Case Title:
Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab & Ors.
Date of Judgment:
10 January 2014
Bench:
Dr. Justice B.S. Chauhan (Authoring), with Justices Ranjana Prakash Desai, Ranjan Gogoi, N.V. Ramana, and S.A. Bobde
Subject:
In a landmark Constitution Bench ruling, the Supreme Court resolved conflicting interpretations of Section 319 of the CrPC by holding that trial courts can summon additional accused at any stage after cognizance and even post framing of charges, provided judicial evidence adduced during trial indicates their involvement.
Important Provisions Involved:
Section 319, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 : Power to proceed against other persons appearing to be guilty of offence
- Where, in the course of any inquiry into, or trial of, an offence, it appears from the evidence that any person not being the accused has committed any offence for which such person could be tried together with the accused, the Court may proceed against such person for the offence which he appears to have committed.
- Where such person is not attending the Court he may be arrested or summoned, as the circumstances of the case may require, for the purpose aforesaid.
- Any person attending the Court although not under arrest or upon a summons, may be detained by such Court for the purpose of the inquiry into, or trial of, the offence which he appears to have committed.
Where the Court proceeds against any person under Sub-Section (1) then—
- the proceedings in respect of such person shall be commenced afresh, and witnesses re-heard;
- subject to the provisions of clause (a), the case may proceed as if such person had been an accused person when the Court took cognizance of the offence upon which the inquiry or trial was commenced.
Sections 2(g), 2(h) of CRPC:
2(g) "inquiry" means every inquiry, other than a trial, conducted under this Code by a Magistrate or Court;
2(h) "investigation" includes all the proceedings under this Code for the collection of evidence conducted by a police officer or by any person (other than a Magistrate) who is authorised by a Magistrate in this behalf;
Section 227 CrPC: Discharge.
If, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing.
Section 228 CrPC– Framing of charge
1.If, after such consideration and hearing as aforesaid, the Judge is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence which-
- is not exclusively triable by the Court of Session, he may, frame a charge against the accused and, by order, transfer the case for trial to the Chief Judicial Magistrate or any other Judicial Magistrate of the first class and direct the accused to appear before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, or, as the case may be, the Judicial Magistrate of the first class, on such date as he deems fit, and thereupon such Magistrate shall try the offence in accordance with the procedure for the trial of warrant-cases instituted on a police report;
- is exclusively triable by the Court, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused.
2.Where the Judge frames any charge under clause (b) of Sub-Section (1), the charge shall be read and explained to the accused and the accused shall be asked whether he pleads guilty of the offence charged or claims to be tried.
Article 21, Constitution of India – Right to life and liberty, including the right to fair trial.
Introduction:
The ruling in Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab is a doctrinal landmark in Indian criminal procedure law. It dealt with the interpretation of Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and entailed the urgent procedural issue: can a criminal court summon someone as an additional accused from evidence recorded in the trial, even though such a person is neither mentioned in the FIR nor the police charge sheet?
The broader constitutional question before the Court was the procedural and substantive extent of judicial discretion under Section 319 — a provision that vests the court with the rare power to act against individuals not originally arraigned as accused where trial evidence inculpates them.
The Court was further required to specify the exact moment during trial hearings when such power may be wielded and what quantum of evidence-based satisfaction needed to be established before exercising such power.
Factual Background:
The factual scenario of the case was based on the summoning of Hardeep Singh in a murder case. Even though he was not mentioned in the FIR or charge sheet, a prosecution witness, during the examination-in-chief, made a statement which supposedly implicated him in the crime.
On the basis of this statement, the trial court exercised its powers under Section 319 CrPC and summoned Singh as an additional accused. Singh contested this action on the ground that as the trial had already commenced and charges had already been framed, the trial court did not have the power anymore to order a new individual as an accused.
The issue arose because previous differing orders had been passed by different benches of the Supreme Court, such as Mohd. Shafi v. Mohd. Rafiq (2007) and Rakesh v. State of Haryana (2001), which held conflicting opinions with respect to the timing and quantum for applying Section 319. In order to iron out this judicial inconsistency, the case was referred to a constitution bench.
Contentions of the Appellant:
The Appellant, Hardeep Singh, submitted that this power under Section 319 CrPC could only be exercised up to the stage of pre-trial, i.e., up to the charge framing stage. Once charges have been framed, and the trial commenced, then the trial court was functus officio so far as incorporation of new accused is concerned.
