While stepping forward boldly in taking the most decisive action to ensure that police officers don’t misuse randomly and brazenly the power of arrest, the Supreme Court in a most learned, laudable, landmark, logical and latest judgment titled Jaskaran Jeet Singh Deol v. State of Punjab in Criminal Appeal No. 4234 of 2026 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.11103 of 2026) and cited in Neutral Citation No.: 2026 INSC 1022 and so also in 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 967 in the exercise of its criminal appellate jurisdiction that was pronounced just recently on September 21, 2026 has minced absolutely just no words to hold indubitably that the arrest of an accused becomes illegal if the grounds of arrest have not been furnished in writing as per the mandate of Article 22(1) of the Constitution. It was also mandated by the top court that disciplinary proceedings should be initiated against a police officer who arrested a person without furnishing the grounds of arrest in writing. It must be noted that the Apex Court made the key observations in a case that initially arose from an FIR that had been registered against Jaskaran Jeet Singh Deol in Punjab and who was arrested in May 2026 for allegedly sexually assaulting a minor girl.
By any reckoning, the key highlights of this notable judgment are as follows:-
- Arrest of accused becomes illegal if grounds of arrest not furnished in writing.
- No automatic re-arrest after Article 22 breach.
- Magistrate’s sanction mandatory for re-arrest.
- Grounds of arrest must first be furnished in writing.
- Police must explain why grounds were not supplied initially.
- Disciplinary proceedings should be initiated against a police officer who arrests a person without furnishing the grounds in writing.
- Immediate superior police officer must endorse re-arrest plea.
- Magistrate to assess bona fide reasons and need for custody.
- Decision by Magistrate preferably within one week.
- Investigation to be handed to another officer.
- There cannot be a blanket immunity against future arrest as some cases relate to grave offences.
- But any such move by probe agencies must be based on stringent judicial oversight in order to protect citizens from police arbitrariness.
At the very outset, this brief, brilliant, bold and balanced judgment authored by Hon’ble Mr Justice Ujjal Bhuyan for a Bench of the Apex Court comprising of himself and Hon’ble Mr Justice Atul S Chandurkar sets the ball in motion by first and foremost putting forth in para 1 that, “By filing this appeal, appellant has assailed the legality and correctness of the order dated 29.05.2026 passed by the Punjab and Haryana High Court at Chandigarh (briefly ‘the High Court’ hereinafter) in CRM-M-31323-2026(O&M) (Jaskaran Jeet Singh Deol Vs. State of Punjab), whereby the High Court dismissed the petition filed by the appellant by holding that the investigating agency cannot be prohibited or restrained from seeking warrants of arrest against the appellant or from re-arresting him or seeking his custody/remand.”
To put things in perspective, the Bench envisages in para 3 that, “Though it is not necessary for a detailed reference to the facts i.e. the allegations against the accused-appellant, nonetheless for a proper perspective and for completion of the narrative, relevant facts may be briefly set out.
3.1. Informant lodged a first information on 13.05.2026 before the Mataur Police Station in the district of SAS Nagar (Punjab) alleging that his wife had left his company and started living with the accused-appellant from about October-November, 2024 taking with her both his daughters including the alleged victim girl, being his elder daughter. On 09.05.2026, the elder daughter (alleged victim) came back to the company of the informant. It is stated that she narrated to the informant physical and sexual abuse committed on her by the accused-appellant from 25-26.10.2024 onwards, off and on. The first information was registered as FIR No. 73/2026 under Sections 64, 65(1) and 351 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) read with Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, as amended (POCSO Act).
3.2. On 17.05.2026, at around 07:54 am, the appellant was arrested by the police whereafter he was produced before the Judicial Magistrate In-Charge (Duty) on the next day i.e. on 18.05.2026 at around noon for obtaining police remand for one day.
