.
In Peer Mohd. Vs. Hasinabee (1995 JLJ 110), it. is held that
husband gave divorce to his wife after fixation ofmaintenance by the trial court u/s. 125 of the Code divorce was not given during proceedings before trial court. hence divorce at revisional stage makes no change. Provisions of Muslim Women Act do not govern the case.
In Abdul Rashid Vs. Smt. Farida's. (1994 MPLJ 583) judgment, relying on Apex Court's decision M.P. High Court has reiterated that Sec. 125 of the Code is a secular provision. It applies to all persons belonging to all religions and
has no relationship with personal law of parties. Right to maintenance u/s. 125 of the Code is not taken away by Muslim Women Act. On divorce Muslim woman's application will bo.qovemed by the said Act from date of
divorce. Husband is liable to maintain her during iddat period only and not thereafter. Every application under Sec. 125 of the Code made before or after divorce would be governed by 1986 Act. Under Sec. 4 of this Act, a divorced woman can obtain maintenance for post iddat period from her
children, parents. other relatives and State Wakf Board, if there is any, if show avails this remedy.
Interpreting the words "within" occurring in Sec. 3(1 )(a) of the Act. the Full Bench held "It clearly means that is an obligation on the part of Provisions of Sec. 3(1)(a) and Sec. 125 of the Code were interpreted by a Full Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court In Usman Khan Rahamani Vs. Fathimunnisa Begum. 1990 Crl.L.J. 1364. The Full Bench held that:
"Muslim woman shall be entitled to a reasonable and fair
maintenance within the Iddat period to be made and paid
by her former husband. it is equally clear that r.easonable
and fair provision and maintenance has to be made and
paid by the husband within the period of Iddat, which has
been defined under S.2(b) of the Act. There is nothing in
the section which can be read to mean that the husband
is liable to make reasonable and maintenance beyond the
period of lddat' Act, if the parties to the proceedings. on the first date of hearing, exercise their option in that regard either jointly or separately. It Is difficult to hold
that the provisions of the Act would apply to proceedings. already concluded u/s. 125 of the Code. The provisions contained in Sec. 125 are beneficial provisions incorporated in the Code for safeguarding the interest of deserted/divorced hapless women. who are unable to maintainthemselves. As IS apparent from the nomenclature of the 1986 Act, this
Act was enacted by the legislature with a view to protect the rights of divorced Muslim women. Keeping the above object of enacting these provisions in mind, the correct interpretation of Sec. 7 of the Act would be to hold that the orders passed by the Magistrate under the provisions of
Sec. 125 of the Code prior to the coming into force of the Act, would continue to remain valid and enforceable even after the commencement of the Act. Any other interpretation would frustrate the very purpose enacting the 1986 Act.
In Julekha BI Vs. Mohammad Fazal, reported in 1999 (2) MPLJ 64, a single JUdge of M.P. Court has interpreted the implications of Sec. 125 of the Core and of Sec. 3 of Muslim Women Act. In that case, order of maintenance was passed in favour of Muslim wife under Sec. 125 of the
Code. Thereafter. husband gave divorce to his wife. When wife enforced the order of maintenance, the husband opposed it on the ground of subsequent divorce. High Court held that divorced wife IS not entitled to get maintenance from her husband after the period of iddat. The words in Sec. 3(1)(a) "within the iddat period" lay stress on the
urgency of making or paying and they cannot be read as confining the husband to provide fair and reasonable maintenance to his divorced wife within the period of Iddat and for the period of Iddat only." It cannot be interpreted that this liability of the husband extends beyond the period of Iddat. To take a contrary view would result in complete negation of the principles envisaged under S.3 (1)(a) of the Act of 1986 and defeat the very purpose of the Act. SA casts liability on the relatives or the wakf Board to pay maintenance to the divorced woman of the divorced woman
if the divorced woman has not remarried or is unable to maintain herself after the Iddat period. Their Lordships also held that the word 'provision' and 'maintenance' in Sec. 3(1)(a) convey same meaning. They cannot be read as meaning two different things. Liability of husband to pay
maintenance as well as to make reasonable provision are confined only to the period of Iddat. This was the view of Justice Ramanujulu and JusticeSardar Ali Khan of this Bench.
