PETITIONER:
S.GOPAL REDDY
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 11/07/1996
BENCH:
ANAND, A.S. (J)
BENCH:
ANAND, A.S. (J)
MUKHERJEE M.K. (J)
CITATION:
1996 SCC (4) 596 JT 1996 (6) 268
1996 SCALE (5)78
ACT:
HEADNOTE:
JUDGMENT:
THE 11TH DAY OF JULY, 1996
Present:
Hon'ble Dr. Justice A.S.Anand
Hon,ble Mr.Justice M.K.Mukherjee
P.P.Rao, Sr.Adv. A.Sudarshen Reddy, B.Rajeshwar Rao,
Ramkrishna Reddy, Vimal Dave, Advs. with him for the
appellant
Guntur Prabhakar, Adv. for the Respondent
J U D G M E N T
The following Judgment of the Court was delivered:
S.Gopal Reddy
V.
State of Andhra Pradesh
J U D G M E N T
DR. ANAND,J.
The appellant alongwith his brother was tried for
offences under Section 420 IPC read with Section 4 Dowry
Prohibition Act, 1961. The trial Court convicted them both
and sentenced them to undergo 9 months R.I. and to a fine of
Rs. 500/- each and in default to undergo S.I. for four
months for the offence under Section 420 IPC and to R.I. for
6 months and a fine of Rs. 1000/- each and in default S.I.
for six months for the offence under Section 4 Dowry
Prohibition Act, 1961 (hereinafter the Act). In an appeal
against their sentence and conviction, the Additional
Metropolitan Sessions Judge held that no offence under
Section 420 IPC was made out and set aside their conviction
and sentence for the said offence while confirming their
conviction and sentence for the offence under Section 4 of
the Act. Both the convicts unsuccessfully invoked the
revisional jurisdiction of the High Court.
This appeal by special leave filed by the appellant is
directed against the order of the High Court of Andhra
Pradesh dated 16.10.1990 dismissing the Criminal Revision
Petition filed by the convicts. The brother of the appellant
filed SLP (Crl.) 2336 of 1990 against the revisional order
of the High Court but that S.L.P. was dismissed by this
Court on 15.2.1991.
The prosecution case is as follows :
The appellant (hereinafter the first accused) is the
younger brother of the petitioner (hereinafter the second
accused) in S.L.P. (Crl.) No.2336 of 1990, which as already
noticed was dismissed on 15.2.1991 by this Court. The first
accused had been selected for Indian Police Service and was
undergoing training in the year 1985 and on completion of
the training was posted as an Assistant Superintendent of
Police in Jammu & Kashmir Police force. His brother, the
second accused, was at the relevant time working with the
Osmania University at Hyderabad. P.W.1, Shri G.Narayana
Reddy, the complainant, was practising as a lawyer at
Hyderabad. PW1 has four daughters. Ms.Vani is the eldest
among the four daughters. She was working as a cashier with
the State Bank of India at Hyderabad. PW 1 was looking for
marriage alliance for his daughter Ms. Vani. A proposal to
get Ms.Vani married to the first accused was made by P.W.2,
Shri Lakshma Reddy, a common friend of the appellant and
PW1. Lateron P.W.2 introduced the second accused to P.W.1,
who later on also met Ms Vani and approved of the match.
After some time, the first accused also met Ms.Vani at the
Institute of Public Enterprises and both of them approved
each other for marriage. It is alleged that on 6.5.1985, the
second accused accompanied by P.W.2 and some others went to
the house of P.W.1 to pursue the talks regarding marriage.
There were some talks regarding giving of dowry and the
terms were finally agreed between them on 7.5.1985 at the
house of the second accused. The first accused was not
present either on 6.5.1985 or on 7.5.1985. It is alleged
that as per the terms settled between the parties, P.W.1
agreed to give to his daughter (1) house at Hyderabad (2)
jewels, cash and clothes worth about at rupees one lakh and
(3) a sum of Rs 50,000/- in cash for purchase of a car. The
date of marriage, however, was to be fixed after consulting
the first accused PW1, however, later on insisted on having
an engagement ceremony and contacted the first accused but
the first accused persuaded P.W.1 not to rush through the
same as it was not possible for him to intimate the date to
his friends at a short notice. The first accused came to
Hyderabad from Dehradun, where he was undergoing training,
on 6.8.1985 and stayed at Hyderabad till 15.8.1985. The
first accused attended the birthday party of the youngest
sister of Ms.Vani on 15.8.1985 and later on sent a bank
draft of Rs.100/- as the birthday gift for her to Ms.Vani.
In the letter Ex.P1 which accompanied the bank draft, some
reference was allegedly made regarding the settlement of
dowry. It is alleged that the first accused later on wrote
several letters including exhibits P6,P7,P9 and P10 to Ms.
Vani It is the prosecution case that the second accused, on
being approached by PW1 for fixing the date of marriage,
demanded Rs. 1 lakh instead of Rs. 50,000/- for purchase of
car. The second accused also insisted that the said amount
should be paid before marriage. The 'dowry' talks between
the second accused and PW1, however, remained inconclusive.
