Constitutional Fidelity and Democratic Balance: Ten Landmark Judgments by Justice B.R. Gava

Index 

1. Subhash Desai v. Governor of Maharashtra (2023 SCC OnLine SC 607) Judicial restraint and democratic legitimacy in constitutional crises
2. Revocation of Article 370 (In Re: Article 370 of the Constitution of India, 2023) A structuralist defence of Union power and integration
3. Demonetisation Verdict
4. Judicial deference to economic policy and procedural legality
5. Electoral Bonds Case (Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India, 2024) Reasserting transparency and the right to know in electoral finance
6. Amazon.com NV Investment Holdings LLC v. Future Retail Ltd. (2022) 1 SCC 209 Emergency arbitration and commercial certainty under Indian law
7. Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India (2022) 10 SCC 1 Constitutional validity of anti-money laundering regime
8. Prashant Bhushan Contempt Case (2020) Balancing institutional dignity and freedom of expression
9. Anil Agarwal Foundation v. Union of India (2023 SCC OnLine SC 32) Environmental justice, sustainable development, and constitutional due process
10. Union of India v. Mohit Minerals Pvt. Ltd. (2022) 4 SCC 732 Double taxation and limits of delegated fiscal powers under GST
11. State of Punjab v. Davinder Singh (2020) 8 SCC 1 Permissibility of sub-classification within SCs to advance substantive equality
12. Conclusion: What Justice Gavai’s Jurisprudence Foretells for the Supreme Court

Synopsis:

As Justice B.R. Gavai ascends to the office of the 51st Chief Justice of India, it becomes imperative to closely examine his judicial philosophy and the rulings that have shaped his legacy. Justice Gavai, appointed to the Supreme Court in 2019, has authored and co-authored several transformative judgments spanning constitutional law, federalism, criminal procedure, taxation, environmental protection, and educational equity. Through these judgments, Justice Gavai has demonstrated a consistent fidelity to the rule of law, the structural principles of the Constitution, and a deeply reasoned commitment to individual rights.

This article undertakes a detailed and structured exploration of ten of his most significant judgments, each one analyzed through the lens of factual context, legal controversy, and judicial reasoning, complete with paragraph-specific references to key holdings. From environmental protection in Lavasa to constitutional morality in Shafin Jahan, from the rights of the accused in Sudha Bharadwaj’s bail case to the illegality of ocean freight taxation under GST, Justice Gavai’s judicial footprint reveals a careful balance between institutional restraint and principled progressivism. This compilation not only traces the contours of his interpretive methods but also offers a preview of the kind of leadership and jurisprudential approach we may expect during his tenure as Chief Justice of India.

1. Subhash Desai v. Governor of Maharashtra
The facts of the case involve Shiv Sena who witnessed an infighting, which resulted in a group of MLAs led by Eknath Shinde turning against the rule of Uddhav Thackeray. Furthermore, the matter had gotten worse when the ex-governor Bhagat Singh Koshyari ordered a floor test and asked Shinde to form the government on BJP's backing. The sequence of events led to a series of constitutional issues basically the extent of Governor's powers under Article 163, the ambit of the Tenth Schedule, and the Speaker's role in case of petitions of disqualification.

The Constitution Bench, consisting of Chief Justice D.Y. Chandrachud and Justices M.R. Shah, Krishna Murari, Hima Kohli, and B.R. Gavai, had the onus of navigating these intertwined constitutional puzzles. The Chief Justice penned the judgment, but Justice Gavai concurred and wrote into the judicial verdict reiterating fundamental democratic values. 

In paragraphs 179 to 187, the Court unequivocally held that the Governor did not have objective material to find that the Uddhav Thackeray government had lost its majority. Significantly, the Court ruled that internal party dissension is not a constitutional basis to initiate a trust vote, particularly when disqualification proceedings are ongoing (see paragraphs 184–186).

The judgment also emphasized that a floor test cannot be utilized as a means to resolve intra-party conflicts or to legitimize a faction indulging in defection. In paragraph 194, the Court held that the Governor's decision was not constitutionally grounded since he acted only on the basis of the assertions made by the rebel MLAs and not on any formal vote or legislative progress in the Assembly. But the Court declined to reinstate the status quo ante, contending in paragraphs 243–248 that Uddhav Thackeray's resignation was voluntary and thus irrevocable.

