Punjab & Haryana High Court Grants NDPS Bail Due to Prosecutorial Delay: Article 21 Reaffirmed

Index

1. Introduction
2. Factual Background and Procedural Posture
3. Legal Question Before the Court
4. Prosecutorial Apathy and the High Court’s Censure
5. Bail and the Rigours of Section 37 NDPS Act
6. Article 21 and the Right to Speedy Trial
7. First-Time Offender Status and Bail Consideration
8. Judicial Disapproval of Police Non-Compliance
9. Judicial Precedents and the Constitutional Rebalancing of Bail
10. Conclusion

Synopsis

In Kuldeep Singh v. State of Punjab (2025), the Punjab and Haryana High Court addressed the constitutional limits of pre-trial incarceration under the stringent framework of the NDPS Act. Despite the bar on bail under Section 37 of the NDPS Act for commercial quantity offences, the Court granted bail due to egregious prosecutorial delay, noting that only three out of sixteen witnesses had been examined across twenty-seven hearings. The Court held that such stagnation—caused entirely by the prosecution’s failure to produce its own witnesses—violated the petitioner’s right to a speedy trial under Article 21.

Drawing from Supreme Court precedents such as Rabi Prakash, Dheeraj Kumar Shukla, Shiv Shanker Kesari, and Satender Kumar Antil, the Court reaffirmed that no statutory bar can justify indefinite incarceration when the State itself has failed to diligently prosecute the case. The judgment condemned the conduct of police witnesses, emphasised the constitutional supremacy of due process, and ordered bail for the petitioner while preserving the right of the trial court to impose necessary conditions.

This case is a constitutional reaffirmation that liberty must not be sacrificed at the altar of procedural failure. It reinforces the judiciary's duty to prevent the NDPS Act from being misused as an instrument of pre-trial punishment, and positions Article 21 as the ultimate safeguard against systemic injustice.

Introduction

NDPS Act is a stringent legislation enacted to address the vice of drug abuse and trafficking. But the stringency of the legislation cannot override constitutional protection enshrined in Article 21 of the Indian Constitution, i.e. the right to a fair and speedy trial. In Kuldeep Singh v. Stat, the Punjab & Haryana High Court was confronted with a classic conflict between procedure and constitutional justice. The case entailed long-term jail incarceration as a result of prosecutorial delays, failure to examine witnesses, and judicial inertia, forcing the Court to order bail notwithstanding the raising of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, which normally precludes bail for commercial quantity offences.

This article examines the factual and legal background to the case, application of Article 21 jurisprudence by the High Court, scope of statutory bar under Section 37, and evolution in judicial approach to balance procedural rigor and personal liberty in special statutes like the NDPS Act.

Factual Background 

The Petitioner, was arrested under Section 22 of the NDPS Act and the alleged seized contraband was 1.540 kilograms of Tramadol, which is considered to be 'commercial quantity' under the NDPS Act.
Although charges were initiated on the date of arrest—23 March 2023—the trial remained largely static since then. Just three out of the 16 prosecution witnesses on the list were examined up to as many as twenty-seven hearings when the petition for bail was decided in July 2025. 

The rest were police officers, and even though repeated bailable and non-bailable warrants were served, they did not show up. The petitioner with a clean criminal record thus went on remaining behind bars with no actual progress made in the trial.

Legal Issue Pending Before the Court

The central question of law that arose before the High Court was whether bail can be granted under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (formerly Section 439 CrPC) in disregard of statutory constraints under Section 37 of the NDPS Act, due to gross delays caused only by failure to produce witnesses on the part of the prosecution.

The problem demanded a balance between competing priorities of law: the legislative ban on bail in commercial quantity cases and the constitutional requirement of speedy and fair trial under Article 21 of the Constitution.

Prosecutor Apathy and the Censure of the High Court

Justice Manjari Nehru Kaul, in strong words, directly tackled prosecutor apathy. In para. 2, the Court noted that the practice of non-appearance of police witnesses had persisted at least for twenty-seven hearings.

In para. 5, where the Court observed that there was no reasonable explanation for this habitual default on the part of the State counsel and only a vague assurance given that the witnesses would "now appear on every future date"—one that the Court had properly characterized as being devoid of conviction and credibility.

In paragraph 9, the Court mentioned that the testimony of the police witnesses was a sign of a "clear pattern of neglect and indifference" and that such attitude on the part of law enforcement officers who are subject to the laws was "deeply concerning and unacceptable." The Court also mentioned that this "complacency" was not only uncalled for but insulting to judicial authority.

