Guidelines on TIP by Supreme Court

Index

1. Introduction: A Judgment Rooted in Procedural Rectitude
2. The Factual Matrix: A Mosque, a Staircase, and an Alleged Assault
3. The Trial Court’s Reasoning: From Riot to Conviction
4. The Core Issue of Identification: When Procedure Determines Truth
5. Supreme Court Precedent on Test Identification Parades
6. A Case Marred by Investigative Shortcomings
7. The Missing Government Witnesses and Their Impact
8. Medical Evidence Without a Doctor: A Failure to Prove Injury
9. Section 149 IPC: Group Liability Cannot Be Built on Vague Attribution
10. Final Holding and Relief: A Clean Acquittal Based on Multiple Grounds
11. Conclusion: A Doctrinally Rich Reminder That Procedure Is Substance

Synopsis

This article critically examines the Himachal Pradesh High Court’s judgment in Liyakat Ali &Ors. v. State of Himachal Pradesh, wherein the Court overturned the convictions of thirteen individuals previously sentenced under riot-related charges. At the heart of the case was the failure of the police to conduct a Test Identification Parade (TIP) despite the fact that many of the accused were strangers to the witnesses and unnamed in the FIR.

Through a detailed analysis of the prosecution's evidentiary gaps, contradictions in testimony,absence of independent witnesses, and non-examination of key medical and government officers, the Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt.The ruling heavily relied on Supreme Court precedent, particularly Dana Yadav v. State of Bihar (AIR 2002 SC 3325), and reaffirmed that procedural safeguards like TIP are indispensable when identity is contested. This article unpacks the full legal reasoning,paragraph-specific holdings, and the constitutional implications of the verdict, particularly in the context of Section 149 IPC and the presumption of innocence.

Introduction

In a comprehensive and strongly reasoned order, the Himachal Pradesh High Court in Liyakat Ali & Ors v. State of Himachal Pradesh , dated 20 June 2025, granted thirteen inter-related criminal appeals and quashed the conviction of all appellants earlier convicted under Sections 147, 333, 332, 353, and 506(II) read with Section 149 IPC. This decision is legally noteworthy not only for the acquittal it achieves but also for the doctrinal clarity that it reaffirms: that where cases are predicated on conflicting identity, the omission to hold a Test Identification Parade (TIP) amounts to a substantive evidentiary deficit.

Justice Sushil Kukreja, who wrote the ruling, put the judgment in the familiar tryst of criminal law principles set down by the Supreme Court in Dana Yadav @ Dahu v. State of Bihar and other precedents, while at the same time uncovering glaring investigative loopholes, discrepancies in prosecution witness statements, and breakdowns in medical confirmation. The judgment runs from paragraphs 1 to 25, with holdings of substance worked out between paragraphs 14 and 24.

The Incident and Trial

The controversy had begun with an altercation on 8 April 2008, when Wakf Board officials such as Rent Controller Kutub Deen, Naib Tehsildar G.M. Saklani, and Kanungo Mohan Singh, went into Kutub Masjid in Shimla to shut down a staircase pursuant to a written order dated 08.04.2008. According to the prosecution account given in paragraph 2(a) of the judgment, the accused Liyakat Ali and his accomplices, who were said to be acting in a mob-like way, forcibly resisted the shutdown.

The FIR under Section 154 CrPC that was registered in the beginning mentioned only five individuals viz. Liyakat Ali, Shah Nawaz, Saleem, Mohsin, and one Tunnu—while the others were termed as unknown assailants. However, in court, the list of accused somehow grew to encompass a few additional people, whose names never came up in the initial complaint or at police investigation.

Even with this increase in the number of accused, the police never carried out a Test Identification Parade. Rather, the witnesses identified the accused for the first time in open court long after the occurrence, and without any procedural device to rule out mistaken identity. The Fast Track Court, by its order dated 30.03.2010, held all thirteen persons guilty under various charges and awarded prison terms, including two years under Section 333 IPC read with Section 149 IPC (para 4).

Major Judicial Conclusion

Paragraph 14 of the High Court explicitly tackled the pivotal deficiency in the case of the prosecution: that the majority of accused persons were not mentioned by name in the FIR, and that no test identification parade had been conducted.

The complainant PW-1 conceded in cross-examination that he was able to mention only a few of the accused from memory and that he picked many accused for the first time in the court (para 14). The Court reasoned that this lapse was not trivial but struck at the root, since it made the very foundation of the charge made by the prosecution—group culpability under Section 149 IPC—evidentially uncertain.

Firmly based on such analysis, the Court quoted the Supreme Court's path-breaking judgment in Dana Yadav @ Dahu v. State of Bihar where it had categorically held that omission to carry out a TIP, particularly where the accused were unknown to the witnesses, undermines the probative value of in-court identification. Paragraph 38 of Dana Yadav sets out the principle in seven holdings, most applicable being clause (e), which states: "Ordinarily identification of an accused by a witness for the first time in court should not form the basis of conviction. unless it is corroborated by previous identification in the test identification parade or any other evidence."

Justice Kukreja applied this rule meticulously and observed that the prosecution’s inability to explain why TIP was not conducted fatally weakened the value of the courtroom identifications. In paragraph 15, the Court wrote: “In these circumstances, test identification parade was necessary in order to ascertain the identity of the accused persons. Failure to determine the identity of the accused goes to the substance of the issue, and mistaken identity cannot be excluded.

Supreme Court Precedent Applied: Identification in Court Must Be Preceded by Prior Verification

The High Court's use of Dana Yadav was not superficial; it included a blow-by-blow replication of the Supreme Court's directives in para 16 of the judgment. It referred to clause (f) of Dana Yadav, which states: "In exceptional circumstances only… evidence of identification for the first time in court, without the same being corroborated by previous identification in the test identification parade or any other evidence, can form the basis of conviction."

