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illegitimate kids have a right to ancestrarl property too:-

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Illegitimate kids have a right to ancestrarl property too:SC

New Delhi, Apr 1, 2011 

(PTI)

 

The Supreme Court today ruled that illegitimate children were not only entitled to a share in the self-acquired property of parents but also in ancestral property.

A bench of justices G S Singhvi and A K Ganguly said in a judgement that such children cannot be deprived of their property rights as what was considered illegitimate in the past may not be so in the present changing society.

"The court has to remember that relationship between the parents may not be sanctioned by law but the birth of a child in such a relationship has to be viewed independently of the relationship of the parents.

"A child born in such a relationship is innocent and is entitled to all the rights which are given to other children born in valid marriage. Right to property is no longer fundamental but it is a Constitutional right and Article 300A contains a guarantee against deprivation of property right save by authority of law," the bench said.

The bench disagreed with a plethora of earlier decisions taken by the apex court in Jinia Keotin and several other cases that illegitimate children were entitled only to a share in the self-acquired property of the parents and nothing beyond that.

"In our view, in the case of joint family property, such children will be entitled only to a share in their parents´┐Ż property but they cannot claim it on their own right. The only limitation even after the amendment seems to be that during the life time of their parents, such children cannot ask for partition (of property) but they can exercise this right only after the death of their parents.

"Therefore, such children will have a right to whatever becomes the property of their parents whether self acquired or ancestral," the bench said.

 
Reply   
 
advocate

very thanking you Mr.R.K.Varma, could you give which case has been order the above said.

 
Reply   
 


Consultant

hi friends

The Bench goes on to say

"We are, therefore, of the opinion that the matter should be reconsidered by a larger Bench and for that purpose the records of the case be placed before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India for constitution of a larger Bench".

 
Reply   
 
advocate

THANX  RAMESH VERMA AND DEVAKRISHNAN.

CAN YOU YOU NAME OF PARTIES .

 
Reply   
 
Consultant

hi

Revanasiddappa & another  - Versus -Mallikarjun & others
 

 
Reply   
 
Lawyer

the matter has been reffered to full bench with regrd to the conflicting views in previous judgemnt of apex court 

but i think the view taken in the above said judgment is in consonance with intent of legislature as it has not priortized or dilisted any property by its genus

 
Reply   
 
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RESPECTED ALL,

PLEASE NOTED :-

                                                  REPORTABLE



             IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

               CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION





           CIVIL APPEAL NO.           OF 2011

(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) No.12639/09)





Revanasiddappa & another                    ...Appellant(s)





                          - Versus -





Mallikarjun & others                       ...Respondent(s)





                        J U D G M E N T





GANGULY, J.





1.    Leave granted.





2.    The   first   defendant   had   two   wives-   the   third



plaintiff (the first wife) and the fourth defendant



(the   second   wife).   The   first   defendant   had   two



children   from   the   first   wife,   the   third   plaintiff,



namely,   the   first   and   second   plaintiffs;   and


                               1


another   two   children   from   his   second   wife,   the



fourth   defendant   namely,   the   second   and   third



defendant.





3.    The   plaintiffs   (first   wife   and   her   two



children)   had   filed   a   suit   for   partition   and



separate   possession   against   the   defendants   for



their   1/4th  share   each   with   respect   to   ancestral



property   which   had   been   given   to   the   first



defendant by way of grant. The plaintiffs contended



that   the   first   defendant   had   married   the   fourth



defendant   while   his   first   marriage   was   subsisting



and,   therefore,   the   children   born   in   the   said



second   marriage   would   not   be   entitled   to   any   share



in the ancestral property of the first defendant as



they were not coparceners.





4.    However,   the   defendants   contended   that   the



properties were not ancestral properties at all but



were   self-acquired   properties,   except   for   one



property   which   was   ancestral.   Further,   the   first




                               2


defendant   also   contended   that   it   was   the   fourth



defendant   who   was   his   legally   wedded   wife,   and   not



the   third   plaintiff   and   that   the   plaintiffs   had   no



right   to   claim   partition.   Further,   the   first



defendant   also   alleged   that   an   oral   partition   had



already taken place earlier.





