DNA Test Only Proves Sexual Intercourse But Not Whether Relationship Was Consensual And Benefit Of Doubt Must Go To Accused: Delhi HC

Preface

While upholding the legal principle that the benefit of doubt must go to accused, we see that the Delhi High Court in a most learned, laudable, landmark, logical and latest judgment titled KXXXXX vs The State Govt of NCT of Delhi & Anr in CNR No. DLHC010132792026 + CRL.A. 320/2026 & CRL.M.A. 10175/2026 and cited in Neutral Citation No.: 2026:DHC:7451 that was reserved on 25.08.2026 and pronounced and uploaded on 03.09.2026 has minced absolutely just no words to hold indubitably that the DNA report only proves that sexual intercourse took place but does not establish whether or not the relationship was consensual. It is entirely in order that the Delhi High Court was most unequivocal in holding that the benefit of doubt must go to the accused! The Court thus upheld the Trial Court’s order and deemed it fit to dismiss the appeal that had been filed by the woman. Very rightly so!

Introduction

At the very outset, this brief, brilliant, bold and balanced judgment authored by the Single Judge Bench comprising of Hon’ble Ms Justice Madhu Jain sets the ball rolling by first and foremost putting forth in para 1 that, “This hearing has been done through hybrid mode.”

Object

While spelling out the purpose of the appeal, the Bench then discloses in para 2 observing that, “The present appeal has been filed by the prosecutrix under Section 419 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (hereinafter referred to as, ‘BNSS’), against the judgment of acquittal dated 07.10.2024 passed by the learned ASJ , Dwarka Courts, New Delhi, in SC No. 151/2022, arising out of FIR No. 138/2021, registered at Police Station Dwarka North, under Sections 328/376(2)(n)/377/506/509 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as, ‘IPC’), whereby Respondent No. 2 (Anoop) was acquitted of all charges.”

Factual Matrix

To put things in perspective, the Bench envisages in para 3 that, “Briefly stated, the case of the prosecution is that the prosecutrix was residing with her husband and their adopted child. Her husband had sustained a fall from a roof in 2007, resulting in 75% disability, and was unable to father a biological child. Consequently, the couple adopted a child in the year 2014.”

While elaborating further on the facts of the case, the Bench observes in para 4 that, “It is alleged that Respondent No. 2, who was known to the family of the prosecutrix, used to visit their house and, from the year 2017 onwards, established physical relations with the prosecutrix against her wishes by extending threats and inducements. It is further alleged that on one occasion she was administered an intoxicating substance, following which physical relations were established with her. According to the prosecutrix, the alleged acts continued thereafter and included repeated sexual acts, including unnatural intercourse, accompanied by threats and coercion.”

In addition, the Bench then lays bare in para 5 disclosing that, “The prosecutrix became pregnant and gave birth to a child on 20.06.2019. During the course of investigation, DNA samples of the prosecutrix, the accused and the child were obtained and sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory, Rohini. The DNA examination report stated that Respondent No. 2 was the biological father of the child.”                        

Offences Charged

Further, the Bench then reveals in para 6 laying bare that, “The prosecutrix subsequently disclosed the alleged incidents to her husband and family members. On the basis of her complaint, FIR No. 138/2021 came to be registered at Police Station Dwarka North on 17.03.2021 under Sections 376/377/506 IPC. Her statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. was recorded on 18.03.2021.”

Be it noted, the Bench notes in para 7 that, “During investigation, the prosecutrix was medically examined and the requisite biological samples were collected. The DNA report was thereafter received from the FSL. The police filed the charge-sheet against Respondent No. 2 for offences under Sections 376/377/506/509 IPC, followed by a supplementary charge-sheet placing the DNA report on record. Cognizance was taken on 07.09.2021, whereafter the case was committed to the Court of Sessions and registered as SC No. 151/2022.”

Do also note, the Bench notes in para 8 that, “Vide order dated 23.02.2024, the learned Trial Court framed charges against the accused Anoop for offences punishable under Sections 328, 376(2)(n), 377, 506 and 509 IPC. The accused pleaded not guilty and claimed trial.”

Briefly stated, the Bench states in para 11 that, “Vide impugned judgment dated 07.10.2024, the learned Trial Court acquitted Respondent No. 2 of all the charges. While considering the evidence on record, the learned Trial Court, inter alia, considered the alleged inconsistencies in the testimony of the prosecutrix, the delay in disclosure/reporting of the alleged incidents and the defence taken by the accused that the relationship was consensual.”

