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                                    --- by S. Karthikeyan M.A. M.L., Advocate, High Court
Part IV of the Constitution of India, stipulates some directives to the State to apply the principles embodied in Arts.38 to 51 of the Constitution in making laws. The said directives are expressly made unenforceable through Court of Law under Art.37.
It is implicit that the directives to be implemented by legislation and so long as there is no laws carrying out the policy laid down in a Directive shall not be enforceable through Court or neither the State nor an individual can violate any existing law or legal right under the colour of following a Directive[1]
By this express provision, the Courts are made incompetent to compel the Government to carry out any directives or to make any law for that purpose[2]. At the same time, the Supreme Court under Art.32 and the High Courts under Art.226, read with Art. 13 are empowered to review the legislative as well as executive actions judicially and to declare the law unconstitutional if it infringes, abridges or takes away the Fundamental Rights guaranteed in part III of the Constitution of India.
Hence, whenever a law made by the Parliament or any of State Legislature is challenged before the courts on the ground that the said law is inconsistent with the fundamental right or it abridges or takes away any of the fundamental rights, the courts shall be bound to declare the same as 'Unconstitutional' and 'Void' even if the said law was made by the Parliament or State Legislature with an intention to give effect to the directives enshrined in part IV of the Constitution.
For example, when the Madras Government reserved seats in State Medical and Engineering College for different communities in certain proportions on the basis of religion, race, caste with a view to promote social justice for all sections of the people as required by Art. 46 of the Directive Principles the same was challenged on the ground that it infringes Art. 15.
In State of Madras Vs Champakam Dorairajan[3], the Supreme Court declared that the said law is 'void' and in the above case, the Supreme Court further observed as follows:
''The Directive Principles of State Policy, which by Art 37 are expressly made unenforceable by courts cannot override the provisions found in Part III which notwithstanding other provisions are expressly made enforceable by appropriate writ, order or directions under Art.32. The chapter on fundamental Rights is sacrosanct and not liable to be abridged by legislative or executive act or others, except to the extent provided in appropriate Article in part III. The Directive Principles of State Policy have to conform and to run as subsidiary to the chapter on Fundamental Rights. However, so long as there is no infringement of any fundamental rights to the extent conferred by the provision in part III, there can be no objection the State acting in accordance with the directive principles set out in part IV but subject again to the legislative and executive powers and limitations conferred on the State under different provisions."
Similarly, when agrarian reforms were introduced in order to render social order and justice, the same were challenged as it infringes the fundamental right to property and the court came to an inevitable conclusion that the said laws are void in view of Art.13.
Hence, left with no other option, the Parliament was enacted Amending Acts by exercising constituent power vested in it u/Art 368 in order to amend the Constitution especially Part III of the Constitution so as to give effect to or to implement the Directive Principe's of State Policy. (For example, introduction of Art.31A, 31B & IX Schedule in the First Amendment Act in order to save the enactments intended for agrarian reforms.)
When the said amending acts were challenged on the ground that the same are fringing the fundamental rights, initially, in Shankari Prasad Vs Union of India[4], the Supreme Court has held that the word 'law' in clause (2) of Art. 13 did not include a law made by Parliament u/Art.368 and the said decision was followed in Sajjan Singh Vs State of Rajasthan[5] also. However, the said decisions were overruled by the Supreme Court in Golak Nath Vs State of Punjab.[6] The Supreme Court has held that the word 'law' in Art 13 (2) includes every branch of law, Statutory, Constitutional and hence if an amendment to the Constitution took away or abridged fundamental right of citizens, the said amendment would be declared 'void'.
By this decision, the Supreme Court made it impossible for the Parliament to enact an amendment to the Constitution, and thereby abridge or takes away the fundamental right even in order to give effect to the Directive principles. To remove this difficulty the parliament introduced Constitution (24th Amendment) Act 1971 and thereby a new clause (4) was added to Art. 13, which made it clear that Constitutional Amendments passed under Art. 368 shall not be considered as 'law' within the meaning of Art. 13(2) and thereby made it clear that an amendment cannot be challenged on the ground that it infringes the provisions of Part III of the Constitution.                   