Lateron the date of marriage was fixed as 2.11.1985. On
1.10.1985, the first accused allegedly wrote a letter,
exhibit P6, to Ms.Vani asking her to cancel the date of
marriage or to fulfil the demands made by his elders. The
first accused came to Hyderabad on 20.10.1985 when P.W.1
told him about the demand of additional payment of
Rs.50,000/- made by the second accused for the purchase of
car. The first accused told P.W.1 that he would consult his
brother and inform him about it and left for his native
place. lt is alleged that on his return from the village,
the first accused asked P.W.1 to give Rs.75,000/- instead of
Rs.50,000/- as agreed upon earlier instead of Rs. 1 lakh as
demanded by the second accused. According to the prosecution
case this talk took place in the presence of Shri Narasinga
Rao (not examined) The first accused suggested that P.W.1
should give Rs.50,000/- immediately towards the purchase of
the car and the balance of Rs.25,000/- should be paid within
one year after the marriage but PW1 did not accept the
suggestion. According to the prosecution case `Varapuja' was
performed by PW1 and his other relatives at the house of the
second accused on 31.10.1985 At that time P.W.1 allegedly
handed over to the first accused, a document Exhabit P-13
dated 12.10.1985, purporting to settle a house in the name
of his daughter Ms.Vani alongwith a bank pass book, Exhibit
P-12 showing a cash balance of Rs.50,881/- in the name of
Ms.Vani. The first accused is reported to have, after
examining the document Exhibit P-13, flared up saying that
the settlement was for a Double Storeyed House and the
document Exhibit P-13 purporting to settle the house in the
name of Ms.Vanl was only a single storey building. He
threatened to get the marriage cancelled if P.W.1 failed to
comply with the settlement as arrived at on the earlier
occasions. The efforts of P.W.1 to persuade the first
accused not to cancel the marriage did not yield any results
and ultimately the marriage did not take place. The first
accused then returned all the articles that had been given
to him at the time of `Varapuja'. Aggrieved, by the failure
of the marriage negotiations, P.W.1 on 22.1.1986 sent a
complaint to the Director of National Police Academy where
the first accused was undergoing training Subsequently, PW1
also went to the Academy to meet the Director when he learnt
from the personal assistant to the Director of the Academy
that the first accused was getting married to another girl
on 30th of March, 1986 at Bolaram and showed to him the
wedding invitation card. P.W.1, thereupon, gave another
complaint to the director on 26.3.1986, who, however,
advised him to approach the concerned police for necessary
action. P.W.1 filed a report Ex.P20 at Chikkadapalli Police
Station on 28.3.1986. The Inspector of Police P.W.7,
registered the complaint as Crime Case No.109/1986 and took
up the investigation. During the investigation, various
letters purported to have been written by the first accused
to Ms.Vani were sent to the handwriting expert P.W.3, who
gave his opinion regarding the existence of similarities
between the specimen writings of the first accused and the
disputed writings. Both the first accused and his brother,
the second accused, were thereafter chargesheeted and tried
for offences punishable under section 420 I.P.C. read with
an offence punishable under section 4 of the Act and
convicted and sentenced as noticed above.
Mr. P.P.Rao the learned senior counsel appearing for
the appellant submitted that the courts below had committed
an error in not correctly interpreting the ambit and scope
of section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 read with
the definition of `dowry' under section 2 of the said Act.
According to the learned counsel, for "demand" of dowry to
become an offence under Section 4 of the Act, it must be
made at the time of marriage and not during the negotiations
for marriage. Reliance in this behalf is placed on the use
of the expressions `bride' and `bridegroom' in Section 4 to
emphasise that at the stage of pre-marriage negotiations,
the boy and the girl are not `bridegroom' and `bride' and
therefore the `demand' made at that stage cannot be
construed as a `demand' of dowry punishable under Section 4
of the Act. On merits, counsel argued that reliance placed
by the trial court as well as the appellate and the
revisional court on various letters purporting to have been
written by the first accused was erroneous since the
appellant had denied their authorship and there was no
satisfactory evidence on the record to connect the appellant
with those letters except the "inconclusive" and
uncorroborated evidence of the handwriting expert. Mr.Rao
further argued that in the present case there was no
unimpeachable evidence available on the record to bring home
the guilt of the appellant and the failure of the
prosecution to examine Ms.Vani and Shri Narsinga Rao was a
serious lacuna in the prosecution case. Argued Mr. Rao that
the evidence of PW1, the complainant had not received any
corroboration at all and since the evidence of PW1 was not
wholly reliable, conviction of the appellant without any
corroboration of the evidence of PW1 was not justified. Mr.
Rao urged that the complainant had exaggerated the case and
roped in the appellant, whose elder brother alone had made
the demand for dowry, out of anger and frustration and that
let alone `demanding dowry', the first accused was not even
a privy to the demand of dowry as made by the second
accused, his elder brother.
