Right of Residence in Shared Household: DV act, 2005

Introduction:

In societies worldwide, domestic violence stands as an issue that casts a shadow over the well-being of individuals and the progress of communities. It can be defined as a pattern of ‘abusive behaviour within intimate relationships’. Our constitution serves as a guardian, protecting our individual rights. Beyond individual suffering, the societal impact of domestic violence undermines the foundations of a healthy and thriving community. This article delves into the legal provisions in India aimed at combating domestic violence, shedding light on the rights of victims and the statutory relief that the victims can ask for .

Scope :

Domestic violence refers to one person seeking to gain power and control over another through physical, emotional, sexual, verbal, or economic means. In India, matters related to domestic violence are governed by the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. Section 3 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act provides the definition of Domestic violence, which states that “any act, omission or commission or conduct of the respondent shall constitute domestic violence in case it,

1. Harms or injures or endangers the health, safety, life, limb, or well-being, whether mental or physical, of the aggrieved person or tends to do so and includes causing physical abuse, sexual abuse, verbal and emotional abuse, and economic abuse; or
2. Harasses, harms, injures, or endangers the aggrieved person with a view to coerce her or any other person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any dowry or other property or valuable security; or
3. Has the effect of threatening the aggrieved person or any person related to her by any conduct mentioned in clauses (a) or (b); or
4. Otherwise injures or causes harm, whether physical or mental, to the aggrieved person.”

The remedies under the Domestic Violence Act of 2005 can be availed by an aggrieved person whereas the meaning of the same is mentioned under Section 2(a) of the Act. It means “any woman who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with the respondent (perpetrator) and who alleges to have been subjected to any act of domestic violence by the respondent (perpetrator).” If the woman is no longer in a relationship with the perpetrator, the remedies under the Act can still be pursued by her. 

As per Section 2(f) a “ domestic relationship” means a relationship in which two people live or have lived together in the same household. This relationship may be by consanguinity, marriage, or a relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption, or joint family.

The Domestic Violence Act, 2005 has a wide scope and applies to all women who have experienced domestic violence, regardless of their marital status. Along with this, the Act also highlights the definition of respondents or perpetrators under Section 2(q), meaning “any adult male person who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with the aggrieved person and against whom the aggrieved person has sought any relief under this Act: provided that an aggrieved wife or female living in a relationship in the nature of a marriage may also file a complaint against a relative of the husband of the male partner.” On the contrary, the Supreme Court in the Sandhya Manoj Wankhade vs. Manoj Bhimrao Wankhade & ors. Case stated that the word ‘relatives’ in Section 2(q) of the Act does not specify only male relatives. 

It observed “It is true that the expression “female” has not been used in the proviso to section 2(q) also, but, on the other hand, if the Legislature intended to exclude females from the ambit of the complaint, which can be filed by an aggrieved wife, females would have been specifically excluded, instead of it being provided in the proviso that a complaint could also be filed against a relative of the husband or the male partner. No restrictive meaning has been given to the expression “relative”, nor has the said expression been specifically defined in the Domestic Violence Act, 2005, to make it specific to males only.” The bench further ruled that “In such circumstances, it is clear that the legislature never intended to exclude female relatives of the husband or male partner from the ambit of a complaint that can be made under the provisions of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005.” 

Remedies:

The Protection of Women From Domestic Violence Act (PWDVA) 2005, has clearly outlined Five types of  statutory relief what the aggrieved person can seek which are namely Protection Order , Residence Order , Monetary Relief, Custody Order ,Compensation Order. 

Section 18: Protection Orders
According to this Section of the Act, protection is provided to the aggrieved person by prohibiting the respondent from entering the place of employment of the aggrieved person, committing any act of domestic violence, attempting to communicate either personal, oral, written, telephonic, or electronic contact with the aggrieved person, causing violence to aggrieved person’s relatives or any other known person, and committing any other act of violence. 

20: Monetary Reliefs
This section recognizes the economic aspect of domestic violence and provides for monetary relief to meet the expenses incurred by the survivor, including medical expenses, loss of earnings, and damages for mental trauma. It seeks to alleviate the financial burden and empower survivors to rebuild their lives.

