Case Title:
Chenthamara @ Kannan & Ors. v. Meena & Anr.
Date of Order:
23rd May 2025
Bench:
Hon’ble Mrs. Justice M.B. Snehalatha
Parties:
Petitioners:Chenthamara @ Kannan, Sudheeshna, Vasu @ Bhaskaran, Dharmaja, and Kamalam (in-laws of the respondent)
Respondents:Meena (widow of the deceased Gopi @ Govindankutty), and the State of Kerala (represented through Public Prosecutor)
SUBJECT
This case deals with the interpretation of residence rights under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, especially the scope of “shared household” and “aggrieved person” as they apply to a widow facing eviction from her matrimonial home by her in-laws. The decision clarifies that a woman continues to retain her legal right to reside in the shared household, even after the death of her husband, and irrespective of property ownership or current cohabitation.
IMPORTANT PROVISIONS
The following provisions of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 were central to the adjudication of this case. Their interpretation by the Kerala High Court in Chenthamara @ Kannan v. Meena has substantial implications for post-marital and widowhood rights within the shared household framework.
1. Section 2(a) – Aggrieved Person
This provision defines who can approach the court for relief under the Act. It states:
“‘Aggrieved person’ means any woman who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with the respondent and who alleges to have been subjected to any act of domestic violence by the respondent.”
In this case, the key interpretive issue was whether Meena, a widow no longer cohabiting with the petitioners, still qualified as an "aggrieved person." The High Court affirmed that the language “has been” includes past relationships, such as that of a wife to her deceased husband and his family. Therefore, Meena retained her status as an aggrieved person, despite no longer living in the shared household at the time of the complaint.
2. Section 2(f) – Domestic Relationship
This section defines “domestic relationship” as:
“A relationship between two persons who live or have, at any point of time, lived together in a shared household, when they are related by consanguinity, marriage, or through a relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption, or are family members living together as a joint family.”
The High Court applied this provision to hold that the domestic relationship between Meena and her in-laws did not end with her husband’s death. Since she had lived in the shared household during the subsistence of her marriage, she was considered to have been in a domestic relationship with her in-laws. The Court stressed that the relationship need not be ongoing at the time of complaint to qualify under the Act.
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3. Section 2(s) – Shared Household
The definition of shared household includes:
“A household where the person aggrieved lives or at any stage has lived in a domestic relationship... and includes such a household whether owned or tenanted either jointly by the aggrieved person and the respondent, or owned or tenanted by either of them... and includes such a household which may belong to the joint family of which the respondent is a member.”
In the present case, the in-laws argued that since they owned the house, and Meena had left it, she had no right to continue residing there. However, the Court held that ownership is immaterial. What matters is that Meena had resided in that house in a domestic relationship with her husband and in-laws. The definition clearly includes households where the woman has lived at any stage—making her claim valid under Section 2(s), even after her husband's death.
4. Section 3 – Definition of Domestic Violence
Section 3 provides a broad and inclusive definition of domestic violence. It includes physical abuse, sexual abuse, verbal and emotional abuse, and economic abuse. The relevant portions read:
“Any act, omission or commission or conduct of the respondent shall constitute domestic violence if it— (a) harms or endangers the health, safety, life, limb or well-being... of the aggrieved person, and includes causing physical abuse, sexual abuse, verbal and emotional abuse and economic abuse...”
The High Court accepted Meena’s contention that the respondents’ acts—denying her access to her home, obstructing her residence, and attempting to evict her and her children—constituted emotional and economic abuse. These actions were therefore held to fall within the statutory meaning of domestic violence under Section 3.
5. Section 12 – Application to Magistrate
This section enables an aggrieved person to approach the Magistrate seeking one or more of the reliefs provided under the Act, such as protection, residence, maintenance, or compensation orders.
“An aggrieved person or a Protection Officer or any other person on behalf of the aggrieved person may present an application to the Magistrate seeking one or more reliefs...”
Meena filed her original petition under this provision. The Magistrate initially dismissed her case on technical grounds related to her alleged lack of current cohabitation. However, the Sessions Court reversed this dismissal, and the High Court upheld that reversal, emphasizing the wide remedial scope of Section 12.