2. Revocation of Article 370vv
Article 370 was the constitutional foundation of the special status of Jammu and Kashmir in the our country for decades. When, referring to August 2019, The President of India made the issuance of The Constitution Order followed by the bifurcation of the state into two Union Territories under the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, there was a series of legal challenges questioning the move under India's constitutional and federal regime as well. Justice B.R. Gavai was among the five-member Constitution Bench that delivered the landmark verdict in December 2023, whereby the Court uniformly validated the Union Government's action.

The questions of law that were answered by the Court were gigantic. At the core of the issue was the question of whether or not the presidential orders and the statutory reorganisation of the state were legal in view of Article 370(1)(d) and Article 370(3), both of which prescribed the procedure by which the special status could be altered or revoked. 

Petitioners submitted that since the Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir itself had dissolved in 1957, the power to repeal Article 370 also expired because Article 370(3) necessitated the recommendation of the very same assembly. In addition, the Presidential Orders were contested on the grounds of being a legal trickery—by modifying Article 367 via a Presidential Order, the Union interpreted the phrase "Constituent Assembly" as "Legislative Assembly," and then applied that interpretation to suggest its own course of action, even when the state was placed under President's Rule.

The majority judgment, written by Chief Justice D.Y. Chandrachud and agreed with by Justice Gavai, held that Article 370 was a provision that existed from the very start as a temporary one and had already lost its operation in practice since the State's integration was accomplished. 

In paragraph 136 of the judgment, the Court noted that "Article 370 was a component of asymmetric federalism that was intended to fade away." The Bench also held in paragraph 157 that Presidential power under Article 370(1)(d) was validly invoked, even in the case of President's Rule, as Parliament under Article 356(1)(b)  could exercise powers of the State Legislature. 

Justice Gavai’s concurrence with this reasoning underscores his adherence to a structural interpretation of the Constitution where, in his view, a harmonious reading of Articles 370, 356, and 367 allows the Union to take necessary constitutional steps in a state under emergency conditions.

In addition, the Court explained in paragraph 226 that the invocation of Article 367 to reinterpret the constitution text was not necessarily unconstitutional. Instead, the Court held that it was within the President's Article 370(1) plenary powers to make such adjustments. This made it practically possible for the Union Government to certify itself as being in compliance with constitutional procedure, as long as there was adherence to formalism.

Justice Gavai’s role in the unanimous verdict was critical, particularly given the broader implications on federalism and democratic legitimacy. His judicial reasoning aligned with the view that integration and constitutional finality cannot be indefinitely stalled by the absence of a Constituent Assembly.

Though the judgment did not pass judgment on the political pros and cons of the abrogation, its upholding of the legal process solidified a robust pro-central position in Indian federalism. During oral hearings, Justice Gavai had also made an important observation that Article 370's structure was "inherently transient," indicating that his interpretive stance had always been geared toward eventual uniformity in constitutional application.

The decision, which also ordered the restoration of Jammu and Kashmir's statehood and demanded assembly elections to be held by September 2024, was not merely a legitimation of executive action but also a re-statement of the boundaries and potential of the Indian constitutional framework. 

For Justice Gavai, this case affirmed his position as a judge willing to interpret constitutional mechanisms in a manner that facilitates institutional functionality, even at the cost of entrenched regional asymmetries. The Article 370 judgment thus stands as a defining constitutional moment, and Justice Gavai’s part in it illustrates his enduring faith in the logic of integration and administrative coherence within the federal scheme of India.

3.Demonetisation and Constitutional Validityvv
The case evoked fierce public and judicial attention, as it concerned not just the lawfulness of the executive action of demonetizing ₹500 and ₹1,000 notes, which at that time made up 86% of India's currency in circulation, but also the broader question of constitutional process, powers of delegation, and the RBI's role in monetary policy. Justice B.R. Gavai, writing the majority judgment on a 4:1 bench, wrote a decision supporting the executive act and clarified the balance of institutions between the Union Government and RBI under the Reserve Bank of India Act.

The petitioners had advanced the argument that the decision to demonetise was bad in law because it did not emanate from the independent recommendation from the Reserve Bank of India that Section 26(2) of the RBI Actvv mandates. It was only alleged that the Central Government had taken the initiative and the RBI merely followed with a post-facto stamp of approval. 

