Allegation Of Political Vendetta In Itself Not Sufficient To Grant Anticipatory Bail: SC

It is certainly in the fitness of things that while displaying zero tolerance for corruption, the Supreme Court in a most learned, laudable, landmark, logical and latest judgment titled P Krishna Mohan Reddy vs State of AP in Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 7532 of 2025 With SLP (Cri.) No. 7533/2025 & SLP (Cri.) No. 7534/2025 and cited in Neutral Citation No.: 2025 INSC 725 that was pronounced as recently as on May 16, 2025 in the exercise of its criminal appellate jurisdiction has denied anticipatory bail to two former bureaucrats in the alleged multi-crore Andhra Pradesh liquor policy scam case ruling that the allegation of political vendetta in itself would not be sufficient to grant anticipatory bail to the accused. We need to note that a Bench of Apex Court comprising of Hon’ble Mr Justice JB Pardiwala and Hon’ble Mr Justice R Mahadevan who authored this notable judgment minced absolutely just no words to observe unequivocally that when two rival political parties “are at war”, there is bound to be some element of political bias or vendetta involved in the litigation, particularly the criminal prosecution. For sake of clarity, the top court clarified clearly adding that, “However, political vendetta by itself is not sufficient for the grant of anticipatory bail. The courts should not just look into the aspect of political vendetta and ignore the other materials on record constituting a prima facie case as alleged by the State.” But in the same vein, the Apex Court also reiterated that when the court prima facie is convinced that the allegations are frivolous and baseless, it may consider the element of political vendetta for the purpose of grant of anticipatory bail.      

It is worth noticing that in the present case, there were allegations that the bureaucrats had favoured certain select liquor brands such as Adan and Leela over well-established brands like Pernod Ricard and McDowell and received huge kickbacks for the same. It is also worth recalling that former government officials P Krishna Mohan Reddy and K Dhananjaya Reddy who were accused in the alleged Rs 3200 crore liquor scam had earlier been denied pre-arrest bail by the Andhra Pradesh High Court. While strongly challenging the denial of relief, they argued vehemently before the Apex Court that the case was politically motivated and lacked credible prosecutorial foundation.

It is of immense significance to note that the top court underscored the utility of custodial interrogation in criminal investigations, particularly corruption cases involving influential persons. The Bench held that, “In corruption cases concerning influential persons, effective interrogation of the suspect is of tremendous advantage in disinterring many useful information and also materials which are likely to be concealed. Success in such interrogation would elude if the suspected person knows that he is well protected and insulated by a pre-arrest bail order during the time he is interrogated. Very often interrogation in such condition would reduce to a mere ritual.” The Apex Court thus denied relief to the two former bureaucrats but warned the probe agency against using coercion or third-degree methods during interrogation of the accused.   

At the very outset, this robust judgment sets the ball in motion by first and foremost putting forth in para 1 that, “Since the issues involved in the two petitions i.e. SLP (Crl.) No. 7532 of 2025 and SLP (Crl.) No. 7533 of 2025 wherein anticipatory bail is being prayed for are same and the challenge is also to the self-same common impugned order passed by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Amaravati denying anticipatory to the petitioners, those were taken up for hearing analogously and are being disposed of by this common order.”

As we see, the Bench then specifies in para 2 stating that, “The petitioners have been denied anticipatory bail by the High Court in connection with Crime No.21 of 2024 registered at CID Police Station, Langalagiri, Guntur District for the offence punishable under Sections 409, 420, 12-B read with Sections 34 & 37 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 respectively (now Sections 316(5), 318(4), 61(2), 3(5) & 3(8) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023) & Sections 7, 7A, 8 and 13(1)(b) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.”

Needless to say, the Bench observes in para 3 that, “We need not delve much into the case of the prosecution as put up, more particularly, when the High Court has reproduced the same exhaustively in its impugned order dated 7-5-2025 passed in Criminal Petition No.4837/2025 and Criminal Petition No.4838/2025 respectively.”

Do note, the Bench notes in para 16 that, “Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having gone through the materials on record, we are of the view that we should not exercise our discretion for the purpose of grant of anticipatory bail. The High Court has looked into the matter in details and thereafter, declined to grant anticipatory bail as prayed for.”

Briefly stated, the Bench points out in para 17 that, “The High Court while reaching the conclusion that more than a prima facie case has been made out against the petitioners for the purpose of denying anticipatory bail to them, has observed thus: -

“22.According to the prosecution, the scheme in question favoured select liquor brands such as Adan and Leela, while sidelining well-established brands like Pernod Ricard and McDowell. As a result, several distilleries either shut down operations or diverted their products to other states Despite receiving consumer complaints regarding the quality of alcohol, no remedial measures were undertaken. The distilleries allegedly employed methods such as transferring funds to gold traders, procuring GST invoices, and remitting cash to the accused after deducting commissions. The investigation has revealed suspicious transactions amounting to approximately Rs 300-400 crores. In support of these allegations, the prosecution has produced records suspicious transactions involving Leela Agro and S.P.Y. Agro; bullion transactions entered into by Tilak Nagar Industries Limited: bullion invoices and ledger entries of Arham Bullion and Tilak Nagar Industries Limited and details of entities that were found to be non-existent.