5.    The   Trial   Court,   by   its   judgment   and   order



dated   28.7.2005,   held   that   the   first   defendant   had



not   been   able   to   prove   oral   partition   nor   that   he



had   divorced   the   third   plaintiff.   The   second



marriage   of   the   first   defendant   with   the   fourth



defendant   was   found   to   be   void,   as   it   had   been



conducted   while   his   first   marriage   was   still



legally subsisting. Thus, the Trial Court held that



the   third   plaintiff   was   the   legally   wedded   wife   of



the   first   defendant   and   thus   was   entitled   to   claim



partition.   Further,   the   properties   were   not   self-



acquired   but   ancestral   properties   and,   therefore,



the   plaintiffs   were   entitled   to   claim   partition   of



the   suit   properties.   The   plaintiffs   and   the   first




                                3


defendant   were   held   entitled   to   1/4th  share   each   in



all the suit properties.





6.    Aggrieved,   the   defendants   filed   an   appeal



against   the   judgment   of   the   Trial   Court.   The   First



Appellate   Court,   vide   order   dated   23.11.2005,   re-



appreciated   the   entire   evidence   on   record   and



affirmed   the   findings   of   the   Trial   Court   that   the



suit   properties   were   ancestral   properties   and   that



the   third   plaintiff   was   the   legally   wedded   wife   of



the first defendant, whose marriage with the fourth



defendant   was   void   and   thus   children   from   such



marriage   were   illegitimate.   However,   the   Appellate



Court reversed the findings of the Trial Court that



illegitimate   children   had   no   right   to   a   share   in



the   coparcenary   property   by   relying   on   a   judgment



of   the   Division   Bench   of   the   Karnataka   High   Court



in  Smt.   Sarojamma   &   Ors.  v.  Smt.   Neelamma   &   Ors.,



[ILR 2005 Kar 3293].





                               4


7.    The   Appellate   Court   held   that   children   born



from a void marriage were to be treated at par with



coparceners and they were also entitled to the joint



family         properties                   of         the         first         defendant.



Accordingly,   the   Appellate   Court   held   that   the



plaintiffs,   along   with   the   first,   second   and   third



defendants   were   entitled   to   equal   share   of   1/6th



each in the ancestral properties.





8.    The   plaintiffs,   being   aggrieved   by   the   said



judgment of the Appellate Court, preferred a second



appeal   before   the   High   Court   of   Karnataka.   The



substantial   questions   of   law   before   the   High   Court



were:





      "a)  Whether   the   illegitimate   children   born   out



               of         void         marriage               are         regarded         as



               coparceners   by   virtue   of   the   amendment   to



               the Hindu Marriage Act, 1956?





                                                  5


       b)    At   a   partition   between   the   coparceners



             whether they are entitled to a share in the



             said properties?"





9.    The   High   Court   stated   that   the   said   questions



were no more  res integra  and had been considered in



the   judgment   of  Sri   Kenchegowda  v.  K.B.   Krishnappa 



&   Ors.,   [ILR   2008   Kar   3453].   It   observed   that   both



the   lower   courts   had   concurrently   concluded   that



the   fourth   defendant   was   the   second   wife   of   the



first   defendant.   Therefore,   the   second   and   third



defendants   were   illegitimate   children   from   a   void



marriage.   Section   16(3)   of   the   Hindu   Marriage   Act



makes   it   clear   that   illegitimate   children   only   had



the   right   to   the   property   of   their   parents   and   no



one   else.   As   the   first   and   second   plaintiffs   were



the legitimate children of the first defendant they



constituted   a   coparcenary   and   were   entitled   to   the



suit  properties,  which  were  coparcenary  properties.



They   also   had   a   right   to   claim   partition   against



the other     coparcener and thus     their     suit for


                                6


partition          against         the         first         defendant             was



maintainable.            However,         the         second      and         third



defendants   were   not   entitled   to   a   share   of   the



coparcenary   property   by   birth   but   were   only



entitled   to   the   separate   property   of   their   father,



the   first   defendant.   The   High   Court   observed   that



upon   partition,   when   the   first   defendant   got   his



share   on   partition,   then   the   second   and   third



defendants   would   be   entitled   to   such   share   on   his



dying intestate, but during his lifetime they would



have no right to the said property. Hence, the High



Court   allowed   the   appeal   and   held   that   the   first



plaintiff, second plaintiff and the first defendant



would   be   entitled   to   1/3rd  share   each   in   the   suit



properties.   The   claim   of   the   third   plaintiff   and



the second, third and fourth defendants in the suit



property was rejected.





