Case title:
ANGADI CHANDRANNA v SHANKAR & ORS

Date of Order:
22nd April, 2025

Bench:
Justice J.B. Pardiwala
Justice R. Mahadevan

Parties:
ANGADI CHANDRANNA - APPELLANT

SHANKAR & ORS. - RESPONDENT(S

SUBJECT

A property issue dispute arose when Defendant No.1 used personal cash to purchase his brother's share after a valid split of ancestral property in 1986, and then sold it. His children challenged the sale, asserting coparcenary rights and arguing that the property remained part of the joint family inheritance. The fundamental issue before the court was whether property inherited after partition remained ancestral or became self-acquired property. The Supreme Court clarified that when a joint family property is partitioned, each coparcener's assigned half becomes their property, and as a result, Defendant No.1 had entire ownership rights, including the ability to sell the property.

OVERVIEW

• The appeal arises from a judgment passed by the High Court of Karnataka, wherein it set aside the judgment and decree passed by the Civil Judge at Challakere and affirmed the ones passed by the First Class judicial magistrate of the same place.
• Defendant no. 1 Jayaramappa (hereinafter D1) and his 2 brothers, C. Thippeswamy and C. Eshwarappa, divided the joint family properties (hereinafter JFP) under a registered partition deed after the death of their father and their uncle, who died leaving behind no heirs. Subsequently, D1 purchased the property from Thippeswamy via a sale deed and sold it to Defendant no. 2. (D2). 
• The plaintiffs (D2 and the sons and daughters of D1) instituted a suit before the trial court seeking partition and separate possession of the suit property, wherein the court held their entitlement to partition and separate possession.
• Defendant No. 2 challenged the decision, and the First Appellate Court allowed the appeal. Aggrieved by this, the plaintiffs filed a Regular Second Appeal, which was allowed by the High Court of Karnataka on 12.08.2021. Defendant No. 2 has now approached the apex court in appeal against this judgment.

ISSUES RAISED

Whether the suit property belonged to Defendant No.1 as ancestral property or was self-acquired by him?

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED BY THE APPELLANT

1. The counsel for the appellant D2 argued that the law question framed by the High Court is a pure factual issue that cannot be decided under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. They subsquently relied on this court's decision in Jaichand (Dead) through LRs & Ors. v. Sahnulal & Anr 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3864 and Gurnam Singh (Dead) & Ors. v. Lehna Singh (Dead) by LRs (2019) 7 SCC 641.
2. Reiterating the facts and the timeline of the suit, including how the property was partitioned and sold, it was further argued that the evidence submitted by Defendant No. 2 establishes that the property was purchased by Defendant No. 1 using his funds, along with a loan obtained from Narasimhamurthy (DW3). 
3. This, by definition, rendered the property self-acquired in nature. Consequently, at the time of its sale, the property no longer formed part of the JFP. Accordingly, the First Appellate Court correctly held that the property was the self-acquired property of Defendant No. 1.
4. Additionally, the sons and daughters of D1, filed a suit for partition and separate possession “after” a sale deed was executed in favor of D2. The decision in Murugan & Ors. v. Kesava Gounder (Dead) Through LRs. & Ors was relied upon, which held that a specific prayer for setting aside the sale deed is mandatory in the suit for declaration and separate possession.
5. The property that D1 received under the partition deed is distinct from the suit property, which he subsequently purchased using his funds and a loan. The doctrine of blending is inapplicable in this context, as the suit property did not form part of the JFP. For the doctrine to be applicable, a self-acquired property must be voluntarily thrown into the common stock, accompanied by a clear intention to abandon individual ownership. No such intention is evident in the present case.

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED BY THE RESPONDENT

1. 1.The counsel for the respondents contended that the suit property was purchased by D1 using funds generated from multiple sources” namely, the income derived from the land he received after the partition, his earnings from coolie work, and cash provided by the respondents’ grandmother from the sale of her property. On this basis, the property should be treated as an ancestral property.
2. 2.At the time the partition between D1 and his brothers took effect, the plaintiffs, being the sons and daughters of D2, were minors and qualified as coparceners concerning the share allotted to D1, as the family was residing jointly. Consequently, they claim to have a rightful interest in the suit property.
3. 3.Referring to Hindu Law by Mulla, it was submitted that ancestral property remains ancestral even after partition, as cosharers' shares continue to be ancestral for their male children, regardless of their birth. The suit property, acquired by D1, remains ancestral property, and the plaintiffs have a right over it. The counsel relied on the Yudhishter v. Ashok Kumar decision for this reasoning.
4. 4.The counsel pleaded that the court direct their attention to how D1 acquired the suit property since there was no reasonable possibility that he could have accumulated a sum of 15,000 rupees in 3 years solely by coolie work or cultivating the partitioned land allotted to him.
5. .Additionally, D1’s deposition suggests the property was acquired using joint family funds, but there are contradictions and inconsistencies. The plaintiffs have successfully proven this, producing sufficient material to establish that the property was acquired using joint family funds, and its character must still be considered ancestral.
6. .Counsel argued that the suit property was not sold for the estate's benefit but rather for D1’s gain. The amount received was never handed over to the plaintiffs, implying the property was sold without consent or legal necessity, thus rendering the sale deed void.

