Kulwinder Kaur v. Kandi Friends Education Trust
- Bench : Justice C.K Thakker , Justice MarkandeyKatju
- Appellant : Kulwinder Kaur
- Respondent : Kandi Friends Education Trust
- Citation : (2008) 3 SCC 659
Issue:
In what circumstances the transfer of suit is allowed under CPC?
Facts:
• The trust was established on 24-09-1997 in Punjab to establish professional institutions. Gurcharan singh was the Founder Chairman of the trust & appellant was trustee along with founder chairman.
• In 1998, B.S Randhawa inducted as new trustee. In 2002, elections held & Gurcharan again elected as Chairman on which B.S randhawa&Hardev Kaur raised protests.
• On June 21, 2003, Gurcharan was murdered while he was in the park with appellant.
• B.S randhawa was arrested as main accused.
• On July 23,2003 elections held again for Chairman & appellant was selected.
• Hardev Kaur filed a suit on 25-07-2003 for a declaration that proceedings conducted on July 23 in which appellant was selected, were illegal & void. Only limited interim relief was granted & she was allowed to attend meetings.
• In oct,2003 they filed another suit in the name of Kandi Friends Education Trust through general secretary Jaspal. It was prayed that resolution dated 14-10-2003 is illegal. On 4-06-2005, one more suit filed by Jaspal for permanent injunction against the appellant.
• In 2006, the trust filed a transfer application of the case as it was pending since 3 years. The appellant filed the reply stating that false allegations are being made on her.
• The HC transferred the suit to Chandigarh.
• The order has been challenged by the appellant in SC.
Appellant’s contentions:
• It was contended no reasons has be given to transfer the case; incorrect to say that the delay was on their part.
Respondent’s contentions:
• It was contented that the order is correct & the court was satisfied under Section 24 of CPC.
Judgement:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal & set the impugned orders.
“Reading Sections 24 and 25 of the Code together and keeping in view various judicial pronouncements, certain broad propositions as to what may constitute a ground for transfer have been laid down by courts. They are balance of convenience or inconvenience to the plaintiff or the defendant or witnesses; convenience or inconvenience of a particular place of trial having regard to the nature of evidence on the points involved in the suit; issues raised by the parties; reasonable apprehension in the mind of the litigant that he might not get justice in the court in which the suit is pending; important questions of law involved or a considerable section of public interested in the litigation; “interest of justice” demanding for transfer of suit, appeal or other proceeding, etc. Above are some of the instances which are germane in considering the question of transfer of a suit, appeal or other proceeding. They are, however, illustrative in nature and by no means be treated as exhaustive. If on the above or other relevant considerations, the court feels that the plaintiff or the defendant is not likely to have a “fair trial” in the court from which he seeks to transfer a case, it is not only the power, but the duty of the court to make such order.”
Section 3, 5 of Official Secrets Act, Section 8(1) and 8(2) of RTI Act, Section 123 of the Indian Evidence Act Case Law
Yashwant Sinha v. CBI
(The Revision Petition was dismissed and the Court stated that There is no provision has been brought to notice by which Parliament has vested any power in the executive arm of the government either to restrain publication of documents marked as secret or from placing such documents before a Court of Law which may have been called upon to adjudicate a legal issue concerning the parties.)
- Bench: Ranjan Gogoi, C.J.I., Sanjay Kishan Kaul and K.M. Joseph, JJ.
- Appellant: Yashwant Sinha and Ors.
- Respondent: Central Bureau of Investigation and Ors.
- Citation: AIR 2019 SC 1802, 2019 (6) SCALE 171, (2019) 6 SCC 1
Issue:
· Whether a document marked secret under Official Secrets Act, 1923 be restrained from publication or placing before Court of Law for adjudication?
Facts:
· The three documents which are the subject matter of the present controversy, admittedly, was published in 'The Hindu' newspaper on different dates in the month of February, 2019.
· One of the documents i.e. Note-18 of the Ministry of Defence was also published in 'The Wire' a member of the Digital Print Media.
· The fact that the three documents had been published in the Hindu and were thus available in the public domain has not been seriously disputed or contested by the Respondents.
· No question has been raised and, very rightly, with regard to the publication of the documents in 'The Hindu' newspaper.