10.    As   a   result,   the   second   and   third   defendants



(present appellants) filed the present appeal.





                                     7


11.    The   question   which   crops   up   in   the   facts   of



this   case   is   whether   illegitimate   children   are



entitled   to   a   share   in   the   coparcenary   property   or



whether   their   share   is   limited   only   to   the   self-



acquired   property   of   their   parents   under   Section



16(3) of the Hindu Marriage Act?





12.    Section   16(3)   of   the   Hindu   Marriage   Act,   1955



reads as follows:





       "16.   Legitimacy   of   children   of   void   and

       voidable marriages-

       (1)    xxx

       (2)    xxx

       (3)   Nothing   contained   in   sub-section   (1)

       or   sub-section   (2)   shall   be   construed   as

       conferring   upon   any   child   of   a   marriage

       which   is   null   and   void   or   which   is

       annulled   by   a   decree   of   nullity   under

       section   12,   any   rights   in   or   to   the

       property   of   any   person,   other   than   the

       parents,   in   any   case   where,   but   for   the

       passing of this Act, such child would have

       been   incapable   of   possessing   or   acquiring

       any such rights by reason of his not being

       the legitimate child of his parents.





13.    Thus,   the   abovementioned   section   makes   it   very



clear   that   a   child   of   a   void   or   voidable   marriage




                                8


can   only   claim   rights   to   the   property   of   his



parents,   and   no   one   else.   However,   we   find   it



interesting   to   note   that   the   legislature   has



advisedly   used   the   word   "property"   and   has   not



qualified   it   with   either   self-acquired   property   or



ancestral   property.     It   has   been   kept   broad   and



general.





14.    Prior to enactment of Section 16(3) of the Act,



the   question   whether   child   of   a   void   or   voidable



marriage   is   entitled   to   self-acquired   property   or



ancestral   property   of   his   parents   was   discussed   in



a   catena   of   cases.   The   property   rights   of



illegitimate   children   to   their   father's   property



were   recognized   in   the   cases   of   Sudras   to   some



extent.





15.    In  Kamulammal (deceased) represented by Kattari 



Nagaya   Kamarajendra   Ramasami   Pandiya   Naicker         v.



T.B.K.   Visvanathaswami   Naicker   (deceased)   &   Ors.,



[AIR 1923 PC 8], the Privy Council held when a Sudra




                              9


had   died   leaving   behind   an   illegitimate   son,   a



daughter,   his   wife   and   certain   collateral   agnates,



both   the   illegitimate   son   and   his   wife   would   be



entitled   to   an   equal   share   in   his   property.     The



illegitimate   son   would   be   entitled   to   one-half   of



what   he   would   be   entitled   had   he   been   a   legitimate



issue. An illegitimate child of a Sudra born from a



slave or a permanently kept concubine is entitled to



share   in   his   father's   property,   along   with   the



legitimate children.





16.    In     P.M.A.M.   Vellaiyappa   Chetty   &   Ors.         v.



Natarajan   &   Anr.,   [AIR   1931   PC   294],   it   was   held



that   the   illegitimate   son   of   a   Sudra   from   a



permanent   concubine   has   the   status   of   a   son   and   a



member of the family and share of inheritance given



to him is not merely in lieu of maintenance, but as



a   recognition   of   his   status   as   a   son;   that   where



the   father   had   left   no   separate   property   and   no



legitimate son, but was joint with his collaterals,



the   illegitimate   son   was   not   entitled   to   demand   a




                                10


partition   of   the   joint   family   property,   but   was



entitled   to   maintenance   out   of   that   property.   Sir



Dinshaw   Mulla,   speaking   for   the   Bench,   observed



that   though   such   illegitimate   son   was   a   member   of



the family, yet he had limited rights compared to a



son   born   in   a   wedlock,   and   he   had   no   right   by



birth.   During   the   lifetime   of   the   father,   he   could



take   only   such   share   as   his   father   may   give   him,



but   after   his   death   he   could   claim   his   father's



self-acquired   property   along   with   the   legitimate



sons.