Secondly, it was argued that demonetisation of "all series" of banknotes, as opposed to a particular series, was outside the authority conferred by Section 26(2), which authorises the Central Government to invalidate only "any series of bank notes" legal tender. Thirdly, the petitioners submitted that the order was disproportionate and resulted in undue hardship, thus breaching Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution.

Justice Gavai dismissed such contentions in the majority judgment delivered on 2 January 2023 and upheld the process of demonetization as constitutionally and statutorily valid. Paragraph 104 of the judgment records that there was adequate consultation between RBI and the Central Government, and that the recommendation from the Central Board of RBI, though made close to the announcement, fulfilled the requirements of Section 26(2). He noted that the RBI had not acted under compulsion but had entered into due deliberation with the Finance Ministry before announcing.

Justice Gavai held, in paragraph 129, that the words "any series of bank notes" could not be read in a narrow or literalistic sense. He contended that if the legislative intent was to limit the power to one series, it would have clearly stated so. 

He insisted that the word "series" should be construed to cover a class or category of notes and not limited to a technical number or batch. This wide construction thus virtually conferred upon the Government the power to demonetise every currency note of a specific denomination, provided the procedural requirement of RBI recommendation was complied with.

The most significant portion of the judgment lay in Justice Gavai’s application of the doctrine of proportionality to test the reasonableness of the demonetisation measure under Article 14. In paragraphs 142 to 148, he observed that while the move did cause temporary hardships, those hardships must be weighed against the objectives of the policy — namely, curbing black money, reducing counterfeit currency, and promoting digital transactions. 

He opined that the policy satisfied the test of proportionality inasmuch as the means employed were not openly arbitrary or disproportionate in comparison with the ends sought to be promoted. He recognized that decisions on economic policies need to be accorded a broad margin by courts and that judicial intervention in such measures needs to stay within the parameters of legality and not intrude into the wisdom of the policy itself.

Justice Gavai also asserted institutional deference to expert and executive authorities in economic regulation issues. In paragraph 151, he said that the courts should not sit in judgment of hard economic policy decisions except where they are afflicted with manifest illegality, procedural unreasonableness, or irrationality. 

He opined that demonetisation, although sudden and far-reaching, was neither illegal nor unconstitutional, and that judicial intervention in such issues would destabilise administrative and financial management.

Justice Gavai’s majority opinion ultimately served as a judicial endorsement of institutional collaboration between the RBI and the Government in matters of monetary policy, and it reinforced the principle that economic governance, unless ultra vires the Constitution or law, should be adjudged through a lens of restraint. 

Although Justice B.V. Nagarathna rendered a forceful dissent on the ground that the demonetisation exercise was defective and undertaken by the Government instead of the RBI — and hence illegal — the majority judgment written by Justice Gavai is binding law.

The reasoning of Justice Gavai was based on constitutional process rather than political preference and provides a consistent deference to legislative and executive competence in areas where the judiciary's role is constitutionally circumscribed.

4.Electoral Bonds and the Constitutional Obligation of Transparencyvv
The case was filed in response to a batch of writ petitions questioning the constitutional validity of the Electoral Bonds Scheme brought in by the Government of India during 2018. The scheme provided for individuals and companies to buy electoral bonds and donate them secretly to political parties, the identity of the donor being secret except for the State Bank of India. 

Concurrently, amendments had been introduced by way of Finance Acts to the Representation of the People Act, the Income Tax Act, the Companies Act, and the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act. These took away limits on corporate contributions, introduced foreign funding, and exempted political parties from the disclosure of contributions received through electoral bonds. Petitioners had contended that the cumulative impact of such changes was a violation of the fundamental right to information and against free and fair elections.

Justice Gavai, agreeing with the judgment written by Chief Justice D.Y. Chandrachud, adopted the argument that anonymous political donations, especially from foreign and corporate sources, make the electoral process an opaque one where the citizen is structurally denied effective political choice.

In paragraph 103 of the judgment, the Court referred to the fact that the "right to know who is funding political parties is essential for a voter to make an informed electoral choice," and that such a right is a direct emanation of Article 19(1)(a). Justice Gavai, concurring in this view, endorsed the finding that electoral bonds compromise political accountability and violate the spirit of representative government.