JUDGEMENT ANALYSIS

1. The Court before delving into the facts in, criticized the High Court for misapplying Section 100 CPC, which allows interference only on substantial legal questions in the case of Jaichand (supra). It clarified that factual findings by the first Appellate Court cannot be disturbed unless they are contrary to law, based on inadmissible evidence, or unsupported by any evidence. Section 103 CPC allows the High Court to determine issues not addressed by lower courts.
2. The High Court's reappraisal of existing evidence without addressing any legal question does not create a substantial question of law. In Chandrabhan (Deceased) through L.Rs. & Ors. v. Saraswati & Ors., the Court emphasized that a substantial question must materially affect the case's outcome and cannot be settled by statute or precedent unless the lower court ignored or acted contrary to settled principles.
3. The High Court's re-appreciation of evidence, including exhibits, reliance on wrongful identification, and treating the same property as the suit property in dispute, demonstrates their callousness in applying settled principles. Therefore, the High Court erred in setting aside the First Appellate Court's judgment.
4. 4.The principle of law states that a property cannot be presumptively considered joint family property solely due to the existence of a joint Hindu family. The asserting party must prove the property's joint family status. If a nucleus was available for the property's acquisition, the property's jointness would be presumed, but the claimant must prove they purchased it with their funds, not from a joint family nucleus. The existence of a nucleus cannot be presumed or assumed based on probabilities. Reliance was placed on R.Deivanai Ammal (Died) v. G. Meenakshi Ammal.
5. Hindu law states that a property is considered ancestral if it's inherited from a paternal ancestor for up to three generations. Furthermore, in Govindbhai Chhotabhai Patel & Ors. v. Patel Ramanbhai Mathurbhai, the burden of proof was placed on the plaintiffs to prove the property's ancestral character, as without it, it's treated as the donor's self-acquired property, allowing them to dispose of it.
6. It is an undisputed fact that the properties divided between D1 and his brothers through a partition deed in 1986 are considered joint family properties. However, according to Hindu law, each party receives a separate share, which becomes their self-acquired property with absolute rights, allowing them to sell, transfer, or bequeath it.
7. As reiterated above, once a JFP is lawfully partitioned, it ceases to retain its joint character, and each co-parcener’s share becomes their self-acquired property. Accordingly, the suit property became the self-acquired property of D1 upon its purchase from his brother Thippeswamy through a registered sale deed. Furthermore, the mere existence of sons and daughters in a joint Hindu family does not make the father's separate or self-acquired property as a JFP.
8. Additionally, the mere fact that other family members were permitted to use the property jointly, or that income from the separate property was generously used to support dependents, whether legally obligated or not, does not imply abandonment of ownership. Similarly, the absence of separate accounts cannot lead to such an inference. Acts of generosity or kindness should not ordinarily be construed as an acknowledgment of a legal obligation.

CONCLUSION

The High Court, in the apex court’s view, erred in applying the doctrine of blending under Hindu joint family law by relying on precedents that are inapplicable to the present case. It also re-appreciated the evidence without formulating any substantial question of law, and wrongly allowed the plaintiffs' appeal. For these reasons, the High Court’s judgment was not sustained, and the impugned judgment was set aside.

FAQS

Q1: What is an ancestral property under Hindu law?
 A: Ancestral property is property inherited by a Hindu from his paternal ancestors up to three generations. It is considered joint family property and is held by all coparceners of the joint Hindu family. This means the property is jointly owned and cannot be disposed of unilaterally by any one member.

Q2: How is self-acquired property different from ancestral property?
 A: Self-acquired property is property acquired by a person out of his own earnings or funds and is not inherited from ancestors. Unlike ancestral property, self-acquired property belongs solely to the individual and can be sold, transferred, or bequeathed by him without the consent of other family members.

Q3: What happens to ancestral property after a lawful partition?
 A: Once ancestral or joint family property is lawfully partitioned; each coparcener receives a separate share. From that point onward, that share ceases to be joint family property and becomes the self-acquired property of that coparcener. This means the property can then be dealt with independently.

Q4: Does the existence of a joint Hindu family automatically make all family property ancestral?
 A: No. The mere existence of a joint Hindu family does not presumptively make all property joint family property. The party claiming that a property is ancestral or joint family property must prove the property’s status and the existence of a joint family nucleus used to acquire it. Probabilities or assumptions are insufficient.

Q5: What is the burden of proof regarding the nature of property?
 A: The burden lies on the party asserting that the property is ancestral. If they fail to prove that the property is ancestral, it will be treated as self-acquired property of the donor, who has full rights over it, including the right to transfer or sell it.

Q6: Can acts like sharing income or permitting others to use self-acquired property make it joint family property?
 A: No. Permitting family members to use the property or using income to support dependents, even if done generously does not amount to abandonment of ownership or conversion into joint family property. Similarly, the absence of separate accounts for the property does not indicate joint ownership.

Q7: What does the law say about interfering with factual findings regarding property classification?
 A: Courts typically do not disturb factual findings of lower appellate courts unless such findings are contrary to law, based on inadmissible evidence, or unsupported by any evidence. A High Court’s re-appreciation of evidence without raising a substantial legal question does not justify interference.

Q8: What qualifies as a substantial question of law in property disputes?
 A: A substantial question of law materially affects the outcome of the case and involves settled principles or statutes. It arises when lower courts ignore or act contrary to established legal principles. Re-examining facts without addressing legal questions is not sufficient.

Q9: Can the doctrine of blending apply to property purchased by a family member from his own funds?
 A: The doctrine of blending applies only when self-acquired property is voluntarily thrown into the joint family stock, thereby abandoning individual ownership. If the property was purchased separately and not made part of the joint family property, blending does not apply.

Q10: What legal precedent supports the principle that the mere existence of sons and daughters does not make the father’s separate property joint family property?
 A: The principle has been upheld in cases such as R. Deivanai Ammal (Died) v. G. Meenakshi Ammal, which establishes that self-acquired property of a father does not become joint family property simply because other family members exist or reside jointly.