CASE TITLE
Gajanan Dattatray Gore v. State of Maharashtra & Anr.
DATE OF ORDER
28 July 2025
BENCH
Justice J.B. Pardiwala
PARTIES
Appellant: Gajanan Dattatray Gore
Respondents: State of Maharashtra and the Private Complainant Institution
SUBJECT
Whether voluntary financial undertakings by an accused—made without formal court direction—can be used to cancel bail, and whether such monetary-based practices undermine the constitutional structure of bail under Indian criminal jurisprudence.
IMPORTANT PROVISIONS
Indian Penal Code, 1860
Section 406 – Criminal Breach of Trust
Whoever commits criminal breach of trust shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.
Section 408 – Criminal Breach of Trust by Clerk or Servant
Whoever, being a clerk or servant or employed as a clerk or servant, and being in any manner entrusted in such capacity with property, or with any dominion over property, commits criminal breach of trust in respect of that property, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.
Section 420 – Cheating and Dishonestly Inducing Delivery of Property
Whoever cheats and thereby dishonestly induces the person deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to make, alter or destroy the whole or any part of a valuable security, or anything which is signed or sealed, and which is capable of being converted into a valuable security, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.
Section 467 – Forgery of Valuable Security, Will, etc.
Whoever forges a document which purports to be a valuable security or a will, or an authority to adopt a son, or which purports to give authority to any person to make or transfer any valuable security, or to receive the principal, interest or dividends thereon, or to receive or deliver any money, movable property, or valuable security, or any document purporting to be an acquittance or receipt acknowledging the payment of money, or an acquittance or receipt for the delivery of any movable property or valuable security, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.
Section 468 – Forgery for the Purpose of Cheating
Whoever commits forgery, intending that the document forged shall be used for the purpose of cheating, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.
Section 471 – Using as Genuine a Forged Document
Whoever fraudulently or dishonestly uses as genuine any document which he knows or has reason to believe to be a forged document, shall be punished in the same manner as if he had forged such document.
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
Section 439 – Special Powers of High Court or Court of Session Regarding Bail
(1) A High Court or Court of Session may direct—
(a) that any person accused of an offence and in custody be released on bail, and if the offence is of the nature specified in sub-section (3) of section 437, may impose any condition which it considers necessary for the purposes mentioned in that sub-section;
(b) that any condition imposed by a Magistrate when releasing any person on bail be set aside or modified.
(2) A High Court or Court of Session may direct that any person who has been released on bail under this Chapter be arrested and commit him to custody.
Constitution of India
Article 21 – Protection of Life and Personal Liberty
No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.
FACTS
The appellant, who had been employed at a private educational institution, was alleged to have embezzled ₹1.6 crores while he was entrusted with financial duties. An FIR was filed under various penal provisions of criminal breach of trust, cheating, and forgery. On his arrest on 17 August 2023, his bail application was rejected by the Trial Court.
When the case came to the Bombay High Court, the appellant filed a voluntary affidavit-cum-undertaking to deposit ₹25 lakhs in five months. The High Court released him on bail, apparently swayed by this offer to pay compensation. But when the appellant defaulted on his financial promise, the complainant sought cancellation of bail. The High Court granted cancellation, prompting the appellant to move the Supreme Court.
ISSUES RAISED
- Must a bail be revoked based on the violation of a voluntary money commitment that was not a condition of the court?
- Is it constitutionally permissible for courts to condition freedom indirectly on repayment assurances, particularly in economic offenses?
- Must such commitments be enforceable when not made part of the binding terms of the order of bail?
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED BY THE APPELLANT
The appellant had averred that the repayment of ₹25 lakh was voluntary in nature and formed no part of formal bail conditions instituted by the High Court. He had argued that the order of the High Court, dated 1 April 2024, did not subject his freedom to completing this amount. He emphasized that Article 21 personal liberty could not be revoked just because a privately volunteered undertaking had not been adhered to. Notably, the appellant submitted that he had not abused his liberty nor obstructed the continued proceedings—two standard bases for the cancellation of bail according to established jurisprudence. He went on to contend that permitting courts to enforce the informal undertaking would introduce an unfair system whereby liberty is indirectly traded.