Appellant’s Contentions:
· No question has been raised and, in our considered opinion, very rightly, with regard to the publication of the documents in 'The Hindu' newspaper.
· The right of such publication would seem to be in consonance with the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech.
Respondent’s Contentions:
- It is contented that the alleged unauthorized removal of the documents from the custody of the competent authority of the Government of India and the use thereof to support the pleas urged in the review petition is in violation of the provisions of Sections 3 and 5 of the Act, 1923.
- It is further contended that the documents cannot be accessed under the Act, 2005 in view of the provisions contained in Section 8(1)(a) of the said Act.
Final Decision:
By dismissing the petition, the Supreme Court stated that there is no provision in the Official Secrets Act and no such provision in any other statute has been brought to notice by which Parliament has vested any power in the executive arm of the government either to restrain publication of documents marked as secret or from placing such documents before a Court of Law which may have been called upon to adjudicate a legal issue concerning the parties. ButThe preamble to the constitution proclaims justice-social, economic or political, as the goal to be achieved. It is the duty of every State to provide for a fair and effective system of administration of justice. Judicial review is, in fact, recognised as a basic feature of the Constitution. Section 24 of the Act also highlights the importance attached to the unrelenting crusade against corruption and violation of human rights. The most important aspect in a justice delivery system is the ability of a party to successfully establish the case based on materials. Subject to exceptions it is settled beyond doubt that any person can set the criminal law into motion. Ability to secure evidence thus forms the most important aspect in ensuring the triumph of truth and justice. It is imperative therefore that Section 8(2) must be viewed in the said context.
R. VISWANATHAN V. RUKN-UL-MULK SYED ABDUL WAJID
(A foreign Court has jurisdiction to deliver a judgment in rem which may be enforced or recognized in an Indian Court provided that the subject matter of the action is property, whether movable or immovable within the jurisdiction of that Court)
- Bench: Shah, J.C.
- Appellant: R. Viswanathan
- Respondent: Rukn-Ul-Mulk Syed Abdul Wajid
- Citation: 1 1963 SCR (3) 22
Facts:
One Ramalingam died at Bangalore leaving a will whereby he devised considerable immovable and movable properties in the States of Mysore and Madras. The executors applied for Probate of the will and it was granted by the District judge. Thereupon the sons of Ramlingam instituted two suits in the District Court, Bangalore and the District Court Civil and Military Station for possession of the immovable properties in Mysore and the movable properties devised by the will and a suit in the Madras High Court for possession of movable and immovable properties in Madras devised by the will. The movable included certain shares of the India Sugars and Refineries Ltd., a company with its registered office at Bellary in the State of Madras. The suits were based on the ground that all the properties were joint family properties and Ramalingam had no power to dispose of the property by his will. The Madras suit was stayed pending the disposal of the Bangalore Suits. The District judge decreed the suit holding that the property devised by the will was of the joint family of Ramalingam and his sons and the will was on that account inoperative. The executors preferred appeals to the Mysore High Court. The HC dismissed the appeals. The case was referred to a full Bench and appeals were allowed and the suit holding that the property was the self-acquired property of Ramalingam was dismissed. Thereafter, in the Madras suit the executors urged that the judgment of the Mysore High Court was binding upon the parties and the suit was barred as res judicata. The plaintiff contended that as to the immovables in Madras the Mysore Court could not and did not adjudicate upon their claim and that in any event the Mysore judgment which was a foreign judgment was not conclusive as the proceedings in the Mysore High Court were opposed to natural justice within the meaning of s. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure the bench showed bias before and during the hearing of the appeals and were incompetent to sit on the Full Bench and their judgment was coram non judice. The Trial judge held that the judgment of Mysore High Court was coram non judice and was nonconclusive under s. 13 of the Code and that all the properties movable and immovable disposed of by Ramalingam belonged to the joint family and he accordingly decreed the suit. On appeal the High Court held that it was not established that the Mysore Full Bench was coram non judice, that the properties in suit were joint family properties which Ramalingam was incompetent to dispose of by his will, that the Mysore judgment did not affect the immovable in Madras but it was conclusive with respect to the movables even outside the State of Mysore and accordingly modified the decree of the trial Court by dismissing the suit with respect to the movables which consisted mainly of shares of the India Sugars & Refineries Ltd.
