Can a Wife be Denied Interim Maintenance For Adultery? Supreme Court Claries the Scope of Section 125(4) crpc

By LCI Content Desk

A husband's claim that his wife is involved in an adulterous relationship does not automatically stop her from claiming maintenance. However, a court cannot simply ignore this claim until the end of the maintenance process. The Supreme Court has now clearly defined the boundary between these two positions.

In Himanshu Chordia v. State of Rajasthan & Anr., decided on 31 July 2026, a bench of two judges, Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Vipul M.Pancholi, examined whether an application under Section 125(4) of the CRPC, which alleges that a wife is living in an adulterous relationship, needs to wait until the final decision in the maintenance case before being addressed. The Court answered this question in the negative.

At the same time, the judgment does not establish a rule that every allegation of adultery automatically halts interim maintenance.

The Supreme Court made an important distinction regarding evidence. If the material provided by the husband clearly shows the adulterous relationship, or if the fact is admitted, then the statutory bar can apply even during the interim stage. However, if the allegation depends on disputed evidence that requires proof, authentication, or a full examination, interim maintenance can continue while the Section 125(4) application is being considered.

This distinction is the core significance of the judgment. It is not merely about adultery and maintenance; it also deals with how courts should handle a statutory defense when issuing interim relief. The case that brought the matter to the Supreme Court. Himanshu Chordia and Arushi Jain's marital disagreement gave rise to the problem.

In 2014, the pair tied the knot. The woman left the marital residence along with their kid and her possessions when marital issues arose, according to the Supreme Court's ruling. She filed for maintenance and interim relief under Section 125 CrPC on November 5.

These proceedings were before the Special Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, PCPNDT Cases, Udaipur. The husband, however, raised a statutory objection.

He filed an application under Section 125(4) CrPC, alleging that the wife was in an adulterous relationship and therefore not entitled to maintenance. The evidence included photographs, a CD, and other material submitted through affidavits. The Trial Court did not address the allegation immediately.

Its reasoning was that the authenticity and originality of the photographs and other material could not be confirmed right away, and that the issue would need to be examined during the main maintenance proceedings. The husband challenged this approach.

The High Court also did not interfere. It stated that the allegation of an adulterous relationship could be considered during the proceedings, but there was no provision in the CrPC requiring the issue to be decided before an application for interim maintenance. The High Court treated it as a disputed question of fact that could be resolved at the final stage.

This became the central question before the Supreme Court: could a court simply say, “The adultery allegation is in dispute, so we will deal with it at the end”?

The Supreme Court said that the aforesaid approach was not legally suitable in this case.

Section 125(4) And Its Importance 

Section 125(1) CrPC creates a summary remedy for maintenance where a person with sufficient means neglects or refuses to support his wife, children, or parents as required by law. The provision is intended as a social justice measure. The Supreme Court has consistently recognised that these proceedings are summary in nature and are meant to prevent vagrancy and destitution. In Himanshu Chordia, the Court again stressed that the provision is about ensuring people who cannot support themselves have a means to secure the necessities of a dignified life.

Section 125(1) also provides the mechanism for interim maintenance.

The second proviso allows the Magistrate, during the course of the proceedings, to order monthly interim maintenance and the expenses of the proceedings.

It further states that such an application should, as far as possible, be decided within sixty days from the time the notice is served. Section 125(4), however, creates a clear and explicit exception.

It states that a wife is not eligible for maintenance or interim maintenance under this section if she is living in adultery, if she refuses to live with her husband without valid reasons, or if the couple is living separately by mutual agreement. Section 125(5) takes this further.

If an order has already been issued and it is later found that the wife is living in adultery, is refusing to live with her husband without valid reasons, or if the couple is living separately by mutual consent, the Magistrate must cancel the order.

The statutory framework therefore includes both a general right to maintenance and certain explicit exceptions. The issue in Himanshu Chordia was not about the existence of Section 125(4). The real issue was when and how this statutory exception should be taken into account.

THE SUPREME COURT'S ANSWER: THE DEFENCE CANNOT BE KEPT IN LIMBO  

The Supreme Court examined the nature and purpose of Section 125 proceedings.

The Court noted that maintenance proceedings are essentially civil in nature, even though they are governed by the Code of Criminal Procedure.

It also emphasized that these proceedings are summary in nature and meant to provide quick relief. The standard of proof required in such cases is not the same as in criminal cases, which requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

This background was important. If the law clearly says that a wife living in adultery is not entitled to maintenance, a court cannot have a process that delays the consideration of this legal defence until after interim maintenance and the entire maintenance process is completed.