17.    In     Raja         Jogendra          Bhupati         Hurri         Chundun 



Mahapatra  v.  Nityanund   Mansingh   &   Anr.,  [1889-90



Indian   Appeals   128],   the   facts   were   that   the   Raja



was   a   Sudra   and   died   leaving   behind   a   legitimate



son,   an   illegitimate   son   and   a   legitimate   daughter



and   three   widows.   The   legitimate   son   had   died   and



the   issue   was   whether   the   illegitimate   son   could



succeed   to   the   property   of   the   Raja.   The   Privy





                                       11


Council held that the illegitimate son was entitled



to succeed to the Raja by virtue of survivorship.





18.    In  Gur   Narain   Das   &   Anr.  v.  Gur   Tahal   Das   & 



Ors.,  [AIR 1952 SC 225], a Bench comprising Justice



Fazl Ali and Justice Bose agreed with the principle



laid down in the case of Vellaiyappa Chetty (supra)



and   supplemented   the   same   by   stating   certain   well-



settled   principles   to   the   effect   that   "firstly,



that the illegitimate son does not acquire by birth



any   interest   in   his   father's   estate   and   he   cannot



therefore   demand   partition   against   his   father



during   the   latter's   lifetime.     But   on   his   father's



death,         the     illegitimate         son         succeeds         as         a



coparcener   to   the   separate   estate   of   the   father



along   with   the   legitimate   son(s)   with   a   right   of



survivorship   and   is   entitled   to   enforce   partition



against   the   legitimate   son(s)   and   that   on   a



partition   between   a   legitimate   and   an   illegitimate



son,   the   illegitimate   son   takes   only   one-half   of



what   he   would   have   taken   if   he   was   a   legitimate




                                 12


son."   However,   the   Bench   was   referring   to   those



cases   where   the   illegitimate   son   was   of   a   Sudra



from a continuous concubine.



 



19.    In   the   case   of  Singhai   Ajit   Kumar   &   Anr.  v.



Ujayar   Singh   &   Ors.,  [AIR   1961   SC   1334],  the   main



question was whether an illegitimate son of a Sudra



vis-`-vis   his   self-acquired   property,   after   having



succeeded   to   half-share   of   his   putative   father's



estate,   would   be   entitled   to   succeed   to   the   other



half   share   got   by   the   widow.   The   Bench   referred   to



Chapter   1,   Section   12   of   the   Yajnavalkya   and   the



cases   of      Raja   Jogendra   Bhupati          (supra)   and



Vellaiyappa Chetty  (supra) and concluded that "once



it   is   established   that   for   the   purpose   of



succession   an   illegitimate   son   of   a   Sudra   has   the



status  of a  son and  that he  is entitled  to succeed



to   his   putative   father's   entire   self-acquired



property   in   the   absence   of   a   son,   widow,   daughter



or   daughter's   son   and   to   share   along   with   them,   we



cannot   see   any   escape   from   the   consequential   and




                                13


logical   position   that   he   shall   be   entitled   to



succeed   to   the   other   half   share   when   succession



opens after the widow's death."





20.    The amendment to Section 16 has been introduced



and   was   brought   about   with   the   obvious   purpose   of



removing the stigma of illegitimacy on children born



in   void   or   voidable   marriage   (hereinafter,   "such



children").





21.    However,   the   issues   relating   to   the   extent   of



property   rights   conferred   on   such   children   under



Section   16(3)   of   the   amended   Act   were   discussed   in



detail   in  the   case  of  Jinia  Keotin   &  Ors.  v.  Kumar 



Sitaram   Manjhi   &   Ors.  [(2003)   1   SCC   730].  It   was



contended   that   by   virtue   of   Section   16(3)   of   the



Act,   which   entitled   such   children's   rights   to   the



property   of   their   parents,   such   property   rights



included   right   to   both   self-acquired   as   well   as



ancestral   property   of   the   parent.   This   Court,



repelling   such   contentions   held   that   "in   the   light




                                14


of   such   an   express   mandate   of   the   legislature



itself,   there   is   no   room   for   according   upon   such



children   who   but   for   Section   16   would   have   been



branded   as   illegitimate   any   further   rights   than



envisaged therein by resorting to any presumptive or



inferential process of reasoning, having recourse to



the mere object or purpose of enacting Section 16 of



the Act. Any attempt to do so would amount to doing



not   only   violence   to   the   provision   specifically



engrafted   in   sub-section   (3)   of   Section   16   of   the



Act but also would attempt to court relegislating on



the   subject   under   the   guise   of   interpretation,



against   even   the   will   expressed   in   the   enactment



itself."   Thus,   the   submissions   of   the   appellants



were rejected. 