6. Section 17 – Right to Reside in a Shared Household
Section 17 confers a statutory right on every woman in a domestic relationship to reside in the shared household, regardless of title or ownership. It states:
“Every woman in a domestic relationship shall have the right to reside in the shared household, whether or not she has any right, title or beneficial interest in the same.”
This provision was the cornerstone of Meena’s case. The High Court reinforced that a woman cannot be evicted from her matrimonial home merely because the property is not in her or her husband’s name. The Court clarified that this right continues even after the death of the husband, provided the woman previously resided there. Any action to deny or obstruct this right constitutes domestic violence under Section 3.
7. Section 19 – Residence Orders
Section 19 empowers the Magistrate to pass residence orders to protect the aggrieved person’s right to stay in the shared household. The orders may restrain the respondent from evicting the woman or direct alternate accommodation.
Relevant part:
“The Magistrate may, on being satisfied that domestic violence has taken place, pass a residence order—(a) restraining the respondent from dispossessing or in any other manner disturbing the possession of the aggrieved person from the shared household...”
In Meena’s case, the Sessions Court issued such a residence order, restraining her in-laws from evicting her or interfering with her peaceful residence. The High Court upheld this direction, finding that it was well within the scope of Section 19 and supported by the factual record.
Facts
This criminal revision petition was filed by the in-laws of a widow, Meena, who had sought residence and protection under the Domestic Violence Act, 2005. The Magistrate dismissed her application under Section 12 of the Act, holding that she was not in a continuing domestic relationship with her in-laws and therefore could not be an “aggrieved person.” On appeal, the Sessions Court reversed this decision, upholding Meena’s right to reside in the shared household and directing the in-laws not to obstruct her or her children from residing there peacefully. Challenging this, the in-laws approached the High Court. The key legal questions centered on whether a widow has a continuing right to claim residence in the matrimonial home, and whether the absence of current cohabitation or independent ownership defeats such a claim under the DV Act.
ISSUES RAISED
- Whether the respondent Meena, as a widow, qualifies as an “aggrieved person” under Section 2(a) of the DV Act, despite not currently residing with the petitioners.
- Whether a widow can continue to claim residence rights under Section 17 of the DV Act in the shared matrimonial home after the husband's death.
- Whether the residence in question is a “shared household” under Section 2(s), even though the ownership is vested in the in-laws.
- Whether the alleged actions of the petitioners constituted “domestic violence” under Section 3 of the DV Act.
- Whether the Sessions Court was justified in granting protection and residence orders under Sections 17 and 19 of the DV Act.
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED BY THE APPELLANT
The in-laws (revision petitioners) advanced a set of technical and factual objections against the Sessions Court’s order. They contended that the respondent Meena had not resided in the shared household after the death of her husband in 2009 and had since relocated to her parental home. Based on this, they asserted that she did not fall within the ambit of “aggrieved person” under Section 2(a), as there existed no active “domestic relationship” between her and the petitioners under Section 2(f).
The petitioners also argued that the house in question, though earlier occupied by Meena and her husband, was not owned by either of them. It was claimed to be ancestral property held exclusively by the petitioners, and hence, could not constitute a “shared household” for the purposes of Section 2(s).
The fact that Meena had received separate residential property from her brother via a family settlement deed was heavily relied upon to assert that she had no continued right of residence in the shared household. Lastly, the petitioners denied any conduct amounting to domestic violence and contended that the Magistrate had rightly dismissed the case for lack of evidence.
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED BY THE RESPONDENT
The respondent Meena, through her counsel, firmly opposed the revision petition and reiterated her entitlement to relief under the DV Act. It was submitted that she was married to the deceased Gopi and had resided in the shared household with him and their children until his death. Following his demise, the relationship with her in-laws deteriorated, and attempts were made to unlawfully dispossess her and her children from the household.
The respondent argued that Section 2(a) of the DV Act clearly covers any woman who “has been” in a domestic relationship, and that her relationship with her in-laws did not cease merely because her husband had died. On the contrary, she was still a part of the joint family. It was further argued that Section 2(s) defines “shared household” to include property that is owned by relatives of the respondent, provided that the aggrieved person has lived there in a domestic relationship.
The fact that she had received a separate property from her brother did not nullify her statutory right under Section 17(1) to reside in the shared household. Relying on judicial precedents, including Prabha Tyagi v. Kamlesh Devi, Meena submitted that the DV Act grants independent rights of residence irrespective of title or ownership, and that obstruction by her in-laws amounted to emotional and economic abuse within the scope of Section 3.
