Punishment for Abusing a Judge: Delhi High Court Upholds Conviction of a Lawyer

PREFACE

It has to be definitely taken most seriously that none other than the Delhi High Court itself has in a most learned, laudable, landmark, logical and latest judgment titled Sanjay Rathore vs State (Govt of NCT of Delhi) & Anr in CRL.REV.P. 128/2024 and cited in Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:4401 that was pronounced as recently as on 26.05.2025 has minced absolutely just no words to hold in no uncertain terms that the advocate’s act of abusing, threatening and outraging the modesty of the woman judge during proceedings was not merely misconduct but a direct assault on the justice system. It is a no-brainer that we thus see that in this leading case, the Delhi High Court refused to reduce the sentence of an advocate who was convicted for his unjustified act holding that such conduct attacked the very foundation of judicial decorum and institutional integrity. No doubt, an advocate has to be most cautious while speaking with any person and here the abuse was made on a Judge and that too female and so no wonder that action had to follow as we see in this leading case!   

INTRODUCTION

At the very outset, this brief, brilliant, bold and balanced judgment authored by the Single Judge Bench comprising of Hon’ble Dr Justice Swarana Kanta Sharma sets the ball in motion by first and foremost putting forth in para 1 that, “This case narrates a deeply disturbing incident. It presents shocking conduct of an Advocate – conduct which is completely unacceptable. Even the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, though sought leniency for the petitioner and a reduction in the sentence awarded by the learned Trial Court, he did not attempt to justify or defend the behaviour of the accused.”

While setting the background, the Bench then points out in para 2 that, “Thus, although the petitioner has not assailed his conviction itself, this Court finds it necessary – especially in light of the plea for a lesser sentence – to narrate the incident in question, as the incident itself and its potential impact on the entire adjudicatory system of the Trial Courts will form the backdrop against which this Court considers the plea for leniency.”

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

To put things in perspective, the Bench while elaborating on the factual background envisages in para 3 stating that, “At the time of the incident, the complainant Ms. ‘X’ was serving as a Metropolitan Magistrate in Delhi. On 30.10.2015, at around 3:50 PM, she was presiding over her courtroom on the 6th floor of the Karkardooma Courts Complex (North-East District). Present in the courtroom were Naib Court Sh. Pawan Kumar, court staff members Sh. Neeraj Kumar and Sh. Sumit Kumar, one Advocate Sh. Chittranjan Dass, Investigating Officers Sh. Rajpal Singh from P.S. Bhajanpura, Delhi and ASI Sh. Mahendra Kumar from P.S. Usmanpur, Delhi, along with Sh. Arun Kumar (victim in FIR No. 1124/2015), and a convict in a challan matter related to vehicle no. DL1RQ3967. At this time, the present petitioner Sanjay Rathore (Enrolment No. D/****/09), an Advocate by profession and representing the owner of vehicle no. UP14CT0689 entered the courtroom with a colleague, and enquired with the Reader about the status of their challan case. Upon being informed that the case had already been adjourned to 31.10.2015, the petitioner suddenly began shouting in open court. He allegedly used abusive and disrespectful language towards the presiding judge Ms. ‘X’, and said “aise kar dia adjourn matter, aise kese date de di, main keh rha hun, abhi lo matter, order karo abhi.” When Ms. ‘X’ asked him about his vakalatnama, the petitioner arrogantly responded, “dekh lo lga hai challan ke sath mein, usi mein mera naam hai.” His name, indeed, appeared on the vakalatnama attached with the challan. However, instead of calming down, the petitioner became more aggressive. He began shouting louder, creating a nuisance that forced Ms. ‘X’ to pause the court proceedings. When she reiterated that the matter had already been adjourned, the petitioner allegedly charged towards the dais and began threatening her, stating, “aisa karo matter transfer kar do CMM ko, order karo abhi, aise kaise adjourn kar diya matter.” He further warned her that he would be moving an application to transfer the case. In the presence of court staff and litigants, the petitioner continued to shout threats: “mein tumhari complaint karunga CMM ke pass, mein kal khud hi jaunga High Court, mein dekhta hun tumhe abhi, order karo abhi, dasti do copy.” He thereafter began banging the table repeatedly, attempting to obstruct judicial work. In her complaint, Ms. ‘X’ stated that based on his behaviour and speech, she suspected he was under the influence of alcohol. She then directed him to leave the courtroom. However, at this point, he became even more violent and shouted: “mein kahin nahi jaunga, mein dekhta hu kis me dum hai mujhe bahar nikalne ka, tum kah do or mein chal jaun—nahi jaunga bahar.” He then allegedly uttered an extremely offensive and vulgar remark towards Ms. ‘X’, stating: “chadhi far kar rakh dunga.” She sought the accused’s identification and directed court staff to retain him for a breath analysis. However, before the test could be conducted, the petitioner fled the courtroom while continuing to hurl filthy abuse at her. Deeply shaken by the incident, Ms. ‘X’ submitted a formal complaint with the police. She alleged that the petitioner herein “had insulted her and had outraged her modesty, being a female judicial officer and had also insulted the court’s dignity.”