3.3. However, the learned Judicial Magistrate noted that though the appellant was arrested on 17.05.2026 and produced before her on 18.05.2026, no written grounds of arrest were provided to the appellant. After referring to the judgment of this Court in Mihir Rajesh Shah Vs. State of Maharashtra (2026) 1 SCC 500, the learned Magistrate held that the investigating agency had miserably failed to comply with the mandate of law of providing written grounds of arrest. Therefore, appropriate action should be taken against the officers at fault. For non-furnishing of written grounds of arrest, which is in violation of Article 22(1) of the Constitution read with Section 50(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.) and Section 47 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023(BNSS), the appellant was directed to be released immediately since his arrest was rendered illegal. However, the learned Magistrate clarified that if the investigating agency finds it necessary, they can move an application for remand or custody, if required, alongwith the reasons and the necessity for the same after supplying the grounds of arrest in writing to the appellant setting forth the explanation for non-supply thereof. The learned Magistrate further clarified that the aforesaid order dated 18.05.2026 would not preclude the investigating agency from proceeding in accordance with law and in strict compliance with the statutory and constitutional mandate.
3.4. On the same day itself i.e. 18.05.2026, the same Station House Officer Rupinder Singh, who had caused the arrest of the appellant without furnishing the grounds of arrest and who had moved the earlier remand application, again moved a fresh application for custody and remand of the accused-appellant. The following were furnished as the grounds of arrest:
(a) accused has committed aggravated sexual assault on a minor girl of 16 years (approx.), who was his stepdaughter;
(b) accused has committed a heinous crime and the punishment for the same is a minimum of 20 years of imprisonment, if convicted;
(c) custodial interrogation of the accused Jaskaran Jeet Singh is required for taking the accused to both the places of incident i.e. Radisson Hotel and their house in Sector 70, Mohali;
(d) mobile phone and other video recordings are to be recovered from the accused; and,
(e) potency test of the accused is to be got done.
3.5. This time the subsequent custody/remand application was assigned to the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate who passed order dated 22.05.2026 dismissing the said application as being not maintainable at that stage. Learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate noted that the said application was moved by the prosecution without supplying the grounds of arrest to the accused and before the arrest of the accused. Referring to the decision of this Court in Mihir Rajesh Shah, the learned Magistrate observed that such an application could be moved only after supplying the grounds of arrest to the accused. According to him, in the present case, grounds of arrest have not been provided to the accused till then. Moreover, custody and remand of the accused can only be granted by the court after the arrest of the accused and it cannot be granted in the absence of the accused.
3.6. It was, thereafter, that the appellant moved the High Court in the related proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C. (Section 528 BNSS) seeking the following reliefs:
(i) quashing of observations made in the order dated 18.05.2026 by the learned Magistrate;
(ii) to prohibit and restrain the investigating agency from re-arresting the appellant under any circumstances;
(iii) to prohibit and restrain the respondents from seeking custody of the appellant and his remand; and
(iv) to prohibit and restrain the respondents seeking warrant of arrest of the appellant.
3.7. It was contended on behalf of the appellant before the High Court that the appellant was released by the learned Magistrate for not furnishing grounds of arrest. However, the clarification by the learned Magistrate that notwithstanding such release of the appellant, the investigating agency would not be precluded from proceeding in accordance with law and in strict compliance with the statutory and constitutional mandate was susceptible to misconstruction. Such clarification was unwarranted particularly in the teeth of several judgments of this Court including in Mihir Rajesh Shah. Another contention urged on behalf of the appellant was that appellant was arrested on 17.05.2026 at 07:55 am and was produced before the learned Magistrate at 12:00 noon on 18.05.2026 which is more than 24 hours. Appellant was released at 03:00 pm. In the circumstances, an indefeasible right of release has accrued in favour of the appellant. Consequently, no arrest warrant can be issued qua the appellant.
3.8. In the above context, the High Court framed the question for determination as to whether release of the appellant in the case on 18.05.2026 completely shielded him from future arrest in the same case.