Learned counsel for the respondent-State, however,
supported the judgment of the trial court and the High Court
and argued that the case against the appellant had been
established beyond a reasonable doubt and that this court
need not interfere in exercise of its jurisdiction under
Article 136 of the Constitution of India with findings of
fact arrived at after appreciation of evidence by the courts
below. According to Mr. Prabhakar, the interpretation sought
to be placed by Mr. Rao on Section 4 of the Act would defeat
the very object of the Act, which was enacted to curb the
practice of "demand" or acceptance and receipt of dowry" and
that the definition of `dowry' as contained in Section 2 of
the Act included the demand of dowry `at or before or after
the marriage'.
The curse of dowry has been raising its ugly head every
now and then but the evil has been flourishing beyond
imaginable proportions. It was to curb this evil, that led
the Parliament to enact The Dowry Prohibition Act in 1961.
The Act is intended to prohibit the giving or taking of
dowry end makes its `demand' by itself also an offence under
Section 4 of the Act. Even the abetment of giving, taking or
demanding dowry has been made an offence. Further, the Act
provides that any agreement for giving or taking of dowry
shall be void and the offences under the Act have also been
made non-compoundable vide Section 8 of the Act. Keeping in
view the object which is sought to be achieved by the Act
and the evil it attempts to stamp out, a three Judges Bench
of this court in L.V. Jadhav vs. Shankar Rao Abasaheb Pawar
& Others (1983 4 SCC 231) opined that the expression "Dowry"
wherever used in the Act must be liberally construed.
Before proceeding further, we consider it desirable to
notice some of the relevant provisions of the Dowry
Prohibition Act,1961.
"Section 2- `dowry' means any
property or valuable security given
or agreed to be given either
directly or indirectly-
(a) by one party to a marriage to
the other party to the marriage; or
(b) by the parents of either party
to a marriage or by any other
person, to either party to the
marriage or to any other person;
at or before or after the marriage
as consideration for the marriage
of the said parties, but does not
include dower or mahr in case of
person to whom the Muslim Personal
law
(Shariat) applies.
. . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . .
Section 3-Penalty for giving or
taking dowry- If any person, after
the commencement of this Act, gives
or takes or abets the giving or
taking of dowry, he shall be
punishable with imprisonment for a
term which shall not be less than
five years, and with fine which
shall not be less than fifteen
thousand rupees or the amount of
the value of such dowry, whichever
is more.
Provided that the Court may,
for adequate and special reasons to
be recorded in the judgment, impose
a sentence of imprisonment for a
term of less than five
years(Substituted for the words
"six months" w.e.f. 19th November,
1986).
Section-4: Penalty for demanding
dowry-if any person demands
directly or indirectly, from the
parents or other relatives or
guardian of a bride or bridegroom
as the case may be, any dowry, he
shall be punishable with
imprisonment for a term which shall
not be less than six months but
which may extend to two years and
with fine which may extend to ten
thousand rupees.
Provided that the Court may,
for adequate and special reasons to
be mentioned in the judgments
impose a sentence of imprisonment
for a term of less than six
months."
The definition of the term 'dowry' under Section 2 of
the Act shows that any property or valuable security given
or "agreed to be given" either directly or indirectly by one
party to the marriage to the other party to the marriage "at
or before or after the marriage" as a "consideration for the
marriage of the said parties" would become 'dowry'
punishable under the Act. Property or valuable security so
as to constitute 'dowry' within the meaning of the Act must
therefore be given or demanded "as consideration for the
marriage".
Section 4 of the Act aims at discouraging the very
"demand" of "dowry" as a 'Consideration for the marriage'
between the parties thereto and lays down that if any person
after the commencement of the Act, "demands", directly or
indirectly, from the parents or guardians of a 'bride' or
'bridegroom', as the case may be, any 'dowry', he shall be
punishable with imprisonment which may extend to six months
or with fine which may extend to Rs.5,000/- or with both.
Thus, it would be seen that section 4 makes punishable the
very demand of property or valuable security as a
consideration for marriage, which demand, if satisfied,
would constitute the graver offence under section a of the
Act punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not
be less than five years and with fine which shall not be
less than fifteen thousand rupees or the amount of the value
of such dowry whichever is more.
The definition of the expression 'dowry' contained in
Section 2 of the Act cannot be confined merely to the
'demand' of money, property or valuable security 'made at or
after the performance of marriage' as is urged by Mr. Rao.
The legislature has in its wisdom while providing for the
definition of 'dowry' emphasised that any money, property or
valuable security given, as a consideration for marriage,
'before, at or after the marriage would be covered by the
expression 'dowry' and this definition as contained in
Section 2 has to be read wherever the expression 'dowry'
occurs in the Act. Meaning of the expression 'dowry'as
commonly used and understood is different than the peculiar
definition thereof under the Act. Under Section 4 of the
Act, mere demand of 'dowry' is sufficient to bring home the
offence to an accused. Thus, any "demand" of money, property
or valuable security made from the bride or her parents or
other relatives by the bridegroom or his parents or other
relatives or vice-versa would fall within the mischief of
'dowry' under the Act where such demand is not properly
referable to any legally recognised claim and is
consideration of marriage. Marriage in this context would
include a proposed marriage also more particularly where the
non-fulfilment of the "demand of dowry" leads to the ugly
consequence of the marriage not taking place at all. The
expression 'dowry' under the Act must be interpreted in the
sense which the Statute wishes to attribute to it. Mr.