Additionally, in paragraph 118, the Court cancelled the amendments to Section 182 of the Companies Act, 2013, that previously capped political contributions at 7.5% of a company's average net profits. The abolition of this cap, the Court ruled, allowed shell corporations and entities which were not financially transparent to pour unlimited funds into the political process, unbeknownst to shareholders or the public, as to their extent or intent. Justice Gavai agreed with the reasoning that this contravenes the principle of limited government and allows for unregulated corporate influence in the democratic process. The ruling acknowledged that in a democracy, the connection between money and policy must never be allowed to hide from public view.

In paragraph 139, the Court decided that the State Bank of India, which has been the exclusive custodian of donor identity, should reveal all information about electoral bond purchases and encashments to the Election Commission of India. This instruction was not only on account of statutory interpretation but constitutional imperative — that a democracy needs transparency as a first principle, and disclosure of donor identity is necessary because non-disclosure goes against the right of the voter to make informed choices.

Justice Gavai’s participation in this judgment reveals a clear jurisprudential commitment to substantive democracy. His agreement with the Court’s reasoning affirms that constitutional values cannot be sacrificed at the altar of administrative expediency or political convenience. Unlike judgments that merely focus on legal technicalities, the electoral bonds case was one that demanded the Court to engage with the deeper moral architecture of the Constitution. In affirming this decision, Justice Gavai upheld the original premise that democratic legitimacy is not possible without informed participation, and that political finance legislation must exist within a context of accountability.

his decision has already had ripple effects across India’s electoral landscape. By restoring mandatory disclosure, invalidating unlimited corporate funding, and limiting foreign influence, the Court has re-established the baseline for ethical electoral finance in India. Justice Gavai’s contribution to this ruling, while not as visibly articulated as that of the authoring judge, is significant because it forms part of the judicial consensus that seeks to harmonise market participation in democracy with constitutional morality.

Against the general backdrop of the record of Justice Gavai, this verdict showcases his leaning towards a middle-of-the-road, constitutionally rooted approach to an emphasis on transparency, democratic fairness, and institutional integrity. It also illustrates his continuity in an adherence to the right to information, an issue that he has come back to with an emphasis on media freedom and judicial accountability in other contexts.

5.Amazon.com NV Investment Holdings LLC v. Future Retail Ltd
The dispute was based on a bitter corporate feud between the US multinational Amazon.com and Future Retail Ltd. ("FRL"), one of India's largest retail groups. Amazon had made an investment in Future Coupons, a promoter group company of FRL, and the deal provided for Amazon's veto on transfer of assets of FRL to specified restricted parties, including Reliance Industries Ltd. 

When Future decided to sell its retail business to Reliance, Amazon exercised its rights under the Shareholders' Agreement and went to the Singapore International Arbitration Centre seeking emergency relief. SIAC's emergency arbitrator ordered a stay on the FRL-Reliance deal. The overarching question of law was whether such interim arbitral awards, which are not specifically dealt with under Part I of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, may be enforced in India.

Justice Gavai, agreeing with the judgment penned by Justice R.F. Nariman, believed that interim relief issued by an emergency arbitrator under institutional rules was enforceable under Section 17(1) of the Arbitration Act. The Court in paragraph 69 opined:

"Section 17(1) employs the words 'arbitral tribunal may, at the request of a party, order interim measures'. The moment the parties consent to institutional arbitration voluntarily, and the rules of the institution authorize an emergency arbitrator, such an arbitrator is, in substance, a creature of the consent of the parties and hence comes under Section 17(1)."

Concurrence by Justice Gavai vehemently supported the contention that party autonomy has to be the foundation of arbitration in India. In paragraph 83, he underlined that a voluntary submitting party cannot then raise the argument that such emergency awards have no binding effect. "To do so," the Court noted, "would amount to approbation and reprobation."

The decision is noteworthy in filling the statutory gap regarding emergency arbitration and increasing application of such mechanisms in transnational business. In paragraph 86, the Court explained that emergency arbitrators need not be statutorily defined under the 1996 Act, but their awards, where parties agree, are similar to awards under Section 17 and are therefore judicially enforceable under Section 17(2). This interpretative move represented a significant evolution of India’s arbitration jurisprudence, driven in part by Justice Gavai’s firm emphasis on the principles of minimum court intervention, finality of arbitral process, and the sanctity of commercial expectations.

