Additional Evidence in Appellate Proceedings: A Study of Iqbal Ahmed v. Abdul Shukoor (2025)

The decision of the Supreme Court of India in Iqbal Ahmed (Dead) by LRs. and Another v. Abdul Shukoor makes an important clarification of the principles regarding the production of fresh evidence in appellate proceedings under Order XLI Rule 27(1) of the CPC. 

The judgment, handed down by a Bench headed by Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Justice Atul S. Chandurkar, does not really decide a private case with regard to specific performance of a contract, but something much more, namely, lays down an authoritative exposition on what the approach of the appellate courts has to be in entertaining applications for admitting fresh evidence.

The main issue at hand was not just if the plaintiffs had a valid and enforceable sales contract, but also if the defendant could present new documentary evidence at the appellate stage that was unavailable during the trial court. 

Factual Background

The case arose out of a contract whereby the defendant purported to sell his house property in Bangalore to the plaintiffs, for a consideration of Rs 1067000. On the day of the agreement, the plaintiffs had paid ₹250000, and a further payment of Rs 250000 was also made. The one and a half years was the period within which the contract was to be concluded. Surprisingly, the agreement included a provision that in case the defendant failed to give vacant possession, the paymen-at price would be reduced to ₹8,67,000.

The plaintiffs alleged that they had sold other immovable assets to mobilise funds for this acquisition. On 18 April 1996, the plaintiffs served a notice inviting the defendant to sign the sale deed, to which there was no response. The follow up telegraphic notice on 11 July 1996 also met with no reply. At last, on 19 July 1996, they instituted a suit for specific performance of the contract.

In their complaint, the plaintiffs particularly averred that they had sold valuable immovable properties in order to finance the transaction and were ever ready and willing to execute their part of the agreement. They also averred that the balance sale consideration was immediately available with them.

The defendant, on the other hand, presented a remarkably different story. He refuted entering into a sale agreement and averred instead that he had taken a loan of ₹1,00,000 from plaintiff No. 1. He stated that his signatures had been taken on blank stamp papers in February 1995, and though he owned up to his signature at two places, he repudiated other endorsements made in his name. He also claimed ignorance of whether the plaintiffs had disposed off any properties for buying the suit property.

The Trial Court's Decision

The trial was disputed with each presenting evidence. Plaintiff No. 1 questioned himself and two witnesses, assuring that the agreement was real and that money was arranged through sale of property. The defendant assured that the agreement was forged and had only been signed as guarantee of a loan.

After evaluating the evidence, the Trial Court ruled that the plaintiffs established the agreement to sell of 20 February 1995 and had shown readiness and willingness to perform. The Court did not believe the defendant's account and ordered the suit for specific performance on 19 February 2000.

The Appeal before the High Court

Discontented, the defendant preferred an appeal under Section 96 CPC before the Karnataka High Court. In its pendency, he attempted to file more documents by submitting an application under Order XLI Rule 27(1). They were:

1. Certified copy of extract of the house tax demand register.
2. Encumbrance certificate of the property.
3. Certified copy of a sale deed of 1948.
4. Certified copy of City Survey endorsement.

The defendant had contended that these documents were required in order to demonstrate that the plaintiffs had not, as pleaded in their plaint, sold properties to bring funds for the purchase. He asserted that he had received this information only in June 2000.

The application was opposed by the plaintiffs. But the High Court granted the plea, considering the documents to be public records under Section 74 of the Indian Evidence Act. 

Acting on the documents and exercising Section 73 of the Evidence Act powers of comparing signatures, the High Court held that the agreement of 20 February 1995 was not established. It reserved the decree for specific performance but instead ordered the defendant to refund ₹1,00,000, finding that the transaction was nothing but a loan.

The Supreme Court Appeal

Aggrieved by the turnabout, the plaintiffs moved to the Supreme Court. It was argued by their counsel that the High Court had been in error to admit more evidence without considering if it was backed by pleadings. 

It was also argued that the High Court inappropriately compared signatures by itself without expert knowledge, and that the plaintiffs were not given a chance to refute the additional material. They also resented delay in the High Court's judgment pronouncement.