Issues:
1. Whether the Judgment of the Mysore High Court was conclusive
2. Whether a foreign court has jurisdiction to deliver a judgment in rem which may be enforced or recognized in an Indian Court
Contentions raised by the Appellant:
The appellant contended that the judgment of the Mysore Fall Bench is not conclusive between parties in the Madras suit, for the Mysore Court was not a court of competent jurisdiction as to property movable and immovable outside the territory of the Mysore State, that the judgment was not binding because the Judges who presided over the Full Bench were not competent by the law of the Mysore State to decide the dispute and that in any event it "was coram non judice" because they were interested or biased and the proceedings before them were conducted in a manner opposed to natural justice.
Contentions raised by the Respondent:
The respondent submitted that the judgment was and the Madras High Court was competent to decide whether the immovables in Madras were not acquired out of the earnings of that business.
Judgment:
The judgment of the Mysore High Court was not conclusivebetween the parties in the Madras suit with respect to the immovable properties in Madras but was conclusive with respect to the shares of the Company in the State of Madras.
A foreign Court has jurisdiction to deliver a judgment in rem which may be enforced or recognised in an Indian Courtprovided that the subject matter of the action is property,whether movable or immovable within the jurisdiction of thatCourt. The Mysore Courts were not competent to give a Binding judgment in respect of the immovable property situate in the State of Madras nor did they in fact give anyjudgment with respect to immovable property outside Mysore.
Maneka Sanjay Gandhi and Anr vs. Rani Jethmalani on 23 November, 1978
- Bench: Krishnaiyer, V.R.
- Appellant: MANEKA SANJAY GANDHI AND ANR.
- Respondent: RANI JETHMALANI
- Citation: 1979 AIR 468, 1979 SCR (2) 378
- 1979 SCC (4) 167
Issue:
Transfer of criminal case from Bombay to Delhi
Facts:
1. Rani Jethmalani, a young advocate by profession and daughter of an MP, presses defamation charges against Mrs. Maneka Gandhi, Wife of Sri Sanjay Gandhi and daughter in law of Former Prime minister of India, Mrs. Indira Gandhi.
2. This is a transfer petition, been made, for the transfer of this case from Bombay to Delhi.
Appellants Contention
The Appellant contented that an alternate venue will not hamper the complaint and will not really mitigate the serious difficulties of the accused.
The petitioner also claimed that both the parties reside in Delhi and some formal witnesses also belong to Delhi; thus transferring the case to Delhi will not bring any hindrance in the path of justice.
Respondent Contention
Since the witnesses of this case belonged to Bombay, hence the respondent objected to the transfer petition.
Final Decision
The court observed that normally the complainant has the right to choose any court having jurisdiction and the accused cannot dictate where the case against him should be tried.
Also the court pointed that it is difficult to believe that a person of the position of the petitioner who is the daughter-in-law of the former Prime. Minister, wife of a consequential person and, in her own right, an editor of a popular magazine, is unable to engage a lawyer to defend her in another city while she is apparently represented in many legal proceedings quite competently.
Emphasising on the assurance of a fair trial as the first imperative for the dispensation of justice and not letting easy availability of legal services for a particular party, the court dismissed the transfer of petition.
Civil Appeal No: 4958-60 in Special Leave Petitions-Case Law-
Most. Rev. P.M.A. Metropolitan &V. Moran Mar Marthoma&Anr
- Bench: R M Sahai J
- Petitioner: Most. Rev. P.M.A. Metropolitan &Ors.
- Respondent: Moran Mar Marthoma&Anr.
- Citation: 20TH, June 1995. SCC Supl. (4) 286
Issue:
Two clauses in the constitution which necessarily have to be amended in the aforementioned, the objective has to be attained. The clauses are 71 and 46. Accordingly both the parties have placed their proposals. The proposals have been put forward to the patriarch group seeking to amend a large number of constitutions which is not intended to regarding religions.
Appellant/Respondent’s Contention:
This is a rivalry which has rose among two parties who belong to the same religion, on the not who is better. In easy words it can be said that this case is between English Christianity and rest of the other Christianity, so in between there comes religious questions on who is orthodox and who is superior and who has to be followed. Therefore the contention of both the parties are same but against each other.
