The Marvin decision under implicit examination in Indian Family Law Context by Hon'ble SC:-
In Marvin, the plaintiff, Michelle Marvin, alleged that she and Lee Marvin entered into an oral agreement which provided that while "the parties lived together they would combine their efforts and earnings and would share equally any and all property accumulated as a result of their efforts whether individual or combined."Marvin, supra, 18 Cal.3d at 666. The parties allegedly further agreed that Michelle would "render her services as a companion, homemaker, housekeeper and cook." Id. Michelle sought a judicial declaration of her contract and property rights, and sought to impose a constructive trust upon one half of the property acquired during the course of the relationship.
The trial court granted a judgment on the pleadings in favor of the defendant, holding that the alleged agreement was unenforceable. The California Supreme Court reversed, stating that "a contract between nonmarital partners is unenforceable only to the extent that it explicitly rests upon the immoral and illicit consideration of meretricious s*xual services." Id. at 668-669 (emphasis in original.) The Court held:
“In summary, we base our opinion on the principle that adults who voluntarily live together and engage in s*xual relations are nonetheless as competent as any other persons to contract respecting their earnings and property rights . . . . So long as the agreement does not rest upon illicit meretricious consideration, the parties may order their economic affairs as they choose, and no policy precludes the courts from enforcing such contracts. Id. at 674.
Although the plaintiff's complaint alleged only an express contract, the Supreme Court went on to address the issue of "the property rights of a nonmarital partner in the absence of an express contract." Id. Here, the Supreme Court made new law. Prior California cases had refused to enforce implied contracts between nonmarital cohabitants. The Court overruled that line of cases, holding that in the absence of an express agreement the plaintiff might be able to establish an implied contract or implied partnership, and might be able to invoke such remedies as constructive trust, resulting trust, and quantum meruit
In a footnote, the Court stated that its opinion did not "preclude the evolution of additional equitable remedies to protect the expectations of the parties to a nonmarital relationship in cases in which existing remedies prove inadequate." Id. at 684, n. 25. Notwithstanding this suggestive footnote the Marvin decision did not create any new legal theories or causes of action. Rather, the express intention of the Court's opinion was simply to treat nonmarital cohabitants "as we do any other unmarried persons." Id. at 682 (emphasis supplied).
"Palimony":
The term "palimony" implicitly analogizes the rights of a nonmarital partner to the right of a spouse to receive alimony. However, a Marvin action is in no way analogous to an action for dissolution of marriage.
The Supreme Court in Marvin expressly declined to treat unmarried cohabitants like married persons, overruling two prior decisions of the Court of Appeal which had applied the Family Law Act to unmarried cohabitants. Id. at 681. Since Marvin, California courts have been scrupulous in separating Marvin actions from domestic relations actions. The courts have held:
Trial courts in divorce proceedings do not have jurisdiction over Marvin claims arising out of premarital cohabitation. In re Marriage of Johnson (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 57 [191 Cal.Rptr. 545]. (A Marvin claim filed in a civil action may, however, be consolidated with a dissolution proceeding. Id.)
An award of spousal support may not be based on the parties' cohabitation before marriage. In re Marriage of Bukaty (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 143 [225 Cal.Rptr. 492].
A Marvin case may not be processed in the superior court under the special family law rules. Schafer v. Superior Court (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 305 [225 Cal.Rptr. 513].
Jurisdiction standards applicable to domestic relations cases do not apply to Marvin actions. Kroopf v. Guffey (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 1351, 1357-1358 [228 Cal.Rptr. 807].
The obligation to pay support pursuant to a stipulated judgment in a Marvin action is - unlike an order for spousal support - dischargeable in bankruptcy. In re James P. Doyle (9th Cir. BAP 1986) 70 B.R. 106.
A former unmarried partner is not entitled to an award of pendente lite support. Friedman v. Friedman 20 Cal.App.4th 876 (1993).