The Validity of the said amendment was considered by the Supreme Court in Kesavananda Bharti's case[7] and the Supreme Court has upheld the validity of the said Amendment. The Supreme Court opines that Parliament is competent to amend the Constitution to over ride or abrogate any of the Fundamental Rights in order to enable the State to implement the Directives so long as the basic structure of the Constitution is not affected.
It is pertinent to mention here that only in the Kesavanda Bharti, the Courts responsibility in so interpreting the Constitution as to ensure implementation of the Directives was recognized since the Courts also form part of the State as defined in Art. 36 r/w Art. 12 of the Constitution. 
After Kesavananda Bharati, certain broad propositions are laid down by the Supreme Court and it was recognised that there is no disharmony between the Directive Principles and the Fundamental Rights.[8] Both are supplement to each other[9] in aiming at the same goal of bringing out a social revolution and the establishment of a welfare state.
The decision taken in Kesavananda Bharti paved the way for liberal interpretations of the Fundamental Rights and gave the Directives, the status of Fundamental Rights.
Especiallly, the liberal interpretations given to Art.21 in and after the decision of Menaka Gandhi Vs. Union of India[10] explores ways to implement the directive principles on par with the Fundamental Rights by giving to those directives the status of Fundamental Rights.
In Menaka Gandhi Vs. Union of India[11] it was held that the right to live is not merely continuous physical existence but it includes within its ambit the 'right to live with human dignity'.
In Francis Coralie Vs. Union Territory of Delhi[12], the Supreme Court held that right to live is not restricted to mere animal existence. It means something
more than just physical survival. The right to live is not continued to be the protection of any faculty or limb through which life is enjoyed or the soul communicates with the outside world. But it also includes the rights to live with human dignity and all that goes along with it, namely, the bare necessities of life such as 'adequate nutrition', 'clothing and shelter' and facilities for reading, writing and expressing ourselves in diverse forms, freely moving about and mixing and communicating with fellow human being and thereby gives effect to the directives given under Art.47 wherein the state was directed to raise the level of nutrition and the standard of living.
In Peoples Union for Democratic Rights Vs. Union of India[13] it was held that the non payment of minimum wages to the workers employed in various Asiad Projects in Delhi was a denial to them of their right to live with basic human dignity.
In Olga Tellis Vs. Bombay Municipal Corporation[14], by considering Art.39 (a) and 41, it extended the meaning of 'life' in Art. 21 and held that it includes 'right to livelihood' also.
In Chemeli Singh Vs. State of U.P[15], it was held that right to shelter is a Fundamental Right under Art.21. Right to live guaranteed in any civilised society implies right to food, water, decent environment, education, medical care and shelter. All Civil, Political, Social and Cultural rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and conventions or under the Constitution of India cannot be exercised without the basic human rights. Shelter for human being therefore is not a mere protection of his life and limb. Right to shelter therefore includes adequate living space, safe and decent structure, clean and decent
surroundings, sufficient light, pure air and water, electricity, sanitation and other civic amenities like roads etc.,
By the above said decisions the State's liability to provide for adequate means of livelihood, to raise the level of nutrition and the standard of living under directives 39(a) and 47 are made Fundamental Rights under Art.21. The directive issued to the State under Art.51 to respect the international law and treaties was also recognized.
In Paramananda Katara Vs. Union of India[16], the professional obligation is casted upon all doctors whether private or Government to extend medical aid to the injured immediately to preserve life without waiting for legal formalities.
In Paschim Bang Khat Mazdoor Samit Vs. State of West Bengal[17] denial of medical aid by government hospital to an injured person on the ground of non availability of beds amounted to violation of Art.21.
In Consumer Education and Research centre Vs. Union of India[18], Right to health and medical care is a Fundamental Right under Art. 21 as it is essential for making the life to the workman meaningful and purposeful with dignity of person. Right to life includes right to livelihood, better standard of life, hygienic conditions in workplace and leisure. The Supreme Court went one step further and laid down guidelines to be followed by all asbestos industries either private or government by virtue of Art.42.
