000/-), the appellants availed Section 28-A to seek parity. Their first application for re-determination was allowed and compensation was paid accordingly. 

Thereafter, the High Court further enhanced compensation (to Rs. 3,50,000/-) for those who had filed references. The appellants then sought a second re-determination to match this superior appellate award. This second application was rejected by the LAO and ultimately by the Division Bench of the High Court of Karnataka, forming the basis of the present appeals before the Supreme Court.

5.Issues

i.Whether a second application under Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is maintainable on the basis of an enhanced award passed by an Appellate Court (i.e., the High Court or Supreme Court), where a first application had already been filed and accepted on the basis of the Reference Court's award.
ii.Whether the term 'Court' in Section 28-A of the Act is confined to a principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction (i.e., the Reference Court) as defined under Section 3(d), or whether it also encompasses the High Court and the Supreme Court as Appellate Courts.
iii.Whether the earlier receipt of re-determined compensation by an applicant under Section 28-A, on the basis of the Reference Court award, operates as a bar to seeking further re-determination once the appellate court passes a more enhanced award.

6.Arguments

On behalf of the Appellants

• The appellants relied on Banwari v. Haryana SIIDC, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3685, which found Ramsingbhai Jerambhai v. State of Gujarat, (2018) 16 SCC 445 to be per incuriam for not considering the earlier three-Judge Bench decision in Union of India v. Pradeep Kumari, (1995) 2 SCC 736. It was argued that the Act's legislative intent behind Section 28-A is to achieve equality of compensation among similarly placed landowners, and any procedural technicality defeating that purpose must be avoided. 
• Reliance was also placed on Bharatsing v. State of Maharashtra, (2018) 11 SCC 92 to urge that the Collector/LAO must stay his hands until the appellate forum finally disposes of the appeals and must then re-determine compensation on the basis of the final appellate award. It was further contended that respondent No. 2 itself was a party to the High Court appeals and was thus fully aware of their pendency.

On behalf of the Respondents

• The respondents supported the impugned judgment of the Division Bench, placing reliance on Ramsingbhai Jerambhai, which holds that Section 28-A re-determination is available only on the basis of an award of the Reference Court (a Court within the meaning of Section 3(d) of the Act), and not on the basis of an appellate court judgment. 
• It was additionally argued that even under Pradeep Kumari, only one application under Section 28-A is maintainable, and since the appellants had already accepted enhanced compensation on the basis of the Reference Court award, a second application was impermissible. The receipt of compensation was urged as a complete estoppel.

Legal Provisions
(i)Section 4(1): Land Acquisition Act, 1894
This provision deals with the preliminary notification issued by the government indicating its intention to acquire land for a public purpose. It is the first formal step in the acquisition process and alerts landowners that their land may be taken.
(ii)Section 11: Land Acquisition Act, 1894
Under this section, the Land Acquisition Officer makes an award determining the compensation payable to landowners, along with details of the land and persons entitled to receive compensation.
(iii)Section 18: Land Acquisition Act, 1894
This provision allows a landowner to seek a reference to a civil court if they are dissatisfied with the compensation awarded by the Collector. It is the primary mechanism for judicial review of the initial award.
(iv)Section 28-A: Land Acquisition Act, 1894
This is a beneficial provision that enables landowners who did not seek a reference under Section 18 to apply for re-determination of compensation based on a higher amount awarded by a court to other similarly placed landowners.
(v)Section 3(d): Land Acquisition Act, 1894
This section defines the term “Court” as the principal civil court of original jurisdiction unless otherwise specified, which becomes important in interpreting who can pass an award under the Act.
(vi)Section 54: Land Acquisition Act, 1894
This provision governs appeals from the decisions of the Reference Court to higher courts such as the High Court and the Supreme Court, treating such appeals as continuations of the original proceedings.

7.Judgment Analysis

A. Dual Nature of the Act and Object of Section 28-A
The Court commenced its analysis by characterising the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as dual in nature: simultaneously expropriatory (in so far as acquisition is concerned) and beneficial (in the matter of compensation). Relying on the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, particularly paragraph (ix) thereof, the Court underscored that Section 28-A was inserted precisely to address the inequality arising from poor and inarticulate landowners being unable to invoke the reference mechanism under Section 18.  The provision was designed to afford such persons the benefit of any enhanced compensation obtained by similarly-placed landowners, thereby advancing parity as the overriding legislative purpose.

B. Interpretation of 'Court' in Section 28-A
The Court examined Section 3(d), which defines 'Court' as a principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction. It noted that this definition consciously vests original jurisdiction in the Reference Court for proceedings under Part III of the Act.  However, critically, the Court held that on a conjoint reading of Sections 3(d) and 28-A, the term 'Court' in Section 28-A is not restricted to the Reference Court alone. The opening words of Section 28-A, namely, 'where in an award under this Part, the Court allows to the applicant any amount of compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector under Section 11', must be understood from the standpoint of the finality of the award.  

Once an appellate court passes an award, the earlier Reference Court award ceases to exist; there cannot be two operative awards simultaneously. The Court accordingly held that 'Court' in Section 28-A encompasses the High Court and the Supreme Court as well, and any contrary interpretation would render Section 28-A redundant in a significant class of cases.