Bail and the Formalities of Section 37 NDPS Act: A Constitutional Perspective

Section 37 of the NDPS Act generally bars bail in cases involving commercial quantity unless there are strong reasons to hold that the accused is not guilty and will not go on to commit any offence while on bail, as required to be satisfied by the Court. 

However, since the issue came up for consideration in Rabi Prakash v. State of Odisha, default of prosecution leading to prolonged detention could be a exceptional ground to grant bail even at the cost of contravening Section 37.

The High Court of Kuldeep Singh based its decision upon judgements like Rabi Prakash and Dheeraj Kumar Shukla v. State of Uttar Pradesh, to highlight that no individual can be detained indefinitely simply on account of systemic shortcomings. At paragraph 3, specifically, it was noted that "an accused—particularly one who has no criminal record—cannot be jailed indefinitely simply because the prosecution has been negligent in performing its responsibility."

This is a purposive and constitutional construction of Section 37. It adheres to the doctrine laid down in Union of India v. Shiv Shanker Kesari, that statutory constraints on bail must yield to constitutional protection in exceptional cases of unjustified and prolonged detention.

Article 21 and the Right to Speedy Trial

Para 8 is where the Court observed that "the right to speedy and fair trial is an integral component of the right to life and personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India," and that "it governs trials under special laws like the NDPS Act, whatever be the seriousness of the allegations." This is the perception from a line of Supreme Court jurisprudence. In Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar, the Supreme Court had issued that the right to speedy trial is a basic right implicit in Article 21. In Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, the Court issued guidelines to find delay and prejudice therefrom. 

Applying the above principles, the High Court in the present case ensured statutory provisions like the NDPS Act are interpreted harmoniously with constitutional safeguards.

First-Time Offender Status and Grant of Bail

In paragraph 6, the Court mentioned that the petitioner was spared of previous criminal antecedents and was being tried for the first time. This factor, although not determinative alone, tipped the balance in favor of bail when used together with prosecutorial delay.

This is consistent with the Supreme Court's rationale in Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar, wherein the Court declared that first-time offenders are to have their pre-trial detention stringently reviewed. In the case of special legislation like the NDPS Act, Tofan Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu, recognized the importance of procedural justice and gravity of evidence, particularly where the case hinges on government witnesses whose reluctance to testify halts the process.

Judicial Precedents and the Constitutional Rebalancing of Bail under the NDPS Act

The Punjab & Haryana High Court ruling in Kuldeep Singh v. State of Punjab draws not just from an appreciation of prosecutorial delays but rests on a rich constitutional jurisprudence that has ever stood the right to liberty above strict statutory formulations where the situation so necessitates. In invoking Article 21 of the Constitution and challenging the mechanical application of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, the Court positions itself within a broader terrain of judgments that have reaffirmed that justice cannot be deferred to oblivion.

A seminal precedent in the discussion is the Supreme Court decision in Rabi Prakash v. State of Odisha, which was the fulcrum of the reasoning of the High Court. In Rabi Prakash, the petitioner was detained for more than three years in an NDPS case where the prosecution had been slow in progressing the evidence. 

The Supreme Court noted in paragraph 7 that, "when the prosecution itself is not serious in questioning its witnesses, the rigours of Section 37 NDPS Act have to give way to Article 21." The Court in that case allowed bail on the sole ground that the State's lethargy had converted custody into punishment in the absence of conviction. This same specific logic was applied by Justice Manjari Nehru Kaul to the rationale in Kuldeep Singh, where more than 27 hearings had already gone by without considering material witnesses, who were predominantly government officials.

Supporting this constitutional shape is the case of Dheeraj Kumar Shukla v. State of Uttar Pradesh, ruled by a bench headed by then Chief Justice D.Y. Chandrachud. In paragraph 6, the Court categorically held that "liberty under Article 21 cannot be held hostage to the systemic inertia of the State," and granted bail despite the commercial quantity of the contraband involved. 

The reasoning adopted emphasized that judicial integrity demands bail not be refused simply because the statute is draconian; it must be refused only when the State has acted with diligence and due process. In Kuldeep Singh, repeated failure on the part of the prosecution to get its own witnesses present despite issuance of both bailable and non-bailable warrants squarely comes within the failure decried in Dheeraj Kumar.

The High Court's constitutional interpretation of Section 37 also receives endorsement in Union of India v. Shiv Shanker Kesari, wherein the Supreme Court stated that although the requirements under Section 37 are to normally be fulfilled, they are not resistant to constitutional override. 