Further in Kirloskar Brothers Ltd., Vs. Employees State Insurance Corporation[19] and In State of Punjab Vs. Mohinder Singh Chowla[20], it was held
that the right to health is a fundamental right of a workmen and 'the amount spent towards treatment has to be reimbursed'[21].
In Neeraja Chowdari Vs. State of M.P[22], it was held that it is not enough merely to identify and release the bonded labour and they should have been suitably rehabilitated.       
In Vincent Parikurlangara Vs. Union of India[23], the Right to maintenance and improvement of Public Health is included in the right to live with human dignity.
By the above decisions the directives under Arts. 39 (e), 42 & 47 were given the status of Fundamental Right under Art.21.
In Subhas Kumar Vs. State of Bihar[24], and in the series of cases filed by the public spirited lawyer M.C. Mehta (which will be dealt later) it was held that the Right to live includes right to get pollution free environment, water and air and thereby Art.48A was given the status of Fundamental Right.
In M.H. Hoskot Vs. State of Maharashtra[25], applying Art. 39A it was held that free legal aid is the duty of the state.
In Hussainara Khatoon (No.1) Vs. Home Secretary, State of Bihar[26] and also in Kadra Panadiya Vs. State of Bihar[27], right to speedy trial is declared as Fundamental Right under Art.21.
Even before the insertion of Art. 21- A by the 93rd Amendment Act, in Mohini Jain Vs. State of Karnataka[28] and following the said judgement in Unni Krishnan P.J Vs. State of A.P[29] also the right to education is recognised as Fundamental Right under Art.21
In Sameer Vs. State[30], the Supreme Court emphasized that it is the duty of the state under this directives (Art. 41) not only to establish educational institutions but also effectively secure right to education by admitting students to the seats available at such institutions and the states action must conform to the standard of equality and rationality underlying Art.14. 
            Similarly, the directive under Art. 39(d) viz., equal pay for equal work for both men and women read together with the equality clauses enshrined under Arts.14 to 16 and was given effect to. In Randhir Singh Vs. Union of India[31] the Supreme Court has held that the principle of "Equal pay for equal work" though not a fundamental right is certainly a constitutional goal and, therefore, capable of enforcement and also in D.S. Nakara v. Union of India[32] the same was reaffirmed.
In a latest judgment, Union of India v. Dineshan K.K.[33] the Supreme Court has extended the benefits of same rank and pay structure to a Radio Mechanic in Assam Rifle as was given to other Central Paramilitary Forces.
In State of Kerala Versus B. Renjith Kumar & Others[34], it was held that the claim of the Presiding Officers of the Industrial Tribunals’ for equal scale of pay to that of the District Judges was upheld by considering the nature of functions or duties attached to those categories of posts.
            In Daily Casual Labour Employees and P & T Dept., Vs. Union of India[35], Right to work is declared as fundamental right under Art. 21 and further it was held that the job security is an ingredient of the 'right to work' read in the light of the Philosophy of socio- economic policy. Hence, the Court would see that the Government does not employ casual labour and then to terminate their services after a fairly long time taking advantage of technical rules. In such a case, the court could issue a direction to the Government to regularise such casual employees.
            Further, the considerable change in the traditional rule of 'locus standi' (a place to stand) i.e the person who is aggrieved only can approach the Court for redressal and the recognition of 'pro bono publico' (Public Interest Litigation) though with limitations further facilitates the courts to formulate various guidelines in order to render complete justice, to recognise class/group rights and to implement or to give effect to the Directive Principles, which is not normally available in ordinary litigation.
            In S.P Gupta Vs. President of India and others[36], the independence of judiciary against all the executive actions is emphasized.    
            In Bandhu Mukti Morcha Vs. Union of India[37], a letter written by the petitioner organisation is treated as a public interest litigation and the Court appointed a Commission to find out the inhuman and intolerable conditions of the many of the bonded workers and held that where a public interest litigation alleging the existence of bonded labourers is filed it is not proper on the part of the
government to raise preliminary objection. On the contrary, the Government should welcome an enquiry by the Court so that if it is found that there are bonded labourers or workers living in inhuman condition such a situation can be set right by the Government.