Facts:
St.Thomas, one of the disciples of Jesus Christ came to Malabar in 52 A.D. to spread his message. He died in India.At the Council held at Nicea in 325 A.D. - First General Council - convened by the Roman Emporer Constantine, four Patriarchates were established spanning the Christendom as it was known then, viz., Rome, Constantinople, Alexandria and Antioch, each headed by a Patriarch. Within the jurisdiction of Patriarch of Antioch was established another office, viz., the great Metropolitan of the East, also known as "Catholicos". The office of Catholicate fell into disuse later and was revived in 628 A.D. Sometime later, it again fell into disuse. All these are matters of faith and are stated merely by way of introduction.By the 16th century, Christianity had gained a fairly substantial foothold in the area now comprised in Kerala. The dominant faith was of the Syrian Orthodox Church. 16th century saw the rise of Portugese political power on the west Coast of India. The Portugese were Roman Catholics. They compelled the local christians to accept Roman Catholic faith. They succeeded to some extent but not for long. In the year 1654, the Christians of Malabar rebelled against the imposition of an alien faith and affirmed their loyalty to Syrian Orthodox Church headed by the Patriarch by taking an oath en masse at Mattancherry, known as the "Koonan Cross Oath". Since then the Patriarch of Antioch was exercising ecclesiastical supremacy over what may be called the "Malankara Syrian Christian Church". With the rise of the British power in the Southern India during the 19th century, they in turn pressurised the Malankara Syrian Christian Community to embrace the Protestant faith. They too succeeded in some measure. Disputes arose between the two groupswhich was settled by an award called "Cochin Award" rendered on April 4, 1840. As per this award, the Church properties were divided between the Church Mission Society (Protestants) and the Malankara Jacobite Syrian Church (Orthodox faith). The amount of 3,000 Star Pagodas deposited by Marthoma VI (Dionysius the Great) with the East Indian Company at eight percent interest came to be allotted to Malankara Jacobite Syrian Church in this division.
On account of certain disputes between the members of Malankara Jacobite Syrian Church, Patriarch Peter III of Antioch came to Malabar in 1876. He called a meeting of the accredited representatives of all Churches in Malabar which is known as the "Mulanthuruthy Synod". At this Synod, Malankara Syrian Christian Association, popularly called the "Malankara Association", was formed to manage the affairs of the Church and the Community. The Malankara Metropolitan was made the ex-officio President of this Association. Each member Church was to send three representatives to the Association.
And under the various representatives from different countries, different issues and pleads were issued before the court on Christianity under article 71 and 46.
Judgment:
It was held that judged from the above angle, clause (68) of the 1934 Constitution cannot be said to be a fair one, in as much as the said clause provided for representation Parish Church wise. We took note of the contention urged on behalf of the Patriarch group that with a view to obtain majority in the Association, the Catholicos group has created a number of new Parish Churches with very small membership and that giving equal representation to all Parish Churches irrespective of the strength of their membership is neither fair nor does it ensure a fair and proper representation of the community in the Association. It was held that it is (SCC p. 393, para 158)
"Necessary to substitute clause (68) (now clause (71)) and other relevant clauses of the Constitution to achieve the aforesaid objective which would also affirm the democratic principle, which appears to be one of the basic tenets of this Church. Accordingly, we direct both the parties as well as the Rule Committee (mentioned in clause (120) of the Constitution) to place before this Court within three months from today draft amendments to the Constitution", said the Supreme Court of India.
Y. Narasimha Rao And Ors v. Y. Venkata Lakshmi And Anr.
- Bench : Justice RangnathMisra, Justice P.B Sawant
- Appellant : Y. Narasimha Rao And Ors
- Respondent : Y. Venkata Lakshmi And Anr
- Citation : (1991) 3 SCC 451
Issue:
Whether the divorce decrees passed by foreign courts can be enforced under Section 13 of CPC by the courts in the country?
Facts:
• A1 & R1 married in Tirupati in 1975 as per Hindu law but separated in 1978.
• A1 filed an application for dissolution of marriage in Sub-court of Tirupati stating that he was resident of New Orleans, USA.
• In 1980, he filed another petition for dissolution in Cicuit Court, Missouri, USA alleging that he has been resident of Missouri for 90 days before filing the petition & his wife has deserted him for more than a year. However, R1 replied for not submitting to the jurisdiction of the foreign court.