The Supreme Court therefore rejected the idea that an application under Section 125(4) should always be postponed until the final decision is made.

The Court effectively divided the proceedings into different stages. The maintenance claim constitutes the first stage.

An application for interim maintenance may be considered during the ongoing main proceeding. An application under Section 125(4) is then a second matter that must be addressed when it is properly raised. The final maintenance claim cannot proceed as if Section 125(4) does not exist.

This is why the Supreme Court outlined the proper sequence as one in which an application under Section 125(4) should be considered after an interim maintenance order has been made, but before the final decision on the main maintenance application.

This does not mean that the wife automatically loses interim maintenance whenever Section 125(4) is raised.

That is where the evidence becomes important.

INFOGRAPHIC 1: WHAT THE SUPREME COURT ACTUALLY HELD

"Ex Facie" Is The Most Crucial Term In The Judgment.

The phrase that requires the most focus is "ex facie."   The Supreme Court ruled that if a husband submits an application under Section 125(4) and is able, at the initial stage, to prove through evidence that "ex facie" amounts to adultery, then there may be a reason to stop interim maintenance.

However, the Court was careful to not consider every item of evidence provided by a party as automatically conclusive.

This distinction is especially important because allegations of adultery are often based on indirect or electronic evidence. A photograph may show two people together.

A message may indicate a close relationship. A video may be used to support a specific claim. A call record may show communication. None of these should be treated as proof of adultery just because they were presented to the court.

The court must assess what the evidence actually proves. The Supreme Court also acknowledged that circumstantial evidence needs thorough evaluation and that electronic evidence may need verification.

When the evidence requires proper proof before the claim can be accepted, interim maintenance does not stop automatically just because the husband has filed a Section 125(4) application.

This is an important protection against a simplistic interpretation of the judgment.

The judgment does not state:  

"Allegation of adultery = no maintenance."  

It actually says:  

"A statutory defense of adultery must be addressed at the right time.

If the material itself shows that the statutory condition is met, the court cannot delay its effect until the very end."  

This is a more precise and narrower statement.

THE COURT'S EXAMPLE MAKES THE POSITION CLEAR  

The Supreme Court used an example to explain the procedural issue. Imagine a wife applies for maintenance, and the court grants interim maintenance.

The husband then files an application under Section 125(4), alleging that the wife is living in adultery. Two scenarios may then arise.

If the evidence with the Section 125(4) application shows that the statutory ground for disqualification is clearly established, or if the relevant fact is admitted, the interim maintenance cannot continue as if the statutory bar does not exist.

The interim maintenance may be stopped, and the principal maintenance claim could be rejected on that basis.

However, the court must consider the claim if it is based on evidence that has to be properly shown. Interim maintenance may be carried out during this period until the Section 125(4) problem is completely fixed.

This distinction prevents two types of mistakes. The first is denying interim maintenance simply because an allegation has been made. The second is granting and continuing interim maintenance indefinitely while refusing to evaluate a statutory defense that could eventually dismiss the claim. The Supreme Court's approach aims to avoid both.

INFOGRAPHIC 2: THE TWO EXTREMES THE COURT REJECTED

Criminal Law And Standard Of Proof

This is another area where headlines can mislead.

The proceedings discussed are under a criminal procedure law, but this does not imply that all factual issues in a maintenance case are subject to the criminal standard of proof, which is the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Supreme Court made it quite evident that Section 125 procedures are fundamentally civil in character.

When describing the nature of these procedures, it cited past rulings like Dwarika Prasad Satpathy v. Bidyut Prava Dixit, Chanmuniya v. Virendra Kumar Singh Kushwaha, Kamala v. M.R. Mohan Kumar. 

In fact, adultery is no longer considered a criminal act in India after the Supreme Court's ruling in the case of Joseph Shine v. Union of India. Section 497 of the IPC was declared unconstitutional. As a result, the question is not whether a wife can be prosecuted for adultery. Instead, the focus is on whether the legal conditions for maintenance are met. This distinction is very important.

The Court is not punishing adultery with a criminal punishment and rather, it is addressing the maintenance issue. Adultery may nonetheless have legal or civil repercussions even when it is not considered a criminal crime.

In the Joseph Shine v. UOI case, the Supreme Court had Section 497 of the IPC as unconstitutional and further, the Court had ruled that the said provision violated basic fundamental rights, particularly where it included treating women unfairly and limiting their freedom in marriage.

Despite no longer being a crime, adultery may still be relevant in other legal matters.