P.P.Rao, learned senior counsel referred to various
dictionaries for the meaning of 'dowry', 'bride' and
'bridegroom' and on the basis of those meanings submitted
that 'dowry' must be construed only as such property, goods
or valuable security which is given to a husband by and on
behalf of the wife at marriage and any demand made prior to
marriage would not amount to dowry. We cannot agree. Where
definition has been given in a statute itself, it is neither
proper nor desirable to look to the dictionaries etc. to
find out the meaning of the expression. The definition given
in the statute is the determinative- factor. The Act is a
piece of social legislation which aims to check the growing
menace of the social evil of dowry and it makes punishable
not only the actual receiving of dowry but also the very
demand of dowry made before or at the time or after the
marriage where such demand is referable to the consideration
of marriage. Dowry as a quid pro for marriage is prohibited
and not the giving of traditional presents to the bride or
the bride groom by friends and relatives. Thus, voluntary
presents given at or before or after the marriage to the
bride or the bridegroom, as the case may be, of a
traditional nature, which are given not as a consideration
for marriage but out of love, affection on regard, would not
fall within the mischief of the expression 'dowry' mare
punishable under the Act.
It is a well known rule of interpretation of statutes
that the text and the context of the entire Act must be
looked into while interpreting any of the expressions used
in a statute. The courts must look to the object which the
statute seeks to achieve while interpreting any of the
provisions of the Act. A purposive approach for interpreting
the Act is necessary. We are unable to persuade ourselves to
agree with Mr. Rao that it is only the property or valuable
security given at the time of marriage which would bring the
same within the definition of 'dowry' punishable under the
Act, as such an interpretation would be defeating the very
object for which the Act was enacted. Keeping in view the
object of the Act, "demand of dowry" as a consideration for
a proposed marriage would also come within the meaning of
the expression dowry under the Act. If we were to agree with
Mr. Rao that it is only the demand made at or after marriage
which is punishable under Section 4 of the Act, Some serious
consequences, which the legislature wanted to avoid, are
bound to follow. Take for example a case where the
bridegroom or his parents or other relatives make a 'demand'
of dowry during marriage negotiations and lateron after
bringing the bridal party to the bride's house find that the
bride or her parents or relative have not met the earlier
'demand' and call off the marriage and leave the bride house
should they escape the punishment under the Act. The answer
has to be an emphatic 'no'. It would be adding insult to
injury if we were to countenance that their action would not
attract the provisions of Section 4 of the Act. Such an
interpretation would frustrate the very object of the Act
and would also run contrary to the accepted principles
relating to the interpretation of statutes.
In Reserve Bank of India Etc. Etc.. vs. Peerless
General Finance And Investment Co. Ltd. & Others Etc.. Etc..
(1987) 1 SCC 424 while dealing with the question of
interpretation of a statute, this court observed:
"Interpretation must depend on the
text and the context. They are the
bases of interpretation. One may
well say if the text is the
texture, context is what gives the
colour. Neither can be ignored.
Both are important. That
interpretation is best which makes
the textual interpretation match
the contextual. A statute is best
interpreted when we know why it was
enacted. With this knowledge, the
statute must be read, first as a
whole and then section by section,
clause by clause, phrase by phrase
and word by word. If a statute is
looked at, in the context of its
enactment, with the glasses of the
statutemaker, provided by such
context, its scheme, the sections,
clauses, phrases and words may take
colour and appear different than
when the statute is looked at
without the glasses provided by the
context. With these glasses we must
look at the Act as a whole and
discover what each section, each
clause, each phrase and each word
is meant and designed to say as to
fit into the scheme of the entire
Act. No part of a statute and no
word of a statute can be construed
in isolation. Statutes have to be
construed so that every word has a
place and everything is in its
place."
Again, in N.K.Jain & Others vs. C.K.Shah & Others(1991)
2 SCC 495 it was observed that in gathering the meaning of a
word used in the statute, the context in which that word has
been used has significance and the legislative purpose must
be noted by reading the statute as a whole and bearing in
mind the context in which the word has been used in the
statute.
In Seaford Court Estates Ltd. vs. Asher, (1949) 2 All
ER 155(CA), Lord Denning advised a purposive approach to the
interpretation of a word used in a statute and observed:
"The English language is not an
instrument of mathematical
precision. Our literature would be
much the poorer if it were. This is
where the draftsmen of Acts of
Parliament have often been unfairly
criticised. A judge, believing
himself to be fettered by the
supposed rule that he must look to
the language and nothing else,
laments that the draftsmen have
note, provided for this or that, or
have been guilty of some or other
ambiguity. It would certainly Leave
the judges trouble if Acts of
Parliament were drafted with divine
prescience and perfect clarity. In
the absence of it, when a defect
appears, a judge cannot simply fold
his hands and blame the draftsman.
