It has to be exclaimed right at the start with considerable degree of satisfaction that in one of the most landmark judgment that Supreme Court which is the highest court in India has delivered since independence which has garnered not just national headlines but also international headlines, the Apex Court on September 28, 2018 in Indian Young Lawyers Association & Ors v The State of Kerala & Ors in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 373 of 2006 by a 4:1 majority in one of the most keenly awaited judgment has very laudably permitted entry of women of all age groups to the Sabarimala temple, holding that 'devotion cannot be subjected to gender discrimination'. It is one of the most progressive and path breaking judgment that we have witnessed in last many decades just like in the Shayara Bano case where Supreme Court not long time back had upheld triple talaq as unconstitutional! Very rightly so!
Be it noted, the lone women in the Bench, Justice Indu Malhotra, dissented. Chief Justice Dipak Misra, Justice RF Nariman, Justice AM Khanwilkar and Justice DY Chandrachud constituted the majority. The Bench was delivering this landmark and laudable judgment in a 2006 PIL filed by Indian Young Lawyers Association challenging the centuries-old tradition of Sabrimala Temple banning entry of women of menstruating age inside the temple. Why do we forget that even in temples of Lord Hanuman who as per mythological beliefs was a bachelor yet no women of any age has ever been stopped from entering his temple and even Muslims and people from other religions are not barred from paying their respect to him if anyone of them so desire?
At the very outset, this landmark judgment written by the CJI Dipak Misra for himself and Justice AM Khanwilkar notes that, 'The irony that is nurtured by the society is to impose a rule, however unjustified, and proffer explanation or justification to substantiate the substratum of the said rule. Mankind, since time immemorial, has been searching for explanation or justification to substantiate a point of view that hurts humanity. The theoretical human values remain on paper. Historically, women have been treated with inequality and that is why, many have fought for their rights. Susan B Anthony, known for her feminist activity, succinctly puts, 'Men, their rights, and nothing more; women, their rights, and nothing less.' It is a clear message.'
More importantly, para 2 then rightly touches the raw nerve by pointing out clearly and categorically that, 'Neither the said message nor any kind of philosophy has opened up the large populace of this country to accept women as partners in their search for divinity and spirituality. In the theatre of life, it seems, man has put the autograph and there is no space for a woman even to put her signature. There is inequality on the path of approach to understand the divinity. The attribute of devotion to divinity cannot be subjected to the rigidity and stereotypes of gender. The dualism that persists in religion by glorifying and venerating women as goddesses on one hand and by imposing rigorous sanctions on the other hand in matters of devotion has to be abandoned. Such a dualistic approach and an entrenched mindset results in indignity to women and degradation of their status. The society has to undergo a perceptual shift from being the propagator of hegemonic patriarchal notions of demanding more exacting standards of purity and chastity solely from women to be the cultivator of equality where the woman is in no way considered frailer, lesser or inferior to man. The law and the society are bestowed with the Herculean task to act as levellers in this regard.'
Continuing in the same vein, para 3 then minces no words in saying that, 'Any relationship with the Creator is a transcendental one crossing all socially created artificial barriers and not a negotiated relationship bound by terms and conditions. Such a relationship and expression of devotion cannot be circumscribed by dogmatic notions of biological or physiological factors arising out of rigid socio-cultural attitudes which do not meet the constitutionally prescribed tests. Patriarchy in religion cannot be permitted to trump over the element of pure devotion borne out of faith and the freedom to practise and profess one's religion. The subversion and repression of women under the garb of biological or physiological factors cannot be given the seal of legitimacy. Any rule based on discrimination or segregation of women pertaining to biological characteristics is not only unfounded, indefensible and implausible but can also never pass the muster of constitutionality.'