Section 21: Custody Orders
It recognizes the importance of ensuring the safety and well-being of the aggrieved person (the survivor) and any children involved in cases of domestic violence. This Section empowers the court to pass custody orders in favor of the aggrieved person, granting temporary custody of the children to her if necessary. The court considers the best interests of the child while making such decisions and may impose conditions or restrictions on the visitation rights of the respondent (the accused). Section 21 aims to protect children from witnessing or experiencing further harm and to provide a safe environment for their upbringing.

Section 22: Compensation Orders
According to this Section, compensation orders are passed by the Magistrate in favor of the aggrieved person. It states that “the Magistrate may on an application being made by the aggrieved person, pass an order directing the respondent to pay compensation and damages for the injuries, including mental torture and emotional distress, caused by the acts of domestic violence committed by that respondent.”  

Section 19: Residence Orders
This section addresses the issue of a woman’s right to reside in her shared household, even if she does not have any legal ownership or title. It prohibits the eviction of the woman from her shared household and grants her the right to reside there. It also enables the Judicial Magistrate to direct the respondent “to return to the possession of the aggrieved person her ‘stridhan’ or any other property or valuable security to which she is entitled.” 

1. Restraining the Respondent:Clause (a): The respondent is restrained from dispossessing or disturbing the possession of the aggrieved person from the shared household, regardless of whether the respondent has a legal or equitable interest in the shared household.
   Example: A woman is protected from being forcibly removed from her home by her abusive spouse.
2. Removal of Respondent:Clause (b): The magistrate can direct the respondent to remove himself from the shared household.
   Example: An abusive husband is ordered to vacate the house to ensure the safety of his wife.
3. Entry Restrictions:Clause(c) : The respondent or any of his relatives are restrained from entering any portion of the shared household where the aggrieved person resides.
   Example: The respondent’s relatives cannot enter the part of the house where the aggrieved person lives, ensuring her privacy and safety.
4. Prohibition on Disposal:Clause (d): The respondent is restrained from alienating or disposing of the shared household or encumbering it in any way.
   Example: The respondent cannot sell or mortgage the house without the court’s permission.
5. Renunciation Rights:Clause(e): The respondent is restrained from renouncing his rights in the shared household without the magistrate’s leave.Example: The respondent cannot transfer his rights in the house to another person without court approval.
6. Alternate Accommodation:Clause (f): The magistrate can direct the respondent to secure an equivalent level of alternative accommodation for the aggrieved person or pay rent.
   Example: If the victim is forced to leave the shared household, the respondent must provide a similar living situation or pay for her rent elsewhere.
7. Imposition of Additional Conditions:  Section 19(2) states that the magistrate may impose any additional conditions or pass any other direction necessary for the protection or safety of the aggrieved person or her children.
   Example: The magistrate may order the respondent to stay a certain distance away from the aggrieved person at all times.
8. Execution of Bond:Under 19(3) the magistrate may require the respondent to execute a bond, with or without sureties, to prevent the commission of domestic violence.
   Example: The respondent may be required to sign a bond, ensuring that he will not engage in further acts of violence, with penalties if he fails to comply.
9. Legal Treatment:As per S-19(4) an order under subsection (3) is deemed an order under Chapter VIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and is treated accordingly.
   Example: Violating the bond would be treated as a violation of “Security for keeping the peace and for good behaviour”.
10. Direction to Police:As per Section 19(5 the magistrate may direct the officer in charge of the nearest police station to provide protection to the aggrieved person or assist her in implementing the order.
    Example: Police are instructed to ensure the safety of the aggrieved person while she remains in the shared household.
11. Discharge of Financial Obligations:Section 19(6) states that the magistrate may impose obligations on the respondent regarding the discharge of rent and other payments, considering the financial needs and resources of the parties.Example: The respondent may be required to continue paying the household bills and rent even if he is removed from the house.
12. Implementation Assistance:As per Section 19(7) the magistrate can direct the officer in charge of the police station to assist in implementing the protection order.
    Example: Police may help enforce the order if the respondent attempts to breach it.
13. Return of stridhan and Property:Section 19(8) states the magistrate may direct the respondent to return to the aggrieved person her stridhan (personal property) or any other property or valuable security she is entitled to.
    Example: The respondent must return the aggrieved person’s jewellery, documents, or other personal items that belong to her.