Do further note, the Bench then stipulates in para 23 stating that, “The principal question which arises for consideration is whether the judgment of acquittal dated 07.10.2024 suffers from such perversity, patent illegality or misappreciation of material evidence as would warrant interference by this Court in an appeal against acquittal.”

Needless to say, the Bench then underscores in para 24 mentioning that, “It is well settled that where the view taken by the learned Trial Court is a reasonably possible view on the evidence, the appellate Court would not interfere merely because another view is also possible. An acquittal can be reversed only where the appreciation of evidence by the learned Trial Court is shown to be perverse, manifestly illegal, based on a misreading of material evidence, or where the conclusion of guilt is the only conclusion reasonably possible on the evidence. The Supreme Court has repeatedly reiterated that an acquittal cannot be reversed merely on account of a difference of opinion.”

While citing the relevant case law, the Bench then states in para 25 that, “In Tulasareddi @ Mudakappa & Anr. v. State of Karnataka & Ors., 2026 SCC OnLine SC 89, the Supreme Court, after considering the earlier decisions on the scope of appellate interference with an order of acquittal, reiterated the aforesaid principles in the following terms:

“From the aforesaid decisions rendered by this Court, it can be said that if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the findings of acquittal recorded by the Trial Court. Further, if the view taken is a possible view, the Appellate Court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible. The following principles have to be kept in mind by the Appellate Court while dealing with the appeals against an order of acquittal:

(a) whether the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity;

(b) whether the judgment is based on misreading/omission to consider the material evidence on record;

(c) an order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are ‘compelling and substantial reasons’ for doing so. If the order is ‘clearly unreasonable’, it is a compelling reason for interference;

(d) the appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after re-appreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record;

(e) if the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and

(f) the appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.”        

It is worth noting that the Bench notes in para 36 that, “This Court is conscious that the conduct of a prosecutrix in a sexual offence cannot be judged on the basis of stereotypical notions of how a victim ought to behave. Nor can delay in reporting a sexual offence, by itself, be treated as sufficient to discard the prosecution case. However, the conduct of the parties and the surrounding circumstances are not wholly irrelevant when the Court is required to determine the credibility of competing versions and whether the prosecution has established the charges beyond reasonable doubt. In the present case, the learned Trial Court did not treat any one circumstance as conclusive; rather, it considered the evidence cumulatively.”

Presumption of Innocence

It would be worthwhile to note that the Bench notes in para 45 that, “The present case is therefore not one where material evidence has been wholly ignored or where the conclusion of acquittal is demonstrably unsustainable. The learned Trial Court has examined the evidence and arrived at a conclusion which is reasonably possible on the material before it. The fact that another view may also be possible is not sufficient to justify interference in an appeal against acquittal. The strengthened presumption of innocence in favour of the accused consequently operates in his favour.”

Nucleus of Judgment

Most significantly, most commendably and so also most forthrightly, the Bench encapsulates in para 46 what constitutes the cornerstone of this notable judgment postulating precisely that, “This Court is also mindful that the offence alleged is grave and the allegations made by the prosecutrix are serious. Nevertheless, the gravity of the accusation cannot substitute the standard of proof required in a criminal trial. The prosecution must establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, and where the evidence permits a reasonable view consistent with innocence, the benefit must go to the accused. The reliance placed by learned counsel for the appellant on the aforesaid judgments is misplaced. The said decisions, having been rendered in materially different factual and evidentiary circumstances, are clearly distinguishable and, therefore, do not advance the case of the appellant.”

Conclusion

As a corollary, the Bench then holds in para 47 that, “In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court finds no compelling ground to interfere with the judgment dated 07.10.2024 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Dwarka Courts, New Delhi. The findings recorded by the learned Trial Court are based on an appreciation of the evidence and cannot be termed perverse, manifestly illegal or wholly unreasonable.”

It would be instructive to note that the Bench then hastens to add in para 48 directing and holding that, “Accordingly, the present appeal is dismissed. The judgment of acquittal dated 07.10.2024 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Dwarka Courts, New Delhi, in SC No. 151/2022 arising out of FIR No. 138/2021, Police Station Dwarka North, is upheld.”