The counsel of the respondent, however, defended the ruling by citing the contradictions in the case of the plaintiffs. She asserted that the High Court was justified in using powers under Section 73 of the Evidence Act and that production of public documents was adequate.

The Legal Issue

The Supreme Court set out the pivotal question as whether the appellate court is required to scrutinize the parties' pleadings prior to deciding a request to lead further evidence pursuant to Order XLI Rule 27(1) CPC.

Order XLI Rule 27 allows further evidence on the appellate level only in exceptional situations: where the trial court has excluded evidence that should have been admitted, where the party to lead the evidence proves that it could not have been led with reasonable diligence, or where the appellate court needs such evidence to render judgment. The rule has been interpreted narrowly to avoid having parties plug gaps in their case.

The Supreme Court's Analysis

The Court noted that the plaintiffs had specifically pleaded in paragraph 9 of their plaint that they had sold immovable properties to finance the acquisition of the suit property. The defendant, however, simply said in his written statement that he did not know of any such sales. He had not particularly denied or framed a case that no such sale was made.

Against this backdrop, the Court tested if the High Court was justified in admitting additional evidence. The Bench ruled that prior to allowing further documents, an appellate court should first consider if the party's pleadings favor the case for the introduction of such material. In the absence of such pleadings, evidence would be irrelevant and not permissible.

Here, the defendant pleadings did not particularly aver that the plaintiffs had made up their case for sale of properties. His position was restricted to one of lack of knowledge. Therefore, allowing him to present evidence at the appellate level to rebut the case of plaintiffs was contrary to his pleadings.

The Court had placed reliance on the cases like Bachhaj Nahar v. Nilima Mandal and Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin, which lay special stress upon the fact that evidence cannot be allowed where there are no pleadings. Evidence in the absence of pleadings is of no utility, and courts cannot go beyond the case established by the pleadings.

The Bench therefore held that the High Court was wrong to entertain the application under Order XLI Rule 27 before examining if the defendant had established the requisite foundation in his written statement. Because the additional evidence was fundamental to the High Court's order of reversal of the decree, the judgment was untenable.

The Operative Order

The Supreme Court reserved the judgment of the High Court on 30 December 2008 in RFA No. 440 of 2000. The case was remitted to the High Court for re-examination of the appeal and the application under Order XLI Rule 27, as per law. The Court made it clear that it was not giving any opinion on the merits of the controversy on the agreement itself.

Since the suit had been filed in 1997, the Bench asked the High Court to bring its decision quickly. The appeal was thus granted, with parties being required to pay their own costs.

Doctrinal Significance

This judgment is important for a number of reasons. To begin with, it reiterates the basic premise that pleadings provide the core of civil litigation. Evidence only becomes admissible if it establishes or contradicts pleaded facts. In the absence of pleadings, evidence cannot be investigated, regardless of how genuine it seems.

Secondly, the ruling clarifies the extent of Order XLI Rule 27. The provision is not a carte blanche for parties to plug gaps or raise novel facts at the appellate court. It is there to ensure justice is served where justice needs to be served, but this must be balanced against the finality of litigation.
Thirdly, the judgment tackles the abuse of other evidence applications. It is common for litigants to try introducing new documents at the appellate level on grounds of public records or subsequent discovery. By putting the focus on pleadings being the touchstone, the Court has devised a protection against strategic misuse of Order XLI Rule 27.

Comparative Reflections

It is interesting to observe that earlier judgments have also stressed caution in the admissibility of further evidence. In K. Venkataramiah v. A. Seetharama Reddy, the Court ruled that even though the appellate court has great discretion, such discretion should be employed sparingly and only as required. Likewise, in State of Rajasthan v. T.N. Sahani, the Court reiterated that further evidence cannot be used to fill gaps.

The current case follows this jurisprudence but introduces a further tier: the mandatory obligation of pleadings conformity. This adds a layer of procedural discipline and avoids surprise to the opposing party.

Implications for Property Disputes and Contractual Litigation

Conflicts regarding definite performance of contracts for sale of immovable property are often heard by appellate courts. Plaintiffs are usually tasked with establishing readiness and willingness, while defendants challenge the authenticity of agreements. In these situations, attempts to lead evidence of revenue records, encumbrance certificates, or municipal registers at the appellate stage are not unusual. 