It was contended that permitting courts to add accused on the basis of untested and uncorroborated statements made on record at the trial would be contrary to Article 21 of the Constitution, which safeguards the right to a fair trial, including notice and the right to be heard.
Singh's counsel also argued that the word "evidence" employed in Section 319 must be given a strict connotation to mean merely such materials gathered in the course of investigation — like statements under Section 161 CrPC and other police documents — and not deposition on oath during trial.
The plea of the appellant was premised on the safeguarding of the rights of individuals from arbitrariness in judicial discretion, particularly given the invocation of Section 319 may expose a person to criminal trial without procedural safeguards extended to the initially charge-sheeted persons. The issue agitated was the prejudice caused by late addition of new accused on their defense capacity and causing unwarranted inconvenience.
Contentions of the Respondent (State):
In reply, the State submitted that the discretion under Section 319 is both substantive and curative, aimed at preventing flight of guilty persons who were not included in the charge-sheet either by negligence, prejudice, or manipulation during investigation.
The State contended that the word "evidence" in Section 319 should be interpreted to mean testimony taken on oath in court, especially while examining-in-chief prosecution witnesses. They underscored that the legislative purpose of Section 319 is to provide for the completeness of the trial process and to avoid miscarriage of justice.
It was also argued that limiting Section 319's operation to the pre-charge phase would excessively restrain the court's capacity to react to credible in-trial disclosures. The State implored the Court to apply a purposive interpretation, allowing trial courts to prevent any guilty individual from evading the criminal justice system solely due to preliminary investigative failure.
Delivering the majority judgment, Justice B.S. Chauhan performed a comprehensive construction of Section 319 within the general scheme of the CrPC as well as constitutional principles. Initially, the Court settled that the word "evidence" under Section 319 is to be interpreted according to the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, and has to denote evidence recorded by the court — not just investigation reports like statements under Section 161 CrPC.
The Court, in paragraph 80, ruled that "evidence" shall be "evidence adduced in the course of trial by the examination of witnesses under oath." This necessarily excluded the utilization of investigation records alone to order new accused to appear under Section 319.
Most importantly, the Court repelled the contention that Section 319 could only be invoked before framing of charges. In paragraph 95, the Constitution Bench categorically held that:
"Stage of inquiry begins, as far as the court is concerned, with the laying of the chargesheet and the court applying its mind to form charges. Hence, the power under Section 319 can be exercised even after the framing of charges and at any stage of trial."
This decision undermined the restriction previously argued by some benches, which limited Section 319 to pre-trial situations. The Court pointed out that such a restricted interpretation would defeat the very object of the provision, namely, ensuring that no one who seems guilty on the grounds of court-recorded evidence goes scot-free for lack of earlier procedural loopholes.
Another significant clarification offered by the Court was the proof standard to be used for invoking Section 319. At paragraph 105, the Court noted that the standard must be higher than that to frame charges under Section 228 CrPC (which is only a prima facie case) but lower than the proof standard beyond reasonable doubt to convict. The threshold, the Court held, should be "strong and cogent evidence" which creates a reasonable probability of guilt. The Court went on to say that the power should be exercised judicially with discretion, not mechanically or casually.
Importantly, the Court also ruled that even individuals who had previously been discharged under Section 227 of the CrPC could be recalled again under Section 319 if evidence gathered in the course of trial incriminates them. The reason given was that discharge does not exclude the court from reconsidering its view in the light of subsequent evidence arising in the trial — a stance in line with the pursuit of substantive justice.
In so doing, the Court explicitly overruled Mohd. Shafi v. Mohd. Rafiq and distinguished Joginder Singh v. State of Punjab, thus resolving a long-standing procedural conflict of interpretation.
Conclusion:
The Constitution Bench’s decision in Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab reaffirms the judiciary’s proactive role in ensuring that procedural rules do not become barriers to justice. By allowing courts to invoke Section 319 at any stage during the trial, including after the framing of charges, and by clarifying that only judicially recorded evidence may trigger such power, the judgment strikes a critical balance between prosecutorial integrity and constitutional due process. Its insistence on a higher threshold of evidentiary satisfaction ensures that the court’s extraordinary powers are not abused but remain available to correct investigative failures that could otherwise shield culpable individuals.
In reaffirming the centrality of fairness, thoroughness, and dynamism in trial proceedings, Hardeep Singh stands as a testament to the Supreme Court’s continued commitment to ensuring that substantive justice is not sacrificed at the altar of procedural rigidity. It is now the governing authority on Section 319 CrPC and remains a doctrinal anchor in Indian criminal procedure.