            In Sunil Batra Vs. Delhi Administration, it was held that the writ of habeas corpus can be not only for releasing a person from illegal detention but also for protecting prisoners from inhuman treatment.
In Lakshmi Kant Pandey Vs. Union of India[38], the Supreme Court has laid down principles and norms which should be followed in determining whether a child should be allowed to be adopted by foreign parents. With the object of ensuring the welfare of the child, the Supreme Court has directed the Government and various agencies dealing with the matter to follow these prinicples in such cases as it is their constitutional obligations under Art.15(3) and 39(c) and (f) to ensure the welfare of the child.
            In M.C. Mehta Vs. State of Tamil Nadu[39]   it was held that the children cannot be employed in match factories or fire works which are directly connected with the manufacturing process as it is hazardous to their health. The Supreme Court has laid down many guidelines for the rehabilitation of children working in those industries.
            In Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra Vs. State of U.P[40], the Court ordered the closure of certain lime stone quarries those who caused large scale pollution adversely affecting the safety and health of the public living in the area on the ground that there were serious deficiencies regarding safety and hazards in them.
In M.C. Metha Vs. Union of India (Shriram Food and Fertilizer case)[41] the Supreme Court ordered the closure of the units manufacturing hazardous and lethal chemicals and gases posing danger to health and life of workmen and people living in its neighbourhood and directed the Companies to take all necessary safety measures before reopening the plant.
In M.C. Metha Vs. Union of India[42], (Ganga Pollution case) the Supreme Court ordered the closure of tanneries at Jajmau near Kanpur, polluting the Ganga unless they took steps to set up treatment plants.
            In M.C. Mehta Vs. Union of India[43], (Pollution of Taj Mahal Case), the Supreme Court has directed the industries in Taj Trapezium Zone to change over to natural gas as industrial fuel and if they could not do so they must stop functioning and to relocate the same to out side the Taj Tarpezium Zone. The court has further given guidelines to safeguard the interests of the worker worked in relocated units.
            In M.C. Mehta Vs Union of India[44] directions to take steps to prevent destruction or damage to the environment Flora and Fauna and wild life were issued in view of Art.48A
            In Animal and Environment Legal Defence Fund Vs Union of India[45], the directions were issued to construct a boundary wall around a test firing range in order to prevent the probable damages to be caused to the animals in view of Art.48A.
            The above said proposition was further extended in M.C Mehta Vs Union of India and directions were issued to set up a barbed wire fencing in order to prevent cutting down numerous trees which would cause an ecological disaster in view of Art.48A & 49.
Applying the doctrine of 'harmonious construction' the court has applied the Directives to adjust the ambit of Fundamental Rights to give a liberal interpretation to the ambit of a legislative entry so as to make it possible for the legislature to implement a Directive[46].
Per Instance.
In Art.14.
i)       a favourable classification of an object, the promotion of which is encouraged by the directive principles, should be regarded as a reasonable classification.
ii)    applying Art.39(d) it has been held that the right to "equal pay for equal work" as between the sexes or within the same age sex is a fundamental right included in Art 14. In determining whether the work done is similar, the court should take a broad view and also strike down any discrimination made on the ground of sex in view of Art.39 (a),(d)[47]
In Article 19:
i)       Restrictions which are imposed on the exercise of Fundamental Rights for the purpose of securing the objectives enjoined by any of the Directives would be regarded as reasonable restriction when the meaning of cl (2) of
Art.19 because the Directive Principles embody the ideal of socio – e conomic justice as assured in the Preamble.
ii) Even though the implementation of a Directive Principles may cause hardship to a few individuals, it should be upheld in the larger interests of the community.