He must set to work on the
constructive task of finding the
intention of Parliament, and he
must do this not only from the
language of the statute, but also
from a consideration of the social
conditions which gave rise to it
and of the mischief which it was
passed to remedy, and then he must
supplement the written word so as
to give 'force and life' to the
intention of the legislature A
judge should ask himself the
question how, if the makers of the
Act had themselves come across this
ruck in the texture of it, they
would have straightened it out? He
must then do so as they would have
done. A judge must not alter the
material of which the Act is woven,
but he can and should iron out the
creases."
(emphasis supplied)
An argument, similar to the one As raised by Mr. Rao
regarding the use of the expressions 'bride'and 'bridegroom'
occurring in Section 4 of the Act to urge that "demand" of
property or valuable security would not be "dowry" if it is
made during the negotiations for marriage until the boy and
the girl acquire the status of 'bridegroom' and 'bride', at
or immediately after the marriage, was raised and repelled
by this court in L.V. Jadhav's case (supra).
In L.V. Jadhav's case (supra) while interpreting the
meaning of 'dowry' under Section 2 of the Act and co-
relating it to the requirements of Section 4 of the Act, the
Bench observed:
"........ Section 4 which Lays down
that
"if any person after the
commencement of this Act, demands,
directly or indirectly from the
parents or guardian of a bride or
bridegroom, as the case may be, any
dowry, he shall be punishable with
imprisonment which may extend to
six months or with fine which may
extend to five thousand rupees or
with both". According to Webster's
New World Dictionary, 1962 edn.
bride means a woman who has just
been married or is about to be
married, and bridegroom means a man
who has just been married or is
about to be married. If we give
this meaning of a bride or a
bridegroom to the word bride or
bridegroom used in Section 4 of the
Act, property or valuable security
demanded and consented to be given
prior to the time when the woman
had become a bride or the man had
become a bridegroom, may not be
"dowry" within the meaning of the
Act. Act. We are also of the
opinion that the object of Section
4 of the Act is to discourage the
very demand for property or
valuable security as consideration
for a marriage between the parties
thereto. Section 4 prohibits the
demand for 'giving' property or
valuable security which demand, if
satisfied, would constitute an
offence under Section 3 read with
Section 2 of the Act.
There is no warrant for taking
the view that the initial demand
for giving of property or valuable
security would not constitute an
offence......... "
Therefore, interpreting the expression 'dowry and
'demand' in the context of the scheme of the Act, we are of
the opinion that any 'demand of 'dowry' made before at or
after the marriage, where such demand is made as a
consideration for marriage would attract the provisions of
Section 4 of the Act.
The alarming increase in cases relating to harassment,
torture, abetted suicides and dowry deaths of young innocent
brides has always sent stock waves to the civilized society
but unfortunately the evil has continued unabated. Awakening
of the collective consciousness is the need of the day.
Change of heart and attitude is needed. A wider social
movement not only of educating women of their rights but all
of the men folk to respect and recognise the basic human
values is essentially needed to bury this pernicious social
evil. The role of the courts, under the circumstances,
assumes a great importance. The courts are expected to deal
with such cases in a realistic manner so as to further the
object of the legislation. However, the courts must not lose
right of the fact that the Act, though a piece of social
legislation, is a penal statute. One of the cardinal rules
of interpretation in such cases is that a penal statute must
be strictly construed. The courts have, thus, to be watchful
to see that emotions or sentiments are not allowed to
influence their judgment, one way or the other and that they
do not ignore the golden thread passing through criminal
jurisprudence that an accused is presumed to be innocent
till proved guilty and that the guilt of an accused must be
established beyond a reasonable doubt. They must carefully
assess the evidence and not allow either suspicion or
surmise or conjectures to state the place of proof in their
zeal to stamp out the evil from the society while at the
same time not adopting the easy course of letting
technicalities or minor discrepancies in the evidence result
in acquitting an accused. They must critically analyses the
evidence and decide the case in a realistic manner.
It is in the light of the scheme of the Act and the
above principles that we shall now consider the merits of
the present case. This Court, generally speaking, does not
interfere with the findings recorded on appreciation of
evidence by the courts below except where there appears to
have occurred gross miscarriage of justice or there exist
sufficient reasons which justify the examination of some of
the relevant evidence by this court itself.
There is no dispute that the marriage of the appellant
was settled with Ms. Vani, daughter of PW1 and ultimately it
did not take place and broke down. According to PW1, the
reason for the brake down of the marriage was his refusal
and inability to comply with the "demand" for enhancing the
'dowry' as made by the appellant and his brother, the second
accused. The High Court considered the evidence on the
record and observed"
"From the evidence of PW1 it is
clear that it is only the 2nd
petitioner that initially demanded
the dowry in connection with the
marriage of his younger brother,
the first petitioner. He alone was
present when PW1 agreed to give a
cash of Rs. 50,000/- for purchase
of car, a house, jewels, clothing
and cash valued at rupees one lakh.