JUDGEMENT ANALYSIS
Justice M.B. Snehalatha, speaking for the Kerala High Court, delivered a well-reasoned judgment that firmly upheld the rights of the respondent Meena under the DV Act. The Court began by interpreting the statutory language of Section 2(a) and observed that the definition of “aggrieved person” expressly includes women who “have been” in a domestic relationship. Therefore, Meena’s status as a widow did not terminate her legal relationship with her in-laws for the purposes of the Act.
In paragraphs 13 to 16, the Court examined the evidence on record and noted that Meena had lived in the shared household after marriage and during her husband’s lifetime, and was subjected to attempts at forcible eviction thereafter.
The Court rejected the petitioners’ argument that absence of cohabitation disqualified Meena from seeking relief. Citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Prabha Tyagi v. Kamlesh Devi, particularly paragraphs 35, 36, and 40, the Court held that it is not necessary for the aggrieved person to reside with the respondents at the time of seeking relief. The phrase “has been in a domestic relationship” allows for retrospective claims, especially when the violence or deprivation arises from that past relationship.
On the question of shared household, the Court invoked Section 2(s) to assert that shared residence is defined not by ownership but by past cohabitation in a domestic relationship. In paragraphs 21 to 23, Justice Snehalatha reiterated that even if the house is owned by the in-laws, the right of the aggrieved person to reside there is independent and protected by law. She further rejected the claim that Meena’s acquisition of alternative property from her brother negated her rights under the DV Act.
Referring to paragraph 40 of Prabha Tyagi, the Court emphasized that rights under Section 17 and 19 are not extinguished by the existence of alternate shelter.
Justice M.B. Snehalatha presented the verdict, strongly affirming the rights of the widow. The Court started its rationale by interpreting Section 17(1) of the DV Act, which grants a woman a right to live in the joint household, "whether or not she has any right, title or beneficial interest in the same."
The Court explained that such right is consequent to the existence of a domestic relationship, which, under Section 2(f), encompasses a relationship where the woman resides or has resided with the person against whom she makes a claim for relief.
Critically, the Court dismissed the contention that the domestic relationship comes to an end upon the death of the husband. The Court believed that the right to reside is founded upon the existence of that relationship in the past and does not come to an end with the death of the husband. In Paragraph 17 of the judgment, the Court noted:
The shield of protection of the DV Act cannot be packed away when the husband dies. It is at times like these, when the individual is most exposed, that the law has to protect the woman, and keep her from being made homeless by family members who are empowered in the absence of the patriarch.
The Court further noted that the legislative purpose of the DV Act is to provide wide, purposive protection to women against physical abuse, but also economic and emotional exploitation. Refusal of residence in a house where the woman had lived before with her husband, particularly in the absence of other shelter, squarely fell within the definition of domestic violence under Section 3.
In aid of its interpretation, the Court also drew reference to the ruling of the Supreme Court in Prabha Tyagi v. Kamlesh Devi, where it was held that the woman is not required to be cohabiting when filing the complaint and that residence earlier within the shared household would be enough for claiming protection. In Paragraphs 24–25 of Prabha Tyagi, the Supreme Court held:
The words 'has been in a domestic relationship' leave no doubt at all that it is enough that the aggrieved party has cohabited in a common household at any moment of time in the past. The Section 17 right is not cut off simply because the aggrieved party does not now live in that household.
Justice Snehalatha followed this precedent to hold that Meena, having cohabited with her husband in the joint household, still had a valid claim under the DV Act even after his death. The Court held that the in-laws' conduct—acts of eviction, denial of access, and mental harassment—amounted to domestic violence as defined under Section 3, warranting the protection relief granted by the Sessions Court.
Finally, in paragraph 27, the Court held that the actions of the petitioners—attempting to oust Meena, obstructing her peaceful residence, and creating an atmosphere of hostility—amounted to domestic violence under Section 3, particularly in the form of emotional and economic abuse. The Sessions Court had therefore rightly passed residence and protection orders in favour of the respondent. The Court found no legal infirmity or perversity in the lower appellate court’s findings and dismissed the revision petition in its entirety.