iii) In view of the absolute prohibition of consumption of liquor in Art.47,    there cannot be any fundamental right to manufacture and sell intoxicating liquor.[48]
iv)   Art. 19(6) has been interpreted with the aid of Art. 46 and held that a ban imposed by the State of Kerala in fishing by mechanized nets and appliances is a reasonable restriction. The Supreme Court emphasized that the protection of the weaker sections is an obligation under Art. 46 and is also in the interests of general public under Art. 19 (6).[49]
v)      The prohibition of slaughter of any of the species of Cattle mentioned, irrespective of their utility from the stand point of agriculture or animal husbandry and such prohibitions cannot be held to be an unreasonable restriction upon the right conferred by art.19(1)(g) in view of the directive contained in the latter part of the article 48.[50]
In Art. 26
Even though a contravention of Art.26 is not expressly shielded by Art.31-A, it has been held that Art.37 imposes an obligation upon the State to make laws to regulate the conduct of men and State affairs in order to secure social welfare, including secular activities of religious institutions,
so long as the core of religion is not interfered with. There is no such interference, when the state undertakes legislation for agrarian reforms to prevent exploitation of tenants and cultivators or ownership of large areas of land exceeding the ceiling fixed by land even though the ownership of such estates belongs to religious institutions[51].                           
Provisions in part IV have also been used as guide in matter of statutory construction[52] including subordinate legislation[53]
1)        Where two statutory constructions of a statute are available, the court should prefer that construction which is in conformity with the directives say Art.39 or 43[54].
(i) a beneficial construction of S.127(3) of Cr.P.C has been made with reference to Art. 41[55]
(ii) the scope of S.13B of the Industrial Employment Standing Orders, 1946 has been extended to employees of Statutory Corporations, in the light of Arts. 42-43[56].
2)        In view of Art. 36 & 37, Art. 41 is held to be a mandate both to legislature and the Courts, the Court should interpret a statute or sub ordinate legislation, if the language permits or will advance the objectives underlying Art.41.[57]
3)        Art.46 has been relied upon in upholding a Service Rule which empowers the Government to exempt (for a specified period) members of S.Cs or S.Ts from the requirement to pass departmental tests for promotion[58].
4)        The maternity leave entitled to women in regular employment under the provisions of the Maternity Benefit act,1961 has been extended to the women engaged on casual basis or on muster roll basis on daily wages in view of Art. 38.[59]
5)        The Supreme Court further held that Courts should have regard to the Directive in Art. 38 to promote welfare of the people and social justice so that where the municipality has failed to remove filthy conditions of drains etc., in slums. The Court should make a positive and mandatory order directing the municipality to remove the public nuisance within a given time irrespective of the financial sources of the municipality[60].
6)        The Supreme Court deprecated the unfair labour practice of engaging contract labourers in public sector undertakings and made appropriate recommendations in Gujarat Electricity Board, Vs. Hind Mazdoor Sabha[61].
7)        The Supreme Court has held that the Tenants/ the tillers of soil have a fundamental right to economic empowerment under Art. 39 (b) and are entitled to ryotwari patta[62].
8)        The nationalization of coal mines is upheld on the ground that it is a law for implementation of Art. 39(b)[63]
9)        The children of prostitutes have right to equality of opportunity, dignity, care, protection and rehabilitation so as to be a part of the main stream of social life without any of the stigma attached to them in view of Clause (e-f) of Art.39.[64]
10)      In view of Art.41, the Court should not encourage a Transport corporation to indulge in false or technical pleas to defeat claims for compensation for injury caused by public carriers belonging to such Corporation leading to disablement and cases of undeserved want.
11)      In view of directives under Art.41, the Supreme Court has held that the President cannot exercise his power under Rule 9 of the Civil Services Pension Rules 1972 to withhold Pension of a retired employee, even in part or for a temporary period in the absence of definite finding recorded in a departmental or judicial proceeding that the pensioner committed grave misconduct or negligence in the discharge of his duty while in office.[65]
12)      In Tapan Kumar Sadhukhan Vs. Food Corporation of India[66]. It was held that the Food Corporation of India, being an agency of the State must conform the letter and sprit of Art. 47 to improve public health and it should release sub standard rice to dealers only after upgrading it for human consumption and not otherwise.
13)      The need for Uniform Civil Code was also emphasized by the Supreme Court in matters like divorce[67] or maintenance for divorced wife[68] which do not form the essence of any religion. The Supreme Court has observed that Art. 44 has so long remained a dead letter and recommended early legislation to implement
it[69]. Further In Sarla Mudgal Vs Union of India[70], the Supreme Court expressed its views and requested the Government of India through Prime Minister to hove a fresh look at Art.44 and endeavor to secure for the citizens a uniform civil code throughout the territory of India. In the said Judgement the Supreme Court opined that there is no connection between religion and personal law in a civilized society.