This took place in the month of
June, 1985 when PW1 approached the
second petitioner for fixation of
date for marriage some time in the
month of September, 1985. According
to PW1, the second petitioner
demanded rupees one lakh for
purchase of car. But, however, PW1
persuaded the second petitioner to
fix the date leaving that matter
open to be decided in consultation
with the first petitioner. When the
first petitioner came to Hyderabad
in October, 1985 PW1 complained to
him about the demand for additional
dowry and that the first petitioner
would appear to have told PW1 that
he would discuss with his brother
and inform him. Then the first
petitioner went to his native place
and return to Hyderabad and asked
PW1 to give Rs. 75,000/- for
purchase of car.
The High Court further observed :
" Thus the demand for dowry either
initially or at later emanated only
from the second petitioner, the
elder brother for the first
petitioner. From the evidence it
would appear that the petitioners
come from a lower middle class
family and fortunately the first
petitioner was selected for I.P.S.
and from the tone of letters
written by the first petitioner to
Kum. Vani particularly from Ex. P-6
letter it would appear that he was
more interested in acting according
to the wishes respondent who he
probably felt was responsible for
his coming up in life. The recitals
in Ex.P-6 would show that he did
not like to hurt the feelings of
the second petitioner and probably
for that reason he could not say
anything when his elder brother
demanded for more dowry. We cannot
say how the first petitioner would
have acted if only he had freedom
to act according to his wishes. But
the first petitioner was obliged to
act according to the wishes of his
elder brother in asking for more
dowry. However, I feel that this
cannot be a circumstances to
exonerate him from his liability
from demand of dowry under Section
4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.
(Emphasis supplied)
From the above noted observations, it appears that the
High Court felt that the appellant was perhaps acting as
"His Master's Voice" of his elder brother. The High Court
accepted the evidence of PW1 to hold that the appellant had
demanded enhanced dowry of Rs 75000/ for purchase of car on
his return from the native village and had repeated his
demand at the him; of "Varapuja" and lateron did not marry
Ms Vani as PW1 was unable to meet the demands as projected
by the appellant and his elder brother. The High Court
appears to have too readily accepted the version of PW1
without properly analyzing and appreciating the same.
Since, PW1 is the sole witness, we have considered it
proper to examine his evidence with caution.
From our critical analysis of the evidence of PW1,it
emerges that at the time of initial demand of dowry as a
consideration for marriage of the appellant it was only the
brother of the appellant, the second accused, who was
present and it was the second accused alone with whom the
negotiations took place in presence of PW2 According to PW1,
the brother of the appellant later on demanded rupees one
lakh for the purchase of car as against the initial
agreement of rupees fifty thousand or the said purpose.
Admittedly, the first accused was not present at either of
the two occasions. According to PW1 when the appellant came
to Hyderabad in October, 1985 he (PW1) complained to him
about the demand for a additional dowry made by his brother
and the appellant told him that he would discuss the matter
with his brother and inform him. It was, thereafter.
According to PW1 that then the appellant returned to
Hyderabad from his native place that he asked the
complainant (PW1) to give Rs.75,000/- for purchase of the
car. Shri Narsingh Rao is stated to have been present at
that time, but he has not been examined at the trial. The
above statement of PW1 has, however, surfaced for the first
time at the trial only. These is no mention of it in the
first information report, Ex.P-20 or even in the two
complaints which had been sent by PW1 to the Director,
National Police Academy prior to the lodging of Ex. P-20.
PW1 admitted in his evidence "I have not stated in Ex. P-20
and in my 161 statement that A-1 on return from his native
place demanded rupees seventy five thousand instead of
rupees one lakh for purchase of car and that I said that
what was the agreed for purchase of car was only Rs.
50,000/- and not Rs. 75,000/- . This story, therefore,
appears to be an after thought, made with a view to
implicate the appellant with the commission af an offence
under Section 4 of the Act. Had this been the state of
affairs, we see no reason as to why the fact would not have
found mention at least in the complaints made to 'the
Director of the Academy where the appellant was under-going
training. PW1, being a lawyer, must be presumed to be aware
of the importance and relevance of the statement attributed
to the appellant to incorporate it in the complaints and the
FIR. We find this part of the evidence of PW1 rather
difficult to accept without any independent corroboration.
There is no corroboration available on the record as even
Shri Narsingh Rao has not been examined.
According to PW1, the demand of dowry was repeated by
the appellant at the time of "Varapuja" which was performed
on 31.10.1985 at the house of the second accused also. PW1
stated that he handed over the documents pertaining to the
house, rupees fifty thousand in cash and pass book showing
the deposit of about rupees fifty thousand in the bank in
the name of Ms.Vani to the appellant alongwith other
articles of 'varapuje'and on seeing the documents the
appellant flared up and said that since the settlement was
for a two storeyed house and not a single storey house, as
reflected in Ex.P13, he would cancel the marriage unless the
'demands' as made earlier were fulfilled. The story of
"varapuja" which has been too readily accepted by the courts
below, again appears to us to be of a doubtful nature and
does not inspire confidence. The following admission of PW1
in his evidence, in the context of "varapuja" allegedly held
on 31.10.1985 has significance :
"It is not true that Varapuja is
puja of brideroom according to my
understanding. I did not take any
prohit for Varapuja. I did not take
any photograph on that occasion. I
did get any Lagna Patrika prepared
for the marriage. It is not true
that I am deposing falsely that
there was Varapuja and that offered
money on that occasion.