The Court held that no exceptional circumstances existed in Liyakat Ali, and therefore, the finding of the trial court sentencing people on the basis of in-court identification alone remained untenable.

This invocation of precedent is essential because it reconciles appellate analysis with binding Supreme Court precedent, rather than delving into speculative reinterpretations. It also serves a greater jurisprudential function: that procedural failures in criminal trials, particularly those concerning liberty, cannot be glossed over by in-court theatrics or witness recall years down the line.

Contradictions, Failure to Examine Witnesses, and Medical Gaps

Aside from the issue of identity, the Court noted glaring inconsistencies in the testimonies of PW-1, PW-2, and PW-3. For instance, whereas PW-2 testified that G.M. Saklani and Mohan were beaten, PW 3 contradicted him on oath (para 20). Likewise, the testimony of whether or not the Imam had been pushed, thrown, or slapped differed widely among witnesses (paras 10–12), and none of these were verified by independent eyewitnesses in an area where the occurrence happened in a public crowd.

The High Court was especially critical of the prosecution for not questioning Naib Tehsildar Saklani and Kanungo Mohan Singh, who happened to be on the scene. Their evidence, the Court held in para 22, could have conclusively substantiated or repudiated the occurrences.

The conscious failure to examine these crucial witnesses warranted a negative inference under Section 114(g) of the Indian Evidence Act, and the Court observed that "the prosecution deliberately and intentionally did not examine [them]. for reasons best known to it."

The other serious failure was not to cross-examine Dr. Rohit Sood, who had carried out the medical examination of the wounded. Rather, the prosecution used the services of a radiologist, Dr. Vijay Thakur (PW-6), who did not have any direct contact with the wounded and had only interpreted an X-ray.

The Court relied on LIC v. Rampal Singh Bisen, where the Supreme Court had ruled (para 25) that "admission of a document in evidence does not amount to its proof." The High Court then held in paragraph 19 that "the contents of the medico-legal certificates are not stated to have been proved in accordance with law."

Section 149 IPC: Collective Liability Cannot Be Constructed On Vague Attribution

The High Court also examined the use of Section 149 IPC. It pointed out that although the FIR and statements indicated a collective assault, the prosecution had not produced any evidence to demonstrate that all the accused were members of the unlawful assembly with a common purpose. Most of the accused were not named in the FIR, not identified in TIPs, and were not given individual roles.

In paragraph 17, the Court noted that "obviously it was the responsibility of the prosecution to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt by establishing evidence of identification…Admittedly, no identification parade was obtained conducted… and no credible evidence was obtained… Hence, by failing to hold the test identification parade, there is a serious failure in the investigation."

This ruling supports the settled principle that the liability under Section 149 demands more than mere presence; it demands evidence of common object, participation, or at least, cogent evidence of association. In its absence, the vicarious criminal liability under Section 149 cannot be attracted.

Final Holding and Relief

Finally, the Court encapsulated its conclusions in paragraph 24, holding that "the prosecution has failed to prove its case against the accused persons beyond reasonable doubt." It found the conviction of the trial court to be unsustainable and quashed the judgment in its entirety.In light of Section 481 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, the Court instructed the appellants to provide personal bonds of ₹50,000 each for a period of six months, in the event of the State filing an SLP (para 25).

Conclusion

The High Court’s judgment in Liyakat Ali is not merely a curative verdict; it is an essential doctrinal restatement. It reiterates that TIP is not a dispensable formality but a critical procedural safeguard in cases where identification is disputed.

It places emphasis on Supreme Court precedent with paragraph-level precision, integrates evidentiary rules with constitutional values, and demands prosecutorial diligence at every stage. By engaging with the factual contradictions, the unexplained non-examination of crucial witnesses, and the evidentiary gaps in medical proof, the Court applied criminal law as it should be: not in pursuit of numbers or appearances, but in service of truth, fairness, and constitutional liberty.

In a climate where procedural shortcuts are increasingly rationalised in the name of efficiency, this judgment affirms a foundational truth: in criminal law, procedure is not a technicality. It is the pathway to justice.

FAQs

Q1. What is the central holding of the Himachal Pradesh High Court in Liyakat Ali v.State of Himachal Pradesh (2025)?

The Court held that the failure to conduct a Test Identification Parade, where many accused were not named in the FIR and were strangers to the witnesses, made in-court identifications unreliable. Consequently, the prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt,resulting in the acquittal of all appellants (see paras 14–17 of the judgment).

Q2. Why was Section 149 IPC held to be inapplicable in this case?

The Court found that no specific evidence was led to show that all accused shared a common object or participated collectively. The vague attribution of group conduct without specific roles or corroboration failed the evidentiary threshold required under Section 149 IPC (see para 17).

Q3. What was the significance of Dana Yadav v. State of Bihar in this judgment?

The Court cited Dana Yadav (AIR 2002 SC 3325) at length, especially para 38, to establish that TIP is essential when identification is in doubt. The Himachal Pradesh High Court aligned its reasoning with the Supreme Court’s holding that dock identification without prior TIP is inherently weak unless exceptional circumstances exist (see para 16 of the judgment).

Q4. What evidentiary lapses weakened the prosecution’s case?

Key lapses included the absence of TIP, contradictions among PW-1, PW-2, and PW-3,failure to examine neutral witnesses and government officers like the Naib Tehsildar, and the non-examination of the doctor who conducted medical tests. The Court discussed these issues across paras 14 to 22.

Q5. What procedural direction was given under the new Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023?

Though the accused were acquitted, the Court directed them to furnish personal bonds of ₹50,000 each for six months under Section 481 of BNSS, 2023, in case the State files a Special Leave Petition (para 25).