14)      In view of Art. 50, it was held that the Independence of judiciary is an essential attribute of Rule of Law which is a basic feature of the Constitution. Judiciary must be free not only from the executive pressure but also from other pressures. Independence of Judiciary is a wider concept which implies independence from any pressure or prejudice and fearlessness from any center of power.
15)      In view of Art.51, the Supreme Court recognised the practice of interpreting the laws with the aid of International treaties/covenants, Further, in the absence of any contrary legislation, Municipal Courts in India would respect the rule of international law.
16)      In Peoples Union for Civil Liberties Vs. Union of India it was held that the provisions of international conventions, covenants which elucidate and effectuate the Fundamental Rights can be relied upon the Courts in India as their facets and be enforced as such.
17)      In Vishaka Vs. State of Rajasthan[71], the Supreme Court laid down exhaustive guidelines to prevent sexual harassment of working women in places of their work until a legislation is enacted for its purpose taking the Convention on all forms of discrimination against Women (CEDAW) as its basis.
In appropriate cases, even though the Directives per se cannot be enforced by the Court nor can the Court compel the State to undertake legislation to implement a Directive, the Supreme Court has been issuing various direction to the Government and administrative authorities to take positive action to remove the grievances which have been caused by non implementation of the Directives.
The directives are thus enforced, indirectly, by the Courts by issuing such directions as follows:
1.         To issue a notification under the minimum wages Act for the benefit of bonded and other exploited labourers.[72]
2.         To set up a joint committee of the Union of India and a State Government concerned as a machinery to supervise and ensure that the poor and needy employees are not exploited by unscrupulous contractors in imposing terms violative of the Directives under Art 38, 41, 42, 43 and or the various provisions of the labour laws.[73]
3.         To take various steps for extending the benefit of Art.39-A, to all under trial prisoners.[74]
4.         To lay down procedural safeguards in the matter of adoption of Indian children by foreigners in view of Art.39(3)[75].
5.         To lay down detailed guidelines for Speedy trial in order to render equal justice in view of Art.39A.[76]
6.         To lay down guidelines for trial of rape cases[77]
7.         To lay down exhaustive guidelines to prevent sexual harassment of working women in places of their work in view of Art.14 and Art.21 & 39 (e) to (f)[78]
8.         To lay down guidelines to prevent air, water and environmental pollution[79]
9.         To arrange free legal aid to the poor and needy[80]
10.       To protection of monuments and places and objects of national importance[81]
11.       To remove the impugned provisions of an act to restore independence of judiciary[82]
Further, two new Chapters i.e IX consisting of 16 Articles , IX-A consisting of 18 Arts, and two new Schedules Elevan and Twelve were added to the Constitution by 73rd & 74th Amendment in order to give effect to the Directives under Art. 40. Hence, it can be executed through Courts like any other constitutional rights though it is not a fundamental right.
Further, in view of the insertion of a New Art. 21-A, by the 93rd Amendment Act, providing free and compulsory education to all children of age 6 to 14 is declared as Fundamental Right in order to implement one of the directives under Art.45   
The above study lead to the following findings that
1. Part IV of the Constitution which deals about Directive Principles of State Policy have imposed duty upon the legislature to implement the directives while making laws in order to render social, economic and political justice to its citizen as declared in the preamble to the Constitution. The directives are declared as fundamental principles to be followed by the State in the governance of the Country.
2. At the same time, Part III of the Constitution guarantees Fundamental Rights to the citizens and the power of Judicial Review expressly made available with the higher judiciary to protect it from any infringement by State's action. In order to protect the sacrosanctity of the Fundamental Rights, all the Pre Constitutional laws that were inconsistent with the Fundamental Rights were declared void and the State is also further restrained from making any law infringing the fundamental right or taking away the fundamental rights.
3. In the said position, if the Parliament or State legislatures enacts any law inconsistent with the Fundamental Rights, the said law is liable to be declared as 'Unconstitutional' by the Courts even if the said Act was enacted with an intention to give effect to the directive principles since the Courts initially were of the view that the Fundamental Rights are so sacrosanct and the Directive Principles of State Policy have to conform and to run as subsidiary to the Fundamental rights.