3.9. By way of the impugned order dated 29.05.2026, the High Court dismissed the said petition of the appellant by observing that liberty granted by the learned Magistrate to the investigating agency to proceed in accordance with law in strict compliance with the statutory and constitutional mandate is in consonance with the settled legal principles and does not call for interference. Even though the arrest of the appellant was declared illegal by the learned Magistrate for non-furnishing of written grounds of arrest, the investigating agency is not precluded from seeking his re-arrest, provided that the subsequent arrest made is strictly in accordance with the procedure established by law. The High Court further observed that for the illegal detention beyond 24 hours before production before the learned Magistrate, appellant may take appropriate legal action against the defaulting police officials. However, the appellant who is accused of serious and grave offences against a minor child cannot claim blanket immunity from future arrest. The investigating agency cannot be prohibited or restrained from seeking warrant of arrest of the appellant or from re-arresting him or seeking his custody/remand.”
Needless to say, the Bench then states in para 4 that, “It was thereafter that the matter has travelled to this Court.”
Do note, the Bench notes in para 5 that, “This Court vide the order dated 27.07.2026 had directed that the appellant should not be arrested till the next date of hearing which order was continued subsequently. In the proceedings held on 06.08.2026, learned state counsel was directed to file an affidavit disclosing therein the steps taken against the erring police officer(s) and as to whether investigation into FIR No. 73/2026 was being carried out by the very same officer or handed over to another officer.”
Do also note, the Bench then notes in para 6 that, “On 14.08.2026, this Court was informed by the learned state counsel, on the basis of the compliance affidavit filed, that Mr. Gurtej Singh, Assistant Sub-Inspector, investigating officer of the case, has been suspended and Mr. Rupinder Singh, Inspector, Station House Officer, has been transferred to and posted at the Police Lines. Departmental action was also being taken against the aforesaid two officers.”
As it turned out, the Bench enunciates in para 7 that, “Finally, the matter was heard on 01.09.2026, whereafter the judgment was reserved. While reserving the judgment, this Court directed that the interim protection granted to the appellant vide the order dated 27.07.2026 shall continue until delivery of the judgment; however, the appellant was directed to appear before the investigating officer and cooperate with the investigation.”
Do further note, the Bench then notes in para 20.8 that, “This Court summarized the conclusions in the following manner:
66. In conclusion, it is held that:
66.1. The constitutional mandate of informing the arrestee the grounds of arrest is mandatory in all offences under all statutes including offences under IPC, 1860 (now BNS 2023);
66.2. The grounds of arrest must be communicated in writing to the arrestee in the language he/she understands;
66.3. In case(s) where, the arresting officer/person is unable to communicate the grounds of arrest in writing on or soon after arrest, it be so done orally. The said grounds be communicated in writing within a reasonable time and in any case at least two hours prior to production of the arrestee for remand proceedings before the Magistrate.
66.4. In case of non-compliance of the above, the arrest and subsequent remand would be rendered illegal and the person will be at liberty to be set free.”
It is also worth noting that the Bench notes in para 24 that, “While we are bound by the ratio laid down in Mihir Rajesh Shah with the conclusions summarized in paragraph 66 of the said judgment and endorse the course of action declared in paragraph 65 thereof, we would like to further stress upon and strengthen the safeguards introduced by way of the said judgment when it comes to re-arrest of an accused who is released from custody for breach of Article 22(1). If upon release of such an accused, the investigating agency is still of the opinion that for furthering the course of investigation it is necessary to have custodial interrogation of the accused, then as directed in paragraph 65 of Mihir Rajesh Shah, the investigating agency has to file an application before the concerned Magistrate for custody mentioning therein the reasons for re-arrest of the accused and the necessity for the same. The application should also contain the explanation for non-supply of the grounds of arrest to the accused at the first instance. However, this application can only be moved after furnishing the grounds of arrest to the accused. To rule out any foul play or collusion, such an application must have the endorsement of the immediate superior authority. This is because the immediate superior authority should know that the concerned officer has committed an unbecoming act of violating a constitutional provision for which necessary remedial steps will have to be taken. On receipt of such application with the endorsement, the concerned Magistrate shall decide the same expeditiously and as directed in Mihir Rajesh Shah preferably within a week of its submission by adhering to the principles of natural justice.”