Accordingly, the term "palimony" is inaccurate insofar as it implicitly compares a "pal's" rights with the rights of a divorcing spouse. A spouse's right to receive alimony and to share in marital property is based on his or her status as a spouse. A "pal" does not have any comparable automatic right to property or support based only on his or her status as a nonmarital partner. Rather, a Marvin plaintiff must prove some other underlying basis for his or her claim, such as an express or implied contract.
This point was greatly clarified in the sequel to the Marvin case, "Marvin II" (Marvin v. Marvin (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 871 [176 Cal.Rptr. 555]). The Supreme Court's decision in the first Marvin case reversed a judgment on the pleadings and remanded the case for further proceedings. Thereafter, Michelle Marvin's claims were tried in the Superior Court without a jury. The trial court found that the parties never agreed to share their property and that Lee Marvin did not agree to support Michelle. Nevertheless, the trial court awarded Michelle $104,000 for the purpose of allowing her to be rehabilitated or to learn new employable skills. [India does not have such employable skills in place as of date]
The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the award was improper because "there is nothing in the trial court's findings to suggest that such an award is warranted to protect the expectations of both parties." Id. at 876 (emphasis in original). Importantly, the court noted that while footnote 25 of the Marvin decision spoke of the evolution of additional equitable remedies, a court of equity "may not create totally new substantive rights under the guise of doing equity." Id.
A similar "rehabilitative" award was reversed in Taylor v. Polackwich (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 1014, 1021 [194 Cal.Rptr. 8], in which the court of appeal stated: "[W]hile a rehabilitative award is a proper means of enforcing rights which cannot otherwise be adequately enforced, an equitable remedy may not be employed to grant rehabilitation to one who has no underlying right to relief on any theory."
Marvin II and Polackwich should have eliminated any lingering belief that Marvin might have created some new right whereby a "pal" could collect "palimony" based on mere status as a cohabitant and nothing more. The primary "right" granted by Marvin is simply the right every person has to seek enforcement of his or her lawful contracts.
Marvin II notwithstanding, there is still some confusion about just what Marvin stands for. That confusion is manifested, for example, in the aberrant opinion of the Court of Appeal for the Second District in Taylor v. Fields (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 653 [224 Cal.Rptr. 186].
In Taylor v. Fields, the plaintiff, Taylor, had a relationship with a married man, Leo, for 42 years. After Leo died Taylor sued his widow, alleging breach of an agreement by Leo to take care of Taylor financially.
As the Court of Appeal correctly pointed out, the relationship alleged by Taylor was "nothing more than that of a legally married man and his mistress." Id. at 658. The alleged contract rested on meretricious consideration and was unenforceable. That was, in fact, one of the alternative holdings in support of the decision. The analysis could have begun and ended there.
Inexplicably, however, the Court of Appeal seized on the fact that the parties did not live together as its primary basis for denying Taylor recovery. First, the Court of Appeal noted that in Marvin, and the cases cited therein, the courts "upheld agreements where the parties lived together and relied on agreements not based on meretricious consideration." Id. at 661. The court then launched into a discussion of cases involving claims by cohabitants for loss of consortium or wrongful death, noting one case which had extended the right to sue for loss of consortium to cohabitants who engaged in "stable and significant" relationships.
In an insupportable leap of logic, the Fields court then held that cohabitation is a prerequisite to recovery in a Marvin-type action and that "Taylor's contract with Leo is unenforceable because there is no showing of stable and significant cohabitation . . . ." Id. at 666. In so holding, the court stated:
"While Taylor avers she and Leo occasionally spent weekends together and
registered as husband and wife, such claims are inadequate to bring their
relationship within Marvin principles. Id. at 663."
The above statement demonstrates a profound misunderstanding of Marvin. After all, what are "Marvin principles?" The only true "Marvin principle" is to treat nomarital cohabitants "as we do any other unmarried persons" - principally, by enforcing their contracts. In effect, then, the Fields court illogically held that one must be a cohabitant to be treated like a non-cohabitant (i.e., like "other unmarried persons"). The loose language in Fields, if taken literally, would lead to the reductio ad absurdum that no contract is enforceable unless the contracting parties live together.