In paragraph 11, the Court held: "A balance must be struck between the need to curb the drug menace and the constitutional guarantee of fair procedure." That balance was decisive in Kuldeep Singh, where the High Court recognized the gravity of drug offences but disallowed that gravity from turning into a free pass towards open-ended detention. Rather, the Court preferred to reconcile statutory policy with constitutional safeguards.
It would be proper to state that the seminal jurisprudence on speedy trial, which thus forms a part and parcel of Article 21, was laid down in Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar, wherein the Supreme Court, through Justice P.N. Bhagwati, declared in paragraph 7 that: "Speedy trial is an essential ingredient of fair trial and the right to speedy trial is a fundamental right." 

This early declaration has only matured into a deeper constitutional doctrine over the years, most notably in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, in which the Constitution Bench observed in paragraph 88 that the reasons for delay have to be inquired into and if they are State-related, then they heavily favour the accused. The High Court in Kuldeep Singh noted specifically this factor—no delay was caused by the petitioner; all the inertia resulted from the prosecution and its continuing inability to present its witnesses before the court.

This argument was further expanded in the case of Vakil Prasad Singh where in paragraph 19, the Court held that "state inaction causing delay is itself a reason for bail," especially where such delay renders the presumption of innocence nugatory and turns pre-trial detention into de facto punishment. 

The petitioner in the case of Kuldeep Singh had been in prison since March 2023, with practically no progress in the trial, and the prosecution had provided no acceptable explanation except for vague assurances that "the witnesses would be present next time". In invoking Vakil Prasad Singh, the High Court accurately held that such flimsy promises are constitutionally inadequate.

As instructive is the ruling in Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI, in which the Supreme Court established systematic guidelines on bail at various stages of criminal proceedings. The Court, in paragraph 18, cautioned that "the seriousness of the offence cannot trump the fundamental rights available under Article 21," and that the judicial system should not make pre-trial detention punitive. The High Court judgment in Kuldeep Singh rings true with this paradigm, in that it recognized the gravity of NDPS charges without permitting gravity to overwhelm procedural fairness.

The Court in Kuldeep Singh also factored in the petitioner's status as a first-time offender with no criminal antecedents—a consideration frequently ignored in NDPS bail orders. The rule that first-time offenders should be more protected against pre-trial punishment has its genesis in Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar, where the Court held in paragraph 8 that, "courts must differentiate between necessity and routine in arrest and custody," particularly for persons not established to be habitual offenders. This distinction was key in Kuldeep Singh.

Conclusion

The decision in Kuldeep Singh v. State of Punjab (2025) is a seminal reaffirmation that special laws like the NDPS Act cannot eclipse fundamental rights. By granting bail despite the bar under Section 37, the Court restored the constitutional balance between the state's interest in prosecution and the individual's right to liberty. It condemned prosecutorial lethargy, reinforced judicial authority, and demanded accountability from police officers.

As courts increasingly encounter delays caused not by accused persons but by the very machinery entrusted with prosecution, this judgment signals a welcome shift from rigid statutory literalism to constitutional pragmatism. It reminds us that while the war on drugs is critical, it cannot be waged at the cost of constitutional due process.

FAQs

Q1. What was the main legal issue in Kuldeep Singh v. State of Punjab?
Whether bail can be granted in an NDPS case involving commercial quantity when the trial is indefinitely delayed due to prosecution’s failure to produce witnesses.

Q2. Why is Section 37 NDPS Act usually a bar to bail?
Section 37 imposes strict conditions for bail in commercial quantity offences, requiring the court to be satisfied that the accused is not guilty and will not reoffend. However, this bar is not absolute in cases of constitutional violations like excessive pre-trial incarceration.

Q3. How did the Court justify granting bail despite Section 37?
The Court held that the petitioner’s right to a speedy trial under Article 21 had been violated due to inaction by the prosecution. Hence, constitutional rights took precedence over statutory restrictions.

Q4. How many witnesses had been examined when bail was granted?
Only 3 out of 16 witnesses had been examined despite 27 hearings. The rest, mostly police officers, repeatedly failed to appear despite summons and warrants.

Q5. Which Supreme Court cases did the High Court rely on?
Key cases include Rabi Prakash v. State of Odisha (2023), Dheeraj Kumar Shukla (2022), Union of India v. Shiv Shanker Kesari (2007), and Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI (2022), all of which uphold Article 21 in the face of prosecutorial delay.

Q6. Was the petitioner a repeat offender?
No. The Court specifically noted that the petitioner had no previous criminal antecedents, which supported the case for bail.

Q7. What message does this judgment send?
That constitutional courts will not tolerate prosecutorial indifference and that liberty under Article 21 cannot be compromised by systemic delay—even in cases under special laws like the NDPS Act.