• The Circuit Court assumed the jurisdiction & passed the decree for dissolution on the ground of irretrievable breakdown on 9-2-1980. The petition before Subcourt of Tirupati was dismissed. A1 married A2 in India in 1981.
• In 1981, R1 filed a criminal complaint against appellants for bigamy. Appellants filed application for discharge in view of order of dissolution of marriage given by Missouri court. The Magistrate discharged the Appellants.
• The HC reversed the decision holding that the photostat copy of judgement by Missouri Court is not admissible in evidence for dissolution of marriage.
• Appellants have filed the appeal in SC now.
Appellant’s contentions:
• It was contended that the decision of HC is not correct.
Respondent’s contentions:
• It was contented that the respondent didn’t submit to the jurisdiction of foreign court.
Judgement:
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal.
“Under Section 13 of CPC , a foreign judgment is not conclusive as to any matter thereby directly adjudicated upon between the parties if (a) it has not been pronounced by a court of competent jurisdiction; (b) it has not been given on the merits of the case; (c) it is founded on an incorrect view of international law or a refusal to recognize the law of India in cases in which such law is applicable; (d) the proceedings are opposed to natural justice; (e) it is obtained by fraud; (f) it sustains a claim founded on a breach of any law in force in India.”
-Para 8,
“Since with regard to the jurisdiction of the forum as well as the ground on which it is passed the foreign decree in the present case is not in accordance with the Act under which the parties were married, and the respondent had not submitted to the jurisdiction of the court or consented to its passing, it cannot be recognised by the courts in this country and is, therefore, unenforceable.”
-Para 15, Y. Narasimha Rao And Ors v. Y. Venkata Lakshmi And Anr
DR. SUBRAMANIAM SWAMY V. RAMAKRISHNA HEGDE
(The Supreme Court is empowered at any stage to transfer any suit, appeal or other proceeding from a High court or other Civil Court in one State to a High Court or other civil court of another state if it is satisfied that such an order is expedient for the ends of justice)
- Bench: Ahmadi, A.M.(J)
- Appellant:Dr. Subramaniam Swamy
- Respondent: Ramakrishna Hegde
- Citation: 1990 AIR 113
Facts:
The Respondent had filed a suit for defamation in the Bombay High Court against the petitioner, claiming Rupees one crore as damages for the injury alleged to have been caused to his reputation by the publication/imputation of certain alleged defamatory statements made by the petitioner at a Press Conference held at New Delhi. The allegation in the plaint was that the petitioner levelledseveralaccusations at the said Press Conferencewhich were widely circulated/reported in the newspapers of1989. In substance the allegation was thattheRespondent and his family members pocketed more than Rs.300crores through fraudulent deals in lands situate in Bangalore and other parts of Karnataka, whereby the respondentfavoured his relatives/friends, besides non-resident Indians. By the instant petition, filed by the petitioner under Section 25. Code of Civil Procedure, the petitioner prays for the transfer of the said suit pending in Bombay High Court to any Civil Court in Karnataka, preferably the City Civil Court at Bangalore on the ground of forum non-convenience.
The respondent is against transferring the suit and further contends that being the dominus litis he was entitled to choose the forum.
Issue:
1. Whether the Supreme Court is empowered at any stage to transfer any suit, appeal or other proceeding from a High court or other Civil Court in one State to a High Court or other civil court of another state if it is satisfied that such an order is expedient for the ends of justice.
Contentions raised by the Appellant:
The appellant contends that the most appropriate place for the trial of the suit filed by the respondent is the State of Karnataka where the various acts complained of were committed by the respondent from time to time during his tenure as the Chief Minister of the State.
It is also submitted by the appellant that the respondent has not made a serious attempt to counter the grounds on which the transfer petition is founded.
Contentions raised by the Respondent:
The respondent contends that mere convenience of the appellant and absence of likelihood of prejudice to the respondent should not weigh with the court in directing the transfer of the suit from the Bombay High Court to a Civil Court in Karnataka.
Judgment:
The Supreme Court is empowered at any stage to transfer any suit, appeal or other proceeding from a High Court or other Civil Court in one State to a High Court or other Civil Court of another State if it is satisfied that such an Order is expedient for the ends of justice.