As it turned out, the Bench enunciates in para 4 disclosing that, “Accordingly, an FIR bearing no. 0885/2015 was registered on 31.10.2025, at P.S. Farsh Bazar, Delhi for commission of offence under Sections 186/189/353/ 354/509 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 [hereafter ‘IPC’]. Later, the statement of the complainant was recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [hereafter ‘Cr.P.C.’], where she reiterated her version of events. She recalled feeling insulted, humiliated, and being moved to tears – prompting her to retire to her chamber while she was dictating the order to initiate the complaint. The President and Secretary of the Karkardooma Bar Association visited her chamber soon after and attempted to persuade her to resolve the matter informally, saying, “that instead of taking legal recourse, she should adopt social move to solve the issue and that they were suggesting this as her elder brother.” In response, she told them, “that this is beyond the dignity of a woman and she had already written the order and complaint.””

FILING OF CHARGESHEET AND CONVICTION

Further, the Bench discloses in para 5 mentioning that, “After completion of investigation, chargesheet was filed on 08.12.2016 for commission of offence punishable under Sections l86/188/189/228/353/354A/355/509 of IPC. Charges were framed against the petitioner on 04.05.2018 for offence punishable under Sections l86/189/188/228/354A/509/353 of IPC. During the course of trial, prosecution examined nine witnesses, and statement of the petitioner herein was recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. and two defence witnesses were also examined by him.”

Do note, the Bench notes in para 6 that, “The learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Mahila Court-1, Shahdara, Karkardooma Courts, Delhi [hereafter ‘Trial Court’], vide judgment dated 28.09.2019 held the petitioner guilty for commission of offence under Sections 186/189/228/509/353 of IPC, whereas acquitted him for offence under Sections 188/354A of IPC. By way order on sentence dated 30.09.2019, the petitioner was sentenced in the following manner:

(a) for offence under Section 186 of IPC: Fine of Rs.500/- and in default thereof, simple imprisonment for 15 days.

(b) for offence under Section 189 of IPC: Simple imprisonment for a period of 3 months and a fine of Rs.1,500/- and in default thereof, simple imprisonment for 15 days.

(c) for offence under Section 228 of IPC: Fine of Rs.1000/- and in  default thereof, simple imprisonment for one month.

(d) for offence under Section 353 of IPC: Simple imprisonment for a period of 3 months and a fine of Rs.1,500/- and in default thereof, simple imprisonment for 15 days.

(e) for offence under Section 509 of IPC: Simple imprisonment for a period of 18 months and a fine of Rs.4,000/- and in default thereof, simple imprisonment for one month.”  

As things stands, the Bench then reveals in para 7 that, “Further, the sentences awarded to the petitioner were directed to run consecutively, and not concurrently. Thus, a total sentence of two years of simple imprisonment was awarded to him.”

Truth be told, the Bench then lays bare in para 8 disclosing that, “Aggrieved by his conviction, the petitioner had filed an appeal i.e., Criminal Appeal No. 206/2019, but the same was dismissed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-05, Shahdara, Karkardooma Courts, Delhi [hereafter ‘Appellate Court’] vide the impugned judgment dated 20.04.2023. By way of impugned order on sentence dated 02.11.2023, the sentence awarded by the learned Trial Court was also upheld and in addition, the petitioner was further directed to pay a compensation of Rs.50,000/- to the complainant/victim as per the decision of Full Bench of this Court in Karan v. State of NCT of Delhi: 277 (2021) DLT 195 (FB).”

Needless to say, the Bench states in para 9 that, “By way of present revision petition, the petitioner seeks to assail the aforesaid judgments and orders of the learned Trial Court and the learned Appellate Court.”

Of course, the Bench then reveals in para 10 that, “The sentence of the petitioner herein was suspended by this Court vide order dated 16.08.2024 considering that he had already remained in judicial custody for about 05 months and 17 days.”

