Since May 2009 Minister for Home Affairs P Chidambaram has been unequivocally stating that Maoism is the greatest internal security threat to the country. In a recent statement, he has observed, "The conflict with Maoist groups escalated and remained the biggest headache for security forces in the year gone by". He has substantiated his observation with facts: A total of 713 civilians were killed by Maoist groups in 2010, as compared to 591 in 2009. While Maoists had only 171 casualties, security forces lost 285 personnel in 2010, a tad less than 317 killed in 2009. It clearly shows that Maoist groups enjoyed an upper hand while security forces struggled to contain violence. Hence, the question is how the Union Government and State Governments witnessing Maoist insurgency should respond to the challenge. Do the political and bureaucratic executives of the Union and State Governments have any consensus on responses to the threat posed by Maoists?
While addressing the Central Reserve Police Forces or Indian Police officials, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, Minister for Finance Pranab Mukherjee and Mr Chidambaram have often asked them to deal with Maoist extremism 'firmly and resolutely'. If this is the strategy of the Union Government, then it has to take along the State Governments with it because fighting against Maoist insurgency is a joint responsibility of the Union Government and the States. However, Mr Chidambaram has created a rift between the Union Government and the West Bengal Government by shooting a letter to Chief Minister Buddhadeb Bhattacharjee in December last year, criticising the 'alarming law and order situation' in the State. He accused the armed cadres of CPI(M), 'Harmad Vahini', of spreading violence, especially against political opponents. Mr Bhattacharjee repudiated the charge calling Mr Chidambaram's assessment of the situation as "surprising" and "far from impartial". It is common knowledge that the West Bengal Government is fighting against Maoists with great determination.
However, it has accused Congress's alliance partner Trinamool Congress of aligning with Maoist groups to gain political mileage before the forthcoming Assembly election. But the Union Government has looked the other way. How can any State Government fight against Maoists without undiluted support from the Union Government?
The UPA2 Government is not at odds only with the West Bengal Government when it comes to dealing with Maoism. Jharkhand Mukti Morcha leader Shibu Soren and Chief Minister of Bihar Nitish Kumar also are not in line with the Union Government's strategy. Mr Nitish Kumar has maintained that Maoism has social roots and it cannot be treated solely as a 'law and order' problem. On the other hand, the JMM has allegedly taken the support of Maoist activists during the Jharkhand State Assembly election as a quid pro quo arrangement because Maoists wanted protection from paramilitary forces. The only upshot is that Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and his Cabinet colleagues seem to have finally realised that Maoism is not just a 'law and order' issue but has its roots in the society. They have acknowledged that gun-wielding Maoists have been successful in establishing bases in nine States of India because gut-wrenching poverty in tribal areas has created serious discontent among locals. The Prime Minister, while addressing the IPS probations on December 25, 2010, said, "You must have the sensitivity to recognise the social and economic roots of disaffection among tribal societies where Maoism has become a major force to reckon with." Mr Mukherjee on December 29 has stated that armed operations against Maoists "must be dovetailed with development" as people have been "denied their legitimate demands" and "deprived of their rights".
Accordingly, the UPA2 Government has sanctioned Rs 13,000 crore for special development of 60 Maoist-affected districts in Odisha, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Bihar, West Bengal and Uttar Pradesh. This is a follow-up of the Planning Commission's Integrated Action Plan for Maoist-hit districts. The emphasis of this special development programme will be on health, education, drinking water and roads. The criteria for the identification of special schemes for these 60 districts are: It should have 25 per cent of tribal population. At least 50 per cent of the local population should be living 'below the poverty line'. And security-related considerations should be kept in mind while identifying the nature of services needed for these districts.
Besides, both the Union Government and State Governments have launched other special schemes and earmarked special funds for backward regions.
Taking into account leakages of welfare funds during the implementation process, the Union Government has decided to form an Implementation Committee consisting of District Collector, Superintendent of Police and Forest Development Officer. That the committee will be held solely responsible for the implementation of such programmes is a welcome move but local tribal people must be involved in the implementation of programmes meant for their welfare.
Having said that, the real bottlenecks in policy planning have been the inconsistency in the Union Government's approach to Maoist insurgency and the clash of perspectives between the Union Government and the States.
