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Adv. Aditya (Litigator GROSON ADVISORS)     07 June 2018

Has there been FIR yet? 

Balkishan Advocate   07 June 2018

yes for hurt

Balkishan Advocate   07 June 2018

under section 319

Kumar Doab (FIN)     08 June 2018

If possible close the mater amicably.

GO thru; IPC;95,319,323,334, 350, 351,353,

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1569253/

Kumar Doab (FIN)     08 June 2018

The implications may be understood from various perspectives since you have not posted the details and implications that you apprehend..

Small incidents of pushing, jostling or slapping are converted into alleged .

….

Delhi High Court

Ms. Nidhi Kaushik vs Union Of India & Ors. on 26 May, 2014

Author: J.R. Midha

 

 

 

29. Looking through the prism of case law pertaining to when can the door be shown to a government servant and by doing reverse engineering we can safely say that what is good for the door to be shown, is good for prohibiting entry through the door, and thus while denying public employment with respect to the offence committed by a person, it can be said, and we say so, that it may be a serious violation of the constitutional right of a citizen to be fairly treated in the matter of public employment if trivial offences committed by the citizen would justify the State shutting its eyes and denying employment.

30. Having answered the question posed in para 1 above, and the answer being in favour of the citizen, we need to answer the further question as to which offences or brush therewith, would justify non entry into public service.

40. All these offences are non-cognizable and needless to state are bailable. No moral turpitude, as generically understood, is involved. The acts do not shock the moral conscious of the society and with reference to the motive do not evidence a person with depraved character. The offences are not of the kind which would justify dismissal or removal from service, if the respondent had committed the same if in service.

41. Thus, being charged with the said offences, of which the respondent has ultimately been acquitted, would not be a bar and cannot be treated as a bar to seek public employment and on being successful at the entrance exam, to be denied the same."

26. Conclusion 26.1. In the facts and circumstances of this case, the appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment dated 4 th September, 2013 is set aside. The order of cancellation of the offer of appointment of the appellant and the letter dated 5th December, 2012 dismissing the appellant's appeal are hereby quashed. The provisional offer of appointment of the appellant dated 3rd September, 2012 is restored. The respondent BHEL shall complete all the formalities and issue the final offer of appointment to the appellant within five days and the appellant shall report for joining the respondent on 2nd June, 2014 at 10:00 am. The respondents shall pay a costs of Rs.50,000/- to the appellant.s

28. The Executive Director (HR & CC) of BHEL, who has filed the affidavits containing false and misleading statements shall remain personally present in Court on 30 th May, 2014 to show cause why action be not taken against him. He shall also disclose the names of other officers responsible for the lapses.

 

Kumar Doab (FIN)     08 June 2018

HC acquitted BUT Apex Court did not agree..

Supreme Court of India

Mrs. Veeda Menezes vs Yusuf Khan And Anr on 31 March, 1966

Equivalent citations: 1966 AIR 1773, 1966 SCR 123

Author: S C.

Bench: Shah, J.C.

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1879362/

HEADNOTE:

In the course of an altercation between neighbours the first

respondent slapped the appellant's servant and threw a              file

of  papers at the appellant's husband which missed  him               but

hit  the  appellant on the elbow, causing a scratch.   On  a

prosecution   being  launched  the   Presidency    Magistrate

convicted  the first respondent under s. 323 of  the  Indian

Penal Code.  The High Court however held that the  offending

act came within the General Exception in s. 95 of the Indian

Penal  Code as it was trivial.         In appeal to this Court   the

appellant  contended that: (1) Section 95 applies only     when

the act of the accused is accidental and not deliberate; (2)

the section cannot be invoked if the harm caused consists of

physical injury.

HELD:(i) It cannot be said that harm caused by doing an act

with  intent to cause harm or with the knowledge  that  harm

may  be caused thereby will not fall within the terms of  s.

95.   The  section  applies if the act            causes  harm  or  is

intended  to  cause harm or is known to be likely  to  cause

harm,  provided                the  harm is so slight that  no  person  of

ordinary  sense or temper would complain of such harm.              [125

F]

(ii) There  is         nothing in s. 95 to justify  the  contention

that  the  word  'harm' as used in  that  section  does      not

include physical injury.  Section 95 is a general  exception

and  that  word has in many  other  sections  dealing      with

general exceptions a wide connotation inclusive of  physical

injury.   There is no reason to suppose that the Legislature

intended  to  use  the     expression 'harm'  in  s.  95  in  a

restricted sense. [126 A-B]

(iii)Whether,  an  offence  is trivial must  depend  on       the

nature  of  the   injury, the position of  the  parties,         the

knowledge or intention with which the offending act is done,

and other related matters.[126 CD]

 

 

 

 

Rest your own counsel must have alresady advised you.


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