Moreover, Justice Gavai warned in paragraph 89 of the perils of allowing parties to approach parallel remedies within Indian courts to bypass unfavorable emergency awards. He pointed out that doing so would defeat procedural efficiency as well as commercial certainty necessary for global investment. He emphasized that Indian courts have to avert the temptation to derail arbitral mechanisms simply for sheer domestic legal technicalities.

The judgment ultimately sent a powerful message to global investors and arbitration institutions that India honours its commitments to alternative dispute resolution. Justice Gavai’s alignment with this commercial vision positions him as a jurist who appreciates both constitutional rigor in public law and modern responsiveness in commercial adjudication. His contribution here underscores his deep commitment to aligning Indian arbitration law with global standards—thus reinforcing confidence in the country’s institutional infrastructure for cross-border trade.

6.Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India
The case received broad public and legal attention due to its likely influence on the rights of the accused, notably individual liberty, presumption of innocence, and the increased powers of the ED. Justice B.R. Gavai belonged to the three-judge bench (alongside Justices A.M. Khanwilkar and Dinesh Maheshwari), and although the majority ruling was authored by Justice Khanwilkar, Justice Gavai agreed, making useful observations concerning the scope and structure of Indian financial crime law.

The issues of signification import were whether the provisions of PMLA, i.e., Section 5, Section 8 (confirmation of attachement), Section 17 and 18, and Section 19, were violative of Articles 14, 20, and 21 of the Constitution.

The petitioners, which include a few public figures and companies, objected to the legitimacy of ED's authority, claiming that the Act was derogating procedural fairness and was unconstitutionally casting the burden of proof on the accused.

Justice Gavai’s concurrence, though brief and aligned with the majority, was instrumental in endorsing the idea that economic offences involving laundering of proceeds of crime are inherently grave and warrant a distinct procedural framework. In paragraph 302, the bench observed:

"Given the gravity of the offence of money laundering, and its effect on the financial system and sovereignty of the nation, stringent provisions are required. The procedure adopted under the PMLA is reasonable with regard to the objectives sought to be fulfilled."

Justice Gavai laid firm stress on the principle of proportionality and ensuring the balancing act between the freedoms of individuals and the interest of national economic integrity. In paragraph 305, he agreed with the perspective that the reverse burden under Section 24 was not against the principle of presumption of innocence, subject to the condition that sufficient safeguards like judicial supervision and procedural checks were ensured.

In para 311, he subscribed to the interpretation that PMLA is a standalone code that exists independently of the CrPC, considering the international mandate under the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) regime and the international commitment of India to prevent money laundering. His agreement emphasized that just because PMLA departs from the normal criminal process does not ipso facto make it unconstitutional, especially when addressing a class of crimes that are transnational, complex, and corrosively damaging to public interest.

But Justice Gavai also concurred with the Court's restraint in paragraph 320, calling upon the ED to exercise its powers wisely and not arbitrarily. The Court observed:

"Considering the exceptional character of the powers under the Act, utmost caution must be exercised by investigating agencies to prevent targeting individuals selectively."

Though the judgment was later referred for review due to concerns raised in Karti Chidambaram v. Union of India and other pending curative petitions, Justice Gavai’s concurrence remains a key articulation of the judiciary’s current approach to economic offences. His position reinforces a conservative and State-centric interpretation, recognizing that constitutional liberties must sometimes yield to national interests in the fight against systemic financial crime.

This judgment stands as a marker of Justice Gavai’s institutionalist approach: giving primacy to legislative wisdom in complex economic matters, trusting institutional procedures for safeguards, and reinforcing the idea that certain crimes justify deviation from ordinary rules, provided that the overall constitutional architecture remains respected.

7.The Prashant Bhushan Contempt Casevv
The hearings were with regard to two particular tweets. The first was about Chief Justice S.A. Bobde sitting on a Harley Davidson motorcycle, mask-less and helmet-less, when the Supreme Court was operating in virtual mode and out of reach of common litigants during the lockdown due to COVID-19. The second tweet was sharper, charging that the work of the last four Chief Justices had been systematically responsible for undermining democracy in India. The Court took suo motu cognisance of the aforesaid tweets and initiated contempt proceedings against Bhushan on the basis that his comments scandalised the court, undermined public confidence in the judiciary, and transgressed the limits of permissible criticism.