25.The allegations against the petitioners are that they were responsible for the discontinuation of popular liquor brands and the promotion of favoured brands, collecting approximately Rs.3200 Crores in kickbacks for the liquor syndicate. The prosecution further claims that, on average, the accused received Rs.50-60 crores per month in kickbacks, with A.1 allegedly handing over these amounts to the petitioners in Crl.P.No.5009 of 2025 and Crl.P.No.4838 of 2025.

36.The statements provided by several witnesses have underscored the petitioners' prima facie involvement in the criminal conspiracy associated with e Excise Policy. It cannot lose sight of serious allegations leveled by the prosecution and the evidences collected during the course of investigation and presented before this Court, which prima facie reveal the petitioners ‘role in the offence in question. The material placed on record, its face, suggests the petitioners involvement in the offence in question. Given these circumstances, custodial interrogation is deemed essential to confront the petitioners with the gathered evidence and to unravel a broader conspiracy implicating the accused in the implementation of the Excise Policy.””

As a corollary, the Bench then holds in para 18 that, “In view of the aforesaid, it cannot be said that the High Court failed to exercise its discretion in a judicious manner while declining to grant anticipatory bail to the petitioners as prayed for.”

Most rationally, the Bench observes in para 19 that, “Custodial interrogation is qualitatively more elicitation oriented than questioning a suspect who is well ensconced with a favourable order under Section 438. In corruption cases concerning influential persons, effective interrogation of the suspect is of tremendous advantage in disinterring many useful information and also materials which are likely to be concealed. Success in such interrogation would elude if the suspected person knows that he is well protected and insulated by a pre-arrest bail order during the time he is interrogated. Very often interrogation in such condition would reduce to a mere ritual. The High Court remained alive and very rightly to the apprehension of the investigating agency that the petitioners would influence the witnesses, considering particularly the high position they all held at one point of time.”

Be it noted, the Bench notes in para 20 that, “Anticipatory bail to accused in cases of the present nature would greatly harm the investigation and would impede the prospects of unearthing of the ramifications involved in the conspiracy. Public interest also would suffer as a consequence.”   

Most significantly, the Bench encapsulates in para 27 what constitutes the cornerstone of this notable judgment postulating that, “To some extent, the petitioners could be said to have made out a prima facie case of political bias or mala fides but that by itself is not sufficient to grant anticipatory bail overlooking the other prima facie materials on record. Political vendetta or bias if any is one of the relevant considerations while considering the plea of anticipatory bail. The courts should keep one thing in mind, more particularly, while considering the plea of anticipatory bail that when two groups of rival political parties are at war which may ultimately lead to litigations, more particularly, criminal prosecutions there is bound to be some element of political bias or vendetta involved in the same. However, political vendetta by itself is not sufficient for the grant of anticipatory bail. The courts should not just look into the aspect of political vendetta and ignore the other materials on record constituting a prima facie case as alleged by the State. It is only when the court is convinced more than prima facie that the allegations are frivolous and baseless, that the court may bring into the element of political vendetta into consideration for the purpose of considering the plea of anticipatory bail. The frivolity in the entire case that the court may look into should be attributed to political bias or vendetta.”

Most judiciously, the Bench mandates in para 54 holding clearly that, “Besides the above, we would also like to make ourselves very clear that the investigating agency shall not adopt any third-degree methods or shall not coerce or exert any undue pressure or bring any undue influence on any of the witnesses or any of the co-accused to make statements that may suit the State. Tomorrow, if any complaint is made before the court in this context with some cogent material, be it the trial Court or the High Court or the Supreme Court, the same shall be viewed very seriously. It is expected of the investigating agency to carry out a fair, impartial and transparent investigation, more particularly, in accordance with law.”

What’s more, the Bench then further clarifies in para 55 stating that, “Before we close this matter, we make it further clear that if the petitioners are ultimately arrested, remanded and thereafter sent to judicial custody and if any regular bail application is filed, the same shall be considered on its own merits in accordance with law. It is needless to say that the principles of grant of anticipatory bail substantially differ from the principles of grant of regular bail. It is for the Court concerned to apply the correct principles of law so far as the grant of regular bail is concerned and decide the same accordingly.”

Furthermore, the Bench then directs in para 56 holding that, “With the aforesaid, these Special Leave Petitions are disposed of.”

Last but not the least, the Bench then further clarifies in para 57 holding precisely that, “If the petitioners have any further apprehension that they may be ill-treated, they can approach the High Court and obtain the very same relief that the High Court has granted in favour of the other witnesses.”