Going forward, para 4 then enunciates that, 'It is a universal truth that faith and religion do not countenance discrimination but religious practices are sometimes seen as perpetuating patriarchy thereby negating the basic tenets of faith and of gender equality and rights. The societal attitudes too centre and revolve around the patriarchal mindset thereby derogating the status of women in the social and religious milieu. All religions are simply different paths to reach the Universal One. Religion is basically a way of life to relaize one's identity with the Divinity. However, certain dogmas and exclusionary practices and rituals have resulted in incongruities between the true essence of religion or faith and its practice that has come to be permeated with patriarchal prejudices. Sometimes, in the name of essential and integral facet of the faith, such practices are zealously propagated.'
It cannot be lost on us that para 5 then observes that, 'Having stated so, we will focus on the factual score. The instant writ petition preferred under Article 32 of the Constitution seeks issuance of directions against the Government of Kerala, Devaswom Board of Travancore, Chief Thanthri of Sabarimala Temple and the District Magistrate of Pathanamthitta to ensure entry of female devotees between the age group of 10 to 50 years to the Lord Ayyappa Temple at Sabarimala (Kerala) which has been denied to them on the basis of certain custom and usage; to declare Rule 3(b) of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Act, 1965 (for brevity, 'the 1965 Act') as unconstitutional being violative of Articles 14, 15, 25 and 51A(e) of the Constitution of India and further to pass directions for the safety of women pilgrims.'
It would be pertinent to mention here that para 6 then illustrates that, 'The three-Judge Bench in Indian Young Lawyers Association and others v. State of Kerala and others, (2017) 10 SCC 689, keeping in view the gravity of the issues involved, sought the assistance of Mr. Raju Ramachandran and Mr. K. Ramamoorthy, learned senior counsel as Amici Curiae. Thereafter, the three-Judge Bench analyzed the decision and the reasons ascribed by the Kerala High Court in S. Mahendran v. The Secretary, Travancore Devaswom Board, Thiruvananthapuram and others AIR 1993 Kerala 42 wherein similar contentions were raised. The Bench took note of the two affidavits dated 13.11.2007 and 05.02.2016 and the contrary stand taken therein by the Government of Kerala.' Para 9 says that, 'It is also worthy to note here that the Division Bench of the High Court of Kerala, in S. Mahendran (supra), upheld the practice of banning entry of women belonging to the age group of 10 to 50 years in the Sabarimala temple during any time of the year.'
Having said this, let us now turn to see what Para 95 enunciates. It says that, 'Though, the respondents have urged that the pilgrims coming to visit the Sabarimala temple being devotees of Lord Ayyappa are addressed as Ayyappans and, therefore, the third condition for a religious denomination stands satisfied, is unacceptable. There is no identified group called Ayyappans. Every Hindu devotee can go to the temple. We have also been apprised that there are other temples for Lord Ayyappa and there is no such prohibition. Therefore, there is no identified sect. Accordingly, we hold, without any hesitation, that Sabarimala temple is a public religious endowment and there are no exclusive identified followers of the cult.'
To put things in perspective, para 96 then stipulates that, 'Coming to the first and the most important condition for a religious denomination, i.e., the collection of individuals ought to have a system of beliefs or doctrines which they regard as conducive to their spiritual well-being, there is nothing on record to show that the devotees of Lord Ayyappa have any common religious tenets peculiar to themselves, which they regard as conducive to their spiritual well-being, other than those which are common to the Hindu religion. Therefore, the devotees of Lord Ayyappa are just Hindus and do not constitute a separate religious denomination. For a religious denomination, there must be new methodology provided for a religion. Mere observance of certain practices, even though from a long time does not make it a distinct religion on that account.'
It is then brought out in para 97 that, 'Having stated that the devotees of Lord Ayyappa do not constitute a religious denomination within the meaning of Article 26 and that Sabarimala Temple is a public temple by virtue of the fact that Section 15 of the 1950 Act vests all powers of direction, control and supervision over it in the Travancore Devaswom Board which, in our foregoing analysis, has been unveiled as 'other authority' within the meaning of Article 12, resultantly fundamental rights including those guaranteed under Article 25(1) are enforceable against the Travancore Devaswom Board and other incorporated Devaswoms including the Sabarimala Temple.'