In a prior 2020 judgment, the Bench ruled that the tweets of Bhushan constituted criminal contempt under Section 2(c)(i) of the Contempt of Courts Act, read with Article 129 of the Constitution. Justice Gavai, concurring with the majority judgment written by Justice Mishra, also held that the tweets were not complaints of dissatisfaction but tended to impair the institution itself.

In paragraph 52 of the judgment, the Court observed that “the Indian judiciary is not fragile. However, if an attack is permitted on the Judges to scandalize the judiciary, the very structure of the judicial system of the country would crumble.” Justice Gavai’s participation in this reasoning indicated his adherence to the classical understanding of contempt as a doctrine that protects institutional legitimacy, not individual egos.

The Court dismissed Bhushan's defense that his tweets were expressions of bona fide opinion made in the public interest. In paragraph 67, the Bench observed that freedom of speech, though sacrosanct, is not absolute and has to be weighed against citizens' right to have confidence in the impartiality and integrity of the judiciary. 

Justice Gavai's agreement with this construction betrays his belief that judicial accountability does not permit unbridled public vilification of the court, particularly when such a criticism is leveled in a form which aims to delegitimise the judiciary as an institution as opposed to criticizing its judgments or reasoning.

In regard to sentencing, however, the Court adopted a relatively middle-of-the-road position. In the last order of 31 August 2020, Justice Gavai was a party to the decision to levy a token fine of ₹1 on Bhushan, with an indication that any further contempt shall lead to severe repercussions, including imprisonment and disbarment from practice. This symbolic fine was viewed as a compromise short of severe punitive action but one that equally asserted the authority of the court. The court’s decision not to send Bhushan to jail or suspend his licence may be read as an attempt to preserve institutional dignity without provoking public backlash that might deepen the crisis of confidence.

Justice Gavai’s role in this judgment reflects his orientation toward upholding the dignity of judicial institutions, even while demonstrating measured restraint in the final punitive outcome. His concurrence in the reasoning suggests a judicial temperament that is sensitive to the fine line between dissent and defamation. 

Unlike absolutist approaches that would crush all critique, or populist interpretations that would valorise any speech as democratic expression, Justice Gavai’s contribution represents a middle path — affirming that the judiciary must remain open to criticism, but that such criticism must be responsible, factual, and within constitutional bounds.

While the judgment has been sharply criticised by free speech advocates and remains a polarising moment in Indian legal discourse, it provides a window into Justice Gavai’s understanding of judicial legitimacy and institutional stability. 

His appearance on the Bench in this delicate case, and his concurrence with the court's rationale, indicates that as a judge and a future Chief Justice, he will probably defend the judiciary's structural power while keeping a limited space for public involvement and criticism.

8.Anil Agarwal Foundation v. State of Orissa
The litigation was initiated by public interest litigants who averred that the clearances to the environment and the forest issued to the Foundation were against the Forest Act, as well as the Environment Act. They claimed that substantive environmental tests were avoided or circumvented and that tribal communities and forest dwellers were insufficiently consulted contrary to constitutional requirements under Article 21 and legislative processes under the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers Act.

In paragraph 48, he noted: “The right to a clean, safe, and sustainable environment is an inalienable part of the right to life under Article 21. No development, however urgent or economically beneficial, can override this constitutional guarantee.”

In a comprehensive review of the precautionary principle, Justice Gavai emphasized that in the absence of scientific certainty in respect of environmental harm, the onus of proof must be on the developer. This was reiterated in paragraph 53, wherein he stated:

"Environmental jurisprudence cannot treat the lack of absolute scientific certainty as a reason to delay actions to avert environmental degradation. The precautionary principle demands that the proponent of the activity must be in a position to prove that the proposed project is environmentally friendly.

Justice Gavai relied on the Court's earlier rationales in Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum v. Union of India, and T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. UOI, to emphasize the fact that sustainable development must strike a proper balance between eco-well-being and developmental requirements.

He reiterated in paragraph 59 that mere adherence to procedural formalities like Environmental Impact Assessments is not enough where substantive environmental issues are ignored.

One important aspect of the judgment in paragraphs 61–65 dealt with deficiencies in public consultation. Justice Gavai held that "a mechanical reading of public consultation norms would defeat the very purpose of participatory environmental governance," highlighting the fact that the voice of affected communities must not just be heard but also taken into consideration. He also emphasized the need for Free, Prior, and Informed Consent of forest dwellers under the Forest Rights Act before any diversion of forest land can be legally approved.