Difference between S/17 & S/19 :

• Section 17 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, grants every woman in a domestic relationship the right to reside in the shared household, regardless of her legal ownership or interest in the property. This means she can’t be evicted or excluded, except as per the procedure established by law.
• Section 19, on the other hand, deals with residence orders, which are orders the Magistrate can make to protect or provide for the safety of the aggrieved person or their children. These orders can include directing the respondent to secure alternate accommodation for the aggrieved person or to pay rent for the shared household, as well as imposing other conditions to ensure safety. 
• In essence, Section 17 establishes the fundamental right to reside, while Section 19 provides the legal framework for the Magistrate to issue specific orders to protect that right and ensure safety. 
• While Section 19 deals with a multitude of directions or orders which may be passed against the respondent vis-à-vis the shared household in favour of an aggrieved person, Section 17 confers a right on every woman in a domestic relationship to reside in the shared household irrespective of whether she has any right.

Concept of Domestic Relationship:

The term ‘Domestic Relationship’ has been defined in Section 2(f) of the Act, as – “a relationship between two persons who live or have, at any point of time, lived together in a shared household, when they are related by consanguinity, marriage, or through a relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption, or are family members living together as a joint family”.

So the two most important thing which has been interpreted through various landmark Judgements is Relationship in the nature of Marriage & Share Household .

1.Thakur GokalChand v. Parvin Kumari [AIR 1952 SC 231] 
The Apex court observed that “continuous cohabitation for a number of years may raise the presumption of marriage”. It was further observed that “the presumption which may be drawn from long cohabitation is rebuttable, and if there are circumstances which weaken or destroy that presumption, the court cannot ignore them”. Therefore, a live-in relationship where a man and a woman have been living together for a number of years may fall within the definition of a ‘relationship in the nature of marriage’. However, this presumption may be rebutted if the relationship in question is not monogamous or exclusive in character. 

2.Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma [AIR 2014 SC 309] 
In this case, the Respondent was a married man with two children, and the Appellant was an unmarried woman. Both worked in the same company, and an intimacy developed between them. In 1992, the Appellant left her job and began living with the Respondent in a shared household, despite severe backlash from their respective families. The Appellant claimed that she became pregnant on three occasions, but each pregnancy ended in abortion, allegedly due to the Respondent’s insistence on contraceptive measures. Additionally, the Appellant alleged that the Respondent took several loans under various pretexts. Ultimately, the Respondent left the Appellant without providing any maintenance for her, citing his family’s constant opposition to their live-in relationship, which led to the Appellant filing an application under Section 12 of the DV Act.

The Supreme Court In this case while dismissing the appeal of the Appellant observed that there arose no need to rebut the presumption of marriage as the Appellant was well aware that the Respondent was a married person even before the commencement of their relationship and therefore, the status of the Appellant was that of a concubine or a mistress, who cannot enter into a relationship in the nature of marriage. Interestingly, the Court also noted that while this relationship was not in the nature of marriage, it might still, at times, deserve protection, particularly if the woman is not financially independent. In light of this observation, the Court called for an amendment to Section 2(f) of the DV Act, describing it as restrictive and exhaustive, as it does not account for such types of relationships.

3.Mr. Ramachandra Warrior v. Jayasree (Crl. Rev. Pet. No. 3079 of 2009) 
Decided on 18 March 2021, the court examined the rights of a divorced woman under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (DV Act). The court held that the right to reside in a shared household under Section 17 is available only to women in a subsisting domestic relationship. A divorced wife does not have this right.

The court noted that Section 17(1)”confers the right to reside in the shared household on “every woman in a domestic relationship.” The term “domestic relationship” implies a subsisting relationship, and thus, a divorced wife does not qualify.

Despite the above, the court clarified that a divorced wife qualifies as an “aggrieved person” under the DV Act.
This status allows her to seek reliefs such as protection orders, monetary reliefs, custody orders, and compensation under Sections 18, 20, 21, and 22 of the Act.