I started marriage preparation
probably in the month of September,
or October, I cannot say on what
date I booked hall for the
marriage. Ex. P.8 is only
cancellation receipt of the
marriage hall. I have not got
invitation cards printed. I did not
write any letters to anybody
informing them of the marriage or
inviting them to the marriage as I
received letter from A-1 to cancel
the marriage in the month of
October,itself cancellation of the
date of marriage was prior to
Varapuja.
(emphasis ours)
The above admission creates a lot of doubt about the
performance of 'varapuja.' According to PW1, he had received
a letter from the appellant to the marriage in the month of
October itself. Therefore, if the marriage had been it does
not stand to reason as to why 'vrapuja' should have take?
place at all. The holding of 'Varapuja' appears to be highly
improbable. No corroboration of any nature to support this
part of the evidence of PW1 is forthcoming on the record.
That the marriage between the parties did not take
place is not in dispute but these is no satisfactory
evidence on the record to show that the appellant cancelled
the marriage on account of non-fulfilment of dowry demand
allegedly made by him. The letter which PW1 claims to have
himself received from the appellant regarding cancellation
of marriage prior to 'varapuja' ceremony has not been
produced. Reliance instead has been placed by the
prosecution on letter Ex P-6 allegedly written by the
appellant to Ms.Vani cancelling the date of marriage. We
shall refer to the documentary evidence in the latter part
of the judgment. The failure of PW1 to produce the letter
allegedly received by him from the first accused invites an
adverse presumption against him that had he produced the
letter, the same would have belied his evidence. The
evidence of PW1, who is the sole witness, suffers from
serious inconsistencies and exaggerations. He admittedly is
the most interested person to establish his case. He is the
complainant an the case. It was he who had made two
complaints to the Director of National Police Academy
against the appellant before lodging the FIR, Ex.P20. He is
a lawyer by profession. He would be presumed to know the
importance of the 'demand made by the appellant on the two
occasions. He, however, has offered no explanation as to why
those facts are conspicuous by their absence from the FIR
and the two complaints made to the Director of the Academy.
PW1, does not appear to us to be a wholly reliable witness.
He has made conscious improvements at the trial to implicate
the appellant by indulging in exaggerations and that
detracts materially from his reliability. Prudence,
therefore, requires that the Court should look for
corroboration of his evidence in material particulars before
accepting the same. Neither Ms Vani nor Shri Narsingh Rao in
whose presence the appellant is said to have demanded dowry
have been examined as Witnesses. The failure to examine them
is a serious lacuna in the prosecution case. It was Ms. Vani
who could have deposed about the circumstances which led to
the breakdown of the metrimonial negotiations, before its
maturity. Various letter which PW1 produced at the trial
were allegedly written by the appellant to the handwriting
expert prosecution has sought to corroborate the evidence of
PW1 regarding the authorship of those letters. The opinion
of PW3,the Assistant Director in the State Forensic &
Science Laboratory, Hyderabad, in our view can not be said
to be of inching type to attribute the authorship of those
letters to the appellant. PW3 during his statement deposed :
"In my opinion (1) there are
similarities indicating common
authorship between the red enclosed
writings marked as S-12 to S-23 and
the red enclosed writings marked as
Q.4 to Q.7. But definite present
standards.(2) No opinion can be
given on the authorship of the red
enclosed signatures and writings
marked as Q-1 to Q-3 and Q-8 to Q-
15 on the basis of present
standards.
(emphasis supplied)
The expert further opined :
"When all the writing
characteristics are considered
collectively, they led to the
conclusion that there are
similarities indicating common
authorship between the standard
writings marked S-12 to S-25 and
the questioned writings marked Q-4
to Q-7. But no definite opinion can
be given on the basis of the
present standards Extensive
admitted writings are required for
offering definite opinion.
(emphasis supplied)
During his cross-examination PW3 admitted :
"Q. From the available
standards you cannot say that the
signatures of Exs. P.7 and P.9 is
the same person who wrote Exs. P.7
and P.9.
Ans: we can compare truly like
live, signatures with signatures
and writings with writings and not
a signature with a writing."
Thus, the evidence of PW3, is not definite and cannot
be said to be of a clinching nature to connect the appellant
with the disputed letters. The evidence of an expert is
rather weak type of evidence and the courts do not generally
consider it as offering 'conclusive' proof and therefore
safe to rely upon the same without seeking, independent and
reliable corroboration. In Magan Bihari Lal Vs. State of
Punjab (AIR 1977 SC 1091), while dealing with evidence of a
handwriting expert, this Court opined:
"We think it would be
extremely hazardous to condemn the
appellant merely on the strength of
opinion evidence of a handwriting
expert. It is now well settled that
expert opinion must always be
received with great caution and
perhaps none so with mare caution
than the opinion of a handwriting
expert. There is a profusion of
precedential authority which holds
that it is unsafe to base a
conviction solely on expert opinion
without substantial corroboration.