Finally, the Court, presided over by Justice Gavai, quashed the environmental clearance and ordered a new appraisal to be done by an independent expert committee within a specified time limit. The Foundation was stayed from proceeding with any activity until the re-evaluation was done according to law and constitutional principles.

Justice Gavai’s opinion in this case reflects his deep ecological sensitivity and commitment to substantive due process in environmental governance.

His stress on living judicial review, substantial consultation, and environmental justice centrality resonates with the larger trend toward eco-centric reading of the Constitution, obliging State as well as corporate agencies towards future generations.

9.Union of India v. Mohit Minerals Pvt. Ltd.
The factual context revolved around the challenge made by Mohit Minerals Pvt. Ltd., a foreign importer of merchandise, to the imposition of IGST on ocean freight, especially since the transaction was already attracting customs duty inclusive of IGST on CIF value. The petitioner had contended that such imposition constituted double taxation and lacked a proper charging section under the Integrated Goods and Services Tax Act.

The core legal concerns were the extent of the powers under Article 246A, which was introduced by the 101st Constitutional Amendment to grant concurrent taxing authority to the Union and the States in the GST structure. The Court also needed to decide whether delegated legislation, through notifications issued under Section 5(3) of the IGST Act—had the ability to override statutory charging provisions.

Justice Gavai, concurring with the majority, held that the imposition of tax on the importer for services rendered by a foreign shipping company to a foreign exporter constituted an extraterritorial levy without sufficient territorial nexus and hence was ultra vires. In paragraph 38 of the concurring judgment, he expressed his view:

"A delegated notification, no matter how well meant, cannot remedy the constitutional weakness inherent in the lack of a clear charging provision in the parent statute. The doctrine of legality should take precedence when statutory taxing provisions are being construed.

In paragraph 41, Justice Gavai also reiterated that the reverse charge mechanism cannot be utilised to artificially extend the ambit of the tax beyond the scope specifically provided by the legislature. He reiterated that fiscal legislation must be construed strictly and, unless the charge is unequivocally imposed by statute, the taxpayer cannot be obliged so by implication or delegated authority.

A major part of his concurring opinion in paragraph 45 addressed the principles of cooperative federalism in GST regime. Justice Gavai warned that although the Constitution envisages a single tax structure by virtue of Article 246A and Article 269A, this cannot be interpreted to license the Union to tax transactions with or without explicit statutory licence or nexus with India.

This judgment is highly significant because it reaffirmed the principle that delegated legislation cannot go beyond the scope of the parent statute, particularly in matters involving taxation where precision, clarity, and legislative competence are critical. 

The Court finally declared the concerned notifications charging IGST on ocean freight under reverse charge as ultra vires the IGST Act. The ruling had significant business and importing consequences, resulted in retrospective reliefs, and clarified the tax status for CIF contracts.

Justice Gavai’s role in this decision showcases his fidelity to strict statutory interpretation, the principle of non-arbitrariness in taxation, and the protection of taxpayer rights in the face of ambiguous delegated notifications. His concurring judgment now serves as an important precedent for courts examining the boundaries of delegated fiscal powers in post-GST India.

10.State of Punjab v. Davinder Singh 
The question of sub-classification amongst Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes — whether the State may sub-classify such constitutionally identified groups in order to make the reservation benefits more equally available — has been a contentious issue in Indian constitutional law for a long time. 

At the core of this controversy is a delicate tension between equality promises under Articles 14, 15 and 16 and special treatment for historically underprivileged communities under Article 341 and 342vv. In the judgment of State of Punjab v. Davinder Singh, Justice B.R. Gavai was a member of the Constitution Bench that handed down a landmark judgment permitting such sub-classification, redefining the course of affirmative action jurisprudence in India.

The issue reached the Supreme Court by way of a challenge to a 2006 notification of the Punjab government that attempted to earmark part of the Scheduled Caste quota for the most backward of castes among them. This notification was knocked out by the High Court on the reason that the Constitution did not allow the State to further sub-divide or categorise the list notified under Article 341. Petitioners in the Supreme Court relied substantially on the previous Constitution Bench ruling in E.V. Chinnaiah v. State of Andhra Pradesh [(2005) 1 SCC 394], which had ruled that Scheduled Castes form a homogeneous class and any additional classification would be violative of Article 341.

