CAUSE TITLE
XXX v. State of Haryana & Ors.
DATE OF ORDER
30 July 2025
JUDGE(S)
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Jasgurpreet Singh Puri
PARTIES
- Petitioner: Accused in FIR under Sections 363, 366A, 376 IPC and Sections 4 & 12 POCSO
- Respondents: State of Haryana and the victim (minor at the time of offence, later married to accused)
SUBJECT
Whether a POCSO case can be quashed under Section 482 CrPC on the ground of compromise after the victim attained majority and married the accused.
IMPORTANT PROVISIONS
Indian Penal Code, 1860
Section 363 – Punishment for Kidnapping
Whoever kidnaps any person from India or from lawful guardianship shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.
Section 366A – Procuration of Minor Girl
Whoever, by any means whatsoever, induces any minor girl under the age of eighteen years to go from any place or to do any act with intent that such girl may be, or knowing that it is likely that she will be, forced or seduced to illicit intercourse with another person shall be punishable with imprisonment which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.
Section 376 – Punishment for Rape
(1) Whoever, except in the cases provided for in sub-section (2), commits rape shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than ten years, but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.
(2) Whoever—
(a) being a police officer, commits rape within the limits of the police station to which he is appointed; or
(b) being a public servant, commits rape on a woman in his custody or in the custody of a public servant subordinate to him; or
(c) being a member of the armed forces deployed in an area by the Central or a State Government, commits rape in such area; or
(d) being on the management or staff of a jail, remand home or other place of custody established by or under any law for the time being in force or of a women’s or children’s institution, commits rape on any inmate of such jail, remand home, place or institution; or
(e) being on the management or staff of a hospital, commits rape on a woman in that hospital; or
(f) commits rape on a woman knowing her to be pregnant; or
(g) commits rape on a woman incapable of giving consent; or
(h) commits rape on a woman when she is under sixteen years of age; or
(i) commits rape on a woman suffering from mental or physical disability; or
(j) while committing rape causes grievous bodily harm or maims or disfigures or endangers the life of a woman; or
(k) commits rape repeatedly on the same woman,
shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than ten years, but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.
(3) The minimum sentence under this section shall not be less than ten years except for adequate and special reasons recorded by the Court.
Section 34 – Acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention
When a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone.
Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012
Section 4 – Punishment for Penetrative Sexual Assault
(1) Whoever commits penetrative sexual assault shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than ten years but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.
(2) Where the penetrative sexual assault is committed by a person in a position of trust or authority of the child, or by a public servant, or by a person managing or working in an institution providing services to children, the punishment shall be rigorous imprisonment for not less than twenty years, which may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.
Section 12 – Punishment for Sexual Harassment of the Child
Whoever commits sexual harassment upon a child shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine.
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
Section 482 – Saving of Inherent Powers of High Court
Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court, or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.
FACTS
The FIR in the case claimed that the petitioner and co-accused had tempted a 13-year-old girl and held her captive in Bihar for about four months. The girl was subsequently rescued by the police, later reached the age of majority, and married the petitioner. The husband and wife have since borne four children. Based on affidavits made by the girl and her father declaring themselves willing to withdraw the complaint, the petitioner went to the High Court requesting quashing of the FIR under Section 482 CrPC as the case had been settled amicably and prosecution would have no practical utility.
QUESTIONS RAISED
- Does a later marriage of the victim with the accused cut short statutory liability for offenses under POCSO?
- Is compromise after-majority a valid reason for quashing serious non-compoundable offences under the POCSO Act?
- Can the High Court invoke its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to quash such FIRs on account of alleged settlement?
ARGUMENTS PLACED BY THE PETITIONER
The petitioner's counsel pointed out that the putative victim, now an adult, had voluntarily married the petitioner and was living with him in harmony, along with their four children. Affidavits had also been filed by the victim and her father opining their unwillingness to take the case any further.
The petitioner urged that pursuing the prosecution would serve only to undermine their settled life and inflict avoidable trauma on the children. It was argued that the inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC could be invoked in order to administer real and substantial justice.
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED BY THE RESPONDENT
The State, represented by the Deputy Advocate General, staunchly resisted the quashing. It was submitted that POCSO offences are compoundable in principle and are meant to safeguard children against abuse regardless of future reconciliation or individual arrangements.
The DAG argued that consent obtained from a minor was void in law and that subsequent marriage could not validate criminal behavior retrospectively. It was argued that granting such quashing would negate the very intention of child protection legislation and encourage perpetrators to abuse minor victims and legalize the offence through forced marriage.