For example, the Supreme Court addressed a case regarding financial support in the Himanshu Chordia case. This kind of distinction is sometimes ignored in everyday discussions.

A person cannot be charged with a crime with the sole reason being adultery. That does not mean the existence of an adulterous relationship is never important in family or maintenance matters.

Family law distinguishes between criminal consequences and civil or statutory consequences.

For example, family law may consider adultery as a reason for divorce, and maintenance laws may include conditions that affect the right to receive maintenance.

These consequences do not make adultery a criminal offense again.

The 2026 judgment should therefore not be interpreted as conflicting with Joseph Shine. Both decisions deal with different legal issues.

WHAT ABOUT THE NEW BNSS?

There is an important technical point for anyone writing about this 2026 judgment. The Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, has replaced the Code of Criminal Procedure.

The corresponding provision for maintenance is now Section 144 of the BNSS. Section 144 covers the maintenance of wives, children, and parents.

Sub-section (4) continues to include the three legal situations outlined in Section 125(4) of the CrPC: a wife is not entitled to maintenance if she is living with someone else in an adulterous relationship, refuses to live with her husband without a valid reason, or the couple is living separately by mutual consent.

Section 144(5) also outlines the cancellation of a maintenance order when these conditions are proven. The BNSS provision also allows for interim maintenance.

This creates an important difference between the law that the Supreme Court considered in this case and the law that will generally apply to new cases under the current criminal procedure system.

Himanshu Chordia arose from a maintenance application filed in 2020 under Section 125 of the CrPC.

The Supreme Court correctly analyzed Section 125 of the CrPC in deciding the appeal.

For lawyers and students discussing the case today, however, the corresponding provision under the BNSS should not be overlooked.

INFOGRAPHIC 3: CRPC TO BNSS

THE JUDGMENT IS NOT A BLANK CHEQUE FOR HUSBANDS TO WITHHOLD MAINTENANCE

This is perhaps the most important caveat of all.

A husband cannot withhold interim maintenance on a mere allegation of his wife’s infidelity.

The Supreme Court did not create a presumption in favour of husbands in matters of interim maintenance.

The evidentiary standard was critical.

If the material before the court established infidelity ex facie, the statutory disqualification applied even at the stage of interim maintenance.

However, if the material before the court raised a dispute of fact, the court had to adjudicate on the dispute rather than presuming its existence on the mere filing of the documents by the husband.

This was particularly relevant in view of the evidence of screenshots, photographs, social media, call detail records and other digital evidence.

Such evidence, while potentially conclusive of the adultery allegation, could also be misleading in isolation.

A photograph might show a man and a woman walking out together – but not necessarily in a relationship.

A message could have multiple meanings.

A social media post by a spouse could range from an innocuous comment to a public declaration of love – the exact intent had to be determined by the court.

A video might have to be authenticated.

A call detail record could establish opportunity but not necessarily a romantic or sexual relationship.

The Supreme Court, in short, drew a distinction between material which indicated infidelity ex facie and material which merely raised a dispute of fact and had to be examined more closely as evidence.

For this reason, rather than adopting a general rule that any charge of adultery would negate interim maintenance, the Court adopted the expression ex facie.

What Happens If The Evidence Is Disputed And The Wife Is Accused?

The Supreme Court appreciated that where the material raised a dispute of fact, especially when weighed against electronic evidence, a careful assessment was required.

The Court did not permit the issue to be completely sidelined.

The Section 125(4) application had to be decided – but within the narrow parameters of the evidence.

This is crucial to an understanding of the judgment.

The court has to weigh the need to preserve the statutory object of maintaining a wife against the possibility of a husband defeating this object by falsely accusing his wife of adultery at the stage of interim maintenance.

The wrong way to resolve this tension is to allow a husband to retain the interim maintenance for the duration of the proceedings merely by filing a Section 125(4) application and attaching documents that allege but fail to prove adultery.

The other wrong way is to allow a husband to terminate interim maintenance immediately upon making a bare allegation of adultery without proof, thus defeating the statutory scheme entirely.

The Supreme Court struck a careful middle path by focusing on the evidence.

That, in fact, is the true genius of this judgment.

The Decision Also Reinforces The Summary Nature Of Maintenance Proceedings

The Supreme Court has consistently held that Section 125 proceedings were not meant to be drawn out proceedings.

They were summary proceedings with a narrow objective to ensure that a wife was not left destitute.

The Court in the present case, once again, took note of the fact that Section 125 proceedings were not meant to involve extensive pleadings or detailed evidence on ancillary issues.

