What is the difference between culpable homicide and murder?
• The accused Govinda was a young man of eighter years. He kicked his young wife of twelve or thirteen years of age and struck her several times by his fists on the back.
• The injuries on the back were not that serious. However, after she fell on the ground, the accused put one knee on her breast and struck her two or three times on the face.
• One or two of these blows, the medical evidence showed to be violent and had effect on the left eye of the wife, producing confusion and dislocation.
• Although the skull was not fractured, the blow caused by extravagance of blood on the brain and the girl died in a short span of time afterwards.
• The learned Counsel for the petitioner did not dispute the position that the Magistrate's action on 6-10-1958 amounted to an implied discharge in respect of the alleged offence Under Section 322. Indian Penal Code. Some of their criticisms against the proceedings of the learned Sessions Judge were based on a misconception of the facts. It was urged that the entries in the docket of C.R.P. 13 of 1958 did not mention, that the records were called for from the Magistrate and that the question arises whether a Sessions Judge has jurisdiction to make an order Under Section 436. Cr.PC. without calling for the records
• The main contention of Sri M. Lakshman-Rao on behalf of the petitioner was that under the new procedure specified in Section 251-A, Criminal Procedure Code for warrant cases instituted on police reports, there is no inquiry but only a trial by the Magistrate that any order purporting to remand such a case Under Section 436 for further inquiry can only amount to an order for a retrial of the case and that such an order is without jurisdiction as the Sessions Judge has no power Under Section 436 to direct a retrial.
• The petitioner had also stated that in no way the respondent was unaware of the damages that will happen.
• The contention of the respondent was that there was no intension to cause death nor the bodily injury intended to be inflicted was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The counsel that had represented the respondent referred to Clause (1) and Clause (3) of Section 300.
• The respondent also stated that he had n knowledge that such an injury could amount to the death of the victim.
The Lordship had brought forward the differences between Section 299 and 300 of the IPC.The court had stated that there was absence of intention. In both, Section 299 and 300, the key element is that there should be an intention of causing the death.
The Lordship had put forward another opinion that the offence committed by the accused was not murder but culpable homicide not amounting to murder.
The accused was sentenced to transportation for seven years, under Part I of Section 304 I.P.C and not under Section 302 of the IPC.