Now coming to para 100, it clearly and categorically says that. 'The right guaranteed under Article 25(1) has nothing to do with gender or, for that matter, certain physiological factors, specifically attributable to women. Women of any age group have as much a right as men to visit and enter a temple in order to freely practise a religion as guaranteed under Article 25(1). When we say so, we are absolutely alive to the fact that whether any such proposed exclusion of women from entry into religious places form an essential part of a religion would be examined at a subsequent stage.'
As it turned out, para 101 then spares no punches in explicitly stating that, 'We have no hesitation to say that such an exclusionary practice violates the right of women to visit and enter a temple to freely practice Hindu religion and to exhibit devotion towards Lord Ayyappa. The denial of this right to women significantly denudes them of their right to worship. We concur with the view of the Amicus Curiae, learned senior counsel, Mr. Raju Ramachandran, that the right guaranteed under Article 25(1) is not only about inter-faith parity but it is also about intra-faith parity. Therefore, the right to practise religion under Article 25(1) in its broad contour, encompasses a non-discriminatory right which is equally available to both men and women of all age groups professing the same religion.'
Simply put, para 104 then elucidates that, 'Therefore, it can be said without any hesitation or reservation that the impugned Rule 3(b) of the 1965 Rules, framed in pursuance of the 1965 Act, that stipulates exclusion of entry of women of the age group of 10 to 50 years, is a clear violation of the right of such women to practice their religious belief which, in consequence, makes their fundamental right under Article 25(1) a dead letter. It is clear as crystal that as long as the devotees, irrespective of their gender and/or age group, seeking entry to a temple of any caste are Hindus, it is their legal right to enter into a temple and offer prayers. The women, in the case at hand, are also Hindus and so, there is neither any viable nor any legal limitation on their right to enter into the Sabarimala Temple as devotees of Lord Ayyappa and offer their prayers to the deity.'
It was also clarified in para 105 that, 'When we say so, we may also make it clear that the said rule of exclusion cannot be justified on the ground that allowing entry to women of the said age group would, in any way, be harmful or would play a jeopardizing role to public order, morality, health or, for that matter, any other provision/s of Part III of the Constitution, for it is to these precepts that the right guaranteed under Article 25(1) has been made subject to.'
Needless to say, it is then underscored in para 110 that, 'The right guaranteed under Article 25(1) has been made subject to, by the opening words of the Article itself, public order, morality, health and other provisions of Part III of the Constitution. All the three words, that is order, morality and health are qualified by the word 'public'. Neither public order nor public health will be at peril by allowing entry of women devotees of the age group of 10 to 50 years into the Sabarimala temple for offering their prayers. As regards public morality, we must make it absolutely clear that since the Constitution was not shoved, by any external force, upon the people of this country but was rather adopted and given by the people of this country to themselves, the term public morality has to be appositely understood as being synonymous with constitutional morality.' Para 111 then seeks to make it clear that, 'Having said so, the notions of public order, morality and health cannot be used as colourable device to restrict the freedom to freely practise religion and discriminate against women of the age group of 10 to 50 years by denying them their legal right to enter and offer their prayers at the Sabarimala temple for the simple reason that public morality must yield to constitutional morality.'
In a nutshell, it is then observed in para 144 that, 'In view of our aforesaid analysis, we record our conclusions in seriatim:
(i) In view of the law laid down by this Court in Shirur Mutt (supra) and S.P. Mittal (supra), the devotees of Lord Ayyappa do not constitute a separate religious denomination. They do not have common religious tenets peculiar to themselves, which they regard as conducive to their spiritual well-being, other than those which are common to the Hindu religion. Therefore, the devotees of Lord Ayyappa are exclusively Hindus and do not constitute a separate religious denomination.
(ii) Article 25(1), by employing the expression 'all persons', demonstrates that the freedom of conscience and the right to freely profess, practise and propagate religion is available, though subject to the restrictions delineated in Article 25(1) itself, to every person including women. The right guaranteed under Article 25(1) has nothing to do with gender or, for that matter, certain physiological factors specifically attributable to women.