This decision guarantees that such attempts shall not prevail unless they are solidly rooted in the defendant's pleadings.

The case also highlights the need for careful drafting of written words. A general denial or assertion of ignorance might in the future render a defendant unable to adduce evidence to refute the claims of the plaintiff. Litigants have to thus be accurate and exhaustive in the articulation of their defence.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s decision in Iqbal Ahmed v. Abdul Shukoor is a landmark ruling that refines the jurisprudence on additional evidence in appellate proceedings. It reiterates that pleadings are the foundation of civil litigation, and no evidence can be considered without corresponding pleadings. By remanding the matter to the High Court, the Court has ensured that the substantive dispute will be decided afresh, but under a proper procedural framework.

Beyond the immediate dispute, the ruling carries lasting significance for civil procedure. It will guide appellate courts in balancing the interests of justice with the principle of finality, and it will caution litigants against treating appellate stages as opportunities to introduce fresh materials. Ultimately, the judgment strengthens procedural discipline and reinforces the role of pleadings in shaping the contours of civil trials and appeals.

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)

Q1. What was the main issue before the Supreme Court in Iqbal Ahmed v. Abdul Shukoor (2025)?
The central issue was whether an appellate court, while considering an application under Order XLI Rule 27(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, must first examine the pleadings of the parties to determine if the additional evidence sought to be produced is consistent with the case originally set up. The Court clarified that without corresponding pleadings, additional evidence cannot be admitted, as it would otherwise allow parties to introduce entirely new narratives at the appellate stage.

Q2. Why was the agreement of 20 February 1995 disputed?
The plaintiffs claimed it was a genuine agreement to sell the defendant’s house for ₹10,67,000, with part payments already made. The defendant, however, argued that it was never a sale agreement but merely a document executed as security for a loan of ₹1,00,000. He further contended that his signatures had been taken on blank stamp papers, and that the plaintiffs’ claim of having sold other properties to raise funds was fabricated.

Q3. On what basis did the High Court reverse the Trial Court’s decree for specific performance?
The High Court allowed the defendant to introduce additional documents such as property tax extracts, encumbrance certificates, and city survey endorsements. It held that these records contradicted the plaintiffs’ claim that they had sold properties to finance the purchase. Relying on these documents, the High Court concluded that the agreement was not proved and instead treated the transaction as a loan.

Q4. What was the Supreme Court’s view on the High Court’s acceptance of additional evidence?
The Supreme Court held that the High Court committed an error by admitting additional evidence without first verifying whether the defendant’s pleadings supported such a case. Since the defendant had only claimed ignorance about the plaintiffs selling properties, and had not specifically pleaded that no sale took place, the documents he introduced could not have been admitted. Evidence without pleadings, the Court emphasised, is legally irrelevant.

Q5. Which precedents did the Supreme Court rely upon in its reasoning?
The Court relied on earlier authorities such as Bachhaj Nahar v. Nilima Mandal (AIR 2009 SC 1103) and Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin ((2012) 8 SCC 148). These cases had laid down that courts cannot look into facts not pleaded and that evidence without pleadings is meaningless. By citing these judgments, the Supreme Court reinforced that procedural discipline is essential for fairness in civil litigation.

Q6. What was the final outcome of the Supreme Court’s judgment?
The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s judgment and remanded the matter for fresh consideration. It directed the High Court to decide the appeal and the application under Order XLI Rule 27 afresh, strictly in accordance with law. The Court also urged the High Court to expedite the matter, given that the litigation dated back to 1997.

Q7. How does this judgment affect future civil appeals?
The ruling establishes a clear safeguard: appellate courts cannot admit additional evidence unless it is directly connected to the pleadings of the party seeking it. This prevents litigants from altering their case midway and ensures that the appellate stage does not become a platform for filling gaps or introducing entirely new defences. It will also compel defendants and plaintiffs alike to draft their pleadings with precision.

Q8. What broader lesson does this case provide for litigants?
The case highlights the importance of pleadings as the foundation of any civil suit. Vague denials or casual assertions in a written statement can later restrict the scope of evidence that a party may rely upon. Litigants must be careful to set out all relevant facts at the outset, because appellate courts will not permit them to improve or change their case later through fresh evidence.