Recent Landmark Judgments on Key Questions under the DV Act
1. Satish Chander Ahuja v. Sneha Ahuja
This was a landmark case wherein the Supreme Court overruled the limited property-oriented precedent established in S.R. Batra v. Taruna Batra. The core issue was was whether a woman is entitled to live in a house owned solely by her father-in-law under the Domestic Violence Act, especially in light of the interpretation of the term "shared household" as defined by Section 2.
The respondent was the daughter-in-law and was evicted from the matrimonial household, which legally belonged to her father-in-law, Satish Ahuja. The respondent claimed that since the building belonged only to him, it could not be termed a "shared household," and Sneha therefore had no legal claim to live there. The Delhi High Court dismissed this argument, and an appeal was made before the Supreme Court.
In a strongly contextual reading, the Supreme Court considered that the term "shared household" in the DV Act cannot be narrowed down to an issue of title or ownership. The Court observed that determining what constitutes a "shared household" is not who owns the property, but whether the aggrieved person resided in the premises in a domestic relationship. In para 62, the Court firmly asserted that "the meaning of shared household has to be directed not by the strict boundaries of law relating to property but by the social realities of home life."
The Supreme Court emphasized that the Act has as its objective the preservation of women's dignity in the home and that turning out a woman from the very home she inhabited during marriage on account of technical claims of property would undermine the social intent of the Act.
The ruling is a distinct move away from legal formality of ownership to the operative realities of living matrimonially. Significantly, the Court ruled that a woman's right to occupy is not tied to title but to her status as a wife who occupied the premises during marriage.
Overruling Taruna Batra thus held out the woman's right to occupy within premises belonging to relatives of the husband, provided that she had occupied them in a domestic relationship, thus fulfilling the real object of the DV Act.
2. Suresh Babu v. Leela
In Suresh Babu v. Leela, the Kerala High Court decided a crucial but rarely asked question: whether an aggrieved woman can claim a separate household, independent and in another city, at the cost of her husband, under the DV Act? The petitioner Leela had moved under Sections 17, 19, and 20 of the DV Act, praying for alternate residence and monetary relief following complaints of continuous mental and emotional harassment by her husband and in-laws.
She made it very clear that living in the common household was not feasible any longer due to hostility and safety issues. She asked for a order to compel her husband to offer a different rental housing in a different city, where she was having job opportunities and family support.
The husband's position was that Section 17 only assured the right to live in the joint home and that the prayer for a residence elsewhere was not tenable under the DV Act, particularly one in a different matrimonial town. He went on to argue that offering a residence elsewhere would be an unreasonable fiscal burden and go against principles of shared cohabitation central to the institution of marriage.
The High Court firmly dismissed this literalist interpretation. In a forward-looking interpretation based upon the dignity and autonomy of the woman, the Court held that Section 19(1)(f) of the DV Act authorizes the Magistrate to direct the respondent to arrange alternative accommodation for the aggrieved person or to pay rent for the same. The Court made clear in paragraph 19 that "the law does not require the victim of domestic violence to be tethered to the very location of her victimization."
Justice K. Vinod Chandran noted that forcing a woman to live in an abusive or unsafe situation under the guise of statutory co-residence is a frontal attack on Article 21 of the Constitution. The Court also held that the DV Act recognizes the woman's agency to opt for a dignified and secure life, and this may involve resettlement elsewhere, and that such an option cannot be frustrated on grounds of logistics or cost alone.
The cost of providing her with safety and dignity continued to be the responsibility of the husband who had lost his claim to cohabitation by virtue of neglect and abuse.
In doing so, Suresh Babu vindicated the right to alternate accommodation and judicially affirmed a woman's choice to break geographical links with her battered past, upholding the promise of rehabilitative justice under the DV Act.
3. Ajay Kumar v. Lata,
The Supreme Court addressed a central interpretative question about the character of proceedings under the DV Act—whether a woman is entitled to claim financial relief or maintenance without a criminal proceeding or registration of a First Information Report. Lata had come to the Magistrate for relief under Section 20 of the Act for monthly maintenance without filing criminal proceedings. The respondent, Ajay Kumar, argued that there could be no monetary relief unless there existed a cognizable offence, and that the Act mandated the commencement of criminal prosecution before civil remedies can be sought.