(iii) The exclusionary practice being followed at the Sabrimala temple by virtue of Rule 3(b) of the 1965 Rules violates the right of Hindu women to freely practise their religion and exhibit their devotion towards Lord Ayyappa. This denial denudes them of their right to worship. The right to practise religion under Article 25(1) is equally available to both men and women of all age groups professing the same religion.
(iv) The impugned Rule 3(b) of the 1965 Rules, framed under the 1965 Act, that stipulates exclusion of entry of women of the age group of 10 to 50 years, is a clear violation of the right of Hindu women to practise their religious beliefs which, in consequence, makes their fundamental right of religion under Article 25(1) a dead letter.
(v) The term 'morality' occurring in Article 25(1) of the Constitution cannot be viewed with a narrow lens so as to confine the sphere of definition of morality to what an individual, a section or religious sect may perceive the term to mean. Since the Constitution has been adopted and given by the people of this country to themselves, the term public morality in Article 25 has to be appositely understood as being synonymous with constitutional morality.
(vi) The notions of public order, morality and health cannot be used as colourable device to restrict the freedom to freely practise religion and discriminate against women of the age group of 10 to 50 years by denying them their legal right to enter and offer their prayers at the Sabarimala temple.
(vii) The practice of exclusion of women of the age group of 10 to 50 years being followed at the Sabarimala Temple cannot be regarded as an essential part as claimed by the respondent Board.
(viii) In view of the law laid down by this Court in the second Ananda Marga case, the exclusionary practice being followed at the Sabarimala Temple cannot be designated as one, the non-observance of which will change or alter the nature of Hindu religion. Besides, the exclusionary practice has not been observed with unhindered continuity as the Devaswom Board had accepted before the High Court that female worshippers of the age group of 10 to 50 years used to visit the temple and conducted poojas in every month for five days for the first rice feeding ceremony of their children.
(ix) The exclusionary practice, which has been given the backing of a subordinate legislation in the form of Rule 3(b) of the 1965 Rules, framed by the virtue of the 1965 Act, is neither an essential nor an integral part of the religion.
(x) A careful reading of Rule 3(b) of the 1965 Rules makes it luculent that it is ultra vires both Section 3 as well as Section 4 of the 1965 Act, for the simple pure reason that Section 3 being a non-obstante provision clearly stipulates that every place of public worship shall be open to all classes and sections of Hindus, women being one of them, irrespective of any custom or usage to the contrary.
(xi) Rule 3(b) is also ultra vires Section 4 of the 1965 Act as the proviso to Section 4(1) creates an exception to the effect that the regulations/rules made under Section 4(1) shall not discriminate, in any manner whatsoever, against any Hindu on the ground that he/she belongs to a particular section or class.
(xii) The language of both the provisions, that is, Section 3 and the proviso to Section 4(1) of the 1965 Act clearly indicate that custom and usage must make space to the rights of all sections and classes of Hindus to offer prayers at places of public worship. Any interpretation to the contrary would annihilate the purpose of the 1965 Act and incrementally impair the fundamental right to practise religion guaranteed under Article 25(1). Therefore, we hold that Rule 3(b) of the 1965 Rules is ultra vires of the 1965 Act.'
As things stand, Justice RF Nariman in his separate but concurring judgment too strongly backed the majority judgment that Sabarimala custom must yield to fundamental right of women to worship. He also rightly pointed out that although the rights claimed by the Thantri and the believers in the custom of the temple have protection under Article 25(1), the right of a woman believer is also protected under Article 25(1), and her right should prevail over the right to maintain the exclusionary custom.
Interestingly enough, Justice RF Nariman while concluding in para 32 notes that, 'I, therefore, concur in the judgment of the learned Chief Justice of India in allowing the writ petition, and declare that the custom or usage of prohibiting women between the ages of 10 to 50 years from entering the Sabarimala temple is violative of Article 25(1), and violative of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Act, 1965 made under Article 25(2)(b) of the Constitution. Further, it is also declared that Rule 3(b) of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Rules, 1965 is unconstitutional being violative of Article 25(1) and Article 15(1) of the Constitution of India.'
