Two and a half years on, nothing about the aftermath of 26/11 has been straightforward. But evidence of ISI involvement in the attack has been mounting, from David Headley's evidence, to former Pakistan foreign secretary Shaharyar Khan's admission of a possible ISI role, to the sophistication of the operation itself, to Pakistan's reluctance to take action against the Lashkar-e-Taiba ( LeT). Another attack on the lines of 26/11 would result in a warlike situation between India and Pakistan. It's imperative, therefore, that diplomatic pressure be brought to bear on Islamabad for 26/11, to reduce the incentives for another attack.
Since New Delhi has little leverage and few policy options to influence Pakistan directly, it must work closely with the US and build its case at the bar of international opinion. It must validate its claims in a New York court by becoming party to a lawsuit filed by the relatives of the Chabad House victims - Rabbi Gavriel Holtzberg and his wife Rivka - against the Lashkar-e-Taiba and ISI chief Shuja Pasha. The Holtzbergs' case is, after all, the same as those of the many Indian victims of 26/11. Home secretary G K Pillai has called it a political decision, pointing to the old logic of keeping Pakistan sweet. But this is a false opposition. It is possible to pursue dialogue with Islamabad while building an international consensus against terrorism sponsored by state agencies in Pakistan. The latter can, in fact, reinforce the former. At the same time New Delhi needs to strengthen its internal defences against terror, where it has dropped the ball in recent times.