4. Hence, the Parliament was left with no other option except to amend the Constitution in order to remove the difficulty in implementing the directive principles. When the said amendments were challenged before the Courts initially, the Courts held that the term 'law' in Art.13 did not include a law made by Parliament under Art.368 of the Constitution of India.
5. However, by the decision of the Supreme Court in Golaknath Vs. State of Punjab, the Amending Acts also met with the same fate of the ordinary legislation since the Supreme Court has given wide interpretation to the word 'law' in Art. 13, which include every branch of law either Statutory or Constitutional. 
6. In order to remove the difficulty caused by the said decisions in implementing the Directive Principles, the Parliament enacted 24th Amendment Act and thereby made it clear that the word 'law' in Art.13 shall not include an amendment made to the Constitution under Art.368.
7. The said amendment was challenged before the Supreme Court in Kesavanada Bharti Case and for the first time the Court's responsibility in so interpreting the Constitution as to ensure implementation of the directives was recognized since the courts also form part of the State as defined under Art.36 r/w. Art.12. The Supreme Court further opines that Parliament is competent to amend the Constitution to over ride or abrogate any of the Fundamental Rights in order to enable the State to implement the Directives so long as the basic structure of the Constitution is not affected.
8. The Courts approach towards the Directive Principles has considerably changed after Kesavananda Bharati case and now the Courts are also bound to implement the directives in view of Art.36 read with Art.12.
9.         The Court has given many of the Directives the status of Fundamental Right/ other Constitutional or Statutory rights, by giving wide possible interpretations to the Fundamental Rights or any other Constitutional or Statutory rights in the light of the Directive Principles.
10. The liberal attitude of the Courts in enforcing the Group/Class rights through 'Pro bono publico' proceedings also facilitates the above endeavour.
11. Furthermore, the Courts, in many occasions, in appropriate cases, issued many directions/guidelines and laid down policies to give effect to the directive principles either directly or indirectly in order to remove the grievances which have been caused by non implementation of the Directives.
12.       The Amendments made to the Constitution in order to implement the Directive Principles also encourage the Courts to enforce those directives as any other Constitutional Rights though it is not a Fundamental Right.

In view of the above discussions and findings, we can conclude that almost all the Directives have now become executable by the Courts except a few despite the express bar under Art.37. Let us hope for the implementation of the non - implemented directive principles also in the near future.

[1]   Mangru Vs. Commissioner of Budge Budge (1951) 87 CLJ 369
[2]   UPSE Board Vs. Harishankar Jain AIR 1979 SC 65
[3] AIR 1951 SC 228
[4] AIR 1951 SC 458
[5] AIR1965 SC 845
[6] AIR 1967 SC 1643
[7] AIR 1973 SC1461
[8] Minerva Mills Vs. Union of India AIR 1980 SC 1789
[9] Chandra Bhawan Boarding Vs. State of Mysore AIR 1970 SC 2042; State of Kerala Vs. Thomas AIR 1976 SC 490