22.    In   our   humble   opinion   this   Court   in          Jinia 



Keotin  (supra)   took   a   narrow   view   of   Section   16(3)



of   the   Act.     The   same   issue   was   again   raised   in



Neelamma   &   Ors.  v.  Sarojamma
                                        &   Ors.
                                               
                                                      [(2006)   9   SCC



612], wherein the court referred to the decision in




                                15


Jinia   Keotin  (supra)   and   held   that   illegitimate



children   would   only   be   entitled   to   a   share   of   the



self-acquired property of the parents and not to the



joint Hindu family property.





23.    Same   position   was   again   reiterated   in   a   recent



decision   of   this   court   in  Bharatha   Matha   &   Anr.  v.



R.   Vijaya   Renganathan   &   Ors.  [AIR   2010   SC   2685],



wherein this Court held that a child born in a void



or   voidable   marriage   was   not   entitled   to   claim



inheritance   in   ancestral   coparcenary   property   but



was   entitled   to   claim   only   share   in   self-acquired



properties.





24.    We   cannot   accept   the   aforesaid   interpretation



of   Section   16(3)   given   in  Jinia   Keotin  (supra),



Neelamma  (supra) and  Bharatha Matha  (supra) for the



reasons discussed hereunder:





25.    The legislature has used the word "property" in



Section 16(3) and is silent on whether such property




                                 16


is   meant   to   be   ancestral   or   self-acquired.   Section



16   contains   an   express   mandate   that   such   children



are only entitled to the property of their parents,



and not of any other relation.





26.    On   a   careful   reading   of   Section   16   (3)   of   the



Act   we   are   of   the   view   that   the   amended   Section



postulates that such children would not be entitled



to   any   rights   in   the   property   of   any   person   who   is



not   his   parent   if   he   was   not   entitled   to   them,   by



virtue   of   his   illegitimacy,   before   the   passing   of



the   amendment.   However,   the   said   prohibition   does



not   apply   to   the   property   of   his   parents.   Clauses



(1)   and   (2)   of   Section   16   expressly   declare   that



such children shall be legitimate. If they have been



declared          legitimate,              then         they             cannot         be



discriminated   against   and   they   will   be   at   par   with



other   legitimate   children,   and   be   entitled   to   all



the   rights   in   the   property   of   their   parents,   both



self-acquired            and         ancestral.              The         prohibition



contained   in   Section   16(3)   will   apply   to   such




                                           17


children   with   respect   to   property   of  any   person 



other than their parents.





27.    With   changing   social   norms   of   legitimacy   in



every society, including ours, what was illegitimate



in the past may be legitimate today. The concept of



legitimacy   stems   from   social   consensus,   in   the



shaping of which various social groups play a vital



role. Very often a dominant group loses its primacy



over   other   groups   in   view   of   ever   changing   socio-



economic scenario and the consequential vicissitudes



in   human   relationship.   Law   takes   its   own   time   to



articulate such social changes through a process of



amendment.   That   is   why   in   a   changing   society   law



cannot afford to remain static. If one looks at the



history of development of Hindu Law it will be clear



that   it   was   never   static   and   has   changed   from   time



to   time   to   meet   the   challenges   of   the   changing



social pattern in different time.





                                18


28.    The   amendment   to   Section   16   of   the   Hindu



Marriage   Act   was   introduced   by   Act   60   of   76.   This



amendment     virtually     substituted     the     previous



Section   16   of   the   Act   with   the   present   Section.



From   the   relevant   notes   appended   in   the   clause



relating to this amendment, it appears that the same



was         done         to         remove            difficulties              in         the



interpretation of Section 16.





29.    The constitutional validity of Section 16(3) of



Hindu Marriage Act was challenged before this Court



and         upholding               the         law,          this         Court           in



Parayankandiyal   Eravath   Kanapravan   Kalliani   Amma



(Smt.)   &   Ors.  v.  K.   Devi   and   Ors.,   [(1996)   4   SCC



76],   held   that   Hindu   Marriage   Act,   a   beneficial



legislation, has to be interpreted in a manner which



advances   the   object   of   the   legislation.   This   Court



also   recognized   that   the   said   Act   intends   to   bring



about   social   reforms   and   further   held   that



conferment   of   social   status   of   legitimacy   on





                                                19


innocent children is the obvious purpose of Section



16 (See para 68).