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED BY THE RESPONDENT
The State and the complainant argued that granting of bail was intimately connected with the appellant's undertaking to repay a portion of the amount defalcated. The default in depositing ₹25 lakhs, they contended, was a violation of faith and proof of the fact that the appellant had induced the Court to grant him bail by making false representations. They drew strength from the High Court's findings that the commitment had persuasive force, and its breach indicated a lack of bona fides. The respondents asked the Supreme Court not to encourage a defaulter who had defaulted on his own terms, and rather restore deterrence in economic offence cases.
JUDGMENT ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court judgment is not just a reversal of facts but a constitutional realignment of how bail has to operate in India. In paragraph 14, the Court proceeded to answer the uncertainty regarding whether the ₹25 lakh repayment was a condition of bail. It held it was not a part of any condition that was ordered by a court and hence its violation could not invite cancellation under the CrPC.
In paragraph 16, the Court began its doctrinal exposition: bail is a legal concession granted based on objective criminal law considerations—not on private settlements or voluntary payments. Justice Pardiwala emphasized that when courts accept voluntary affidavits as informal proxies for legal conditions, they blur the lines between judicial discretion and personal negotiation.
In paragraph 17, the Court declared:
"Liberty cannot be put on a price tag. Individual liberty under Article 21 is not something to be traded for promises or pecuniary guarantees that are nowhere to be found in judicial orders."
The Court specifically pointed to the precedent in Moti Ram v. State of M.P., where Justice Krishna Iyer had cautioned against monetizing bail and its excessive burden on the poor. The case before us brought that warning to life.
By paragraph 19, the Court established the doctrinal heart: an undertaking which is voluntary is not enforceable except if it is made a condition of bail by the court itself. It explained that the jurisprudence relating to cancellation of bail—as established in State v. Amarmani Tripathi—mandates misuse of liberty, interference with investigation, or probable absconsion—not default in payment.
The Court, in paragraph 22, labelled such new practices a "backdoor financial condition" constituting an unconstitutional imposition of the burden of liberty to monetary terms. The judgment also expressed apprehension regarding how economic offences came to be dealt with increasingly through semi-formal restitution schemes, rather than criminal due process.
In paragraph 24, the Court cautioned High Courts and Trial Courts against impliedly enforcing undertakings that were never judicially sanctioned. It noted:
"The judiciary should not be regarded as a dues-collecting agent or an enforcer of private settlements, especially where criminal freedom is at stake."
This statement not only constrains the current case but also sets a precedent for future criminal litigation on informal monetary settlements.
Finally, in paras 25–26, the Court restored bail to the appellant, upholding that there had been no breach of the formal terms of the bail order and no proof that liberty was abused. The judgment reaffirmed that failure to pay a non-binding financial undertaking is not a lawful basis for cancellation of bail.
CONCLUSION
This judgment is a strong reaffirmation of constitutional discipline in India's bail jurisprudence. The Supreme Court has made it categorically clear that freedom cannot be bought, sold, or bargained through unofficial affidavits. In an age where courts are seduced to grant bail only upon part payments—especially in economic offences—this verdict delineates a harsh line: individual freedom is beyond the logic of settlement.
The Court's disapproval of "monetary conditioning" of bail reminds us that justice must not be made a function of affordability. Voluntary commitments, no matter how sincere, are not permitted to supersede the law. This decision will have a profound effect on the way subordinate courts frame bail orders, particularly by severing financial compensation from freedom unless statutorily allowed or judicially infused.
In reinstating the appellant's bail, the Court did more than safeguard one man's freedom—it safeguarded the constitutional framework that guarantees freedom for all, irrespective of their resources or vows. It is a judicial assurance against encroaching informalities that have the potential to commodify entry into freedom.