[10] AIR 1978 SC 594, 597
[11] AIR 1978 SC 594, 597
[12] AIR 1981 SC 746
[13] AIR 1982 SC 1473
[14] AIR 1986 SC 180
[15] 1996(2) SCC 549
[16] AIR 1989 SC 2039
[17] (1996) 4 SCC 37
[18] (1995) 3 SCC 42
[19] (1996)2 SCC 682
[20] AIR 1997 SC 1225
[21] Ibid
[22] AIR 1980 SC 470
[23] (1987) 2 SCC 165
[24] AIR1991SC 420
[25] AIR1978 SC 1548
[26] AIR1979 SC 1360
[27] AIR 1982 SC 1167
[28] (1992) 3 SCC 666
[29] (1993) 4 SCC 111
[30] AIR 1982 SC 66
[31] AIR 1982 SC 879
[32] (1983) 1 SCC 305
[33](2008) 1 SCC 586
[34]CDJ 2008 SC 1101
[35] AIR 1987 SC 2342
[36] AIR 1982 SC 149
[37] AIR 1984 SC 803
[38] (1984) 2 SCC 244
[39] AIR 1991 SC 417
[40] (1985) 2 SCC 431
[41] (1986) 2 SCC 176
[42] (1987) 4 SCC 463
[43] AIR 1997 SC 735
[44] (1992) Supp (2) SCC 948
[45] AIR 1997 SC 1071
[46] Jagannath L Vs. LRO Madurai AIR 1972 SC 425; Asst. Commissioner Vs. B&C Co AIR 1970 SC 169
[47] Mackinon Mackenzie and Co. Ltd Vs. Andry D'costa AIR 1987 SC 1281
[48] Nashirwar Vs St of M.P AIR 1975 SC 360; Razakbai Issukbai Mansuri Vs. St of Gujarat 19993 Supp (2) SCC 659
[49] State of Kerala Vs. Joseph Antony AIR 1994 SC 721
[50] Hanif Quareshi Mohd. Vs. State of Bihar AIR 1958 SC 731
[51] Narendra Prasadji Anand Prasadji Maharaj Vs. St of Gujarat AIR 1974 SC 2008
[52] UPSE Board Vs. Harishankar Jain AIR 1979 SC 65
[53] Ct Balwant Raj Vs U.O.I AIR 1968 ALL 14
[54] Mumbai Kamgar Sabha Vs. Abdul Bhai; AIR 1976 SC 1455, Ramesh Chandra Kaushal Capt Vs Veena Kaushal AIR 1978 SC 1807; N.T. Corpn. Vs Sitaram Mills Ltd AIR 1986 SC 1234
[55] Bai Tahisa Vs. Ali Hassein Fissali Chotia AIR 1979 SC 362
[56] UPSE Board Vs. Harishankar Jain AIR 1979 SC 65
[57] Daily Casual Labour Employees and P & T Dept., Vs. Union of India AIR 1987 SC 2342; Jacob Vs. Kerala Water Authority AIR 1990 SC 2228
[58] State of Kerala Vs. Thomas AIR 1976 SC 490
[59] Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs. Female Workers ( Muster Roll) AIR 2000 SC 1274
[60] Ratlam Municipal Counsil Vs. Vardhichand AIR 1980 SC 1622
[61] AIR 1995 SC 1893
[62] State of T.N. Vs Sri Ambalavana Pandara Samadhi Adheenakartha, (1997) 9 SCC 313
[63] Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Co., Vs Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. AIR 1983 SC 239
[64] Gaurav Jain Vs. Union of India (1997) 8 SCC 114
[65] Kapoor Vs. Union of India AIR 1990 SC 1923
[66] (1996) 6 SC 101.
[67] Jordan Diengdeh Vs. Chopra SS AIR 1985 SC 935
[68] Ahmed Khan Mohd. Vs. Shah Banu Begum AIR 1985 SC 945
[69] Supra 65 & 66
[70] AIR 1995 SC 1531 See also in Lilly Thomas Vs. Union of India AIR 2000 SC 1650
[71] AIR 1997 SC 3011
[72] Mukesh Advani Vs. State of M.P AIR 1985 SC 1363; Bandhua Mukti Morcha Vs. Union of India AIR 1984 SC 802
[73] Ibid
[74] Sheela Barse Vs. State of Maharashtra AIR 1983 SC 378
[75] Laxmi Kant Panddy Vs. Union of India AIR 1987 SC 232
[76] Abdul Rahman Antuley Vs. R.S. Nayak AIR 1992 SC 1630
[77] Delhi Domestic Working Women's Forum Vs. Union of India (1995)1 SCC 14
[78] Vishaka Vs. State of Rajasthan AIR1997 SC 3011
[79] M.C. Mehta Vs. Union of India (1986) 2 SCC 176; (1987) 4 SCC 463; AIR 1997 SC 735
[80] Bajiban Salambhai Chauhan Vs. UPSRTC (1990) Supp SCC 769
[81] M.C. Mehta Vs. Union of India AIR 1997 SC 735
[82] Pareena Swarup Vs. Union of India 2009 AIR SCW 206

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