Most significantly, most rationally and so also most forthrightly, the Bench then encapsulates in para 25 what constitutes the cornerstone of this notable judgment postulating precisely that, “What is sought to be highlighted is that once there is a breach of Article 22(1) of the Constitution, the power to re-arrest the accused must not be left to the discretion of the very same authority who had violated the said provision of the Constitution. It must have the judicial imprimatur. It is only when the Magistrate is satisfied that for bona fide reasons the grounds of arrest could not be furnished to the arrestee at the first instance but furnished subsequent to his release and on further satisfaction that the accused needs to be re-arrested, he may pass an order permitting the investigating agency to re-arrest.
25.1. On the administrative side, the superior authority when presented with the application seeking his endorsement for custody of the accused who has been released for violation of Article 22(1) shall hand over the investigation of the case to another officer, further directing departmental enquiry for such a serious lapse. If the enquiry culminates in adverse finding against the erring police officer(s), it would entail departmental action with entry in the service book of such officer(s).”
Most remarkably, the Bench propounds in para 37 holding explicitly that, “Before we wind up, we need to remind ourselves that the Constitution or a constitutional provision cannot be interpreted in a vacuum. Interpretation of the Constitution cannot also be left to imponderables in the form of ifs and buts. The Constitution is based on certain basic principles, much above the statutory threshold. Therefore, violation of the Constitution or a constitutional provision cannot be countenanced. It has to be dealt with strictly. It is not dependent on the nature or gravity of the offence, encompassing within its sweep all offences. It cannot be interpreted in a restrictive manner. Though observed in the backdrop of an order of preventive detention, nonetheless, it is worth mentioning and reiterating what a three-Judge Bench of this Court held in Prabhu Dayal Deorah Vs. District Magistrate, Kamrup (1974) 1 SCC 103. This Court observed in no uncertain terms that the gravity of the evil to the community resulting from anti-social activities can never furnish an adequate reason for invading the personal liberty of a citizen except in accordance with the procedure established by the Constitution and the laws. When a certain procedure is prescribed by the Constitution or the laws for depriving a citizen of his personal liberty, it is the duty of the court to ensure that such procedure is rigorously observed, howsoever, strange this might sound to some ears.”
As a corollary, the Bench then directs and holds in para 38 that, “For all the aforesaid reasons, we set aside and quash the impugned order of the High Court dated 29.05.2026 as well as the impugned observations of the learned Magistrate dated 18.05.2026. We hold and direct that in the event the respondents are of the view that custodial interrogation of the appellant is necessary, they will have to follow the mandate of Mihir Rajesh Shah read with paragraphs 24 to 25.1 of this judgment as well as the mandate of paragraph 36 supra. We, however, clarify that we have not expressed any opinion on the merit of the accusation against the appellant.”
It would be instructive to note that the Bench then hastens to add in para 39 noting that, “A copy of this judgment and order may be circulated to all Director Generals of Police of the States and Union Territories as well as to the Registrar Generals of the High Courts and Directors of State Judicial Academies.”
Finally, the Bench then aptly concludes by directing and holding in para 40 that, “Appeal is accordingly allowed.”
In conclusion, we thus see that the Apex Court has made it crystal clear that when an accused is freed due to violation of his fundamental rights, he is not “enlarged on bail” but released from illegal and unconstitutional detention. It was also made clear that in such cases, the accused should be first provided written grounds of arrest, then an application should be filed before a Magistrate explaining why a re-arrest is necessary and why the grounds were not given the first time. We thus see that the top court raises the bar for the state in arresting an individual even in serious offences and reiterates firmly that procedural norms are sacrosanct when liberty is curtailed. It is also underscored by the Apex Court in this leading case that the police would face negative consequences for violating Constitutional safeguards. It is a no-brainer that this leading case is a very loud and strong reminder to the police that it cannot bulldoze the legal rights of the accused and if anyone of them tries then they would be not only removed from investigation but also would be made to face departmental inquiry and adverse entry in service records of such officer!
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