That does not mean that questions of fact on collateral matters cannot be considered at all.

The Second proviso to Section 125(1) of the CrPC itself contemplated that where the application for interim maintenance was made, the court would decide it on such terms as it thought fit, having regard to the provisions of the Second Schedule to the CrPC.

The court would decide it “as far as practicable within a period of sixty days from the date of service of notice of motion”. The Supreme Court’s approach in the present case reinforces this summary nature of Section 125 proceedings.

Had any and every defence been allowed to be raised before the grant of interim maintenance, the proceedings could conceivably last for years, defeating the very object of such proceedings as envisioned by Parliament.

But then, as noted earlier, allowing a bare allegation of adultery to defeat a wife’s right to interim maintenance would also defeat Parliament’s intent.

The Supreme Court’s emphasis on the need to focus on the evidence before the court, is therefore to be commended.

What The Judgment Does Not Decide

A caveat regarding this judgment is in order.

The judgment must not be read as saying that every wife accused of adultery is automatically deprived of interim maintenance.

It must not be read as saying that photographs conclusively establish adultery.

It must not be read as a reviving of the adultery law.

It must not be read as saying that husbands can unilaterally withhold interim maintenance.

It must not be read as saying that courts can ignore evidence.

It must not be read as saying that every matrimonial dispute should be decided under Section 125(4).

It must not be read as saying that there is no distinction between a Section 125(1) maintenance proceeding and a Section 125(4) criminal proceeding.
The judgment addresses a narrow procedural question – one which is reflected in the title – and it answers this question narrowly.

The court decided that in a Section 125(4) proceeding, the court could not ignore a Section 125(4) defence merely because the proceedings were summary in nature.

What Does It Mean To Practitioners?

For the purposes of this article, this response should be attributed to an identified advocate after confirmation.

The identity of the speaker should not be fabricated or presented as an interview unless actually confirmed.
Speaking with LCI, Adv. Sudhanshu Khetrapal observed that the practical value of the judgment lies in distinguishing between an allegation and evidence.

“The Supreme Court has not created a rule that an allegation of adultery automatically defeats a maintenance claim.

What it has made clear is that a court cannot simply leave a statutory defence under Section 125(4) of the CrPC undecided until the very end.

If the material establishes the disqualification on its face, the court has to give effect to it.

If the evidence is disputed, the court has to examine it properly rather than treating the allegation itself as proof.”

He added that the judgment would have particular relevance in view of the increasing use of electronic evidence in matrimonial disputes.

“Family disputes increasingly involve photographs, chats, social media material, location records and other digital evidence.

Courts have to be careful about drawing conclusions from isolated pieces of material.

The judgment’s distinction between evidence that establishes adultery ex facie and evidence that requires further proof is therefore important in preventing both arbitrary denial and indefinite continuation of interim maintenance.”

The Child’s Position Cannot Be Lost In The Discussion

The facts of this case also involve a child and the maintenance payable to him/her.

The Supreme Court records that in the interim order, the maintenance payable to the wife and the child was fixed at Rs. 25,000/- each.

It is crucial to bear in mind that the entitlements of the wife and the child are separate. The wife’s entitlements cannot be conflated with the child’s entitlements. The Supreme Court in the present case took note of this important distinction. Section 144 BNSS makes it clear that children also have distinct maintenance entitlements.

It is therefore pertinent to bear in mind that a wife’s adultery does not automatically deprive the child of his or her statutory entitlements to maintenance.

The same applies to a wife’s claim to maintenance from the husband.

The Supreme Court’s judgment in this case cannot therefore be reduced to a mere discussion of wife versus husband.

Maintenance law deals with dependants and destitution – the child is as much a dependant as the wife.

Why This Case Is Of Interest Beyond This Particular Fact Situation

The present case deals with adultery. However, the underlying principle is of much wider applicability. In many areas of law, courts are called upon to decide on applications for interim relief.

The law on such applications always turns on whether or not the material before the court shows that a statutory condition for granting or denying such relief is met.

The problem with many such statutory provisions is that they create a condition or a disqualification that has to be assessed on a factual basis.

The courts then end up in an evidentiary tangle where too much scrutiny defeats the object of interim relief while too little scrutiny allows the wrong party to benefit from such relief.

The Supreme Court’s formulation of the ex facie standard is an attempt to meet this challenge midway.

Where the statutory disqualification is apparent from the material before the court, there is no reason why it should not be applied even at the stage of interim relief.