The ends of justice in the instant case demand that the suit be transferred from the Bombay High Court to the City Civil Court, Bangalore, where most of the documentary evidence and the majority of witnesses are available. Since the respondent ordinarily resides in Bangalore and was the Chief Minister of Karnataka during the period the various acts of which he is accused of took place, the impact of the accusation would be as much, if not more, on the readers of Bangalore. No prejudice, much less substantial prejudice would be caused to the respondent if the suit is transferred as prayed.
ABDUL GAFUR & ANR V. STATE OF UTTARKHAND & ORS
(The civil court shall have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature and one has the right to bring a suit of civil nature of one’s choice however frivolous the claim may be, unless it is barred by a statute)
- Bench: C.K. Thakker, D.K. Jain
- Appellants: Abdul Gafur and Anr.
- Respondents: State of Uttarakhand and Ors.
- Citation: 2008 (10) SCC 97
Facts:
On 2/28th March, 2005, a gazette Notification was issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short `the Act') for acquiring land belonging to one Tek Chand, the original owner, for construction of approach road for Himalayan Institute Hospital Trust, Dehradun (herein referred as Hospital). Tek Chand objected to the said acquisition. In the meanwhile, on 25th May, 2005, he alienated a part of the said land in favor of appellants by way of gift deeds.
4. On 4th July, 2005, preferred a Writ Petition challenging the validity of Notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act. It appears that a clarification was issued by the State Governmentto the effect that the possession of the passage to the Hospital shall remain with them; the Government would be making financial contribution in its construction and the public would be entitled to use the same. In the affidavit filed on behalf of the Government in the Writ Petition it was reiterated that the road was not going to be used exclusively by the Hospital. Ultimately, the Writ Petition was dismissed. Special Leave Petition filed by Tek Chand against the said order was also dismissed. Licence deed in respect of the said land was executed in favour of the Hospital and construction of the road commenced sometime later.
5. Apprehending that the Hospital was planning to raise a wall on both sides of the road, obstructing use of the road by the public at large, including the appellants, the appellants filed the aforementioned two suits against the Hospital and Tek Chand for perpetual injunction in the court of Civil Judge (JD), Dehradun, restraining the Hospital from raising construction of any nature in the said property. Applications under Order 39, Rules 1 & 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short "the Code") were also filed for grant of interim injunction.
6. The suits were contested by the Hospital. Taking into consideration the written statement filed on behalf of the Hospital and after hearing the parties, the trial court, by detailed orders granted temporary injunction in favor of the appellants and restrained the Hospital from constructing boundary wall on both sides of the road in question. Being aggrieved, the Hospital, filed appeals to the court of District Judge, Dehradun. Arguments in the appeals were heard and orders were reserved.
7. During the pendency of the appeals, Tek Chand filed yet another Writ, inter alia, alleging that the acquisition was fraudulent. While entertaining the Writ Petition, exercising its power under Section 24 of the Code, vide an ex-parte order, the High Court transferred both the said suits as well as the civil appeals to itself in order to get the dispute settled between the parties. In the said order, the High Court directed that both the lower courts shall give notices to all the parties in the suit and the appeals, informing them that the suits and appeals stand transferred to the High Court and they were required to appear in person before the Court. On the said order being communicated to the appellants, they filed Misc. Application in the said Writ Petition seeking recall of order. When the Writ Petition came up for consideration, the High Court dismissed both the suits and the appeals.
Issue:
1. Whether the High Court committed an error in dismissing the suits
Contentions raised by the Appellant:
The appellants contended that the High court has committed a manifest error in dismissing the suits by a cryptic order without taking into consideration the nature and the purport of the two suits.
It was also contended that the scope of the Writ Petition filed by the original owner of the subject land and the suits filed by the appellants was entirely different inasmuch as in the suits there is no challenge to the acquisition of the piece of land as in the case of the Writ Petition.
Contentions raised by the Respondents:
The respondent (Hospital) submitted that said suits were nothing but yet another attempt by the original owner, herein, to somehow retain the control on the acquired land, now a public road, as it would enhance the value of his remaining land on both sides of the road.
The respondent (State Government) contended that both the suits being meritless, the High Court was justified in dismissing them.