The court stated that a divorced wife residing in the shared household at the time of divorce can seek a residence order under Section 19. However, she cannot be reinstated into the shared household if she had left it prior to the divorce.

A divorced wife occupying a shared household can be evicted only in accordance with the procedure established by law, as stipulated in Section 17(2) of the DV Act.

4.D. Sudheer v Anusha R. Nair 2025 Kerala HC
A Single judge bench of Justice K. Babu, clarified that a divorced woman cannot claim residence rights under the DV Act after the dissolution of the marriage, as the “domestic relationship,” which is a prerequisite under the said Act, ceases to exist. Hence specifically residence orders under Section 19, cannot be extended to a divorced woman after the dissolution of her marriage.

Concept of Shared Household :

To fully comprehend the concept of a ‘domestic relationship,’ it is essential to understand what constitutes a ‘shared household,’ as these two interconnected concepts are incomplete without each other.

Under Section 2(S) of the Act, shared household means –

“a household where the person aggrieved lives or at any stage has lived in a domestic relationship either singly or along with the respondent and includes such a house hold whether owned or tenanted either jointly by the aggrieved person and the respondent, or owned or tenanted by either of them in respect of which either the aggrieved person or the respondent or both jointly or singly have any right, title, interest or equity and includes such a household which may belong to the joint family of which the respondent is a member, irrespective of whether the respondent or the aggrieved person has any right, title or interest in the shared household”.

Therefore, per this definition a shared household is a place where the aggrieved person lives or has lived at any time in a domestic relationship, either alone or with the respondent. This includes a household whether it is owned or rented jointly by the aggrieved person and the respondent, or by either of them individually. It also covers households where either the aggrieved person or the respondent, or both, have any right, title, interest, or equity. Additionally, it includes households that belong to a joint family of which the respondent is a member, regardless of whether the respondent or the aggrieved person has any right, title, or interest in the property.

But what happens if an aggrieved person has lived in a domestic relationship in multiple places? Would all such households fall within the purview of a ‘shared household’? The Supreme Court answered this question in the negative in

S.R. Batra & Ors. V. Smt. Taruna Batra [AIR 2007 SC 1118].

Facts : 
In this case, Smt. Taruna Batra was married to Amit Batra and began living in her mother-in-law’s house, which was on the second floor of a property in Delhi. After relations between the couple soured, Amit Batra filed for divorce, and in response, Taruna Batra lodged an F.I.R. under Sections 406, 498A, 506, and 34 of the Indian Penal Code. This led to the arrest of her in-laws, husband, and married sister-in-law, who were granted bail only after three days. During this period, Taruna Batra temporarily moved to her parents’ residence. Upon her return, she found the door to her mother-in-law’s house locked. She then filed Suit No. 87/2003, seeking a mandatory injunction to gain entry to the house and even broke the locks to do so. Meanwhile Amit Batra had moved to Ghaziabad, raising the question of whether Taruna Batra had the right to reside in her mother-in-law’s property under Section 17 of the DV Act.

Rulling: 
The Supreme Court held that a wife is only entitled to claim a right to residence in a ‘shared household,’ which is defined as the house belonging to or rented by the husband, or the house that is part of the joint family property in which the husband is a member. In this case, the property in question neither belonged to Amit Batra, was not rented by him, nor was it a joint family property of which he was a member. It was the exclusive property of Amit Batra’s mother, appellant No. 2, and therefore, it could not be considered a ‘shared household.’ The Court also noted that the definition of ‘shared household’ under Section 2(s) was clumsily drafted and required a sensible interpretation. 

This judgment was overruled by a full bench of the Supreme Court in

Satish Chander Ahuja vs Sneha Ahuja [AIR 2020 SC 784], where the wife filed an application under Section 12 of the DV Act, alleging severe emotional and mental abuse by the respondents and seeking, among other reliefs, alternate accommodation.

The Court In this landmark judgment observed that the phrase “lives or at any stage has lived in a domestic relationship” should be given its normal and purposeful meaning, indicating a woman living in a household with some degree of permanency. The Court clarified that “mere fleeting or casual living at different places” does not constitute a shared household. It emphasized that the intention of the parties and the nature of their living arrangement, including the nature of the household, must be considered to determine whether the parties intended to treat the premises as a shared household.