It is notable that another eminent Judge Dr DY Chandrachud also concurred with the majority judgment. He held in para 119 that, 'I hold and declare that:
1) The devotees of Lord Ayyappa do not satisfy the judicially enunciated requirements to constitute a religious denomination under Article 26 of the Constitution;
2) A claim for the exclusion of women from religious worship, even if it be founded in religious text, is subordinate to the constitutional values of liberty, dignity and equality. Exclusionary practices are contrary to constitutional morality;
3) In any event, the practice of excluding women from the temple at Sabarimala is not an essential religious practice. The Court must decline to grant constitutional legitimacy to practices which derogate from the dignity of women and to their entitlement to an equal citizenship;
4) The social exclusion of women, based on menstrual status is a form of untouchability which is an anathema to constitutional values. Notions of 'purity and pollution', which stigmatize individuals, have no place in a constitutional order;
5) The notifications dated 21 October 1955 and 27 November 1956 issued by the Devaswom Board, prohibiting the entry of women between the ages of ten and fifty, are ultra vires Section 3 of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Act 1965 and are even otherwise unconstitutional; and
6) Hindu women constitute a 'section of class' of Hindus under clauses (b) and (c) of Section 2 of the 1965 Act. Rule 3(b) of the 1965 Rules enforce a custom contrary to Section 3 of the 1965 Act. This directly offends the right of temple entry established by Section 3. Rule 3(b) is ultra vires the 1965 Act.
Before concluding, it must be brought out that there was only one dissenting Judge - Indu Malhotra. Ironically, she was the only women Judge in the five-Judge Bench who delivered this landmark judgment. She summarized her analysis as follows in para 16:
1. The Writ Petition does not deserve to be entertained for want of standing. The grievances raised are non-justiciable at the behest of the Petitioners and Intervenors involved herein.
2. The equality doctrine enshrined under Article 14 does not override the Fundamental Right guaranteed by Article 25 to every individual to freely profess, practise and propagate their faith, in accordance with the tenets of their religion.
3. Constitutional Morality in a secular polity would imply the harmonisation of the Fundamental Rights, which include the right of every individual, religious denomination, or sect, to practise their faith and belief in accordance with the tenets of their religion, irrespective of whether the practise is rational or logical.
4. The Respondents and the Intervenors have made out a plausible case that the Ayyappans or worshippers of the Sabarimala Temple satisfy the requirements of being a religious denomination, or sect thereof, which is entitled to the protection provided by Article 26. This is a mixed question of fact and law which ought to be decided before a competent court of civil jurisdiction.
5. The limited restriction on the entry of women during the notified age group does not fall within the purview of Article 17 of the Constitution.
6. Rule 3(b) of the 1965 Rules is not ultra vires Section 3 of the 1965 Act, since the proviso carves out an exception in the case of public worship in a temple for the benefit of any religious denomination or sect thereof, to manage their affairs in matters of religion.
All said and done, it is one of the most landmark, laudable and progressive judgment that I have ever read in recent times. This alone explains why most of the Judges barring Justice Indu Malhotra have been all unanimous in deciding that women aged between age group of 10 to 50 years should not be barred from entering Sabarimala temple in any way and are fully entitled to go there. No politics should be done over it but politicians love to dabble in everything and support this worst discrimination against women even while talking about providing women equality in all spheres! This landmark judgment must be implemented in letter and spirit and all devotees and politicians must appreciate that they have to respect this final judgment delivered by the highest court of our country which is the Supreme Court and should refrain from stopping the interested women devotees from having a darshan of the holy Sabarimala shrine! Those who feel aggrieved by this judgment have every right to go for review petition but no one has the right to take law in their hands and stop women from entering the holy shrine as permission has been granted to them by the top court of India that is the Supreme Court!