30.    In   paragraph   75,   page   101   of   the   report,   the



learned   judges   held   that   Section   16   was   previously



linked   with   Sections   11   and   12   in   view   of   the



unamended   language   of   Section   16.   But   after



amendment,   Section   16(1)   stands   de-linked   from



Section   11   and   Section   16(1)   which   confers



legitimacy   on   children   born   from   void   marriages



operates with full vigour even though provisions of



Section 11 nullify those marriages. Such legitimacy



has   been   conferred   on   the   children   whether   they



were/are born in void or voidable marriage before or



after the date of amendment.





31.    In   paragraph   82   at   page   103   of   the   report,   the



learned Judges made the following observations:




       "In view of the legal fiction contained in

       Section  16,  the  illegitimate children,  for

       all         practical         purposes,         including

       succession   to   the   properties   of   their

       parents, have to be treated as legitimate.

       They   cannot,   however,   succeed   to   the


                                     20


       properties   of   any   other   relation   on   the

       basis         of         this         rule,         which         in         its

       operation, is limited to the  properties of

       the parents."





32.    It   has   been   held   in  Parayankandiyal  (supra)



that Hindu Marriage Act is a beneficent legislation



and   intends   to   bring   about   social   reforms.



Therefore,   the   interpretation   given   to   Section



16(3)   by   this   Court   in                       Jinia   Keotin                 (supra),



Neelamma  (supra)   and  Bharatha   Matha  (supra)   needs



to be reconsidered.



 



33.    With the amendment of Section 16(3), the common



law   view   that   the   offsprings   of   marriage   which   is



void   and   voidable   are   illegitimate  `ipso-jure'  has



to   change   completely.   We   must   recognize   the   status



of   such   children   which   has   been   legislatively



declared             legitimate               and          simultaneously                   law



recognises   the   rights   of   such   children   in   the



property   of   their   parents.     This   is   a   law   to



advance the socially beneficial purpose of removing





                                              21


the stigma of illegitimacy on such children who are



as innocent as any other children.





34.    However,   one   thing   must   be   made   clear   that



benefit   given   under   the   amended   Section   16   is



available   only   in   cases   where   there   is   a   marriage



but   such   marriage   is   void   or   voidable   in   view   of



the provisions of the Act.





35.    In   our   view,   in   the   case   of   joint   family



property   such   children   will   be   entitled   only   to   a



share   in   their   parents'   property   but   they   cannot



claim   it   on   their   own   right.   Logically,   on   the



partition   of   an   ancestral   property,   the   property



falling   in   the   share   of   the   parents   of   such



children   is   regarded   as   their   self   acquired   and



absolute property. In view of the amendment, we see



no   reason   why   such   children   will   have   no   share   in



such property since such children are equated under



the   amended   law   with   legitimate   offspring   of   valid



marriage.   The   only   limitation   even   after   the




                                22


amendment   seems   to   be   that   during   the   life   time   of



their   parents   such   children   cannot   ask   for



partition   but   they   can   exercise   this   right   only



after the death of their parents.





36.    We         are         constrained                to      differ         from      the



interpretation   of   Section   16(3)   rendered   by   this



Court   in  Jinia   Keotin  (supra)   and,   thereafter,   in



Neelamma  (supra) and  Bharatha Matha  (supra) in view



of   the   constitutional   values   enshrined   in   the



preamble   of   our   Constitution   which   focuses   on   the



concept   of   equality   of   status   and   opportunity   and



also   on   individual   dignity.   The   Court   has   to



remember   that   relationship   between   the   parents   may



not   be   sanctioned   by   law   but   the   birth   of   a   child



in such relationship has to be viewed independently



of the relationship of the parents. A child born in



such   relationship   is   innocent   and   is   entitled   to



all   the   rights   which   are   given   to   other   children



born   in   valid   marriage.   This   is   the   crux   of   the



amendment               in         Section          16(3).             However,         some




                                              23


limitation   on   the   property   rights   of   such   children



is still there in the sense their right is confined



to   the   property   of   their   parents.   Such   rights



cannot   be   further   restricted   in   view   of   the   pe-



existing common law view discussed above.