This rule has been universally
acted upon and it has almost become
a rule of law. It was held by this
Court in Ram Chandra Vs. State of
U.P. AIR 1957 SC 381 that it is
unsafe to treat expert handwriting
opinion as sufficient basis for
conviction, but it may be relied
upon when supported by other items
of internal and external evidence.
This Court again pointed out in
Ishwari Prasad Vs. Md. Isa, AIR
1963 SC 1728 that expert evidence
of handwriting can never be
conclusive because it is, after
all, opinion evidence, and this
view was reiterated in Shashi
Kumar Vs. Subodh Kumar, AIR 1964 SC
529 where it was pointed out by
this Court that expert's evidence
as to handwriting being opinion
evidence can rarely, if ever, take
the place of substantive evidence
and before acting on such
evidence, it would be desirable to
consider whether it is corroborated
either by clear direct evidence or
by circumstantial evidence. This
Court had again occasion to
consider the evidentiary value of
expert opinion in regard to
handwriting in Fakhruddin Vs. State
of M.P. AIR 1967 SC 1326 and it
uttered a note of caution pointing
out that it would be risky to
found a conviction solely on the
evidence of a handwriting expert
before acting upon such evidence,
the court must always try to see
whether it is corroborated by other
evidence, direct or
circumstantial."
We are unable to agree, in the established facts and
circumstanced of this case, with the view expressed by the
courts below that PW1 is a competent witness to speak about
the handwriting of the appellant and that the opinion of PW3
has received corroboration from the evidence of PW1. PW1
admittedly did not receive any of those letters. He had no
occasion to be familiar with the handwriting of the
appellant. He is not a handwriting expert. The bald
assertion of PW1 that he was "familiar" with the handwriting
of the appellant and fully "acquainted" with the contents of
the letters, admittedly not addressed to him, without
disclosing how he was familiar with the handwriting of the
appellant, is difficult to accept. Section 67 of the
Evidence Act enjoins that before a document can be looked
into, it has to be proved. Section 67, of course, does not
prescribe any particular mode of proof. Section 47 of the
Evidence Act which occurs in the chapter relating to
'relevancy of facts' provides that the opinion of a person
who is acquainted with the handwriting of a particular
person is a relevant fact. Similarly, opinion of a
handwriting expert is also a relevant fact for identifying
any handwriting. The ordinary method of proving a document
is by calling as a witness the person who had executed the
document or saw it being executed or signed or is otherwise
qualified and competent to express his opinion as to the
handwriting. There are some other modes of proof of
documents also as by comparison of the handwriting as
envisaged under Section 73 of the Evidence Act or through
the evidence of a handwriting expert under Section 45 of the
Act, besides by the admission of the person against whom the
document is intended to be used. The receiver of the
document, on establishing his acquaintance with the
handwriting of the person and competence to identify the
writing with which he is familiar, may also prove a
document. These modes are legitimate methods of proving
documents but before they can be accepted they must bear
sufficient strength to carry conviction. Keeping in view the
in-conclusive and indefinite nature of the evidence of the
handwriting expert PW3 and the lack of competence on the
part of PW1 to be familiar with the handwriting of the
appellant, the approach adopted by the courts below to
arrive at the conclusion that the disputed letters were
written by the appellant to Ms.Vani on the basis of the
evidence of PW1 and PW3 was not proper. The doubtful
evidence of PW1 could neither offer any corroboration to the
inconclusive and indefinite opinion of the handwriting
expert PW3 nor could it receive any corroboration from the
opinion of PW3. We are not satisfied, in the established
facts and circumstances of this case, that the prosecution
has established either the genuineness or the authorship of
the disputed letters allegedly written by the appellant from
the evidence of PW1 or PW3. The courts below appear to have
taken a rather superficial view of the matter while relying
upon the evidence of PW1 and PW3 to hold the appellant
guilty. We find it unsafe to base the conviction of the
appellant on the basis of the evidence of PW1 or PW3 in the
absence of substantial independent corroboration,internally
or externally, of their evidence, which in this case is
totally wanting.
To us it appears that the demand of dowry in connection
with and as consideration for the marriage of the appellant
with Ms.Vani was made by the second accused the elder
brother of the appellant and that no such demand is
established to have been directly made by the appellant. The
High Court rightly found the second accused, guilty of an
offence under Section 4 of the Act against which S.L.P.
(Criminal) No.2336 of 1990, as earlier noticed stands
dismissed by this court on 15.2.1991. The evidence on the
record does not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that any
demand of dowry within the meaning of Section 2 read with
Section 4 of the Act was made by the appellant. May be the
appellant was in agreement with his elder brother regarding
'demand' of 'dowry' but convictions cannot be based on such
assumptions without the offence being proved beyond a
reasonable doubt. The courts below appear to have allowed
emotions and sentiments, rather than legally admissible and
trustworthy evidence, to influence their judgment. The
evidence on the record does not establish the case against
the appellant beyond a reasonable doubt. He is, therefore,
entitled to the benefit of doubt. This appeal, thus,succeeds
and is allowed. The conviction and sentence of the appellant
is hereby set aside. The appellant is on bail. His bail
bonds shall stand discharged.