Where, on the other hand, the material raises a dispute of fact, the court should scrutinise the evidence carefully before concluding that the disqualification applies. This approach is entirely consistent with the objectives of Section 125(1) of the CrPC.

This case therefore has much wider lessons for law students and practitioners in other areas of law dealing with the law of interim relief and the evidentiary standards for applying statutory qualifications and exceptions.

The Intent Behind Maintenance 

Maintenance law is often interpreted through the prism of entitlement. What is forgotten is that the very reason why these laws were enacted was to prevent vagrancy and destitution.

In Himanshu Chordia, the Court has reiterated that the object of Section 125 is to secure, for persons unable to earn a livelihood, a bare subsistence level of living.

This being so, it explains the very existence of an interim maintenance regime. It also explains why courts cannot automatically accept every single allegation under Section 125(4) as true and thereby deny a wife any interim relief.

At the same time, it must be remembered that the same law, Section 125, sets out specific grounds for denying relief to the wife – grounds such as living in adultery.

Thus, the very same law contains both goals:
preventing destitution through interim maintenance, and
allowing denial of maintenance on specific grounds.

The Court has held that both these objectives must be fulfilled, and therefore, the law must be interpreted to further both.

That is why this case is of much bigger significance than the sensational headline about the adulterous wife being denied maintenance.

Indeed, the very fact that the Court finds such a headline misleading shows that the true significance of the case lies elsewhere.

Advice For Lawyers And Students

For lawyers practicing in the area, the takeaways from this ruling are mixed but mostly provide guidance on procedure.

An application under Section 125(4) is not one that can always be kept pending with the main application for final orders.

If the husband takes it seriously as a defence, the Court has to deal with it.

However, if the supporting affidavits and documentary evidence on which it is based are not conclusive of the allegations of adultery, then it must be dealt with as an issue to be determined before making any orders on interim maintenance.

For the wife, that means that allegations of adultery by the husband are not always a complete answer to an application for interim maintenance. For both husband and wife, this case serves as a reminder that evidence on allegations of adultery, and its response, must be taken very seriously.

What Law Students Should Remember

For law students gearing up for mooting competitions, internships or examinations, the following five observations can be made about this case:

Section 125 CrPC is a summary procedure to prevent vagrancy and destitution.

Section 125(4) makes it clear that a wife is not entitled to maintenance if she is living in adultery.

An application under Section 125(4) cannot be kept pending with the main application if the defence is taken seriously.

An allegation of adultery does not by itself conclusively establish that a wife is living in adultery and therefore such an application must be dealt with as an issue to be determined before making any orders on interim maintenance.

For fresh applications to the new criminal procedure code, the corresponding section is 144(4) BNSS and not 125(4) CrPC.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's decision in Himanshu Chordia v. State of Rajasthan is likely to attract attention because it concerns a subject that generates strong reactions: adultery and a wife's entitlement to maintenance.

But the legal significance of the judgment is more precise than the headline suggests.

The Court has not said that a husband's allegation of adultery is enough to deprive a wife of interim maintenance.

It has said that where Parliament has expressly created a statutory bar, courts cannot simply postpone consideration of that bar until the final stage of the proceedings. At the same time, the Court recognised that allegations are not evidence and that circumstantial or electronic material may require proper examination before a finding can be reached.

The result is a balance between two competing concerns.

The first is the social justice purpose of maintenance law. A person who is unable to maintain herself should not be left without financial support merely because a matrimonial dispute has generated an allegation that has yet to be proved.

The second is the statutory text. Where the law expressly says that a wife living in adultery is not entitled to maintenance under the provision, a court cannot effectively neutralise that rule by refusing to decide the issue until years of litigation have passed.

The Supreme Court's answer is therefore neither an automatic denial nor an automatic continuation of interim maintenance.

It is an insistence on timely adjudication backed by appropriate evidence.

That is the point that should survive the headlines.

And for practitioners, there is a practical lesson as well. In maintenance litigation, the strength of a Section 125(4) defence will not be determined merely by the seriousness of the allegation. It will depend upon what the evidence actually establishes at the stage when the court is required to consider it.

For new proceedings, the same statutory idea now appears in Section 144(4) of the BNSS. The numbering has changed from Section 125(4) CrPC to Section 144(4) BNSS, but the underlying issue remains relevant.

The judgment therefore deserves to be read not as a broad statement about “adulterous wives”, but as a carefully qualified decision about statutory disqualification, interim maintenance, evidentiary assessment and the duty of courts to decide a defence that directly affects the relief being claimed.

That distinction is where the real law lies.