It is well known that this Court cannot interpret a



socially   beneficial   legislation   on   the   basis   as   if



the   words   therein   are   cast   in   stone.                            Such



legislation          must         be          given         a          purposive



interpretation   to   further   and   not   to   frustrate   the



eminently   desirable   social   purpose   of   removing   the



stigma   on   such   children.   In   doing   so,   the   Court



must   have   regard   to   the   equity   of   the   Statute   and



the   principles   voiced   under   Part   IV   of   the



Constitution,   namely,   the   Directive   Principles   of



State   Policy.     In   our   view   this   flows   from   the



mandate of Article 37 which provides that it is the



duty of the State to apply the principles enshrined



in Chapter IV in making laws.     It is no longer in



dispute     that     today     State   would   include   the



higher   judiciary   in   this   country.                          Considering




                                        24


Article 37 in the context of the duty of judiciary,



Justice              Mathew         in           Kesavananda         Bharati



Sripadagalvaru           v.     State   of   Kerala   and   another



[(1973) 4 SCC 225] held:





       "......I   can   see   no   incongruity   in   holding,

       when   Article   37   says   in   its   latter   part

       "it   shall   be   the   duty   of   the   State   to

       apply   these   principles   in   making   laws",

       that   judicial   process   is   `State   action'

       and that the judiciary is bound to apply

       the   Directive   Principles   in   making   its

       judgment."





38.    Going   by   this   principle,   we   are   of   the   opinion



that   Article   39   (f)   must   be   kept   in   mind   by   the



Court   while   interpreting   the   provision   of   Section



16(3)   of   Hindu   Marriage   Act.     Article   39(f)   of   the



Constitution runs as follows:





       "39. Certain   principles   of   policy   to   be

       followed by the State: The State shall, in

       particular,   direct   its   policy   towards

       securing-

       (a)    xxx

       (b)    xxx

       (c)    xxx

       (d)    xxx

       (e)    xxx

       (f)    that   children   are   given   opportunities

              and facilities to develop in a healthy


                                          25


            manner   and   in   conditions   of   freedom

            and   dignity   and         that   childhood   and

            youth         are          protected         against

            exploitation   and   against   moral   and

            material abandonment."





39.    Apart   from   Article   39(f),   Article   300A   also



comes   into   play   while   interpreting   the   concept   of



property rights. Article 300A is as follows:





            "300A.  Persons   not   to   be   deprived   of

            property   save   by   authority   of   law:  No

            person   shall   be   deprived   of   his

            property   save   by   authority   of   law."





40.    Right   to   property   is   no   longer   fundamental   but



it   is   a   Constitutional   right   and   Article   300A



contains a guarantee against deprivation of property



right save by authority of law.





41.    In   the   instant   case,   Section   16(3)   as   amended,



does   not   impose   any   restriction   on   the   property



right   of   such   children   except   limiting   it   to   the



property of their parents. Therefore, such children





                                      26


will   have   a   right   to   whatever   becomes   the   property



of their parents whether self acquired or ancestral.





42.    For   the   reasons   discussed   above,   we   are



constrained   to   take   a   view   different   from   the   one



taken   by   this   Court   in         Jinia   Keotin     (supra),



Neelamma     (supra)   and     Bharatha   Matha      (supra)   on



Section 16(3) of the Act. 





43.    We   are,   therefore,   of   the   opinion   that   the



matter should be reconsidered by a larger Bench and



for   that   purpose   the   records   of   the   case   be   placed



before   the   Hon'ble   the   Chief   Justice   of   India   for



constitution of a larger Bench.





                                 .......................J.

                                 (G.S. SINGHVI)





                                 .......................J.

New Delhi                        (ASOK KUMAR GANGULY)

March 31, 2011




                                27


LINK IS:-

http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/helddis3.aspx

 
Reply   
 
Consultant

hi friends

This Verdict by SCC clearly says that the property of ancestral kind becomes absolute property

after partition ,then the illegimate child may be give rights on that property ,if there is no partition then

the illegimate child has no right in that property  accourding this verdict "NOT FINAL YET".

The Article

"300A.  Persons   not   to   be   deprived   of

            property   save   by   authority   of   law:  No

            person   shall   be   deprived   of   his


            property   save   by   authority   of   law."

To my understanding " No person shall be deprived of his property" .

HIS -means the person property established under court of law.

If i am correct how can ARTICLE 300A can be cited in determining the rights of person property

under issue.

The person should first establish his right on the property.

Further more the authority does not cove the  judiciary.

 

 
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