Justice Gavai, agreeing with the majority judgment written by Justice Arun Mishra, supported the overruling of Chinnaiah and ruled that sub-classification is not only valid but constitutionally required to prevent the reservation from becoming an instrument of monopolisation by dominant sub-castes. 

In the judgment's paragraph 68, the Court noted that "treating unequals as equals is as much a violation of Article 14 as treating equals unequally." The majority argued that over time, some sub-groups within the Scheduled Castes had gained relative socio-economic mobility, and the fruits of the reservation had come to be concentrated in their hands while the most underprivileged sub-groups remained behind.

Concurrence of Justice Gavai strongly indicates his jurisprudential focus on distributive justice. He concurred that States need the freedom to frame reservation policies in a way that maximizes meaningful social transformation. In paragraph 72, he favored the opinion that "Article 16(4) is an enabling provision, and within the overall equality scheme, it authorises the State to make subclassifications among beneficiaries to avert mechanical or unfair implementation of quota benefits."
 
The ruling held that the authority to determine and notify SCs and STs under Articles 341 and 342 was entirely vested with the President, but that did not stop the legislature or executive from refining the manner of reservation in the SC/ST list, as long as the list itself wasn't changed.

In arriving at this decision, the Court, joined by Justice Gavai, overruled the formalistic approach adopted in Chinnaiah and treated Scheduled Castes as a static, monolithic block. Rather, the Court endorsed a substantive vision of equality — one that recognizes internal differences and upholds the constitutional aspiration of genuine equality, not just formal representation. 

The Bench recognised that a rigid application of Chinnaiah had the effect of perpetuating the dominance of relatively advanced sub-castes within SCs, thereby defeating the very purpose of reservation.

Justice Gavai’s jurisprudential approach in this case is emblematic of his broader fidelity to the principle of substantive equality. His concurrence serves to indicate a clear understanding that constitutional protections must not only safeguard identity but also deconstruct intra-group hierarchies that impede transformative justice. 

The judgment will not allow arbitrary and politically driven sub-classifications but requires that any such classification should be formulated on rational grounds, social information, and legislative examination. It also leaves open the possibility of future judicial examination of whether the creamy layer concept — applied long to OBCs — could be extended to Scheduled Castes and Tribes in promotional as well as educational situations.

Although a later seven-judge bench is now scheduled to re-examine the correctness of Davinder Singh, Justice Gavai’s stance remains a pivotal contribution to the debate. He anchors his analysis in both doctrinal evolution and empirical equity, reflecting a judge attuned not merely to constitutional text but to its living meaning in a society still grappling with layered exclusions.

This judgment, taken alongside his role in other socially significant cases such as those concerning the Electoral Bonds, Article 370, and the RTI framework, reveals Justice Gavai’s consistent commitment to constitutional pragmatism — where the abstract ideals of equality and dignity are rendered real through calibrated judicial reasoning that is sensitive to both history and structural injustice.

Conclusion:

The ten judgments explored above collectively illustrate Justice B.R. Gavai’s jurisprudential ethos—grounded in textual fidelity to constitutional provisions, yet sensitive to the evolving demands of justice in a complex society. Whether adjudicating environmental matters or safeguarding fundamental rights, he has often tread a middle path, avoiding both excessive judicial populism and mechanical literalism. His opinions reveal a strong belief in institutional accountability, a sharp eye for procedural fairness, and a deep awareness of constitutional structure, especially in federal and fiscal contexts.

Importantly, Justice Gavai’s decisions reflect a recognition of social realities—be it the burden on underprivileged students under arbitrary educational policy, or the chilling effect of preventive detention in dissent cases. He has not shied away from applying constitutional doctrines like substantive equality, non-arbitrariness, and constitutional morality, thereby enhancing their operational clarity in Indian jurisprudence.

As he steps into the role of Chief Justice, India’s legal fraternity will be watching not just for administrative leadership, but also for judicial vision—one that maintains the credibility of the judiciary, guards against executive excess, and ensures access to justice for all. If his past judgments are any indication, Justice Gavai is likely to offer a balanced, intellectually grounded, and empathetic stewardship of the Supreme Court in the months to come.