C. Role of Section 54 and the Doctrine of Merger
Section 54 of the Act, which governs appeals in proceedings before the Court, was found to illuminate this interpretation. The Court observed that appeals under Section 54 are themselves described as appeals 'from original decrees', indicating that the Reference Court proceedings are original in nature while the High Court and Supreme Court function as appellate forums, yet remain 'Courts' within the scheme of the Act.  Applying the well-settled doctrine of merger, the Court held that once an appellate court renders its decision, the decree of the lower court stands subsumed within it. 

There can be only one operative award at any given time. Consequently, on the High Court passing its enhanced award, the Reference Court's award merged into and was superseded by the High Court's award. The court relied on Surinder Pal Soni v. Sohan Lal (Dead), (2020) 15 SCC 771 and the constitutional exposition of merger in Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala, (2000) 6 SCC 359 to affirm that this principle applies irrespective of whether the appellate court affirms, modifies, or reverses the lower court's award.

D. Analysis of Precedents

Babua Ram v. State of U.P., (1995) 2 SCC 689: The Court drew upon this decision to establish the procedural obligation of the Collector/LAO to hold his hands in re-determination proceedings while any appeal against the Reference Court's award remains pending before the appellate forum. The finality of compensation is attained only with the decree of the appellate forum.  The LAO must stay the Section 28-A application and re-determine compensation only on the basis of the final appellate judgment. 

Union of India v. Pradeep Kumari, (1995) 2 SCC 736: The Court read this decision as holding that Section 28-A applications may be filed on the basis of any award passed under Part III after the coming into force of Section 28-A, not just the first award passed by the Reference Court. The condition that 'only one application is maintainable' was correctly confined to situations where multiple Reference Court awards exist, not to the situation where a distinct and subsequent appellate court award has been passed. 

Bharatsing v. State of Maharashtra, (2018) 11 SCC 92: The Court extracted from this decision the principle that a Collector who decides a Section 28-A application while appeals remain pending violates the law laid down in Babua Ram. The decision also demonstrated that even where an applicant's first Section 28-A application is decided (irregularly, while appeals are pending), the applicant is not estopped from seeking the benefit of the final appellate award.  The Court however expressly noted that the stray observation in Bharatsing that a second application based on the High Court award is not maintainable was inconsistent with Pradeep Kumari and was made without the benefit of the relevant distinction being placed before the Court. 

Ramsingbhai Jerambhai v. State of Gujarat, (2018) 16 SCC 445 (declared per incuriam): This Three-Judge Bench decision had categorically held that Section 28-A re-determination is available only on the basis of the Reference Court's award under Part III and not on the basis of an appellate court's judgment. 
The Supreme Court in the present case declined to follow it on three grounds: 
(i)it did not take note of the earlier co-equal Bench decision in Pradeep Kumari; 
(ii)it did not consider the relevant provisions in light of the Statement of Objects and Reasons; and 
(iii)it did not address the doctrine of merger or the principle that an appeal is merely a continuation of the original proceedings. The Court affirmed the view taken in Banwari v. Haryana SIIDC, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3685, which had similarly found Ramsingbhai to be per incuriam. 

8.Conclusion

The Supreme Court allowed the appeals and set aside the impugned judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court of Karnataka. Directing the respondents to re-determine compensation within eight weeks, the Court laid down the following significant propositions of law. These things were held majorly:
a.A second application under Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, filed on the basis of an enhanced award passed by an Appellate Court (High Court or Supreme Court), is maintainable and must be considered by the Collector/LAO. The prior receipt of re-determined compensation on the basis of the Reference Court's award does not bar such a second application. 
b.On a conjoint reading of Sections 3(d), 28-A, and 54 of the Act, and applying the doctrine of merger, the term 'Court' in Section 28-A is not confined to the Reference Court but extends to the High Court and the Supreme Court when those courts pass final awards in the same proceedings.
c.Since only one operative award can exist at a given time, an award by an appellate forum subsumes the Reference Court's award. The benefit of a higher compensation secured by one landowner before an appellate forum must equally be extended to similarly-placed landowners invoking Section 28-A.
d.As reiterated from Babua Ram and Bharatsing, where appeals against the Reference Court's award are pending, the Collector/LAO must stay his hands in re-determination proceedings until the appellate forum disposes of the matter, and must re-determine compensation only on the basis of the final judgment. 
e.The decision in Ramsingbhai Jerambhai v. State of Gujarat, (2018) 16 SCC 445 was held to be per incuriam as it did not consider the binding precedent in Union of India v. Pradeep Kumari, (1995) 2 SCC 736, the doctrine of merger, or the legislative object of Section 28-A. The stray observation in Bharatsing echoing that position was similarly discountenanced. The view in Banwari v. Haryana SIIDC finding Ramsingbhai to be per incuriam was expressly approved.
f.Questions of estoppel, waiver, or acquiescence do not arise in the context of Section 28-A, which is a statutory beneficial provision aimed at achieving parity among similarly placed landowners. The statutory right cannot be defeated by the fact that a party accepted compensation at an earlier stage.