Judgment:
The Supreme Court held that under Section 9 of the Code, the civil court shall have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature and one has the right to bring a suit of civil nature of one’s choice however frivolous the claim may be, unless it is barred by a statute.
Competent Authority Calcutta, vs. David Mantosh and Ors. On 26 February, 2019
Bench: Supreme Court of India
Appellant: The Competent Authority Calcutta, Apollo Gleneagles Hospitals Ltd.
Respondent: David Mantosh & Ors.
Citation: Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976
Issue:
Whether the Division Bench of the High Court was justified in allowing the appeal filed by the Plaintiffs and decreeing the suit.
Facts:
1. The suit property went through several transfers between different parties from a period of 1933 to 1962.
2. At last it was surrendered to the state of west Bengal who gave it to Apollo Gleneagles Hospitals for a lease of 30 years.
3. After years of slumber the original owner, filed a writ petition and claimed ownership over the land.
4. The single judge of Calcutta High Court allowed the petition which was then challenged by the respondent before the division bench of the high court.
5. The division bench allowed the appeal and set aside the order of the single bench.
6. Left aggrieved by the decision of the Division bench, a special leave petition was filed by another respondent in Supreme Court which was dismissed by the said court. And the petitioner was asked to adopt for a remedy under the act or any other law.
7. As a consequence, Respondent Nos. 1 to 7 filed Civil Suit out of which the present appeals arise. The suit was filed against the present Appellants, i.e., the Competent Authority under the Act, the State of West Bengal, and Respondent Nos. 8 and 9 in the Court of Additional District Judge, Sealdah.
8. The Civil Suit was filed for declaration and possession of the suit property.
Appellants Contention
The Plaintiffs claimed a declaration that the entire proceedings which culminated in the issuance of the notification dated 12.02.1990 under the Act in relation to the suit property be declared null and void and the plaintiffs be declared owners of the suit property.
Respondents Contention
The respondents contented that the Civil Suit filed by the Plaintiffs was barred by limitation, because the Plaintiffs had slept over their alleged right of ownership over the suit property by not availing of remedies under the Act.
Final Decision
Supreme Court considered the view that the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts to try the civil Suits with respect to the lands, which were subjected to ceiling proceedings under the Act, are held to be impliedly barred, since the Act excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Court.
Hence, the appeals succeed and are allowed. The impugned judgments are set aside and the judgment of the Trial Court is restored.
Para 77, Competent Authority Calcutta, vs. David Mantosh and Ors. On 26 February, 2019
Dhulabhai And Others vs The State of Madhya Pradesh
(appeal of wrongful sales tax taken,under sec80 of CPC)
- Bench: Hidayatullah, M. (Cj), Bachawat, R.S., Vaidyialingam, C.A., Hegde, K.S., Grover, A.N.
- Petitioner : M . C. Setalvad, Rameshwar Nath and MahinderNarain
- Respondent : B. Sen and I. N. Shroff
Issue:
Whether civil courts have jurisdiction in cases of tax refund?
Facts:
· The appellants are tobacco dealers.
· It was a writ petition on sales tax illegally collected against Constitution in Art 301 & 304A
· Suits not maintainable under sec17 of the act.
· There was an exclusion of jurisdiction of civil court.
· In Firm IlluriSubbayya Chetty & Sons' case,the petitioner acknowledged that the tax was payable & he did not raise this issue under the Act.
· In M/s. Kamala Mills Ltd. v. State of Bombay, it was held that civil courts are excluded in suits of tax refund,under sec 20 of Bombay Sales Tax act.
· Writ of certiorari can be issued for the refund under the time limit in Limitation act.
· It was illegal to levy a tax on the importer when an equal tax was not levied on similar goods produced in the State.
Appellant’s contentions:
· They state that the taxes were not levied in Madhya Pradesh,hence were illegally taken from them.
· If sec 17 of Limitation act was valid,then its provisions could be applied,but it’s not.
Respondent’s contentions:
· The State pleaded that as appeals against the assessment were pending before the Sales Tax Appeal Judge the plaintiffs were not entitled to file suits.
Final judgement:
· Appeals were granted in the favour of the appellants.
· The tax was ex facie violative of art 301, and civil courts do not have the jurisdiction.
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