ANALYSIS BY THE COURT
Justice Jasgurpreet Singh Puri rendered an absolute judgment that reiterated the supremacy of statutory provisions over individual settlements in minor victim cases. The Court started by recalling the statutory purpose of the POCSO Act—protection of children from sexual abuse and exploitation—and emphasized that the Act leaves no scope for private settlements or later marital arrangements. In paragraph 11 of the judgment, the Court noted:
"Despite the fact that the girl has reached majority and married the accused, it does not imply that the serious offence committed on a child is obliterated. The law punishes such offences with extreme rigor exactly in order to prevent such future manipulations."
The Court made it categorically clear that consent by a minor—even if reaffirmed subsequently upon reaching majority—carries no legal weight in a criminal prosecution for child sexual offenses. In so holding, the Court cited the precedent in Nardeep Singh Cheema @ Navdeep Singh v. State of Punjab, where the High Court had declined to quash proceedings on identical facts. There, it was decided (at ¶13):
"POCSO offenses being compoundable offences and serious in nature cannot be permitted to be quashed on the sole ground that the accused has since married the prosecutrix. Individual whims do not prevail over public policy, protection of children, and deterrence."
The Court also relied upon the historic Supreme Court decision Independent Thought v. Union of India, where the top court read down Exception 2 to Section 375 IPC, holding that sexual relations with a minor wife under 18 years is rape. The Court emphasized in para 117:
A child is a child in law, and no marital status exception can abrogate her dignity and right to bodily integrity."
This finding was applied by Justice Puri to support the argument that marriage is not a defence for sexual offences committed against a child.
In addition, the Court quoted Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, wherein the Supreme Court allowed quashing of criminal proceedings in private matters relating to personal wrongs but explicitly ruled out serious and heinous crimes such as rape and those involving public interest (See ¶61). Justice Puri stated that recourse to Section 482 CrPC in POCSO cases would constitute judicial overreach.
Lastly, the Court dealt with the increasing tendency on the part of the accused to marry the victim in order to avoid legal action and held that allowing such settlements would be setting an ill-advised precedent and would nullify the deterrent effect of child protection laws. Accordingly, the High Court saw no merit in the petition, thereby quashing it and refused any interference
CONCLUSION
Finally, the High Court rejected the petition and refused to quash the FIR under Section 482 CrPC. The judgment reiterated the non-compoundability of POCSO offences and made it clear that no later compromise, marriage, or consent obtained subsequent to the offence can exempt criminal liability for such actions against a child.
Anchoring its reasoning both in statutory requirements and binding judicial precedents, the Court reiterated that personal settlements cannot counter the public interest enshrined in protection of children law. The verdict establishes a robust precedent against resisting attempts to legalize abuse by coerced or strategic post-offense marriage, and protects the legislative intent of the POCSO Act.
Frequently Asked Questions
1. Can a POCSO case be quashed if the victim and the accused get married later?
No. The Punjab & Haryana High Court has held that subsequent marriage between the accused and the victim does not erase the criminal offence under the POCSO Act, as the victim was a minor at the time of the offence. The law does not permit compromise in such cases.
2. Does a minor’s consent hold any legal value under the POCSO Act?
No. As per Section 2(d) of the POCSO Act, any person below the age of 18 is a child. The Act presumes that a child cannot give legal consent for any sexual activity. Therefore, even if the child appeared to have consented, it is legally irrelevant.
3. Is marriage a valid defence against charges of child sexual assault?
No. The courts have consistently held, including in Independent Thought v. Union of India, that marriage cannot be used as a defence to justify or dilute the offence of sexual assault committed on a minor.
4. Can proceedings under POCSO be quashed under Section 482 CrPC due to settlement?
No. Section 482 CrPC cannot be used to quash proceedings under POCSO on the basis of compromise, as these offences are considered crimes against society and are non-compoundable by law.
5. What was the key finding of the High Court in this case?
The Court held that permitting quashing based on compromise and marriage would defeat the object of the POCSO Act. It emphasized that serious offences involving children cannot be resolved through private settlements and must be prosecuted to their legal conclusion.
6. Why did the Court reject the affidavits by the victim and her father?
Because the offence was committed when the victim was a minor. The subsequent willingness of the victim and her father to withdraw the case cannot override the statutory mandate under POCSO, which is enacted to protect children from exploitation.
7. Are POCSO offences compoundable?
No. Offences under the POCSO Act are expressly non-compoundable, meaning they cannot be withdrawn or settled privately between parties.
