Clever interpretation of statues

Law does not work like a math problem. Whatever you do still all the probabilities can not be provided in any law and that is why every case is different.

Why so many courts, appeals , revisions and advocates on both sides., because numerous interpretations are possible for any written law.

 So dear sir such problems occur every where, for example just go thorugh HIRE PURCHASE ACT 1972, it is not notified still being used.

@ Author,

There is nothing clever and/or printers devil as interpreted by you in stated query!

It is to be noted in

Re.: Driedger, Construction of Statutes, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1983), at p. 223: 

“There is a distinction between an enactment of a statute (i.e. the completion of the formal enacting process) and its commencement or coming into force. The two times enactment and commencement are not necessarily the same: the statute may be operative as at the day of its enactment or, if it so provides, as at an earlier or later date.”

Côté, The Interpretation of Legislation in Canada, 2nd ed. (Quebec: Yvon Blais, 1991), at pp. 84 and 87:

“A statute exists from its adoption but it becomes binding only upon its commencement or its coming into force.”

Parliament may establish special rules for commencement of particular statutes which depart from those of the Interpretation Acts. There are two basic methods; either the statute itself specifies the exact moment of its commencement or the statute delegates to the executive branch the authority to determine by proclamation the commencement of either the entire statute or of some of its provisions. In the latter case the date of commencement is set by proclamation. When a statute comes into force on a date other than that of royal assent it is binding from the beginning of the day in question. Re.: Hubbard v. Hamburgh, 1993 CanLII 5500 (ON S.C.)]

The making of the law and its commencement are different things. Operation of the statute starts from the date of its commencement. The commencement of the statute depends on the express words provided therein as to when it will come into operation but in absence of any special provision either with regard to the whole Act or portion thereof, an Act will come into operation on the day it receives assent of the President or the Governor, as the case may be, immediately on the expiration of the day it precedes its commencement (S. 5 of the General Clauses Act, 1897). However, the commencement is often postponed to some specified future date or to such date as the appropriate government may appoint by a notification in the Official Gazette. In such cases, even assent by the President will not bring the Act into operation, till notification is issued and published in the Government Gazette, B. Re.: Basavalingappa vs. State of Karnataka (1985) 59 STC 1, 9 (Karn); Dy. CTO vs. Sha Sukraj Peerajee AIR (1968) SC 67, 70; Haji Lal Mohd. Biri Works vs. State of U.P. (1973) 32 STC 496, 500 (SC).Similarly, provision can be made for commencement of various parts of the statute on different dates. Re.: K. Manikchand vs. Elias Saleh Mohammed Sait And Ors. (1969) 1 SCC 52 a

Question has arisen as to whether the power to bring into force a statute can be exercised by a delegate such as the executive government. The answer is yes. Even in cases where at the time of bringing the statute into operation by the act of the delegate, the legislature may have ceased to be competent to enact the statute at that time. Re.: Ishwar Das vs. Union of India AIR (1972) SC 1193 and State of Assam vs. K. B. Kurkalang AIR (1972) SC 223.

A question has also arisen as to whether the court can direct the government to bring a statute into operation. The answer is generally in the negative but if a considerable time has elapsed since the passing of the statute, a writ can be issued by the court directing the government to decide whether the statute should be brought into force. Re.: Altmesh vs. Union of India AIR (1988) SC l768, and A. K Roy vs. U.O.I. AIR (1982) (SC) 710, 732-733  (1969) SC 751, 761.

If you get time off from chuskibaazi from time pass female writers postings here then do read some of my lengthy older articles in Family Law Forum on Interpretation of (PWDVA) Domestic Violence Act, 2005  especially its commencement; retrospective or prospective operation !

Thanks JSDN and Tajobsindia. The Act is very clear that the Law will come into force on the date and area as directed by State Govt Gazette Notification. Yes, the date of enforcement has been notified as 30th December 2011 through gazette notification, but in the said notification the area is not mentioned. Q is, does the notification of the date as 30th December 2011 enforcing the Act, which does not mentioned the area, but nevertheless, can it be said that by  implication it can be assumed that it is apply to the whole state? That is the issue on hand.