In disagreeing with the observations made in S.R. Batra v. Taruna Batra, the Court noted that the expression “at any stage has lived” was included to protect women from being denied the right to live in a shared household on the grounds that they were excluded from possession of the house or temporarily absent when the application was filed. The use of this expression is intended to ensure protection, not to imply that all houses where the aggrieved person has lived with the husband’s relatives automatically become shared households—a misinterpretation that does not reflect the legislative intent. Moreover, the Court disagreed with the finding in S.R. Batra that Section 2(s) was clumsily drafted, asserting instead that the definition of ‘share household’ is clear and exhaustive, designed to grant the aggrieved person a right of residence in the shared household.

Therefore, the earlier narrow view established in S.R. Batra v. Taruna Batra—that an aggrieved wife cannot reside in a shared household owned by her mother-in-law or father-in-law—was rejected. The Court granted the aggrieved wife’s request for alternate accommodation, placing due reliance on Sections 17 and 19 of the DV Act. Through this judgment, it was clarified that an aggrieved person has the right to reside in a shared household owned by her in-laws until her husband secures an alternate accommodation.

The Supreme Court's ruling In Satish Chander Ahuja v. Sneha Ahuja significantly expanded the understanding of a ‘shared household,’ yet the evolution of this concept did not end there. In a recent landmark judgment of 

Prabha Tyagi v. Kamlesh Devi [Criminal Appeal No. 511 of 2022], the Court has gone a step forward in reinforcing the rights of women under the DV Act, by observing that “every woman in a domestic relationship has a right to reside in the shared household even in the absence of any act of domestic violence by the respondent”. This judgment establishes that as long as a domestic relationship subsists between an aggrieved person and the respondent, a right to reside in the shared household exists, de hors a right, title or beneficial interest in the same. Further noting that, the expression contained in Section 17 namely, ‘every woman in a domestic relationship shall have the right to reside in the shared household irrespective whether she has any right, title or beneficial interest in same’ requires an expansive interpretation.

It was also observed that even In cases where a woman has not actually resided in the shared household, she can still enforce her right of residence under Section 17(1) of the DV Act. The Court further clarified the legislative intent behind the expression “shall not be evicted or excluded from the shared household” under Section 17(2) of the Act, reinforcing the protection afforded to women in domestic relationships, ensuring that they cannot be unjustly removed or denied access to the shared household.

Conclusion: 

Domestic violence is a critical concern that demands attention and action. In conclusion, it must be added that the domestic violence term is not limited just to physical abuse, it also includes other forms of domestic abuse such as economic, emotional, socio-economic, and financial abuse as well. Every person has self-respect and it should be preserved by the people around them. By understanding the legal landscape surrounding domestic violence, one can appreciate the ongoing efforts to safeguard the rights and dignity of those affected and work toward a society where such violence has no place.

FAQs :

1.Who can file a complaint?
Any woman or man who alleges to have been subjected to domestic violence may file a complaint against the offender. A woman can also file a complaint of domestic violence on behalf of the child.

2.What is the penalty for breach of protection order by respondent?
Imprisonment for a term which may extend to 1 year and with a fine which may extend to 20,000 rupees or both.

3.What is Section 19 of the Domestic Violence Act?
Section 19 provides legal measures to protect victims of domestic violence through residence orders, ensuring they are not forcibly removed from their homes.

4.How does a residence order protect victims?
A residence order restrains the respondent from dispossessing or disturbing the victim’s possession of the shared household and may include other protective measures.

5.Can a respondent be removed from the shared household?
Yes, a magistrate can order the respondent to remove themselves from the shared household to ensure the victim’s safety.

6.What additional conditions can be imposed under Section 19?
The magistrate may impose conditions such as restraining the respondent from entering certain areas or requiring the respondent to pay rent for alternative accommodation.

7.How can victims seek help under Section 19?
Victims can apply with the magistrate, who will then assess the situation and issue appropriate orders to ensure their protection and safety.