The Court emphatically rejected this technical argument. Paragraph 12 makes it clear that the DV Act is not criminal in scope but has civil, quasi-civil, and preventive aspects as well.
The DV Act is a curative statute that grants a broad range of reliefs—monetary, residential, protective—none of which involve the registration of a criminal case. It opined that making a criminal prosecution a condition precedent for the grant of relief would make the statute otiose and would deter victims from availing non-punitive solutions like residence and maintenance.
The Court observed that Sections 18 to 23 of the Act contain a range of remedies, most of which are preventive and welfare-focused, rather than punitive. This reading was reinforced by the wording of Section 26, permitting relief to be applied for in other legal actions, and Section 28(2), permitting summary procedures to be used. The judgment thus placed the DV Act strongly within the social justice framework of the Constitution, enacting that women can access financial security without going through criminal prosecution.
The appeallant extended the reach of the Act by minimizing procedural hurdles, making it possible for vulnerable women to access economic remedies without fear, delay, and stigma of criminal trial.
The judgment reaffirmed the concept that domestic violence encompasses not only physical abuse but also economic empowerment, and that courts needed to respond promptly to provide redress.
4. Krishna Bhattacharjee v. Sarathi Choudhury
In Krishna Bhattacharjee v. Sarathi Choudhury, the Supreme Court discussed the legal status of a woman who comes seeking relief in terms of the DV Act once her divorce was already settled. The trial court had rejected the petitioner's complaint on the basis that since she was no longer in a domestic relationship, the complaint under Section 12 of the DV Act was not sustainable. The High Court upheld this view, which resulted in an appeal before the Supreme Court.
The Apex Court overturned these conclusions in a wide and forward-looking interpretation of the DV Act. It took the view that the term "aggrieved person" under Section 2(a) covers a woman who "is or has been" in a domestic relationship. The Court emphasized that the temporal phrasing "has been" was intentionally employed by Parliament so that the protection of the Act would extend even after the existence of the relationship.
In paragraphs 30-35, the Court explained that domestic relationship must be present at the time when violence has happened, not necessarily at the time of lodging the complaint. Therefore, remedies under the Act are still available even after divorce, if cause of action has arisen during marriage.
The Court also held that economic abuse, like unlawful withholding of a woman's properties or refusal to provide maintenance after divorce, may amount to ongoing domestic violence.
Ongoing wrongs such as these are not effaced just because the institutional marital relationship gets terminated. The Court reaffirmed that the DV Act is not intended to be circumscribed within narrow procedural criteria but should be interpreted in a way that allows real access to justice.
This case provided a vital precedent for divorced women who still endure the economic, emotional, or social consequences of abuse experienced while married. The ruling allowed post-divorce claims under the Act and maintained its rehabilitative and reparative nature.
CONCLUSION
The judgment delivered by the Kerala High Court in Chenthamara @ Kannan & Ors. v. Meena & Anr. stands as a robust reaffirmation of the protective objectives enshrined in the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. Through its purposive and constitutionally grounded interpretation, the Court recognised the continued vulnerability of widows in patriarchal domestic arrangements and clarified that the right to residence in a shared household is neither extinguished by the death of a spouse nor restricted by lack of ownership or title.
By recognising Meena as an “aggrieved person” under Section 2(a) and affirming her residence rights under Sections 17 and 19, the Court gave effect to the statutory language and legislative intent, while also aligning its reasoning with binding precedents such as Prabha Tyagi v. Kamlesh Devi and Satish Chander Ahuja v. Sneha Ahuja. The judgment also reinforces that emotional and economic abuse—manifested in attempts to evict a widow and deny her shelter—constitute actionable forms of domestic violence under Section 3.
Importantly, the Court’s analysis affirms that the DV Act is not constrained by procedural technicalities or narrow property law doctrines, but must instead be read as a living instrument designed to uphold the fundamental rights to dignity, shelter, and security of women. This decision, therefore, carries significant doctrinal value in expanding the jurisprudential understanding of post-marital residence rights and ensuring that the statutory guarantees of the DV Act remain available to women navigating life after widowhood.
By dismissing the revision petition and upholding the residence and protection orders granted to Meena, the Kerala High Court has advanced the cause of gender justice and ensured that the protective architecture of the DV Act is interpreted with the sensitivity and clarity it demands.