The Court of Appeal for the Second District purported to follow Fields in Bergen v. Wood (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 854 [18 Cal.Rptr.2d 75]. However, the Bergen court backed away from the absolutist language in Taylor v. Fields, stating:
"Cohabitation is necessary not in and of itself, but rather, because from cohabitation flows the rendition of domestic services, which services amount to lawful consideration for a contract between the parties." Id. at 858.
Bergen paves the way for a future case repudiating the Second District's cohabitation "requirement," and holding that the only requirement is that the contract be supported by some lawful consideration severable from the s*xual relationship (whether or not that consideration takes the form of "domestic services").
The correct rule on cohabitation was stated by the Court of Appeal for the Fourth District in Milian v. De Leon (1986)181 Cal.App.3d 1185, 1193 [226 Cal.Rptr. 831] as follows:
"[C]ohabitation is not a prerequisite to the finding of an implied agreement between unmarried persons concerning their property."
Despite some lingering confusion exemplified by Fields, Marvin did not create a unique cause of action - rather, it simply extended existing causes of action to unmarried cohabitants. However, there are some unusual defenses which are sometimes available in Marvin - type cases.
I per se am glad that Lordship Katju and Lordship Thakur have taken this unusual case as reference to set Rules in Indian Family Law jurisprudence.
However before parting I am forced to say following which may be benchmark here for and against but bear the legal “perceptions” of mine which you call philosophies !
Typical views of s*x starved ALFA MALE MECHANIST!!
They think women shun s*x. Men always long for s*x.
While Men enjoy s*x, Women feel a big nail being hammered into them!!
So they want money to be paid by men for enjoying s*x !!
During debates here in the forums I raise the question why Money from husband when marriage fails?????????????????
The feminist do not have any qualms in saying;
Have you not enjoyed!! and now read down feminists lawyer in the forum and feminists saying in unison - typical quote and unquote
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""You had spent 14 years with her. She lost her youth but you do not want to pay anything to her. She might not have been legally married to you but you have an obligation,""
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Well I say hey, The man has also lost his youth!
Most respected Lordship Katju is famous for his comments but if you look at his deep thoughts then they are basis for well read wisdoms actually which we all miss in a hurry like (some of his comments)
”What hurry for Divorce? It is 15 years only!”
”Hang all dowry seekers in the lamp post!!”
So a prudent mind turns back and say;
This is total bullsh*t if we are Indians and we live in India !!!!!!
1. If she spent her youth with him it was her choice, the choice of an adult woman. She was never forced to do so in the first place. When the court said she could have got into marriage it meant that she could have gotten a donkey to carry her weight.
2. If the Apex Court wants to refer to California law then use it in its entirety and not by cherry picking judgments and citations according to one parties convenience.
A. California law says that a divorce cannot take longer than a marriage as per USA Laws. Implement that first in India.
B. Maintenance is restricted to one half if the time of the marriage as per USA Laws. Implement that first in India.
C. Child custody is always shared not only in California State but in rest of the States in great USA. Implement that first in India.
D. Divorce MUST be granted no matter who petitions for it as per USA Laws. Implement that first in India and why tail it with IrBM which even in USA is 99.8% acknowledged reason for Divorce there.
E. Alimony is TAX DEDUCTIBLE on giver and TAXABLE on the receiver as per USA Laws. Implement that first in India.
Any one wants citations of any of any of the paras A till E then whistle me and then analysise what we are getting into in longer run.
If we say we are prudent thinking wise as per our Constitutional Law guaranteed to free democratic Indians then we should not allow these Petitioning concubine side’s idiots (Lawyers) to cherry picking laws (USA) according to their convenience without paying attention to sub para A till E.