@ Author


Issue in hand: Can it be construed to include and or exclude “whole and/or certain areas” from the ambit of Operations of the Act? OPR

Carried forward Forceful constructive arguments:

If the Legislature intended to exclude "whole and/or certain areas" from the ambit of the Act, the Gazette Notification would have been specifically excluded, instead of it being provided in the proviso. No forceful restrictive meaning has been given to the expression "the area of its enforcement", nor has the said expression been specifically defined in the Act, to make it specific to whole and or certain areas only. It was left to State to announce in Gazette Notification. In such circumstances, it is clear that the legislature never intended to exclude "while and/or certain areas" out of the ambit of the Act that can be made applicable under the provisions of the Act and left to respective State to pass local amendment to proviso to exclude and or include.

But then, Courts (see PS) are not supposed to throw their hands up in the air expressing their helplessness when same under challenge. It becomes the duty of the Court to give correct interpretation to such a provision having regard to the purpose sought to be achieved by enacting a particular legislation. This is helpful if a Writ © is filed by prudent member of the Bar for State interpretation of the Act. This so expressed by the Supreme Court in the case of Re.: Ahmedabad Municipal Corpn. Anr. Vs. Nilaybhai R. Thakore & Anr. [(1999) 8 SCC 139 in the following words:

“14. Before proceeding to interpret Rule 7 in the manner which we
think is the correct interpretation, we have to bear in mind that it is not the jurisdiction of the court to enter into the arena of the legislative prerogative of enacting laws. However, keeping in mind the fact that the Rule in question is only a subordinate legislation and by declaring the Rule ultra vires, as has been done by the High Court, we would be only causing considerable damage to the cause for which the Municipality had enacted this Rule. We, therefore, think it appropriate to rely upon the famous and oft-quoted principle relied by Lord Denning in the case of Seaford Court Estates Ltd. v. Asher [1994] 2 All ER 155 wherein he held : "When a defect appears a judge cannot simply fold his hand and blame the draftsman. He must set to work on the constructive task of finding the intention of Parliament and then he must supplement the written words so as to give 'force and life' to the intention of the Legislature. A judge should ask himself the question how, if the makers of the Act had themselves come across this ruck in the texture of it, they would have straightened it out? He must then do as they would have done. A judge must not alter the material of which the Act is woven, but he can and should iron out the creases". This statement of law made by Lord Denning has been consistently followed by this Court starting in the case of M. Pentiah and Ors. v. Muddala Veeramallappa and Ors. : [1961]2SCR295 and followed as recently as in the case of S. Gopal Reddy v. Slate of Andhra Pradesh : 1996CriLJ3237 . Thus, following the above Rule of interpretation and with a view to iron out the creases in the impugned Rule which offends Article 14, we interpret Rule 7 as follows : "Local student means a student who has passed H.S.C./New S.S.C. examination and  the qualifying examination from any of the High Schools  or Colleges situated within the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation  limits and includes a permanent resident student of Ahmedabad Municipality who acquires the above qualifications from any of the High School or College situated within Ahmedabad Urban Development Area."

It is also a firmly entrenched principle of interpretation of statutes that the Court is obliged to correct obvious drafting errors and adopt the constructive role of 'finding the intention of Parliament / State legislatures in cases where States are directed to further the Amendment by way of... not only from the language of the statute, but also from a consideration of the social conditions which gave rise to it' as enunciated in State of Re.: Bihar Vs Bihar Distillery Ltd. AIR 1997 SC 1511. Here if The act is put to silver test by a competent member of the Bar and by general public same could have been amended but then your que. would not have popped before us.


Hence need the needful to do to undo the omission and commission; acts thereto by concerned State in question which I feel is erroneous both in eyes of Law and as well subject matter under possible challenge.

PS: Law in perspective:  If the @ Author is still aggrieved from my previous and above forceful arguments interpreting Common Law then filling a appropriate Writ (c) before State's HC is the right route to follow if colly. wisdom of LCI fails to come to your expectations :-)

Thanks Tajobsindia, for such a fantastic write up on the topic.

I am of the view that it is a clumsy enactment as the date of appointing the date of enforcement has been cubbed up with the area of application of the law in the state, and appointing the date of enforcement has been implied as the area of its enforcement. Be that as it may, thanks a ton for your contributions.