Most rationally, the Bench points out in para 31 that, “The plea for leniency must be tested against the standard of whether the sentence is proportionate to the gravity of the act and its impact – not just on the individual, but on the institution she represents. To trivialise such conduct under the garb of emotional outburst or momentary lapse is to reflect a patriarchal mindset – one that struggles to respect women in authority and seeks to normalise the unacceptable. This cannot be permitted. Not in law. Not in court.”

Quite significantly, the Bench observes in para 32 that, “The conduct in question was disproportionate to the dignity of a woman seated on the dias – entrusted with the solemn duty of dispensing justice. To use language meant to outrage her modesty, within the courtroom, is not merely inappropriate – it is deeply offensive.”

Do note, the Bench notes in para 35 that, “As already observed, the learned Trial Court has not awarded the maximum sentence permissible under law. Rather, a lenient view has been taken, and a sentence of only one year and six months has been imposed. Thus, to this extent, this Court finds no justification to interfere with the order of sentence, which is well within the statutory limits and supported by cogent reasoning.”

Do further note, the Bench then notes in para 36 that, “However, it is noted that the petitioner was awarded a sentence of one year and six months (18 months) for the offence under Section 509 IPC, three months for the offence under Section 189 of IPC, and an additional three months for the offence under Section 353 of IPC. These sentences were directed to run consecutively, thereby resulting in a total sentence of two years. In the considered view of this Court, there exists no justifiable reason to deny the benefit of concurrent running of sentences to the petitioner. Accordingly, the order on sentence is modified to the limited extent that all the sentences awarded to the petitioner shall run concurrently – and not consecutively. Consequently, the total sentence to be actually undergone by the petitioner shall be confined to 18 months, out of which he has undergone 05 months and 17 days.”

JUSTICE IS NOT SILENT

Most remarkably, the Bench expounds in para 37 holding that, “Though justice is traditionally considered blind, however, it refers to the blindfold which does not let it differentiate or recognize inequality on the basis of gender, religion, caste, class, social standing, or power – but weighs both sides before it without being affected by whosoever the parties are. In the above background, it can be thus safely said that – justice may be blind in the above sense, but is not silent. Speaking up and dispensing justice fearlessly to all before it is the true essence of the Indian judiciary which makes it trustworthy.”

It would be instructive to note that the Bench notes in para 38 that, “When one who sits on the chair of a judicial officer to deliver justice is wronged by use of filthy language, the law must speak louder – on her behalf, and on its own. The law must speak most clearly in cases where the victim is the voice of justice herself, being looked upon by all those appearing in her Court seeking justice.”

Notably, the Bench notes in para 39 that, “In this peculiar and unfortunate case, it is that voice of justice which today pleads on the other side for justice to herself having been wronged by one of the members of the other pillar of the judicial adjudicatory system i.e. an Advocate.”

CONCLUSION

Most significantly, the Bench encapsulates in para 40 what constitutes the cornerstone of this notable judgment postulating that, “To conclude, this Court would observe that to take a lenient view in a case like the present, where shameful language was used against a judicial officer, would amount to doing injustice to justice. The seat of a judicial officer has its own dignity and is sacrosanct for members of the community who appear before her. If such an officer is not able to get adequate justice for herself, it may leave a scar or hurt dignity that cannot be permitted.”

Be it noted, the Bench notes in para 41 that, “When the dignity of any judicial officer is torn by way of use of filthy words proved beyond reasonable doubt, the law must act as the thread that would mend and restore it.”

Most forthrightly, the Bench points out in para 42 propounding that, “If a court of law decides a case on the basis of misplaced sympathy or empathy either for the victim or for the accused, it will set a wrong precedent. The officers who dispense justice, as first in the line of control of the sea of cases filed for adjudication, carry an important responsibility of dispensing justice to millions knocking at the doors of their Courts. In case, they are not safeguarded or extended respect, it will have serious repercussions not only on the justice delivery system as a whole, but also affect the working capacity and moral strength of the judicial officers.”

While continuing in same vein, the Bench then hastens to add in para 43 holding that, “Thus, this Court finds no ground to take any lenient view, and reduce the sentence awarded to the petitioner to the period already undergone by him.”

It is worth noting that the Bench notes in para 44 holding and directing that, “Accordingly, the impugned judgments and orders on sentence are upheld – but with the modification that the sentences shall run concurrently and not consecutively, as discussed in paragraph 36 of the judgment. The petitioner is directed to surrender within 15 days from date, and serve his unexpired portion of sentence.”